Supernatural Belief Is Not Modulated by Intuitive Thinking Style or Cognitive Inhibition

Examining the relationship between metacognitive trust in thinking styles and supernatural beliefs

Conflicting findings have emerged from research on the relationship between thinking styles and supernatural beliefs. In two studies, we examined this relationship through meta-cognitive trust and developed a new: (1) experimental manipulation, a short scientific article describing the benefits of thinking styles: (2) trust in thinking styles measure, the Ambiguous Decisions task; and (3) supernatural belief measure, the Belief in Psychic Ability scale. In Study 1 (N = 415) we found differences in metacognitive trust in thinking styles between the analytical and intuitive condition, and overall greater trust in analytical thinking. We also found stronger correlations between thinking style measures (in particular intuitive thinking) and psychic ability and paranormal beliefs than with religious beliefs, but a mixed-effect linear regression showed little to no variation in how measures of thinking style related to types of supernatural beliefs. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 with participants from the United States, Canada, and Brazil (N = 802), and found similar results, with the Brazilian participants showing a reduced emphasis on analytical thinking. We conclude that our new design, task, and scale may be particularly useful for dual-processing research on supernatural belief.

A dialog on common morality in medical ethics in a pluralist setting in Iran: a qualitative content analysis

The concept of common morality is fundamental in medical ethics, and lack of universal content and characteristics of common morality is a product of its multifaceted nature. This study aimed to identify the ideas and experiences of academic faculties regarding common morality in a pluralistic setting to promote conceptual knowledge and strengthen moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. The study was conducted using a qualitative method, employing semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen faculty members who were selected purposively. In order to assess their ideas and experiences, the transcripts of the interviews were analyzed using the content analysis method through directed and conventional approaches. The interviews were coded manually. Two themes were reflected in the interviews: ontology and epistemology of common morality. The study indicates that the debate about the subjective or objective dependence of common morality questions the coherence of Beauchamp and Childress' common morality (CM) theory, as common morality is the result of various individual and social factor that influence moral and decision -making in pluralistic environments. Additional studies are needed in order to investigate the effect of cultural, social, theoretical, ideological and individual factors on promoting clinical ethical reasoning and decision-making skills.

Children's beliefs in invisible causal agents-Both religious and scientific

Against the proposal that children have a natural disposition for supernatural or religious beliefs, we review the decades-old evidence showing that children typically invoke naturalistic causes-even in the face of unusual outcomes. Instead, we propose that children's tendency to endorse supernatural agents reflects their capacity for cultural learning rather than an inherent inclination to believe in divine powers. We support this argument by reviewing the findings that religious exposure in childhood, not individual cognitive or personality factors, is the major determinant of religiosity in adulthood. We highlight the role of cultural learning in children's endorsement of invisible divine agents by drawing on cross-cultural evidence that children are equally receptive to claims regarding the existence of invisible natural agents. We end by introducing a hypothesis to explain how children come to endorse religious beliefs despite their bias toward naturalistic explanation.

Faith and science mindsets as predictors of COVID-19 concern: A three-wave longitudinal study

The COVID-19 pandemic allowed for a naturalistic, longitudinal investigation of the relationship between faith and science mindsets and concern about COVID-19. Our goal was to examine two possible directional relationships: (Model 1) COVID-19 concern ➔ disease avoidance and self-protection motivations ➔ science and faith mindsets versus (Model 2) science and faith mindsets ➔ COVID-19 concern. We surveyed 858 Mechanical Turk workers in three waves of a study conducted in March, April, and June 2020. We found that science mindsets increased whereas faith mindsets decreased (regardless of religious type) during the early months of the pandemic. Further, bivariate correlations and autoregressive cross-lagged analyses indicated that science mindset was positive predictor of COVID-19 concern, in support of Model 2. Faith mindset was not associated with COVID-19 concern. However, faith mindset was a negative predictor of science mindset. We discuss the need for more research regarding the influence of science and faith mindsets as well as the societal consequences of the pandemic.

Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God-an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma-another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma-including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations-above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.

The psychology of nonbelievers

Contrary to some conceptualizations, nonbelievers are more than simply those scoring low on religiosity scales. They seem to be characterized by analytic, flexible, and open-minded social-cognitive attributes, although this may interact with sociocultural levels of religiosity. This paper demonstrates that nonbelief, at least in the West, tends to coincide with specific worldviews, namely valuing rationality and science, as well as humanistic and liberal values. Furthermore, nonbelievers seem to parallel believers in various indicators of health. Finally, as all ideologists, nonbelievers may hold prejudicial attitudes toward groups perceived as threatening their (secular) worldviews, although this has some limits. Global increases in secularity make the nascent psychological study of nonbelievers and nonreligious worldviews an important research programme.

How cultural learning and cognitive biases shape religious beliefs

What explains the ubiquity and diversity of religions around the world? Widespread cognitive tendencies, including mentalizing and intuitive thinking, offer part of the explanation for recurrent features of religion, and individual differences in religious commitments. However, vast diversity in religious beliefs points to the importance of the cultural context in which religious beliefs are transmitted. Cultural evolutionary theory provides the basis of a unified explanation for how cognition and culture interact to shape religious beliefs, in ways that are uniquely adapted to local ecological pressures. These insights lay the groundwork for future research regarding how cultural learning interacts with other evolved aspects of human psychology to generate the recurrent and the diverse forms of religious commitments observed around the world.

Does intuitive mindset influence belief in God? A registered replication of

In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

Reflection increases belief in God through self-questioning among non-believers

The dual-process model of the mind predicts that religious belief will be stronger for intuitive decisions, whereas reflective thinking will lead to religious disbelief (i.e., the intuitive religious belief hypothesis). While early research found intuition to promote and reflection to weaken belief in God, more recent attempts found no evidence for the intuitive religious belief hypothesis. Many of the previous studies are underpowered to detect small effects, and it is not clear whether the cognitive process manipulations used in these failed attempts worked as intended. We investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective thought on belief in God in two large-scale preregistered experiments (N = 1,602), using well-established cognitive manipulations (i.e., time-pressure with incentives for compliance) and alternative elicitation methods (between and within-subject designs). Against our initial hypothesis based on the literature, the experiments provide first suggestive then confirmatory evidence for the reflective religious belief hypothesis. Exploratory examination of the data suggests that reflection increases doubts about beliefs held regarding God’s existence. Reflective doubt exists primarily among non-believers, resulting in an overall increase in belief in God when deciding reflectively.

Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.