Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with bounded rationality

A master equation for power laws

We propose a new mechanism for generating power laws. Starting from a random walk, we first outline a simple derivation of the Fokker-Planck equation. By analogy, starting from a certain Markov chain, we derive a master equation for power laws that describes how the number of cascades changes over time (cascades are consecutive transitions that end when the initial state is reached). The partial differential equation has a closed form solution which gives an explicit dependence of the number of cascades on their size and on time. Furthermore, the power law solution has a natural cut-off, a feature often seen in empirical data. This is due to the finite size a cascade can have in a finite time horizon. The derivation of the equation provides a justification for an exponent equal to 2, which agrees well with several empirical distributions, including Richardson's Law on the size and frequency of deadly conflicts. Nevertheless, the equation can be solved for any exponent value. In addition, we propose an urn model where the number of consecutive ball extractions follows a power law. In all cases, the power law is manifest over the entire range of cascade sizes, as shown through log-log plots in the frequency and rank distributions.

Voluntary vaccination may not stop monkeypox outbreak: A game-theoretic model

Monkeypox (MPX) is a viral zoonotic disease that was endemic to Central and West Africa. However, during the first half of 2022, MPX spread to almost 60 countries all over the world. Smallpox vaccines are about 85% effective in preventing MPX infections. Our objective is to determine whether the vaccines should be mandated or whether voluntary use of the vaccine could be enough to stop the MPX outbreak. We incorporate a standard SVEIR compartmental model of MPX transmission into a game-theoretical framework. We study a vaccination game in which individuals decide whether or not to vaccinate by assessing their benefits and costs. We solve the game for Nash equilibria, i.e., the vaccination rates the individuals would likely adopt without any outside intervention. We show that, without vaccination, MPX can become endemic in previously non-endemic regions, including the United States. We also show that to "not vaccinate" is often an optimal solution from the individual's perspective. Moreover, we demonstrate that, for some parameter values, there are multiple equilibria of the vaccination game, and they exhibit a backward bifurcation. Thus, without centrally mandated minimal vaccination rates, the population could easily revert to no vaccination scenario.

A Study of Distributed Earth Observation Satellites Mission Scheduling Method Based on Game-Negotiation Mechanism

While monolithic giant earth observation satellites still have obvious advantages in regularity and accuracy, distributed satellite systems are providing increased flexibility, enhanced robustness, and improved responsiveness to structural and environmental changes. Due to increased system size and more complex applications, traditional centralized methods have difficulty in integrated management and rapid response needs of distributed systems. Aiming to efficient missions scheduling in distributed earth observation satellite systems, this paper addresses the problem through a networked game model based on a game-negotiation mechanism. In this model, each satellite is viewed as a “rational” player who continuously updates its own “action” through cooperation with neighbors until a Nash Equilibria is reached. To handle static and dynamic scheduling problems while cooperating with a distributed mission scheduling algorithm, we present an adaptive particle swarm optimization algorithm and adaptive tabu-search algorithm, respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed method can flexibly handle situations of different scales in static scheduling, and the performance of the algorithm will not decrease significantly as the problem scale increases; dynamic scheduling can be well accomplished with high observation payoff while maintaining the stability of the initial plan, which demonstrates the advantages of the proposed methods.

Optimal governance and implementation of vaccination programmes to contain the COVID-19 pandemic

Since the recent introduction of several viable vaccines for SARS-CoV-2, vaccination uptake has become the key factor that will determine our success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that game theory and social network models should be used to guide decisions pertaining to vaccination programmes for the best possible results. In the months following the introduction of vaccines, their availability and the human resources needed to run the vaccination programmes have been scarce in many countries. Vaccine hesitancy is also being encountered from some sections of the general public. We emphasize that decision-making under uncertainty and imperfect information, and with only conditionally optimal outcomes, is a unique forte of established game-theoretic modelling. Therefore, we can use this approach to obtain the best framework for modelling and simulating vaccination prioritization and uptake that will be readily available to inform important policy decisions for the optimal control of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Influence network design via multi-level optimization considering boundedly rational user behaviours in social media networks

