An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement

A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications

Diverse explanations or theories of consciousness are arrayed on a roughly physicalist-to-nonphysicalist landscape of essences and mechanisms. Categories: Materialism Theories (philosophical, neurobiological, electromagnetic field, computational and informational, homeostatic and affective, embodied and enactive, relational, representational, language, phylogenetic evolution); Non-Reductive Physicalism; Quantum Theories; Integrated Information Theory; Panpsychisms; Monisms; Dualisms; Idealisms; Anomalous and Altered States Theories; Challenge Theories. There are many subcategories, especially for Materialism Theories. Each explanation is self-described by its adherents, critique is minimal and only for clarification, and there is no attempt to adjudicate among theories. The implications of consciousness explanations or theories are assessed with respect to four questions: meaning/purpose/value (if any); AI consciousness; virtual immortality; and survival beyond death. A Landscape of Consciousness, I suggest, offers perspective.

Investigating the impact of early deafness on learned action-effect contingency for action linked to peripheral sensory effects

Investigating peripheral visual processing in individuals with early auditory deprivation is a critical research area in the field of neuroscience, since it helps understanding the phenomenon of sensory adaptation and brain plasticity after sensory loss. Prior research has already demonstrated that the absence of auditory input, which is crucial to detect events occurring out of the central egocentric visual space, leads to an improved processing of visual and tactile stimuli occurring in peripheral regions of the sensory space. Nevertheless, no prior studies have explored whether such enhanced processing also takes place within the domain of action, particularly when individuals are required to perform actions that produce peripheral sensory outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 15 hearing (31 ±3.3 years) and 15 early deaf adults (42 ± 2.6 years) for a neuro-behavioral experiment involving: 1) a behavioral task where participants executed a simple motor action (i.e., a button press) and received a visual feedback either in the center or in a peripheral region of the visual field, and 2) the electrophysiological recording of brain electrical potentials (EEG). We measured and compared neural activity preceding the motor action (the readiness potentials) and visual evoked responses (the N1 and P2 ERP components) and found that deaf individuals did not exhibit more pronounced modulation of neural responses when their motor actions resulted in peripheral visual stimuli compared to their hearing counterparts. Instead they showed a reduced modulation when visual stimuli were presented in the center. Our results suggest a redistribution of attentional resources from center to periphery in deaf individuals during sensorimotor coupling.

Towards an interdisciplinary "science of the mind": A call for enhanced collaboration between philosophy and neuroscience

In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena-as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind-to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long-lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Free Will as Defined by the Constrained Disorder Principle: a Restricted, Mandatory, Personalized, Regulated Process for Decision-Making

The concept of free will has challenged physicists, biologists, philosophers, and other professionals for decades. The constrained disorder principle (CDP) is a fundamental law that defines systems according to their inherent variability. It provides mechanisms for adapting to dynamic environments. This work examines the CDP's perspective of free will concerning various free will theories. Per the CDP, systems lack intentions, and the "freedom" to select and act is built into their design. The "freedom" is embedded within the response range determined by the boundaries of the systems' variability. This built-in and self-generating mechanism enables systems to cope with perturbations. According to the CDP, neither dualism nor an unknown metaphysical apparatus dictates choices. Brain variability facilitates cognitive adaptation to complex, unpredictable situations across various environments. Human behaviors and decisions reflect an underlying physical variability in the brain and other organs for dealing with unpredictable noises. Choices are not predetermined but reflect the ongoing adaptation processes to dynamic prssu½res. Malfunctions and disease states are characterized by inappropriate variability, reflecting an inability to respond adequately to perturbations. Incorporating CDP-based interventions can overcome malfunctions and disease states and improve decision processes. CDP-based second-generation artificial intelligence platforms improve interventions and are being evaluated to augment personal development, wellness, and health.

No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition

Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.

Rapid Compensation for Noisy Voluntary Movements in Adults with Primary Tic Disorders

BACKGROUND

It has been proposed that tics and premonitory urges in primary tic disorders (PTD), like Tourette syndrome, are a manifestation of sensorimotor noise. However, patients with tics show no obvious movement imprecision in everyday life. One reason could be that patients have strategies to compensate for noise that disrupts performance (ie, noise that is task-relevant).

OBJECTIVES

Our goal was to unmask effects of elevated sensorimotor noise on the variability of voluntary movements in patients with PTD.

METHODS

We tested 30 adult patients with PTD (23 male) and 30 matched controls in a reaching task designed to unmask latent noise. Subjects reached to targets whose shape allowed for variability either in movement direction or extent. This enabled us to decompose variability into task-relevant versus less task-relevant components, where the latter should be less affected by compensatory strategies than the former. In alternating blocks, the task-relevant target dimension switched, allowing us to explore the temporal dynamics with which participants adjusted movement variability to changes in task demands.

RESULTS

Both groups accurately reached to targets, and adjusted movement precision based on target shape. However, when task-relevant dimensions of the target changed, patients initially produced movements that were more variable than controls, before regaining precision after several reaches. This effect persisted across repeated changes in the task-relevant dimension across the experiment, and therefore did not reflect an effect of novelty, or differences in learning.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggest that patients with PTD generate noisier voluntary movements compared with controls, but rapidly compensate according to current task demands. © 2024 The Authors. Movement Disorders published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.

