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Schnell E, Muthukrishna M. Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2322072121. [PMID: 38683991 PMCID: PMC11087788 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2322072121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2023] [Accepted: 04/01/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432, 499-502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al., Sci. Adv. 9, eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6, 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, "local" group embedded within a larger, "global" group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric Schnell
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
| | - Michael Muthukrishna
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2300544120. [PMID: 37155910 PMCID: PMC10194006 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2300544120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2023] [Accepted: 04/09/2023] [Indexed: 05/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Universal Biology Institute, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku113-0033, Japan
- CyberAgent, Inc., Shibuya-ku150-0042, Japan
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Hayama240-0193, Japan
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Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Sci Rep 2022; 12:10500. [PMID: 35732644 PMCID: PMC9217807 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-14171-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 06/02/2022] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The present study gives a theoretical analysis of such complex reputation structure. We formulate the time change of goodness of individuals caused by updates of reputations among individuals. By considering a large population, we derive dynamics of the frequency distribution of goodnesses. An equilibrium state of the dynamics is approximated by a summation of Gaussian functions. We demonstrate that the theoretical solution well fits the numerical calculation. From the theoretical solution, we obtain a new interpretation of the complex reputation structure. This study provides a novel mathematical basis for cutting-edge studies on indirect reciprocity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan.
- Universal Biology Institute (UBI), The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, 113-0033, Japan.
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan
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Takács K, Gross J, Testori M, Letina S, Kenny AR, Power EA, Wittek RPM. Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200297. [PMID: 34601917 PMCID: PMC8487750 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Affiliation(s)
- Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Computational Social Science-Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., 1097 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Martina Testori
- Organization Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Srebrenka Letina
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Institute of Health and Wellbeing, MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow, Berkeley Square, 99 Berkeley Street, Glasgow G3 7HR, UK
| | - Adam R Kenny
- Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, UK.,Calleva Research Centre for Evolution and Human Sciences, Magdalen College, High Street, Oxford OX1 4AU, UK
| | - Eleanor A Power
- Department of Methodology, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Rafael P M Wittek
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands
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Podder S, Righi S, Pancotto F. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200293. [PMID: 34601913 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the 'Loner' strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator-defector-loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment-where defectors punish cooperators-causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shirsendu Podder
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK
| | - Simone Righi
- Department of Economics, Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy
| | - Francesca Pancotto
- Department of Communication and Economics, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
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Számadó S, Balliet D, Giardini F, Power EA, Takács K. The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200286. [PMID: 34601918 PMCID: PMC8487738 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0286] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/25/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- S. Számadó
- Department of Sociology and Communication, BUTE, Budapest, Hungary
- CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
| | - D. Balliet
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - F. Giardini
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - E. A. Power
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
| | - K. Takács
- CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
- Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
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