Social media networks have been playing an increasingly more important role for both socialization and information diffusion. Political campaign can gain more supporters by attracting more mass attention and influencing them directly, while commercial campaigns can increase their companies’ profits by expanding social media connection with new users. To build the optimal network structure to influence the whole, this paper studies mathematical models to simulate the users’ behaviours interacting with others in the information provider’s network. The behaviours of concerns include information re-posting and following/unfollowing other users. Linear threshold propagation model is used to determine the re-posting actions, Boundedly Rational User Equilibrium (BRUE) models are used to determine the following or unfollowing actions. Hence, the topology of the network changes and depends on the information provider’s plan to post various kinds of information. A three-level optimization model is proposed to maximize total number of connections, the goal of the top level. The second level simulates user behaviours under BRUE. The third level maximizes the each user’s utility defined in the second level. This paper solves this problem using exact algorithms for a small-scale synthetic network. For a large-scale problem, this paper uses heuristic algorithms based on large neighbourhood search. This paper also discusses possible reasons why the BRUE model may be a more accurate simulation of users’ actions compared to game theory. Comparisons from the BRUE model to game theoretical model show that the BRUE model performs significantly better than game theoretical model.

Game theoretic modelling of infectious disease dynamics and intervention methods: a review

We review research studies which use game theory to model the decision-making of individuals during an epidemic, attempting to classify the literature and identify the emerging trends in this field. The literature is classified based on (i) type of population modelling (classical or network-based), (ii) frequency of the game (non-repeated or repeated), and (iii) type of strategy adoption (self-learning or imitation). The choice of model is shown to depend on many factors such as the immunity to the disease, the strength of immunity conferred by the vaccine, the size of population and the level of mixing therein. We highlight that while early studies used classical compartmental modelling with self-learning games, in recent years, there is a substantial growth of network-based modelling with imitation games. The review indicates that game theory continues to be an effective tool to model decision-making by individuals with respect to intervention (vaccination or social distancing).

Detecting differences in the topology of scale-free networks grown under time-dynamic topological fitness

The fitness model was introduced in the literature to expand the Barabasi-Albert model’s generative mechanism, which produces scale-free networks under the control of degree. However, the fitness model has not yet been studied in a comprehensive context because most models are built on invariant fitness as the network grows and time-dynamics mainly concern new nodes joining the network. This mainly static consideration restricts fitness in generating scale-free networks only when the underlying fitness distribution is power-law, a fact which makes the hybrid fitness models based on degree-driven preferential attachment to remain the most attractive models in the literature. This paper advances the time-dynamic conceptualization of fitness, by studying scale-free networks generated under topological fitness that changes as the network grows, where the fitness is controlled by degree, clustering coefficient, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. The analysis shows that growth under time-dynamic topological fitness is indifferent to the underlying fitness distribution and that different topological fitness generates networks of different topological attributes, ranging from a mesh-like to a superstar-like pattern. The results also show that networks grown under the control of betweenness centrality outperform the other networks in scale-freeness and the majority of the other topological attributes. Overall, this paper contributes to broadening the conceptualization of fitness to a more time-dynamic context.

The impact of behavioral change on the epidemic under the benefit comparison

Human behavior has a major impact on the spread of the disease during an epidemic. At the same time, the spread of disease has an impact on human behavior. In this paper, we propose a coupled model of human behavior and disease transmission, take into account both individual-based risk assessment and neighbor-based replicator dynamics. The transmission threshold of epidemic disease and the stability of disease-free equilibrium point are analyzed. Some numerical simulations are carried out for the system. Three kinds of return matrices are considered and analyzed one by one. The simulation results show that the change of human behavior can effectively inhibit the spread of the disease, individual-based risk assessments had a stronger effect on disease suppression, but also more hitchhikers. This work contributes to the study of the relationship between human behavior and disease epidemics.