Why consciousness?

Conscious emotions drive all we do, except for automatic tasks like breathing. Specifically, they enable the operation of incentives-like hunger for eating-that motivate us to perform tasks that are vital to our lives. Indeed, we act because we want to act, and desire is an emotion. Next, we want to act because we expect the action to lead to some positive emotion such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, comfort, fulfillment, …. Finally, to feel this emotion, we must perceive-consciously experience-the outer world. Conscious emotions also operate indirectly, as when driving an automobile: Though most driving is nonconscious, each particular journey is consciously undertaken for some specific reason; also, emotions operated consciously during the period in which driving was being learned, and for some time afterwards. In short, we suggest that the adaptive function of consciousness is to enable conscious emotions to operate.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

The neuronal basis of human creativity

Human creativity is a powerful cognitive ability underlying all uniquely human cultural and scientific advancement. However, the neuronal basis of this creative ability is unknown. Here, I propose that slow, spontaneous fluctuations in neuronal activity, also known as "resting state" fluctuations, constitute a universal mechanism underlying all facets of human creativity. Support for this hypothesis is derived from experiments that directly link spontaneous fluctuations and verbal creativity. Recent experimental and modeling advances in our understanding of the spontaneous fluctuations offer an explanation for the diversity and innovative nature of creativity, which is derived from a unique integration of random, neuronal noise on the one hand with individually specified, deterministic information acquired through learning, expertise training, and hereditary traits. This integration between stochasticity and order leads to a process that offers, on the one hand, original, unexpected outcomes but, on the other hand, endows these outcomes with knowledge-based meaning and significance.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Cortico-spinal modularity in the parieto-frontal system: A new perspective on action control

Classical neurophysiology suggests that the motor cortex (MI) has a unique role in action control. In contrast, this review presents evidence for multiple parieto-frontal spinal command modules that can bypass MI. Five observations support this modular perspective: (i) the statistics of cortical connectivity demonstrate functionally-related clusters of cortical areas, defining functional modules in the premotor, cingulate, and parietal cortices; (ii) different corticospinal pathways originate from the above areas, each with a distinct range of conduction velocities; (iii) the activation time of each module varies depending on task, and different modules can be activated simultaneously; (iv) a modular architecture with direct motor output is faster and less metabolically expensive than an architecture that relies on MI, given the slow connections between MI and other cortical areas; (v) lesions of the areas composing parieto-frontal modules have different effects from lesions of MI. Here we provide examples of six cortico-spinal modules and functions they subserve: module 1) arm reaching, tool use and object construction; module 2) spatial navigation and locomotion; module 3) grasping and observation of hand and mouth actions; module 4) action initiation, motor sequences, time encoding; module 5) conditional motor association and learning, action plan switching and action inhibition; module 6) planning defensive actions. These modules can serve as a library of tools to be recombined when faced with novel tasks, and MI might serve as a recombinatory hub. In conclusion, the availability of locally-stored information and multiple outflow paths supports the physiological plausibility of the proposed modular perspective.

Clarifying the nature of stochastic fluctuations and accumulation processes in spontaneous movements

Experiments on choice-predictive brain signals have played an important role in the debate on free will. In a seminal study, Benjamin Libet and colleagues found that a negative-going EEG signal, the readiness potential (RP), can be observed over motor-related brain regions even hundreds of ms before the time of the conscious decision to move. If the early onset of the readiness potential is taken as an indicator of the "brain's decision to move" this could mean that this decision is made early, by unconscious brain activity, rather than later, at the time when the subject believes to have decided. However, an alternative kind of interpretation, involving ongoing stochastic fluctuations, has recently been brought to light. This stochastic decision model (SDM) takes its inspiration from leaky accumulator models of perceptual decision making. It suggests that the RP originates from an accumulation of ongoing stochastic fluctuations. In this view, the decision happens only at a much later stage when an accumulated noisy signal (plus imperative) reaches a threshold. Here, we clarify a number of confusions regarding both the evidence for the stochastic decision model as well as the interpretation that it offers. We will explore several points that we feel are in need of clarification: (a) the empirical evidence for the role of stochastic fluctuations is so far only indirect; (b) the interpretation of animal studies is unclear; (c) a model that is deterministic during the accumulation stage can explain the data in a similar way; (d) the primary focus in the literature has been on the role of random fluctuations whereas the deterministic aspects of the model have been largely ignored; (e) contrary to the original interpretation, the deterministic component of the model is quantitatively the dominant input into the accumulator; and finally (f) there is confusion regarding the role of "imperative" in the SDM and its link to "evidence" in perceptual decision making. Our aim is not to rehabilitate the role of the RP in the free will debate. Rather we aim to address some confusions regarding the evidence for accumulators playing a role in these preparatory brain processes.

