Self-regulation versus social influence for promoting cooperation on networks

Influential individuals can promote prosocial practices in heterogeneous societies: a mathematical and agent-based model

In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one's neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one's neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness. In our research, we find that while despotic leadership may lead towards high prosociality and high returns it does not exceed the effects of a local individual who can exert positive influence in the community. This may suggest that greater individual gains can be had by cooperating and that global hierarchical leadership may not be essential as long as influential individuals exert their influence for public good and not for public ill.

Studying topic engagement and synergy among candidates for 2020 US Elections

This article provides a comprehensive summary of how candidates running in the 2020 US Presidential Elections used Twitter to communicate with the public. More specifically, it aims to uncover elements linked to public engagement and internal cooperation (in terms of content and stance similarity among the candidates from the same political front, and with respect to the official Twitter accounts of their political parties). Our main subjects are the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates who contested for the 2020 US Elections from the two major political fronts—Republicans and Democrats. Their tweets were evaluated for social reach, content similarity and stance similarity on 22 topics. According to the findings, Joe Biden had the highest engagement and impact (user impact: 177.08k, normalized to 0.99), followed by Donald Trump (user impact: 164.19k, normalized to 0.92). The Democrats depicted a clearer understanding of their audience, portraying an essential link between public participation, internal cooperation and the electoral campaign. The results also demonstrate that specific topics (like US Elections, and Inauguration Ceremony) were more engaging than others (Trump Healthcare Plan, and The Supreme Court Appointments). This study adds to the existing work on using social media platforms for electoral campaigns and can be effectively utilized by contesting candidates.

Identification and Control of Game-Based Epidemic Models

The effectiveness of control measures against the diffusion of the COVID-19 pandemic is grounded on the assumption that people are prepared and disposed to cooperate. From a strategic decision point of view, cooperation is the unreachable strategy of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where the temptation to exploit the others and the fear of being betrayed by them drives the people’s behavior, which eventually results in a fully defective outcome. In this work, we integrate a standard epidemic model with the replicator equation of evolutionary games in order to study the interplay between the infection spreading and the propensity of people to be cooperative under the pressure of the epidemic. The developed model shows high performance in fitting real measurements of infected, recovered and dead people during the whole period of COVID-19 epidemic spread, from March 2020 to September 2021 in Italy. The estimated parameters related to cooperation result to be significantly correlated with vaccination and screening data, thus validating the model. The stability analysis of the multiple steady states present in the proposed model highlights the possibility to tune fundamental control parameters to dramatically reduce the number of potential dead people with respect to the non-controlled case.

Evolutionary Game Theoretic Insights on the SIRS Model of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The effectiveness of control measures against the diffusion of the COVID-19 pandemic is grounded on the assumption that people are prepared and disposed to cooperate. From a strategic decision point of view, cooperation is the unreachable strategy of the prisoner's dilemma game, where the temptation to exploit the others and the fear to be betrayed by them drives the people behavior, which eventually results fully defective. In this work, we integrate the SIRS epidemic model with the replicator equation of evolutionary games in order to study the interplay between the infection spreading and the propensity of people to become cooperative under the pressure of the epidemic. We find that the developed model possesses several steady states, including fully or partially cooperative ones and that the presence of such states allows to take the disease under control. Moreover, assuming a seasonal variation of the infection rate, the system presents rich dynamics, including chaotic behavior and epidemic extinction.

Modeling pluralism and self-regulation explains the emergence of cooperation in networked societies

Understanding the dynamics of cooperative behavior of individuals in complex societies represents a fundamental research question which puzzles scientists working in heterogeneous fields. Many studies have been developed using the unitary agent assumption, which embeds the idea that when making decisions, individuals share the same socio-cultural parameters. In this paper, we propose the ECHO-EGN model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, which relaxes this strong assumption by considering the heterogeneity of three fundamental socio-cultural aspects ruling the behavior of groups of people: the propensity to be more cooperative with members of the same group (Endogamic cooperation), the propensity to cooperate with the public domain (Civicness) and the propensity to prefer connections with members of the same group (Homophily). The ECHO-EGN model is shown to have high performance in describing real world behavior of interacting individuals living in complex environments. Extensive numerical experiments allowing the comparison of real data and model simulations confirmed that the introduction of the above mechanisms enhances the realism in the modelling of cooperation dynamics. Additionally, theoretical findings allow us to conclude that endogamic cooperation may limit significantly the emergence of cooperation.

Energy cost study for controlling complex social networks with conformity behavior

To understand controlling a complex system, an estimation of the required effort needed to achieve control is vital. Previous works have addressed this issue by studying the scaling laws of energy cost in a general way with continuous-time linear dynamics. However, continuous-time linear dynamics is unable to capture conformity behavior, which is common in many complex social systems. Therefore, to understand controlling social systems with conformity, discrete-time modeling is used and the energy cost scaling laws are derived. The results are validated numerically with model and real networks. In addition, the energy costs needed for controlling systems with and without conformity are compared, and it was found that controlling networked systems with conformity features always requires less control energy. Finally, it is shown through simulations that heterogeneous scale-free networks are less controllable, requiring a higher number of minimum drivers. Since the conformity-based model relates to various complex systems, such as flocking, or evolutionary games, the results of this paper represent a step forward toward developing realistic control of complex social systems.

Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.