Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

Towards an animal model of consciousness based on the platform theory

The evolution of intellectual capacities has brought forth a continuum of consciousness levels subserved by neuronal networks of varying complexity. Brain pathologies, neurodegenerative, and mental diseases affect conscious cognition and behavior. Although impairments in consciousness are among the most devastating consequences of neurological and mental diseases, valid and reliable animal models of consciousness, that could be used for preclinical research are missing. The platform theory holds that the brain enters a conscious operation mode, whenever mental representations of stimuli, associations, concepts, memories, and experiences are effortfully maintained (in working memory) and actively manipulated. We used the platform theory as a framework and evaluation standard to categorize behavioral paradigms with respect to the level of consciousness involved in task performance. According to the platform theory, a behavioral paradigm involves conscious cognitive operations, when the problem posed is unexpected, novel or requires the maintenance and manipulation of a large amount of information to perform cognitive operations on them. Conscious cognitive operations are associated with a relocation of processing resources and the redirection of attentional focus. A consciousness behavioral test battery is proposed that is composed of tests which are assumed to require higher levels of consciousness as compared to other tasks and paradigms. The consciousness test battery for rodents includes the following tests: Working memory in the radial arm maze, episodic-like memory, prospective memory, detour test, and operant conditioning with concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedules. Performance in this test battery can be contrasted with the performance in paradigms and tests that require lower levels of consciousness. Additionally, a second more comprehensive behavioral test battery is proposed to control for behavioral phenotypes not related to consciousness. Our theory could serve as a guidance for the decryption of the neurobiological basis of consciousness.

Continuous flash suppression: Known and unknowns

Studies utilizing continuous flash suppression (CFS) provide valuable information regarding conscious and nonconscious perception. There are, however, crucial unanswered questions regarding the mechanisms of suppression and the level of visual processing in the absence of consciousness with CFS. Research suggests that the answers to these questions depend on the experimental configuration and how we assess consciousness in these studies. The aim of this review is to evaluate the impact of different experimental configurations and the assessment of consciousness on the results of the previous CFS studies. We review studies that evaluated the influence of different experimental configuration on the depth of suppression with CFS and discuss how different assessments of consciousness may impact the results of CFS studies. Finally, we review behavioral and brain recording studies of CFS. In conclusion, previous studies provide evidence for survival of low-level visual information and complete impairment of high-level visual information under the influence of CFS. That is, studies suggest that nonconscious perception of lower-level visual information happens with CFS, but there is no evidence for nonconscious high-level recognition with CFS.

The temporally-integrated causality landscape: A theoretical framework for consciousness and meaning

Theoretical approaches to understanding consciousness have begun to converge upon areas of general agreement, yet substantive differences remain. Here, I introduce a new theoretical framework for the emergence of consciousness from the functional integration of the thalamocortical system: the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). TICL presents a novel perspective which addresses important phenomenological characteristics of consciousness that other frameworks, such as IIT, do not. First, the TICL is based upon the observation that conscious experiences are temporally continuous, not discrete. Secondly, the TICL establishes a thalamocortical basis for the point-of-view. According to TICL, consciousness is composed of contents that arise from neuronal subsystems that have meaning from the point-of-view of the larger, integrated system in which they are nested. Meaningful contents emerge from the subsystems because they exhibit a level of temporally-integrated causality (TIC) that is distinguishable from that of the larger system.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.

Binocular rivalry and emotion: Implications for neural correlates of consciousness and emotional biases in conscious perception

Studies of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) combining MEG/EEG with behavioral data have described two main time ranges relating to conscious perception: 130-320 (the visual awareness negativity; VAN) and 300-500 (P3a) ms after stimulus onset. At the same time, two event-related potential (ERP) peaks have shown an emotional modulation of endogenous attention: the early posterior negativity (EPN; peaking around 250 msec) and the late positive potential (LPP, peaking around 600 msec). Furthermore, an emotional bias on conscious perception has been reported in Binocular Rivalry (BR) studies. Here, we combined an intermittent BR paradigm with neutral and emotional stimuli while recording the behavioral subjective perception and ERPs with two aims: i) to explore the NCCs of emotional content in the time ranges previously described, and ii) to study the emotional bias in conscious perception as first percept when neutral and emotional images rival against each other. First, results revealed a specific ERP emotional modulation (emotional content awareness modulation; ECAM) at the VAN time range. This was the first time window sensitive to the emotional information and showing the strongest modulation in conscious emotional content. Second, results revealed an emotional bias in conscious perception towards the positive valence. This work shows how conscious perception pertaining to emotional content relates to perceptual areas at the VAN latency, which supports the claim of the 130-320 msec time window as the earliest NCC and extends the claim to apply to more than visual perceptual features. Additionally, our findings show that positive and negative content modulates the conscious perception differently.

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.

Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

I introduce arguments toward a non-representational reflexivity theory of consciousness-as-such to address one of the key issues in the science of consciousness today: lack of understanding of the nature of consciousness itself. An expanded map of consciousness is outlined, which includes, in addition to the well-known contents of awareness and levels of arousal, the indeterminate substrate and consciousness-as-such or nondual awareness. The central idea presented is that consciousness-as-such is a non-conceptual nondual awareness, whose essential property is non-representational reflexivity. This property makes consciousness-as-such phenomenologically, cognitively and neurobiologically a unique kind, different from and irreducible to any contents, functions and states, including the indeterminate substrate. Our previous hypothesis on the precuneus network for nondual awareness is further discussed in relation to non-representational reflexivity, and in the light of other hypotheses on the neural correlates of consciousness-as-such.

A methodological dilemma for investigating consciousness empirically

This paper exposes a methodological dilemma arising for the research program of finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), the minimal set of brain processes sufficient for a particular percept. The main claim is that it is doubtful that the right kind of correlations will ever be obtained because the foregoing conceptual decisions regarding the relations between consciousness, attention, cognitive access, report, and other cognitive functions determine the interpretation of the correlation data that can be obtained. Relying on subjective reports likely leads to confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms for cognitive functions because reports presuppose cognitive access. No-report paradigms are in danger of confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. So there does not seem to be a way of making sure to have isolated the neural correlate of conscious experience.

Extending Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness

Aron Gurwitsch's theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch's account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one's body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. These ideas can be linked with (and help unify) contemporary theories about the neural correlates of consciousness, inattention, the small world structure of the brain, meta-stable dynamics, embodied cognition, and predictive coding in the brain.

Psychophysical "blinding" methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing

Numerous non-invasive experimental "blinding" methods exist for suppressing the phenomenal awareness of visual stimuli. Not all of these suppressive methods occur at, and thus index, the same level of unconscious visual processing. This suggests that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can in principle be established. The empirical results of extant studies that have used a number of different methods and additional reasonable theoretical considerations suggest the following tentative hierarchy. At the highest levels in this hierarchy is unconscious processing indexed by object-substitution masking. The functional levels indexed by crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich masking, and single-flash interocular suppression, fall at progressively lower levels, while unconscious processing at the lowest levels is indexed by eye-based binocular-rivalry suppression. Although unconscious processing levels indexed by additional blinding methods is yet to be determined, a tentative placement at lower levels in the hierarchy is also given for unconscious processing indexed by Troxler fading and adaptation-induced blindness, and at higher levels in the hierarchy indexed by attentional blinding effects in addition to the level indexed by the attentional blink. The full mapping of levels in the functional hierarchy onto cortical activation sites and levels is yet to be determined. The existence of such a hierarchy bears importantly on the search for, and the distinctions between, neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision.

Slow cortical potentials and "inner time consciousness" - A neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about the "width of present"

William James postulated a "stream of consciousness" that presupposes temporal continuity. The neuronal mechanisms underlying the construction of such temporal continuity remain unclear, however, in my contribution, I propose a neuro-phenomenal hypothesis that is based on slow cortical potentials and their extension of the present moment as described in the phenomenal term of "width of present". More specifically, I focus on the way the brain's neural activity needs to be encoded in order to make possible the "stream of consciousness." This leads us again to the low-frequency fluctuations of the brain's neural activity and more specifically to slow cortical potentials (SCPs). Due to their long phase duration as low-frequency fluctuations, SCPs can integrate different stimuli and their associated neural activity from different regions in one converging region. Such integration may be central for consciousness to occur, as it was recently postulated by He and Raichle. They leave open, however, the question of the exact neuronal mechanisms, like the encoding strategy, that make possible the association of the otherwise purely neuronal SCP with consciousness and its phenomenal features. I hypothesize that SCPs allow for linking and connecting different discrete points in physical time by encoding their statistically based temporal differences rather than the single discrete time points by themselves. This presupposes difference-based coding rather than stimulus-based coding. The encoding of such statistically based temporal differences makes it possible to "go beyond" the merely physical features of the stimuli; that is, their single discrete time points and their conduction delays (as related to their neural processing in the brain). This, in turn, makes possible the constitution of "local temporal continuity" of neural activity in one particular region. The concept of "local temporal continuity" signifies the linkage and integration of different discrete time points into one neural activity in a particular region. How does such local temporal continuity predispose the experience of time in consciousness? For that, I turn to phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what he calls "inner time consciousness" (Husserl and Brough, 1990). One hallmark of humans' "inner time consciousness" is that we experience events and objects in succession and duration in our consciousness; according to Husserl, this amounts to what he calls the "width of [the] present." The concept of the width of present describes the extension of the present beyond the single discrete time point, such as, for instance, when we perceive different tones as a melody. I now hypothesize the degree of the width of present to be directly dependent upon and thus predisposed by the degree of the temporal differences between two (or more) discrete time points as they are encoded into neural activity. I therefore conclude that the SCPs and their encoding of neural activity in terms of temporal differences must be regarded a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) as distinguished from a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC).