How types of premises modulate the typicality effect in category-based induction: diverging evidence from the P2, P3, and LPC effects

The default-interventionist model underlies premise typicality weakening the premise diversity effect during category-based induction: Event-related potentials evidence

The diversity effect during category-based induction (CBI) means that the more diverse the evidence, the higher will be the conclusion's inductive strength. However, it is influenced by the premise typicality. Three competitive cognitive processing models account for this influence: (1) The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that only premise typicality activates; (2) the parallel-competitive model assumes that premise typicality and diversity activate in parallel; and (3) the default-interventionist model assumes that a default response of premise diversity first activates and is subsequently followed by premise typicality, or premise typicality activates first, followed by premise diversity. The timing of premise typicality affecting the diversity effect during CBI was measured using event-related potentials to determine which cognitive model best explains this influence. Similar to previous studies, non-diverse premise inductive tasks involving two typical premise categories were compared with diverse premise inductive tasks involving a typical and an atypical category. The results showed that non-diverse conditions had higher "correct" response proportions, greater inductive strength, higher "definitely" response proportions, and shorter reaction times than diverse conditions, showing that premise typicality weakens the diversity effect. Moreover, the diverse premises elicited larger P2, smaller FN400, and greater frontal post-N400-positivity amplitudes than non-diverse premises, suggesting that premise diversity was facilitated during a relatively early time window and revised by premise typicality in a later window. These results support the default-interventionist in nature during thinking and reasoning.

Common and distinctive cognitive processes between categorization and category-based induction: Evidence from event-related potentials

Categorization involves forming equivalence classes of discriminable entities, whereas category-based induction (CBI) involves employing categorical knowledge to generalize novel properties. Previous studies have suggested either common or distinctive cognitive processing between categorization and CBI. However, no study has compared cognitive processes with the same stimuli sets using event-related potentials (ERPs), which help to determine the cognitive processes with a high temporal solution. In this study, we compared the ERP responses to categorization and CBI using two separate experiments (i.e., generic and specific conclusions), with the same task materials. Results from both experiments identified distinctive cognitive processing between categorization and CBI based on a greater proportion of "definitely" responses and smaller amplitudes of sustained negativity during categorization. These observations suggest that categorization involves decreased conflict monitoring and control than CBI under single-premise conditions. Contrastingly, categorization and CBI elicited similar FN400 amplitudes in both experiments, which suggests a common cognitive process between them. These findings present the common and distinctive cognitive processes between categorization and CBI.

How types of prior knowledge and task properties impact the category-based induction: diverging evidence from the P2, N400, and LPC effects

Category-based induction task was combined with ERP to unravel whether prior knowledge and property interact when inferring on genes or diseases. Larger P2 amplitudes for near taxonomic/causal distances relative to far ones, as well as larger LPC for taxonomic relation relative to thematic relation, are found in both gene and disease tasks. However, smaller N400 is found for taxonomic relation in gene task and thematic relation in disease task, respectively, and larger LPC at 700-850 ms for near taxonomic distance in the gene task and near causal distance in the disease task. These results suggested that the category-based inductive reasoning is context-sensitive, and there may be four stages of category-based inductive reasoning: the early automatic comparison of features/relations (P2), features/relations generalization process (N400), the extraction of common relationship/rule (LPC at 550-700 ms), the inference generation (LPC at 700-850 ms).

P3a amplitude is related to conclusion specificity during category-based induction

Category-based induction involves the generalization of a novel property (conclusion property) to a new category (conclusion category), based on the knowledge that a category exemplar (premise category) has the respective novel property. Previous studies have shown that conclusion specificity (i.e., specific [S] or generic categories [G]) influences category-based induction. However, the timing of brain activity underlying this effect is not well known, especially with controlling the similarities of premise and conclusion categories between S and G arguments. In this study, the event-related potential (ERP) responses to category-based induction between S and G arguments were compared under both congruent (+, premise and conclusion categories are related) and incongruent (-, premise and conclusion categories are unrelated) arguments; additionally, the similarities of premise and conclusion categories between S and G arguments were controlled. The results showed that replicating this effect, S+ arguments have increased “strong” response rates compared to G+ arguments, suggesting that category-based induction is contingent on factors beyond matched similarities. Moreover, S arguments have more liberal inductive decision thresholds than G arguments, which suggest that conclusion specificity affects the inductive decision reflected by inductive decision thresholds. Furthermore, G+ arguments elicit greater P3a amplitudes than S+ arguments, which suggest greater attention resources allocation to the review of decisions for G+ arguments than that for S+ arguments. Taken together, the conclusion specificity effect during semantic category-based induction can be revealed by “strong” response rates, inductive decision thresholds, and P3a component after controlling the premise-conclusion similarity, providing evidence that category-based induction rely on more than simple similarity judgment and conclusion specificity would affect category-based induction.

