Effect of perceived interpersonal closeness on the joint Simon effect in adolescents and adults

Co-perceiving: Bringing the social into perception

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Introducing IOS11 as an extended interactive version of the 'Inclusion of Other in the Self' scale to estimate relationship closeness

The study of relationship closeness has a long history in psychology and is currently expanding across the social sciences, including economics. Estimating relationship closeness requires appropriate tools. Here, we introduce and test a tool for estimating relationship closeness: 'IOS11'. The IOS11 scale has an 11-point response scale and is a refinement of the widely used Inclusion-of-Other-in-the-Self scale. Our tool has three key features. First, the IOS11 scale is easy to understand and administer. Second, we provide a portable, interactive interface for the IOS11 scale, which can be used in lab and online studies. Third, and crucially, based on within-participant correlations of 751 individuals, we demonstrate strong validity of the IOS11 scale in terms of representing features of relationships captured by a range of more complex survey instruments. Based on these correlations we find that the IOS11 scale outperforms the IOS scale and performs as well as the related Oneness scale.

The Joint Simon task is not joint for capuchin monkeys

Human cooperation can be facilitated by the ability to create a mental representation of one's own actions, as well as the actions of a partner, known as action co-representation. Even though other species also cooperate extensively, it is still unclear whether they have similar capacities. The Joint Simon task is a two-player task developed to investigate this action co-representation. We tested brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a highly cooperative species, on a computerized Joint Simon task and found that, in line with previous research, the capuchins' performance was compatible with co-representation. However, a deeper exploration of the monkeys' responses showed that they, and potentially monkeys in previous studies, did not understand the control conditions, which precludes the interpretation of the results as a social phenomenon. Indeed, further testing to investigate alternative explanations demonstrated that our results were due to low-level cues, rather than action co-representation. This suggests that the Joint Simon task, at least in its current form, cannot determine whether non-human species co-represent their partner's role in joint tasks.

Joint action with human and robotic co-actors: Self-other integration is immune to the perceived humanness of the interacting partner

When performing a joint action task, we automatically represent the action and/or task constraints of the co-actor with whom we are interacting. Current models suggest that, not only physical similarity, but also abstract, conceptual features shared between self and the interacting partner play a key role in the emergence of joint action effects. Across two experiments, we investigated the influence of the perceived humanness of a robotic agent on the extent to which we integrate the action of that agent into our own action/task representation, as indexed by the Joint Simon Effect (JSE). The presence (vs. absence) of a prior verbal interaction was used to manipulate robot's perceived humanness. In Experiment 1, using a within-participant design, we had participants perform the joint Go/No-go Simon task with two different robots. Before performing the joint task, one robot engaged in a verbal interaction with the participant and the other robot did not. In Experiment 2, we employed a between-participants design to contrast these two robot conditions as well as a human partner condition. In both experiments, a significant Simon effect emerged during joint action and its amplitude was not modulated by the humanness of the interacting partner. Experiment 2 further showed that the JSE obtained in robot conditions did not differ from that measured in the human partner condition. These findings contradict current theories of joint action mechanisms according to which perceived self-other similarity is a crucial determinant of self-other integration in shared task settings.

The contextual cueing effect disappears during joint search in preschool children

During preschool years, children's interacting with others increases. One of the involved developmental skills is task co-representation, through which children aged 5 years and older represent a partner's task in a similar way to their own task. In adults, task co-representation makes participants attend to and form memories of objects relevant to both their own task and their partner's task; however, it is unclear whether children can also form such memories. In Experiment 1, we examined the memory facilitation of joint search using a contextual cueing effect paradigm. Children were presented with search displays repeatedly with the same or random layouts and searched and responded to the target either alone (the single group; n = 32; M_age = 73.6 months, range = 61-80) or with their parent (the joint group; n = 32; M_age = 74.3 months, range = 64-81). Results showed that the search with the same layouts was faster than that with the random layouts for the single group, indicating that children form associative memories of target and distractors relevant to their own task. For the joint group, this effect was not statistically different from that of the single group, with exploratory analysis suggesting that it was disrupted. In Experiment 2, children performed the search with a peer (n = 32; M_age = 72.7 months, range = 67-79) and the effect was also not found. Our findings suggest that the self's and partner's tasks are represented but might not be incorporated into associative memory in 5- and 6-year-old children.

Individual differences in co-representation in three monkey species (Callithrix jacchus, Sapajus apella and Macaca tonkeana) in the joint Simon task: the role of social factors and inhibitory control

Behavioral coordination is involved in many forms of primate interactions. Co-representation is the simultaneous mental representation of one’s own and the partner’s task and actions. It often underlies behavioral coordination and cooperation success. In humans, the dyadic social context can modulate co-representation. Here, we first investigated whether individual differences in co-representation in the joint Simon task in capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques can be explained by social factors, namely dyadic grooming and sociality index, rank difference and eigenvector centrality. These factors did not predict variation in co-representation. However, in this specific task, co-representation reduces rather than facilitates joint performance. Automatic co-representation therefore needs to be inhibited or suppressed to maximize cooperation success. We therefore also investigated whether general inhibitory control (detour-reaching) would predict co-representation in the joint Simon task in Tonkean macaques, brown capuchin and marmoset monkeys. Inhibitory control did neither explain individual differences nor species differences, since marmosets were most successful in their joint performance despite scoring lowest on inhibitory control. These results suggest that the animals’ ability to resolve conflicts between self and other representation to increase cooperation success in this task is gradually learned due to frequent exposure during shared infant care, rather than determined by strong general inhibitory control. Further, we conclude that the joint Simon task, while useful to detect co-representation non-invasively, is less suitable for identifying the factors explaining individual differences and thus a more fruitful approach to identify these factors is to design tasks in which co-representation favors, rather than hinders cooperation success.

How vertical elevation affects self-other integration as measured by the joint Simon effect

Earlier findings suggest that positions of power decrease self-other integration and increase psychological distance to others. Until now, however, evidence for this relation rests exclusively on subjective measures. The current research instead employed a vertical joint Simon task to measure self-other integration. This task assesses the extent to which people represent their own actions in reference to their co-actor's, also referred to as the joint Simon effect. Building on cultural associations between power and vertical elevation, we manipulated whether participants were in an elevated (high-power) or lower (low-power) seating position. Experiments 1a and 1b reanalyzed existing datasets and found that elevated (vs. lower) seating position decreased the joint Simon effect, consistent with predictions. Experiment 2 provides a high-powered replication of this finding. Yet, further analyses revealed that feelings of power - measured as a manipulation check and indeed demonstrating that the manipulation was successful - did not mediate or moderate the effect of seating position on the joint Simon effect. Therefore, it is possible that the effect of seating elevation was driven through other aspects of that manipulation than feelings of power. We discuss these and suggest ways to test these alternative explanations.