Consciousness: a neurosurgical perspective

Neurosurgeons are in a unique position to shed light on the neural basis for consciousness, not only by their clinical care of patients with compromised states of consciousness, but also by employing neurostimulation and neuronal recordings through intracranial electrodes in awake surgical patients, as well as during stages of sleep and anethesia. In this review, we discuss several aspects of consciousness, i.e., perception, memory, and willed actions, studied by electrical stimulation and single neuron recordings in the human brain. We demonstrate how specific neuronal activity underlie the emergence of concepts, memories, and intentions in human consciousness. We discuss the representation of specific conscious content by temporal lobe neurons and present the discovery of "concept cells" and the encoding and retrieval of memories by neurons in the medial temporal lobe. We review prefrontal and parietal neuronal activation that precedes conscious intentions to act. Taken together with other studies in the field, these findings suggest that specific conscious experience may arise from stochastic fluctuations of neuronal activity, reaching a dynamic threshold. Advances in brain recording and stimulation technology coupled with the rapid rise in artificial intelligence are likely to increase the amount and analysis capabilities of data obtained from the human brain, thereby improving the decoding of conscious and preconscious states and open new horizons for modulation of human cognitive functions such as memory and volition.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Elevated representational similarity of voluntary action and inhibition in Tourette syndrome

Many people with Tourette syndrome are able to volitionally suppress tics, under certain circumstances. To understand better the neural mechanisms that underlie this ability, we used functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging to track regional brain activity during performance of an intentional inhibition task. On some trials, Tourette syndrome and comparison participants internally chose to make or withhold a motor action (a button press), while on other trials, they followed 'Go' and 'NoGo' instructions to make or withhold the same action. Using representational similarity analysis, a functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging multivariate pattern analysis technique, we assessed how Tourette syndrome and comparison participants differed in neural activity when choosing to make or to withhold an action, relative to externally cued responses on Go and NoGo trials. Analyses were pre-registered, and the data and code are publicly available. We considered similarity of action representations within regions implicated as critical to motor action release or inhibition and to symptom expression in Tourette syndrome, namely the pre-supplementary motor area, inferior frontal gyrus, insula, caudate nucleus and primary motor cortex. Strikingly, in the Tourette syndrome compared to the comparison group, neural activity within the pre-supplementary motor area displayed greater representational similarity across all action types. Within the pre-supplementary motor area, there was lower response-specific differentiation of activity relating to action and inhibition plans and to internally chosen and externally cued actions, implicating the region as a functional nexus in the symptomatology of Tourette syndrome. Correspondingly, patients with Tourette syndrome may experience volitional tic suppression as an effortful and tiring process because, at the top of the putative motor decision hierarchy, activity within the population of neurons facilitating action is overly similar to activity within the population of neurons promoting inhibition. However, not all pre-supplementary motor area group differences survived correction for multiple comparisons. Group differences in representational similarity were also present in the primary motor cortex. Here, representations of internally chosen and externally cued inhibition were more differentiated in the Tourette syndrome group than in the comparison group, potentially a consequence of a weaker voluntary capacity earlier in the motor hierarchy to suppress actions proactively. Tic severity and premonitory sensations correlated with primary motor cortex and caudate nucleus representational similarity, but these effects did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. In summary, more rigid pre-supplementary motor area neural coding across action categories may constitute a central feature of Tourette syndrome, which can account for patients' experience of 'unvoluntary' tics and effortful tic suppression.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Human primary motor cortex indexes the onset of subjective intention in brain-machine-interface mediated actions

Self-initiated behavior is accompanied by the experience of willing our actions. Here, we leverage the unique opportunity to examine the full intentional chain - from will (W) to action (A) to environmental effects (E) - in a tetraplegic person fitted with a primary motor cortex (M1) brain machine interface (BMI) generating hand movements via neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES). This combined BMI-NMES approach allowed us to selectively manipulate each element of the intentional chain (W, A, and E) while performing extra-cellular recordings and probing subjective experience. Our results reveal single-cell, multi-unit, and population-level dynamics in human M1 that encode W and may predict its subjective onset. Further, we show that the proficiency of a neural decoder in M1 reflects the degree of W-A binding, tracking the participant's subjective experience of intention in (near) real time. These results point to M1 as a critical node in forming the subjective experience of intention and demonstrate the relevance of intention-related signals for translational neuroprosthetics.

Neural bases of freedom and responsibility

This review presents a broad perspective of the Neuroscience of our days with special attention to how the brain generates our behaviors, emotions, and mental states. It describes in detail how unconscious and conscious processing of sensorimotor and mental information takes place in our brains. Likewise, classic and recent experiments illustrating the neuroscientific foundations regarding the behavioral and cognitive abilities of animals and, in particular, of human beings are described. Special attention is applied to the description of the different neural regulatory systems dealing with behavioral, cognitive, and emotional functions. Finally, the brain process for decision-making, and its relationship with individual free will and responsibility, are also described.

