1
|
Lozano P, Antonioni A, Sánchez A. On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach. PNAS NEXUS 2023; 2:pgac283. [PMID: 36712929 PMCID: PMC9837665 DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac283] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2022] [Accepted: 12/03/2022] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
Previous research suggests that it is difficult to maintain cooperation in a large society when there is a strong hierarchical structure. In this study, we implement online human experiments to study the effects of exogenous variation in a particular notion of hierarchy on cooperation and conflict within groups. We demonstrate how cooperation can be maintained when collective action is accompanied by dyadic conflicts whose outcome feeds back on the hierarchical rank of the contestants. We find that the majority of individuals take part in conflicts and that highly ranked individuals mostly cooperate and engage in conflicts as a way to punish noncooperators. As a consequence, stable hierarchical groups can arise and maintain high levels of cooperation. Our results are in agreement with the prediction of earlier theoretical models on hierarchical societies and are relevant to understanding the interplay of hierarchy, cooperation, and conflict.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Pablo Lozano
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
- Department of Networks and Data Science, Central European University, Quellenstraße 51, A-1100 Vienna, Austria
| | - Alberto Antonioni
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
| | - Angel Sánchez
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
- Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Tverskoi D, Babu S, Gavrilets S. The spread of technological innovations: effects of psychology, culture and policy interventions. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022; 9:211833. [PMID: 35754991 PMCID: PMC9214287 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.211833] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2021] [Accepted: 06/01/2022] [Indexed: 05/03/2023]
Abstract
Technological innovations drive the evolution of human societies. The success of innovations depends not only on their actual benefits but also on how potential adopters perceive them and how their beliefs are affected by their social and cultural environment. To deepen our understanding of socio-psychological processes affecting the new technology spread, we model the joint dynamics of three interlinked processes: individual learning and mastering the new technology, changes in individual attitudes towards it, and changes in individual adoption decisions. We assume that the new technology can potentially lead to a higher benefit but achieving it requires learning. We posit that individual decision-making process as well as their attitudes are affected by cognitive dissonance and conformity with peers and an external authority. Individuals vary in different psychological characteristics and in their attitudes. We investigate both transient dynamics and long-term equilibria observed in our model. We show that early adopters are usually individuals who are characterized by low cognitive dissonance and low conformity with peers but are sensitive to the effort of an external authority promoting the innovation. We examine the effectiveness of five different intervention strategies aiming to promote the diffusion of a new technology: training individuals, providing subsidies for early adopters, increasing the visibility of peer actions, simplifying the exchange of opinions between people, and increasing the effort of an external authority. We also discuss the effects of culture on the spread of innovations. Finally, we demonstrate that neglecting the cognitive forces and the dynamic nature of individual attitudes can lead to wrong conclusions about adoption of innovations. Our results can be useful in developing more efficient policies aiming to promote the spread of new technologies in different societies, cultures and countries.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Denis Tverskoi
- National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
- Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
| | - Sudarsanam Babu
- Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Biomedical Engineering, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
- Manufacturing Science Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37830, USA
| | - Sergey Gavrilets
- National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
- Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Tverskoi D, Senthilnathan A, Gavrilets S. The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society. Sci Rep 2021; 11:18670. [PMID: 34548509 PMCID: PMC8455579 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-97863-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2021] [Accepted: 08/30/2021] [Indexed: 02/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Denis Tverskoi
- National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA.
- Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA.
| | - Athmanathan Senthilnathan
- Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
| | - Sergey Gavrilets
- National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
- Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Gavrilets S. Coevolution of actions, personal norms and beliefs about others in social dilemmas. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2021; 3:e44. [PMID: 37588544 PMCID: PMC10427329 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2021.40] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Human decision-making is affected by a diversity of factors including material cost-benefit considerations, normative and cultural influences, learning and conformity with peers and external authorities (e.g. cultural, religious, political, organisational). Also important are dynamically changing personal perceptions of the situation and beliefs about actions and expectations of others as well as psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and social projection. To better understand these processes, I develop a unifying modelling framework describing the joint dynamics of actions and attitudes of individuals and their beliefs about the actions and attitudes of their groupmates. I consider which norms get internalised and which factors control beliefs about others. I predict that the long-term average characteristics of groups are largely determined by a balance between material payoffs and the values promoted by the external authority. Variation around these averages largely reflects variation in individual costs and benefits mediated by individual psychological characteristics. The efforts of an external authority to change the group behaviour in a certain direction can, counter-intuitively, have an opposite effect on individual behaviour. I consider how various factors can affect differences between groups and societies in the tightness/looseness of their social norms. I show that the most important factors are social heterogeneity, societal threat, effects of authority, cultural variation in the degree of collectivism/individualism, the population size and the subsistence style. My results can be useful for achieving a better understanding of human social behaviour and historical and current social processes, and in developing more efficient policies aiming to modify social behaviour.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Gavrilets
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN37996USA