N400/frontal negativity reveals the controlled processes of taxonomic and thematic relationships in semantic priming for artifacts

Recent studies show that taxonomic and thematic relationships are functionally and neurologically dissociated; however, there remain some discrepancies due to inconsistencies in definitions, task properties, and concept domains. This issue was further explored via the semantic priming paradigm with a long SOA of 600 ms while controlling for perceptual or functional features of artifacts involved across taxonomic and thematic relationships. Six conditions were compared: perceptual relationship (axe-helve), functional relationship (axe-wood), perceptual classification (axe-hammer), functional classification (axe-saw), unrelated condition (axe-skates), and nonword (axe-derf) conditions. Behavioral priming effects are found for all related conditions relative to unrelated conditions except for perceptual relationships, whereas semantic priming effects (smaller N400 amplitude) are found for functional relationships and perceptual classification relative to unrelated conditions but not for perceptual relationships and functional classification, indicating perceptual features are less important than functional features for artifacts. Furthermore, the frontal negativity elicited by functional relationships is smaller than all other related conditions at 400-550 ms, while it is only smaller than functional classification at 550-650 ms. These results indicate that, besides different features, taxonomic and thematic relationships are dissociated to organize object knowledge, which is primarily fuelled by feature processing, with taxonomic, or thematic, relationships further embedded with such sensory, or functional, features.

Inductive Reasoning Differs Between Taxonomic and Thematic Contexts: Electrophysiological Evidence

Inductive reasoning can be performed in different contexts, but it is unclear whether the neural mechanism of reasoning performed in a thematic context (e.g., bee has x, so honey has x) is the same as that performed in a taxonomic context (e.g., bee has x, so butterfly has x). In the present study, participants were required to judge whether a conclusion was acceptable or not based on its premise, for which the taxonomic or thematic distances between premise and conclusion objects were either far or near. The Event related potential (ERP) results indicated that the effect of context (taxonomic vs. thematic) was initially observed in the P2 component; while the distance effect (far vs. near) was observed in N400 and late components. Moreover, the distance effect on thematic-based inductive reasoning was found in the anterior regions, while the distance effect on taxonomic-based inductive reasoning conditions was found in the posterior regions. These results support the view that inductive reasoning is performed differently under different semantic contexts.

FN400 and sustained negativity reveal a premise monotonicity effect during semantic category-based induction

The premise monotonicity effect during category-based induction is a robust effect that occurs when generalization of a novel property shared by many cases is more likely than one shared by few cases. The timing of brain activity during this effect is unclear. Therefore, the event-related potentials (ERPs) underpinning this effect were measured by manipulating the premise sample size (single [S] vs. two [T]) in a semantic category-based induction task, with the conclusion categories either including the premise categories (congruent induction) or not (incongruent induction). The behavioral results replicated the premise monotonicity effect, and revealed that S arguments produced longer reaction times and more conservative response criteria than did T arguments. This suggests that the premise monotonicity effect was affected by both evidence accumulation speed and decision threshold. ERP results demonstrated that the premise monotonicity effect was reflected by two parameters during inductive decision: (1) S arguments elicited larger FN400 amplitudes than did T arguments under congruent induction, which was linked to reduced global similarity, decreased cognitive relevance, and attenuated conceptual fluency and (2) S arguments elicited larger sustained negativity (SN) in the 450-1050-ms time window than did T arguments, which is related to more inference-driven integration and interpretive processes. Our findings provide insight into the complex temporal course of the premise monotonicity effect during semantic category-based induction.

FN400 amplitudes reveal the differentiation of semantic inferences within natural vs. artificial domains

Category-based inferences allow inductions about novel properties based on categorical memberships (e.g., knowing all trout have genes [premise] allows us to infer that all fish have genes [conclusion]). Natural (N) and artificial (A) domains are the most obvious and traditional distinctions in categorization. The distinct event-related potential (ERP) responses for N and A domains have not yet been examined during category-based inferences. In this study, the differences between ERP inference parameters within N and A domains were measured during inductive decision processing, while controlling the premise−conclusion similarity and premise typicality between those two domains. Twenty-two adults were asked to make a decision on whether a conclusion was definitely weak, possibly weak, possibly strong, or definitely strong, based on a premise. The behavioral results showed that semantic inferences within the N domain shared similar inductive strength, similar “correct” response rates, and similar reaction times with that within the A domain. However, the ERP results showed that semantic inferences elicited smaller frontal-distributed N400 (FN400) amplitudes within the N domain than within the A domain, which suggested that knowledge of the ontological domain of a category affects category-based inferences, and underlaid the increased categorical coherence and homogeneity in the N as compared to the A categories. Therefore, we have distinguished the cognitive course of semantic inferences between N and A domains.

How do the hierarchical levels of premises affect category-based induction: diverging effects from the P300 and N400

Although a number of studies have explored the time course of category-based induction, little is known about how the hierarchical levels (superordinate, basic, subordinate) of premises affect category-based induction. The EEG data were recorded when nineteen healthy human participants were performing a simplified category-based induction task. The ERP results showed that: in the subordinate conclusion condition, the basic premise elicited a larger N400, versus the superordinate promise; in the basic conclusion condition, the superordinate promise elicited a larger P300 relative to both the basic premise and subordinate premise; in the superordinate conclusion condition, however, no difference was found between different promise. Furthermore, the process that reasoning from a higher level to a lower level evoked a larger P300, compared to it did in the reverse direction. The divergent evidence suggested that category-based induction at superordinate, basic, and subordinate levels might be affected by various factors, such as abstract level, direction, and distance between premise and conclusion, which yielded new insights into the neural underpinnings of category-based induction with different inductive strengths.