Distinguishing intentional from nonintentional actions through eeg and kinematic markers

How can an intentional movement be distinguished from the same movement done nonintentionally? How can this distinction be drawn without asking the subject, or in patients who are unable to communicate? Here we address these questions, by focusing on blinking. This is one of the most frequent spontaneous actions in our daily life, but it can also be done intentionally. Furthermore, blinking is often spared in patients with severe brain injuries, and for some, it is the only way to report complex meanings. Using kinematic and EEG-based measures, we found that intentional and spontaneous blinking are preceded by different brain activities, even when they are indistinguishable. Unlike spontaneous ones, intentional blinks are characterized by a slow negative EEG drift, resembling the classic readiness potential. We investigated the theoretical implication of this finding in stochastic decision models as well as the practical significance of using brain-based signals to improve the discrimination between intentional and nonintentional actions. As proof of principle, we considered three brain-injured patients with rare neurological syndromes characterized by motor and communicative impairments. Although further research is needed, our results indicate that brain-based signals can offer a feasible way to infer intentionality even in absence of overt communication.

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.

(Non)-experiencing the intention to move: On the comparisons between the Readiness Potential onset and Libet's W-time

A seminal study of Libet et al. (1983) provided a popular approach to compare introspective timing of movement execution (the M-time) and the intention to move (the W-time) with respect to the onset of the readiness potential (RP). The difference between the W-time and the RP onsets contributed significantly to the current free-will discussion, insofar as it has been repeatedly shown that the RP onset unequivocally precedes the W-time. However, the interpretations of Libet's paradigm continuously attract criticism, questioning the use of both the W-time and the RP onset as indicators of the motor intention. In the current study, we further probe whether the W-time is rather an intention-unrelated product of the participant's inference than an unambiguous temporal marker of the intention to move. Using behavioral reports and concurrent multichannel EEG, we investigated the relation between the W-time and M-time introspective reports in two groups of participants who started an experiment with the series of different reports. Congruently with previous studies, we have shown that the W-time is affected by the experimental procedures: participants who had prior experience reporting the M-time provided significantly earlier W-time. However, contrary to previous papers, we revealed that even naive participants do introspectively differentiate the W-time and the M-time, which suggests that the W-time might actually reflect the intention to move, at least, to some extent. We therefore suggest that training-based modulation of the W-time values may explain this finding. Moreover, we further confirm the absence of a direct link between the RP onset and the W-time by showing no covariation between them in both experimental groups. In turn, our findings question the overall interpretation of the comparison between these two time points. Overall, our study further emphasizes the ambiguity of Libet's paradigm, and suggests that the relatedness of both the RP and the W-time to the movement initiation processes should not be assumed as priori.

Episodic Memory Retrieval Affects the Onset and Dynamics of Evidence Accumulation during Value-based Decisions

In neuroeconomics, there is much interest in understanding simple value-based choices where agents choose between visually presented goods, comparable to a shopping scenario in a supermarket. However, many everyday decisions are made in the physical absence of the considered goods, requiring agents to recall information about the goods from memory. Here, we asked whether and how this reliance on an internal memory representation affects the temporal dynamics of decision making on a cognitive and neural level. Participants performed a remember-and-decide task in which they made simple purchasing decisions between money offers and snack items while undergoing EEG. Snack identity was presented either visually (value trials) or had to be recalled from memory (memory trials). Behavioral data indicated comparable choice consistency across both trial types, but considerably longer RTs in memory trials. Drift-diffusion modeling suggested that this RT difference was because of longer nondecision time of decision processes as well as altered evidence accumulation dynamics (lower accumulation rate and higher decision threshold). The nondecision time effect was supported by a delayed onset of the lateralized readiness potential. These results show that both decision and nondecision processes are prolonged when participants need to resort to internal memory representations during value-based decisions.

Effectiveness of eye movement exercise and diaphragmatic breathing with jogging in reducing migraine symptoms: A preliminary, randomized comparison trial

BACKGROUND

Migraine is a multifactorial headache disorder. Maladaptive functional networks or altered circuit-related connectivity in the brain with migraine appear to perturb the effects of usual treatments.

OBJECTIVES

In the present preliminary trial, we aim to study the effectiveness of performing pieces of body-mind, cognitive, or network reconstruction-based training (i.e., eye movement exercise plus jogging; EME+J and diaphragmatic breathing plus jogging; DB+J) in decreasing migraine symptoms.

METHODS

We used a three-arm, triple-blind, non-inferiority randomized comparison design with pre-test, post-test, and follow-up measurements to assess the effectiveness of EME+J and DB+J in the brain with migraine. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the study groups to perform either 12 consecutive weeks of EME+J (n = 22), DB+J (n = 19), or receiving, treatment as usual, TAU (n = 22).

RESULTS

The primary outcome statistical analysis through a linear mixed model showed a significant decrease in the frequency (p = .0001), duration (p = .003), and intensity (p = .007) of migraine attacks among the interventions and measurement times. The pairwise comparisons of simple effects showed that EME+J and DB+J effectively reduced migraine symptoms at the post-test and follow-up (p < .05). Cochran's tests showed that interventions decreased the number of menses-related migraine attacks. EME+J and DB+J effectively decreased over-the-counter (OTC) drug use, refreshed wake-up mode, and improved sleep and water drinking patterns. These are the secondary outcomes that Cochran's tests showed in the interventional groups after the interventions and at 12 months of follow-up.

CONCLUSION

EME+J or DB+J can be an effective and safe method with no adverse effects to decrease the symptoms of migraine attacks. Moreover, a reduction in the frequency of menstrual cycle-related attacks, OTC drug use, and improved quality of sleep and drinking water were the secondary outcomes of the post-test and a 12-month follow-up.

Neurolaw: Challenges and limits

This chapter canvasses the current relevance of behavioral neuroscience to the law, especially to issues of criminal responsibility and competence. It begins with an explanation of the legal doctrines at stake. I then explore the source of the often-inflated claims for the legal relevance of neuroscience. The next section discusses the scientific status of behavioral neuroscience. Then, it addresses two radical challenges to current conceptions of criminal responsibility that neuroscience allegedly poses: determinism and the death of agency. The question of the specific relevance of neuroscience to criminal law doctrine, practice, and institutions is considered next. This is followed by a discussion of how neuroscience evidence is being used in criminal cases in five different countries, including the United States. The penultimate section points to some areas warranting modest optimism. A brief conclusion suggests that neuroscience is at present of limited legal relevance, and advances in the science might alter that judgment.

Beyond passive observation: feedback anticipation and observation activate the mirror system in virtual finger movement control via P300-BCI

Action observation (AO) is widely used as a post-stroke therapy to activate sensorimotor circuits through the mirror neuron system. However, passive observation is often considered to be less effective and less interactive than goal-directed movement observation, leading to the suggestion that observation of goal-directed actions may have stronger therapeutic potential, as goal-directed AO has been shown to activate mechanisms for monitoring action errors. Some studies have also suggested the use of AO as a form of Brain-computer interface (BCI) feedback. In this study, we investigated the potential for observation of virtual hand movements within a P300-based BCI as a feedback system to activate the mirror neuron system. We also explored the role of feedback anticipation and estimation mechanisms during movement observation. Twenty healthy subjects participated in the study. We analyzed event-related desynchronization and synchronization (ERD/S) of sensorimotor EEG rhythms and Error-related potentials (ErrPs) during observation of virtual hand finger flexion presented as feedback in the P300-BCI loop and compared the dynamics of ERD/S and ErrPs during observation of correct feedback and errors. We also analyzed these EEG markers during passive AO under two conditions: when subjects anticipated the action demonstration and when the action was unexpected. A pre-action mu-ERD was found both before passive AO and during action anticipation within the BCI loop. Furthermore, a significant increase in beta-ERS was found during AO within incorrect BCI feedback trials. We suggest that the BCI feedback may exaggerate the passive-AO effect, as it engages feedback anticipation and estimation mechanisms as well as movement error monitoring simultaneously. The results of this study provide insights into the potential of P300-BCI with AO-feedback as a tool for neurorehabilitation.

Feeling ready: neural bases of prospective motor readiness judgements

The idea that human agents voluntarily control their actions, including their spontaneous movements, strongly implies an anticipatory awareness of action. That is, agents should be aware they are about to act before actually executing a movement. Previous research has identified neural signals that could underpin prospective conscious access to motor preparation, including the readiness potential and the beta-band event-related desynchronization. In this study, we ran two experiments to test whether these two neural precursors of action also tracka subjective feeling of readiness. In Experiment 1, we combined a self-paced action task with an intention-probing design where participants gave binary responses to indicate whether they felt they had been about to move when a probe was presented. In Experiment 2, participants reported their feeling of readiness on a graded scale. We found that the feeling of readiness reliably correlates with the beta-band amplitude, but not with the readiness potential.

Breathing is coupled with voluntary initiation of mental imagery

Previous research has suggested that bodily signals from internal organs are associated with diverse cortical and subcortical processes involved in sensory-motor functions, beyond homeostatic reflexes. For instance, a recent study demonstrated that the preparation and execution of voluntary actions, as well as its underlying neural activity, are coupled with the breathing cycle. In the current study, we investigated whether such breathing-action coupling is limited to voluntary motor action or whether it is also present for mental actions not involving any overt bodily movement. To answer this question, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and respiratory signals while participants were conducting a voluntary action paradigm including self-initiated motor execution (ME), motor imagery (MI), and visual imagery (VI) tasks. We observed that the voluntary initiation of ME, MI, and VI are similarly coupled with the respiration phase. In addition, EEG analysis revealed the existence of readiness potential (RP) waveforms in all three tasks (i.e., ME, MI, VI), as well as a coupling between the RP amplitude and the respiratory phase. Our findings show that the voluntary initiation of both imagined and overt action is coupled with respiration, and further suggest that the breathing system is involved in preparatory processes of voluntary action by contributing to the temporal decision of when to initiate the action plan, regardless of whether this culminates in overt movements.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions

Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will-especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an "easy" decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to "easy" than "hard" decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making.

