Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation

No one is going to recess: How children evaluate collective and targeted punishment

This study examined children's responses to targeted and collective punishment. Thirty-six 4-5-year-olds and 36 6-7-year-olds (36 females; 54 White; data collected 2018-2019 in the United States) experienced three classroom punishment situations: Targeted (only transgressing student punished), Collective (one student transgressed, all students punished), and Baseline (all students transgressed, all punished). The older children evaluated collective punishment as less fair than targeted, whereas younger children evaluated both similarly. Across ages, children distributed fewer resources to teachers who administered collective than targeted punishment, and rated transgressors more negatively and distributed fewer resources to transgressors in Collective and Targeted than Baseline. These findings demonstrate children's increasing understanding of punishment and point to the potential impact of different forms of punishment on children's social lives.

Evolution Dynamics Model of Private Enterprises under Simultaneous and Sequential Innovation Decisions

The innovation of private enterprises plays a crucial role. This study focuses on the impacts of market information asymmetry, the technology spillover effect, and the order of innovation research and development (R&D) decisions on the evolution of private enterprises' innovation. This study constructs a dynamic model to analyze how the innovation decision-making order of private enterprises influences their profits and intertemporal innovation decision making. First, we derive the equilibrium point under sequential decisions and the stability of the system at the equilibrium point. Second, we investigate the impact of sequential and simultaneous innovation decisions on the evolution of the dynamic system and its economic implications. Finally, we study the evolutionary dynamics of the attractor with the rate of innovation adjustment and point to the existence of multiple equilibria. The results suggest that the speed of the innovation R&D cost change should be moderate, and the asynchronous updating of the innovation R&D strategy can prevent the system evolution from turning into chaos. These conclusions guide innovation policies.

Collective Punishment and Cheating in the Die-Under-the-Cup Task

A popular tool in the experimental research on dishonest behavior is the die-under-the-cup (DUTC) task in which subjects roll a die in private and report the outcome to the experimenter after being promised a payoff which increases with the die's outcome. The present paper reports the results of incorporating collective punishment into the DUTC task. We ran two experiments, each involving two rounds of the task performed in a computer lab. Despite being asked not to cheat, the average reported outcome in the first round exceeded the statistical expectancy of 3.5. The second round of the first experiment involved the threat that if this happened again, each subject would be fined by the difference between the average reported outcome and 3.5. Nevertheless, the average reported outcome in the second round significantly exceeded that of the first round. Running a second experiment, this time without the punishment threat, we ruled out the possibility that the increased cheating in the second round of the first experiment was due to a feedback effect, concluding that the threat of collective punishment acted to encourage cheating rather than helped deterring it.

Motivating Physicians to Report Adverse Medical Events in China: Stick or Carrot?

BACKGROUND

Adverse medical events (AMEs) pose serious threats to patient safety. One of the major challenges of AME reporting is low physician engagement. This study attempted to examine how punishment and reward can improve physicians' AME reporting in China.

METHODS

A survey was conducted in a large hospital with 1693 beds in China. Data were collected from 311 physicians. Ordinal and binary logistic regression was used for data analysis.

RESULTS

This study reveals that both punishment and reward are positively associated with intention to report AMEs. There is a negative interaction effect between punishment and reward. Although collective punishment is positively associated with intention to report AMEs, collective reward is not. Moreover, the physicians who have fear of negative consequences of AMEs and lack knowledge of AME reporting have lower intention to report AMEs. These findings do not differ between male and female physicians.

CONCLUSIONS

This survey suggests that punishment and reward have potential to motivate Chinese physicians to report AMEs. However, the implementation strategies of these control mechanisms may not be universally applicable and should be carefully designed on the basis of the specific characteristics of the practice site.

Deterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters

The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, “resistance” is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough “resistance” produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.

Effects of Trust and Threat Messaging on Academic Cheating: A Field Study

Morality-based interventions designed to promote academic integrity are being used by educational institutions around the world. Although many such approaches have a strong theoretical foundation and are supported by laboratory-based evidence, they often have not been subjected to rigorous empirical evaluation in real-world contexts. In a naturalistic field study (N = 296), we evaluated a recent research-inspired classroom innovation in which students are told, just prior to taking an unproctored exam, that they are trusted to act with integrity. Four university classes were assigned to a proctored exam or one of three types of unproctored exam. Students who took unproctored exams cheated significantly more, which suggests that it may be premature to implement this approach in college classrooms. These findings point to the importance of conducting ecologically valid and well-controlled field studies that translate psychological theory into practice when introducing large-scale educational reforms.

