Perception in the absence of attention: perceptual processing in the Roelofs effect during inattentional blindness

The role of perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness: A systematic review and three meta-analyses

The inattentional blindness phenomenon refers to situations in which a visible but unexpected stimulus remains consciously unnoticed by observers. This phenomenon is classically explained as the consequence of insufficient attention, because attentional resources are already engaged elsewhere or vary between individuals. However, this attentional-resources view is broad and often imprecise regarding the variety of attentional models, the different pools of resources that can be involved in attentional tasks, and the heterogeneity of the experimental paradigms. Our aim was to investigate whether a classic theoretical model of attention, namely the Load Theory, could account for a large range of empirical findings in this field by distinguishing the role of perceptual and cognitive resources in attentional selection and attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli. As this model has been mostly built on implicit measures of distractor interference, it is unclear whether its predictions also hold when explicit and subjective awareness of an unexpected stimulus is concerned. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analyses of inattentional blindness studies investigating the role of perceptual and/or cognitive resources. The results reveal that, in line with the perceptual account of the Load Theory, inattentional blindness significantly increases with the perceptual load of the task. However, the cognitive account of this theory is not clearly supported by the empirical findings analysed here. Furthermore, the interaction between perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness remains understudied. Theoretical implications for the Load Theory are discussed, notably regarding the difference between attentional capture and subjective awareness paradigms, and further research directions are provided.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

Loads of unconscious processing: The role of perceptual load in processing unattended stimuli during inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness describes the failure to detect an unexpected but clearly visible object when our attention is engaged elsewhere. While the factors that determine the occurrence of inattentional blindness are already well understood, there is still a lot to learn about whether and how we process unexpected objects that go unnoticed. Only recently it was shown that although not consciously aware, characteristics of these stimuli can interfere with a primary task: Classification of to-be-attended stimuli was slower when the content of the task-irrelevant, undetected stimulus contradicted that of the attended, to-be-judged stimuli. According to Lavie’s perceptual load model, irrelevant stimuli are likely to reach awareness under conditions of low perceptual load, while they remain undetected under high load, as attentional resources are restricted to the content of focused attention. In the present study, we investigated the applicability of Lavie’s predictions for the processing of stimuli that remain unconscious due to inattentional blindness. In two experiments, we replicated that unconsciously processed stimuli can interfere with intended responses. Also, our manipulation of perceptual load did have an effect on primary task performance. However, against our hypothesis, these effects did not interact with each other. Thus, our results suggest that high perceptual load cannot prevent task-irrelevant stimuli that remain undetected from being processed to an extent that enables them to affect performance in a primary task.

Guessing right: Preconscious processing in inattentional blindness

Much research has been conducted on the determinants of inattentional blindness-the failure to miss an unexpected but salient stimulus in plain view. Far less research has been concerned with the fate of those objects that go unnoticed in such a setting. The available evidence suggests that objects that are not consciously noticed due to inattentional blindness are still processed to a certain degree. The present study substantiated and generalised this limited evidence by reanalysing 16 datasets in regard to participants' guessing accuracy in multiple-choice questions concerning the unexpected object: Participants who did not notice the critical object showed guessing accuracy that lay significantly above chance. Thus, stimuli that are not consciously noticed (i.e., cannot be reported) can nevertheless exert an influence on seemingly random choices. Modality of the primary task as well as performance in the primary task and in a divided-attention trial were evaluated as potential moderators. Methodological limitations such as the design and implementation of the multiple-choice questions and the generalisability of our findings are discussed, and promises of the present approach for future studies are presented.

Examining effects of preconscious mere exposure: An inattentional blindness approach

An increase in affective preference for stimuli, which a person has been repeatedly exposed to, is known as mere exposure effect. This effect has been shown for stimuli that are processed subliminally, that is, below the threshold of awareness. This study fills a current research gap by investigating mere exposure effects under processing that is preconscious, which follows from a high stimulus strength but absence of top-down amplification. In three experiments (N = 240 in total) preconscious processing was evoked using an inattentional blindness paradigm, which allowed the processing of stimuli (nonwords or Chinese symbols) under complete inattention. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a mere exposure effect in our experiments. We expand the current state of knowledge by discussing the distractor devaluation effect and the attentional set of participants as possible reasons for the absence of the mere exposure effect. Directions for future investigations are outlined.

The Roelofs and induced Roelofs effects

The visual image provides important cues for an observer's sense of location and orientation within the world. Occasionally, though, these cues can be misleading, resulting in illusions. In the Roelofs and induced Roelofs effects, for example, a large illuminated frame, offset from the observer's midline in otherwise complete darkness, tends to bias the observer's judgment of straight ahead, causing the position of the frame, and anything contained within it, to be misperceived. Studies of these illusions have provided much insight into the processes that establish an observer's egocentric reference frame, and the manner in which object locations are encoded relative to this frame for perception and action.

Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst

Zusammenfassung. Wenn wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit einer Aufgabe zuwenden, nehmen wir Dinge, die währenddessen unerwartet auftauchen, häufig nicht bewusst wahr – obwohl sie unmittelbar in unserem Blickfeld erscheinen. Dieses Phänomen, das als Inattentional Blindness bezeichnet wird, kann fatale Konsequenzen in alltäglichen Situationen und auch einen ernstzunehmenden Einfluss auf sportliche Leistungen haben. In Ergänzung zu vorheriger Forschung zeigen meine eigenen Ergebnisse, dass eine Vielzahl situativer Faktoren die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der Inattentional Blindness auftritt, beeinflussen können. Dazu zählen unter anderem bestimmte Eigenschaften des unerwarteten Objekts sowie Kontextfaktoren. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen interindividuelle Unterschiede über die situativen Einflüsse hinaus kaum (oder zumindest nicht reliabel) vorherzusagen, ob Inattentional Blindness auftritt oder nicht. Während es also eine feste Wahrscheinlichkeit über alle Personen hinweg gibt, dass ein unerwartetes Objekt bemerkt wird (deterministischer Aspekt), kann anhand der Persönlichkeitsstruktur und der kognitiven Fähigkeiten dieser Personen nicht vorhergesagt werden, wer von ihnen das unerwartete Objekt entdecken wird und wer nicht (stochastischer Aspekt).

Orienting of visuo-spatial attention in complex 3D space: Search and detection

The ability to detect changes in the environment is necessary for appropriate interactions with the external world. Changes in the background go more unnoticed than foreground changes, possibly because attention prioritizes processing of foreground/near stimuli. Here, we investigated the detectability of foreground and background changes within natural scenes and the influence of stereoscopic depth cues on this. Using a flicker paradigm, we alternated a pair of images that were exactly same or differed for one single element (i.e., a color change of one object in the scene). The participants were asked to find the change that occurred either in a foreground or background object, while viewing the stimuli either with binocular and monocular cues (bmC) or monocular cues only (mC). The behavioral results showed faster and more accurate detections for foreground changes and overall better performance in bmC than mC conditions. The imaging results highlighted the involvement of fronto‐parietal attention controlling networks during active search and target detection. These attention networks did not show any differential effect as function of the presence/absence of the binocular cues, or the detection of foreground/background changes. By contrast, the lateral occipital cortex showed greater activation for detections in foreground compared to background, while area V3A showed a main effect of bmC vs. mC, specifically during search. These findings indicate that visual search with binocular cues does not impose any specific requirement on attention‐controlling fronto‐parietal networks, while the enhanced detection of front/near objects in the bmC condition reflects bottom‐up sensory processes in visual cortex. Hum Brain Mapp 36:2231–2247, 2015. © 2015 The Authors Human Brain Mapping Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Elucidating unconscious processing with instrumental hypnosis

Most researchers leverage bottom-up suppression to unlock the underlying mechanisms of unconscious processing. However, a top-down approach - for example via hypnotic suggestion - paves the road to experimental innovation and complementary data that afford new scientific insights concerning attention and the unconscious. Drawing from a reliable taxonomy that differentiates subliminal and preconscious processing, we outline how an experimental trajectory that champions top-down suppression techniques, such as those practiced in hypnosis, is uniquely poised to further contextualize and refine our scientific understanding of unconscious processing. Examining subliminal and preconscious methods, we demonstrate how instrumental hypnosis provides a reliable adjunct that supplements contemporary approaches. Specifically, we provide an integrative synthesis of the advantages and shortcomings that accompany a top-down approach to probe the unconscious mind. Our account provides a larger framework for complementing the results from core studies involving prevailing subliminal and preconscious techniques.

Seeing without knowing: neural signatures of perceptual inference in the absence of report

Every day, we experience a rich and complex visual world. Our brain constantly translates meaningless fragmented input into coherent objects and scenes. However, our attentional capabilities are limited, and we can only report the few items that we happen to attend to. So what happens to items that are not cognitively accessed? Do these remain fragmentary and meaningless? Or are they processed up to a level where perceptual inferences take place about image composition? To investigate this, we recorded brain activity using fMRI while participants viewed images containing a Kanizsa figure, an illusion in which an object is perceived by means of perceptual inference. Participants were presented with the Kanizsa figure and three matched nonillusory control figures while they were engaged in an attentionally demanding distractor task. After the task, one group of participants was unable to identify the Kanizsa figure in a forced-choice decision task; hence, they were "inattentionally blind." A second group had no trouble identifying the Kanizsa figure. Interestingly, the neural signature that was unique to the processing of the Kanizsa figure was present in both groups. Moreover, within-subject multivoxel pattern analysis showed that the neural signature of unreported Kanizsa figures could be used to classify reported Kanizsa figures and that this cross-report classification worked better for the Kanizsa condition than for the control conditions. Together, these results suggest that stimuli that are not cognitively accessed are processed up to levels of perceptual interpretation.

Attention as a process of selection, perception as a process of representation, and phenomenal experience as the resulting process of perception being modulated by a dedicated consciousness mechanism

Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward when tackling this issue. Specifically, it is argued that we should carefully differentiate between pre-conscious processes and the processes resulting in phenomenal experience, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional effects on panmodal universal attributes of whatever conscious experience may be the case, and acknowledge that there is a specialized mechanism for leading to conscious experience of the pre-consciously represented contents autonomous from the mechanisms of perception, attention, memory, and cognitive control.