Time-estimation process could cause the disappearence of readiness potential

Generally, the readiness potential (RP) is considered to be the scalp electroencephalography (EEG) activity preceding movement. In our previous study, we found early RP was absent among approximately half of the subjects during instructed action, but we did not identify the mechanism causing the disappearance of the RP. In this study, we investigated whether the time-estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. First, we designed experiments consisting of motor execution (ME), motor execution after time estimation (MEATE), and time estimation (TE) tasks, and we collected and preprocessed the EEG data of 16 subjects. Second, we compared the event related potential (ERP) waveform and scalp topography between ME and MEATE tasks. Then, to explore the influence of time-estimation, we analyzed the difference in ERP between MEATE and TE tasks. Finally, we used source imaging to probe the activation of brain regions during the three tasks, and we calculated the average activation amplitude of eight motor related brain regions. We found that the RP occurred in the ME task but not in the MEATE task. We also found that the waveform of the difference in ERP between the MEATE and TE tasks was similar to that of the ME task. The results of source imaging indicated that, compared to the ME task, the activation amplitude of the supplementary motor area (SMA) decreased significantly for the MEATE task. Our results suggested that the time estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. This phenomenon might be caused by the counteraction of neural electrical activity related to time estimation and motor preparation in the SMA.

Neural signatures of evidence accumulation in temporal decisions

Cognitive models of interval timing can be formulated as an accumulation-to-bound process.1-5 However, the physiological manifestation of such processes has not yet been identified. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to measure the neural responses of participants while they performed a temporal bisection task in which they were requested to categorize the duration of visual stimuli as short or long.6 We found that the stimulus-offset and response-locked activity depends on both stimulus duration and the participants' decision. To relate this activity to the underlying cognitive processes, we used a drift-diffusion model.7 The model includes a noisy accumulator starting with the stimulus onset and a decision threshold. According to the model, a stimulus duration will be categorized as "long" if the accumulator reaches the threshold during stimulus presentation. Otherwise, it will be categorized as "short." We found that at the offset of stimulus presentation, an EEG response marks the distance of the accumulator from the threshold. Therefore, this model offers an accurate description of our behavioral data as well as the EEG response using the same two model parameters. We then replicated this finding in an identical experiment conducted in the tactile domain. We also extended this finding to two different temporal ranges (sub- and supra-second). Taken together, the work provides a new way to study the cognitive processes underlying temporal decisions, using a combination of behavior, EEG, and modeling.

Relating a Spiking Neural Network Model and the Diffusion Model of Decision-Making

Many models of decision making assume accumulation of evidence to threshold as a core mechanism to predict response probabilities and response times. A spiking neural network model (Wang, 2002) instantiates these mechanisms at the level of biophysically-plausible pools of neurons with excitatory and inhibitory connections, and has numerous model parameters tuned by physiological measures. The diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) is a cognitive model that can be fitted to a range of behaviors and conditions. We investigated how parameters of the cognitive-level diffusion model relate to the parameters of a neural-level spiking model. In each simulated "experiment", we generated "data" from the spiking neural network by factorially combining a manipulation of choice difficulty (via the input to the spiking model) and a manipulation of one of the core parameters of the spiking model. We then fitted the diffusion model to these simulated data to observe how manipulation of each core spiking model parameter mapped on to fitted drift rate, response threshold, and non-decision time. Manipulations of parameters in the spiking model related to input sensitivity, threshold, and stimulus processing time mapped on to their conceptual analogues in the diffusion model, namely drift rate, threshold, and non-decision time. Manipulations of parameters in the spiking model with no direct analogue to the diffusion model, non-stimulus-specific background input, strength of recurrent excitation, and receptor conductances, mapped on to threshold in the diffusion model. We discuss implications of these results for interpretations of fits of the diffusion model to behavioral data.

Peripheral NOD-like receptor deficient inflammatory macrophages trigger neutrophil infiltration into the brain disrupting daytime locomotion

Inflammation is known to disrupt normal behavior, yet the underlying neuroimmune interactions remain elusive. Here, we investigated whether inappropriate macrophage-evoked inflammation alters CNS control of daily-life animal locomotion using a set of zebrafish mutants selected for specific macrophage dysfunction and microglia deficiency. Large-scale genetic and computational analyses revealed that NOD-like receptor nlrc3l mutants are capable of normal motility and visuomotor response, but preferentially swim less in the daytime, suggesting possible low motivation rather than physical impairment. Examining their brain activities and structures implicates impaired dopaminergic descending circuits, where neutrophils abnormally infiltrate. Furthermore, neutrophil depletion recovered daytime locomotion. Restoring wild-type macrophages reversed behavioral and neutrophil aberrations, while three other microglia-lacking mutants failed to phenocopy nlrc3l mutants. Overall, we reveal how peripheral inflammatory macrophages with elevated pro-inflammatory cues (including il1β, tnfα, cxcl8a) in the absence of microglia co-opt neutrophils to infiltrate the brain, thereby potentially enabling local circuitry modulation affecting daytime locomotion.