Applications of Game Theory in Project Management: A Structured Review and Analysis

This paper provides a structured literature review and analysis of using game theory to model project management scenarios. We select and review thirty-two papers from Scopus, present a complex three-dimensional classification of the selected papers, and analyse the resultant citation network. According to the industry-based classification, the surveyed literature can be classified in terms of construction industry, ICT industry or unspecified industry. Based on the types of players, the literature can be classified into papers that use government-contractor games, contractor–contractor games, contractor-subcontractor games, subcontractor–subcontractor games or games involving other types of players. Based on the type of games used, papers using normal-form non-cooperative games, normal-form cooperative games, extensive-form non-cooperative games or extensive-form cooperative games are present. Also, we show that each of the above classifications plays a role in influencing which papers are likely to cite a particular paper, though the strongest influence is exerted by the type-of-game classification. Overall, the citation network in this field is sparse, implying that the awareness of authors in this field about studies by other academics is suboptimal. Our review suggests that game theory is a very useful tool for modelling project management scenarios, and that more work needs to be done focusing on project management in ICT domain, as well as by using extensive-form cooperative games where relevant.

The Effects of Imitation Dynamics on Vaccination Behaviours in SIR-Network Model

We present a series of SIR-network models, extended with a game-theoretic treatment of imitation dynamics which result from regular population mobility across residential and work areas and the ensuing interactions. Each considered SIR-network model captures a class of vaccination behaviours influenced by epidemic characteristics, interaction topology, and imitation dynamics. Our focus is the resultant vaccination coverage, produced under voluntary vaccination schemes, in response to these varying factors. Using the next generation matrix method, we analytically derive and compare expressions for the basic reproduction number R 0 for the proposed SIR-network models. Furthermore, we simulate the epidemic dynamics over time for the considered models, and show that if individuals are sufficiently responsive towards the changes in the disease prevalence, then the more expansive travelling patterns encourage convergence to the endemic, mixed equilibria. On the contrary, if individuals are insensitive to changes in the disease prevalence, we find that they tend to remain unvaccinated. Our results concur with earlier studies in showing that residents from highly connected residential areas are more likely to get vaccinated. We also show that the existence of the individuals committed to receiving vaccination reduces R 0 and delays the disease prevalence, and thus is essential to containing epidemics.

Scale-Free Features in Collective Robot Foraging

In many complex systems observed in nature, properties such as scalability, adaptivity, or rapid information exchange are often accompanied by the presence of features that are scale-free, i.e., that have no characteristic scale. Following this observation, we investigate the existence of scale-free features in artificial collective systems using simulated robot swarms. We implement a large-scale swarm performing the complex task of collective foraging, and demonstrate that several space and time features of the simulated swarm—such as number of communication links or time spent in resting state—spontaneously approach the scale-free property with moderate to strong statistical plausibility. Furthermore, we report strong correlations between the latter observation and swarm performance in terms of the number of retrieved items.

Topology-dependent rationality and quantal response equilibria in structured populations

Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize an actors' rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria. Previous work has argued that scale-free topologies maximize a system's overall rationality in this setup. Here we show that while, for certain games, it is true that increasing degree heterogeneity of complex networks enhances rationality, rationality-optimal configurations are not scale-free. For the Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, we provide analytic arguments complemented by numerical optimization experiments to demonstrate that core-periphery networks composed of a few dominant hub nodes surrounded by a periphery of very low degree nodes give strikingly smaller overall deviations from rationality than scale-free networks. Similarly, for the Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pennies games, we find that the optimal network structure is also a core-periphery graph but with a smaller difference in the average degrees of the core and the periphery. These results provide insight on the interplay between the topological structure of socioecological systems and their collective cognitive behavior, with potential applications to understanding wealth inequality and the structural features of the network of global corporate control.