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Currie TE, Campenni M, Flitton A, Njagi T, Ontiri E, Perret C, Walker L. The cultural evolution and ecology of institutions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200047. [PMID: 33993755 PMCID: PMC8126459 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0047] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Human societies are structured by what we refer to as 'institutions', which are socially created and culturally inherited proscriptions on behaviour that define roles and set expectations about social interactions. The study of institutions in several social science fields has provided many important insights that have not been fully appreciated in the evolutionary human sciences. However, such research has often lacked a shared understanding of general processes of change that shape institutional diversity across space and time. We argue that evolutionary theory can provide a useful framework for synthesizing information from different disciplines to address issues such as how and why institutions change over time, how institutional rules co-evolve with other culturally inherited traits, and the role that ecological factors might play in shaping institutional diversity. We argue that we can gain important insights by applying cultural evolutionary thinking to the study of institutions, but that we also need to expand and adapt our approaches to better handle the ways that institutions work, and how they might change over time. In this paper, we illustrate our approach by describing macro-scale empirical comparative analyses that demonstrate how evolutionary theory can be used to generate and test hypotheses about the processes that have shaped some of the major patterns we see in institutional diversity over time and across the world today. We then go on to discuss how we might usefully develop micro-scale models of institutional change by adapting concepts from game theory and agent-based modelling. We end by considering current challenges and areas for future research, and the potential implications for other areas of study and real-world applications. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Thomas E. Currie
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
| | - Marco Campenni
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
| | - Adam Flitton
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
| | - Tim Njagi
- Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, Egerton University, Nairobi, Kenya
| | - Enoch Ontiri
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
- Simply Green Worldwide, Nairobi, Kenya
| | - Cedric Perret
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
| | - Lindsay Walker
- Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, TR10 9FE, UK
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
|
7
|
Abstract
Injunctive social norms are behaviours that one is expected to follow and expects others to follow in a given social situation; they are maintained by the threat of disapproval or punishment and by the process of internalization. Injunctive norms govern all aspects of our social life but the understanding of their effects on individual and group behaviour is currently rather incomplete. Here I develop a general mathematical approach describing the dynamics of injunctive norms in heterogeneous groups. My approach captures various costs and benefits, both material and normative, associated with norm-related behaviours including punishment and disapproval by others. It also allows for errors in decision-making and explicitly accounts for differences between individuals in their values, beliefs about the population state, and sensitivity to the actions of others. In addition, it enables one to study the consequences of mixing populations with different normative values and the effects of persuasive interventions. I describe how interactions of these factors affect individual and group behaviour. As an illustration, I consider policies developed by practitioners to abolish the norms of footbinding and female genital cutting, to decrease college students' drinking, and to increase pro-environmental behaviours. The theory developed here can be used for achieving a better understanding of historical and current social processes as well as for developing practical policies better accounting for human social behaviour.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Gavrilets
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN37996USA
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
The emergence of locally adaptive institutions: Insights from traditional social structures of East African pastoralists. Biosystems 2020; 198:104257. [PMID: 32987143 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2020.104257] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2020] [Revised: 09/17/2020] [Accepted: 09/18/2020] [Indexed: 01/23/2023]
Abstract
Humans inhabit the widest range of ecological and social niches of any mammal. Yet each ecological and social environment presents a set of challenges that we must solve in order to successfully inhabit it. We are able to do so by building institutions that can flexibly respond to changing circumstances. Institutions that solve adaptive challenges necessary for human sociality, such as how to resolve conflicts, find mates, and extract and distribute resources, are termed locally adaptive institutions. The design of locally adaptive institutions promotes coordination and cooperation among unrelated individuals, reflecting the constraints of the particular ecological and social challenges to which they are responsive. Institutions generally are enabled by a suite of social and psychological mechanisms, including norm compliance, self-interested design, selective imitation, and cultural group selection among others. The development of locally adaptive institutions are likely to be especially shaped by self-interested design in which agents are sensitive to the payoffs from various norms and choose to enforce and follow those which they anticipate to be most beneficial to themselves. Exogenous shocks, including the advent of material and cultural technologies, population pressures, or even group conflict can contribute to the modification of existing social institutions and the development of new social structures. Using several case examples from traditional east African pastoralist societies, I illustrate how ecological and social pressures shape the development of social norms that underlie locally adaptive social institutions and facilitate continued cooperation in the face of change at scales ranging from local to global.
Collapse
|
9
|
Lozano P, Gavrilets S, Sánchez A. Cooperation, social norm internalization, and hierarchical societies. Sci Rep 2020; 10:15359. [PMID: 32958841 PMCID: PMC7506014 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-71664-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/05/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Many animal and human societies exhibit hierarchical structures with different degrees of steepness. Some of these societies also show cooperative behavior, where cooperation means working together for a common benefit. However, there is an increasing evidence that rigidly enforced hierarchies lead to a decrease of cooperation in both human and non-human primates. In this work, we address this issue by means of an evolutionary agent-based model that incorporates fights as social interactions governing a dynamic ranking, communal work to produce a public good, and norm internalization, i.e. a process where acting according to a norm becomes a goal in itself. Our model also includes the perception of how much the individual is going to retain from her cooperative behavior in future interactions. The predictions of the model resemble the principal characteristics of human societies. When ranking is unconstrained, we observe a high concentration of agents in low scores, while a few ones climb up the social hierarchy and exploit the rest, with no norm internalization. If ranking is constrained, thus leading to bounded score differences between agents, individual positions in the ranking change more, and the typical structure shows a division of the society in upper and lower classes. In this case, we observe that there is a significant degree of norm internalization, supporting large fractions of the population cooperating in spite of the rank differences. Our main results are robust with respect to the model parameters and to the type of rank constraint. We thus provide a mechanism that can explain how hierarchy arises in initially egalitarian societies while keeping a large degree of cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Pablo Lozano
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911, Leganés, Madrid, Spain. .,Unidad Mixta Interdisciplinar de Comportamiento y Complejidad Social (UMICCS), Madrid, Spain.
| | - Sergey Gavrilets
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
| | - Angel Sánchez
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911, Leganés, Madrid, Spain.,Unidad Mixta Interdisciplinar de Comportamiento y Complejidad Social (UMICCS), Madrid, Spain.,Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, 50018, Zaragoza, Spain.,UC3M-Santander Big Data Institute (IBiDat), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903, Getafe, Madrid, Spain
| |
Collapse
|