Implicit mechanisms of intention

High-level cortical regions encode motor decisions before or even absent awareness, suggesting that neural processes predetermine behavior before conscious choice. Such early neural encoding challenges popular conceptions of human agency. It also raises fundamental questions for brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) that traditionally assume that neural activity reflects the user's conscious intentions. Here, we study the timing of human posterior parietal cortex single-neuron activity recorded from implanted microelectrode arrays relative to the explicit urge to initiate movement. Participants were free to choose when to move, whether to move, and what to move, and they retrospectively reported the time they felt the urge to move. We replicate prior studies by showing that posterior parietal cortex (PPC) neural activity sharply rises hundreds of milliseconds before the reported urge. However, we find that this "preconscious" activity is part of a dynamic neural population response that initiates much earlier, when the participant first chooses to perform the task. Together with details of neural timing, our results suggest that PPC encodes an internal model of the motor planning network that transforms high-level task objectives into appropriate motor behavior. These new data challenge traditional interpretations of early neural activity and offer a more holistic perspective on the interplay between choice, behavior, and their neural underpinnings. Our results have important implications for translating BMIs into more complex real-world environments. We find that early neural dynamics are sufficient to drive BMI movements before the participant intends to initiate movement. Appropriate algorithms ensure that BMI movements align with the subject's awareness of choice.

Improving the performance of a gaze independent P300-BCI by using the expectancy wave

OBJECTIVE

A P300-BCI conveys a subject's intention through recognition of their ERPs. However, in the case of visual stimuli, its performance depends strongly on eye gaze. When eye movement is impaired, it becomes difficult to focus attention on a target stimulus, and the quality of the ERP declines greatly, thereby affecting recognition efficiency.

APPROACH

In this paper, the expectancy wave (E-wave) is proposed to improve signal quality and thereby improve identification of visual targets under the covert attention. The stimuli of the P300-BCI described here are presented in a fixed sequence, so the subjects can predict the next target stimulus and establish a stable expectancy effect of the target stimulus through training. Features from the E-wave that occurred 0~300ms before a stimulus were added to the post-stimulus ERP components for intention recognition.

MAIN RESULTS

Comparisons of 10 healthy subjects before and after training demonstrated that the expectancy wave generated before target stimulus could be used with the P300 component to improve character recognition accuracy (CRA) from 85% to 92.4%. In addition, CRA using only the expectancy component can reach 68.2%, which is significantly greater than random probability (16.7%). The results of this study indicate that the expectancy wave can be used to improve recognition efficiency for a gaze-independent P300-BCI, and that training contributes to induction and recognition of the potential.

SIGNIFICANCE

This study proposes an effective approach to an efficient gaze-independent P300-BCI system.

Unconscious Influences on "Free Will" Movement Initiation: Slow-wave Brain Stimulation and the Readiness Potential

A central objective in the study of volition has been to identify how changes in neural activity relate to voluntary-"free will"-movement. The readiness potential (RP) is observed in the EEG as a slow-building signal that precedes action onset. Many consider the RP as a marker of an underlying preparatory process for initiating voluntary movement. However, the RP may emerge from ongoing slow-wave brain oscillations that influence the timing of movement initiation in a phase-dependent manner. Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) enables brain oscillations to be entrained at the frequency of stimulation. We delivered tACS at a slow-wave frequency over frontocentral motor areas while participants (n = 30) performed a simple, self-paced button press task. During the active tACS condition, participants showed a tendency to initiate actions in the phase of the tACS cycle that corresponded to increased negative potentials across the frontocentral motor region. Comparisons of premovement EEG activity observed over frontocentral and central scalp electrodes showed earlier onset and increased amplitude of RPs from active stimulation compared with sham stimulation. This suggests that movement-related activity in the brain can be modulated by the delivery of weak, nonconsciously perceptible alternating currents over frontocentral motor regions. We present novel findings that support existing theories, which suggest the timing of voluntary movement is influenced by the phase of slow-changing oscillating brain states.

Neurons as will and representation

Memory recollections and voluntary actions are often perceived as spontaneously generated irrespective of external stimuli. Although products of our neurons, they are only rarely accessible in humans at the neuronal level. Here I review insights gleaned from unique neurosurgical opportunities to record and stimulate single-neuron activity in people who can declare their thoughts, memories and wishes. I discuss evidence that the subjective experience of human recollection and that of voluntary action arise from the activity of two internal neuronal generators, the former from medial temporal lobe reactivation and the latter from frontoparietal preactivation. I characterize properties of these generators and their interaction, enabling flexible recruitment of memory-based choices for action as well as recruitment of action-based plans for the representation of conceptual knowledge in memories. Both internal generators operate on surprisingly explicit but different neuronal codes, which appear to arise with distinct single-neuron activity, often observed before participants' reports of conscious awareness. I discuss prediction of behaviour based on these codes, and the potential for their modulation. The prospects of editing human memories and volitions by enhancement, inception or deletion of specific, selected content raise therapeutic possibilities and ethical concerns.

Complex pathways and memory in compressed corrugated sheets

The nonlinear response of driven complex materials-disordered magnets, amorphous media, and crumpled sheets-features intricate transition pathways where the system repeatedly hops between metastable states. Such pathways encode memory effects and may allow information processing, yet tools are lacking to experimentally observe and control these pathways, and their full breadth has not been explored. Here we introduce compression of corrugated elastic sheets to precisely observe and manipulate their full, multistep pathways, which are reproducible, robust, and controlled by geometry. We show how manipulation of the boundaries allows us to elicit multiple targeted pathways from a single sample. In all cases, each state in the pathway can be encoded by the binary state of material bits called hysterons, and the strength of their interactions plays a crucial role. In particular, as function of increasing interaction strength, we observe Preisach pathways, expected in systems of independently switching hysterons; scrambled pathways that evidence hitherto unexplored interactions between these material bits; and accumulator pathways which leverage these interactions to perform an elementary computation. Our work opens a route to probe, manipulate, and understand complex pathways, impacting future applications in soft robotics and information processing in materials.

Ethical problems in the use of algorithms in data management and in a free market economy

The problem that I present in this paper concerns the issue of ethical evaluation of algorithms, especially those used in social media and which create profiles of users of these media and new technologies that have recently emerged and are intended to change the functioning of technologies used in data management. Systems such as Overton, SambaNova or Snorkel were created to help engineers create data management models, but they are based on different assumptions than the previous approach in machine learning and deep learning. There is a need to analyze both deep learning algorithms and new technologies in database management in terms of their actions towards a person who leaves their digital footprints, on which these technologies work. Then, the possibilities of applying the existing deep learning technology and new Big Data systems in the economy will be shown. The opportunities offered by the systems mentioned above seem to be promising for many companies and—if implemented on a larger scale—they will affect the functioning of the free market.

Central nervous system physiology

This is the second chapter of the series on the use of clinical neurophysiology for the study of movement disorders. It focusses on methods that can be used to probe neural circuits in brain and spinal cord. These include use of spinal and supraspinal reflexes to probe the integrity of transmission in specific pathways; transcranial methods of brain stimulation such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation, which activate or modulate (respectively) the activity of populations of central neurones; EEG methods, both in conjunction with brain stimulation or with behavioural measures that record the activity of populations of central neurones; and pure behavioural measures that allow us to build conceptual models of motor control. The methods are discussed mainly in relation to work on healthy individuals. Later chapters will focus specifically on changes caused by pathology.

Increased scale-free and aperiodic neural activity during sensorimotor integration-a novel facet in Tourette syndrome

Tourette syndrome is a common neurodevelopmental disorder defined by multiple motor and phonic tics. Tics in Tourette syndrome resemble spontaneously occurring movements in healthy controls and are therefore sometimes difficult to distinguish from these. Tics may in fact be mis-interpreted as a meaningful action, i.e. a signal with social content, whereas they lack such information and could be conceived a surplus of action or 'motor noise'. These and other considerations have led to a 'neural noise account' of Tourette syndrome suggesting that the processing of neural noise and adaptation of the signal-to-noise ratio during information processing is relevant for the understanding of Tourette syndrome. So far, there is no direct evidence for this. Here, we tested the 'neural noise account' examining 1/f noise, also called scale-free neural activity as well as aperiodic activity, in n = 74 children, adolescents and adults with Tourette syndrome and n = 74 healthy controls during task performance using EEG data recorded during a sensorimotor integration task. In keeping with results of a previous study in adults with Tourette syndrome, behavioural data confirmed that sensorimotor integration was also stronger in this larger Tourette syndrome cohort underscoring the relevance of perceptual-action processes in this disorder. More importantly, we show that 1/f noise and aperiodic activity during sensorimotor processing is increased in patients with Tourette syndrome supporting the 'neural noise account'. This implies that asynchronous/aperiodic neural activity during sensorimotor integration is stronger in patients with Tourette syndrome compared to healthy controls, which is probably related to abnormalities of GABAergic and dopaminergic transmission in these patients. Differences in 1/f noise and aperiodic activity between patients with Tourette syndrome and healthy controls were driven by high-frequency oscillations and not lower-frequency activity currently discussed to be important in the pathophysiology of tics. This and the fact that Bayesian statistics showed that there is evidence for the absence of a correlation between neural noise and clinical measures of tics, suggest that increased 1/f noise and aperiodic activity are not directly related to tics but rather represents a novel facet of Tourette syndrome.

Functional localization and categorization of intentional decisions in humans: A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies

Brain-imaging research on intentional decision-making often employs a "free-choice" paradigm, in which participants choose among options with identical values or outcomes. Although the medial prefrontal cortex has commonly been associated with choices, there is no consensus on the wider network that underlies diverse intentional decisions and behaviours. Our systematic literature search identified 35 fMRI/PET experiments using various free-choice paradigms, with appropriate control conditions using external instructions. An Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analysis showed that, compared with external instructions, intentional decisions consistently activate the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the left insula and the inferior parietal lobule. We then categorized the studies into four different types according to their experimental designs: reactive motor intention, perceptual intention, inhibitory intention, and cognitive intention. We conducted conjunction and contrast meta-analyses to identify consistent and selective spatial convergence of brain activation within each specific category of intentional decision. Finally, we used meta-analytic decoding to probe cognitive processes underlying free choices. Our findings suggest that the neurocognitive process underlying intentional decision incorporates anatomically separated components subserving distinct cognitive and computational roles.