Altruistic Punishment and Impulsivity in Parkinson's Disease: A Social Neuroscience Perspective

Non-motor symptoms of Parkinson's disease (PD) are of increasing interest in clinical and psychological research. Disinhibition-the inability to inhibit inappropriate behavior-leads to social and emotional impairments, including impulsive behavior and disregard for social conventions and decision-making behavior. In recent years, the latter has been investigated using economic exchanges during social interactions. Altruistic punishment-to punish someone who violates group norms even if it foresees a personal cost-is one of the most useful and fruitful paradigms; it allows to maintain a cooperation system within social groups. Alterations of this cognitive ability negatively impact the quality of life of the individual and social stability. Social neuroscience has suggested association between impulsive behaviors and altruistic punishment. Neuroimaging research aimed at exploring functional networks and intrinsic functional connectivity went in this direction. To date, little is known about these issues in neurodegenerative diseases such as PD. Dopamine replacement treatment and dopamine-agonists have been associated with impulse-control disorder and impulsive-compulsive behavior able to affect social decision-making. Frontal-executive dysfunction determines an alteration of social functioning through a mechanism of subversion of online action-monitoring, which associates disinhibition with volition. Genetic polymorphisms, alterations of the nigro-striatal substance, and impairment in the medial prefrontal cortex and in the Default mode network (DMN) seem to be able to explain these mechanisms. This theoretical perspective article aims to present these topics in order to encourage an interdisciplinary discussion capable of generating new research and developing rehabilitative intervention to improve social decision-making in PD patients.

The competitive advantage of institutional reward

Sustaining cooperation among unrelated individuals is a fundamental challenge in biology and the social sciences. In human society, this problem can be solved by establishing incentive institutions that reward cooperators and punish free-riders. Most of the previous studies have focused on which incentives promote cooperation best. However, a higher cooperation level does not always imply higher group fitness, and only incentives that lead to higher fitness can survive in social evolution. In this paper, we compare the efficiencies of three types of institutional incentives, namely, reward, punishment, and a mixture of reward and punishment, by analysing the group fitness at the stable equilibria of evolutionary dynamics. We find that the optimal institutional incentive is sensitive to decision errors. When there is no error, a mixture of reward and punishment can lead to high levels of cooperation and fitness. However, for intermediate and large errors, reward performs best, and one should avoid punishment. The failure of punishment is caused by two reasons. First, punishment cannot maintain a high cooperation level. Second, punishing defectors almost always reduces the group fitness. Our findings highlight the role of reward in human cooperation. In an uncertain world, the institutional reward is not only effective but also efficient.

Knowing the past improves cooperation in the future

Cooperation is the cornerstone of human evolutionary success. Like no other species, we champion the sacrifice of personal benefits for the common good, and we work together to achieve what we are unable to achieve alone. Knowledge and information from past generations is thereby often instrumental in ensuring we keep cooperating rather than deteriorating to less productive ways of coexistence. Here we present a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory that shows how using the past as the benchmark for evolutionary success, rather than just current performance, significantly improves cooperation in the future. Interestingly, the details of just how the past is taken into account play only second-order importance, whether it be a weighted average of past payoffs or just a single payoff value from the past. Cooperation is promoted because information from the past disables fast invasions of defectors, thus enhancing the long-term benefits of cooperative behavior.

Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being exploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such a strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where a largely unselfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies, hence they can sweep out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at the extremely high cost of exclusion where the sole application of an exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emergence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection but could be the result of an evolutionary process.

Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma

Humans benefit from extensive cooperation; however, the existence of free-riders may cause cooperation to collapse. This is called the social dilemma. It has been shown that punishing free-riders is an effective way of resolving this problem. Because punishment is costly, this gives rise to the second-order social dilemma. Without exception, existing solutions rely on some stringent assumptions. This paper proposes, under very mild conditions, a simple model of a public goods game featuring increasing returns to scale. We find that punishers stand out and even dominate the population provided that the degree of increasing returns to scale is large enough; consequently, the second-order social dilemma dissipates. Historical evidence shows that people are more willing to cooperate with others and punish defectors when they suffer from either internal or external menaces. During the prehistoric age, the abundance of contributors was decisive in joint endeavours such as fighting floods, defending territory, and hunting. These situations serve as favourable examples of public goods games in which the degrees of increasing returns to scale are undoubtedly very large. Our findings show that natural selection has endowed human kind with a tendency to pursue justice and punish defection that deviates from social norms.

The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives

The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individuals do not play these rational strategies overall. The goal of our study is to investigate the dynamics of human decision making in the repeated PGG with institutional incentives. We consider that an individual's contribution is affected by four factors, which are self-interest, the behavior of others, the reaction to rewards, and the reaction to punishment. We find that people on average do not react to rewards and punishment, and that self-interest and the behavior of others sufficiently explain the dynamics of human behavior. Further analysis suggests that institutional incentives promote cooperation by affecting the self-regarding preference and that the other-regarding preference seems to be independent of incentive schemes. Because individuals do not change their behavioral patterns even if they were not rewarded or punished, the mere potential to punish defectors and reward cooperators can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation.