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Sodian B, Kaltefleiter LJ, Schuwerk T, Kloo D. Continuity in false belief understanding from 33 to 52 months of age. J Exp Child Psychol 2024; 247:106039. [PMID: 39154614 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2024.106039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2024] [Revised: 07/11/2024] [Accepted: 07/11/2024] [Indexed: 08/20/2024]
Abstract
Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally-Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, D-80802 Munich, Germany.
| | - Larissa J Kaltefleiter
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, D-80802 Munich, Germany
| | - Tobias Schuwerk
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, D-80802 Munich, Germany
| | - Daniela Kloo
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, D-80802 Munich, Germany
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2
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Luo Y, vanMarle K, Groh AM. The Cognitive Architecture of Infant Attachment. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024:17456916241262693. [PMID: 39186195 DOI: 10.1177/17456916241262693] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 08/27/2024]
Abstract
Meta-analytic evidence indicates that the quality of the attachment relationship that infants establish with their primary caregiver has enduring significance for socioemotional and cognitive outcomes. However, the mechanisms by which early attachment experiences contribute to subsequent development remain underspecified. According to attachment theory, early attachment experiences become embodied in the form of cognitive-affective representations, referred to as internal working models (IWMs), that guide future behavior. Little is known, however, about the cognitive architecture of IWMs in infancy. In this article, we discuss significant advances made in the field of infant cognitive development and propose that leveraging insights from this research has the potential to fundamentally shape our understanding of the cognitive architecture of attachment representations in infancy. We also propose that the integration of attachment research into cognitive research can shed light on the role of early experiences, individual differences, and stability and change in infant cognition, as well as open new routes of investigation in cognitive studies, which will further our understanding of human knowledge. We provide recommendations for future research throughout the article and conclude by using our collaborative research as an example.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri-Columbia
| | - Kristy vanMarle
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri-Columbia
| | - Ashley M Groh
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri-Columbia
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3
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Sağel-Çetiner E, Yılmaz Irmak T, Açık Yavuz B. To tell the truth or not: What effortful control, false belief, and sympathy tell us about preschoolers' instrumental lies. J Exp Child Psychol 2024; 240:105839. [PMID: 38184957 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105839] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 09/10/2023] [Accepted: 12/13/2023] [Indexed: 01/09/2024]
Abstract
This study aimed to examine the predictors of instrumental lies in preschool children, specifically focusing on false belief, effortful control, and sympathy. Instrumental lies are intentional falsehoods used to achieve personal goals such as avoiding punishment and obtaining an undeserved reward. A total of 192 preschool children (age range = 32-73 month-olds), along with their mothers and fathers, participated in the study. The Temptation Resistance Paradigm, an experimental task, was employed to elicit instrumental lies from the children. The children also completed first-order false belief measures, and their parents filled out questionnaires assessing their children's effortful control and sympathy skills. Results revealed a positive association between children's effortful control and their decisions to tell instrumental lies. However, no significant relationship was found between false belief and instrumental lying. Age moderated the link between sympathy and the decision to tell instrumental lies, with sympathy being negatively associated with lie-telling behavior among older children but showing no effect among younger children. The study variables did not predict the maintenance of instrumental lies. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the role of effortful control and sympathy as underlying temperamental and emotional processes influencing children's decisions to engage in instrumental lie-telling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ece Sağel-Çetiner
- Department of Psychology, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, 09010 Efeler/Aydın, Turkey.
| | | | - Begüm Açık Yavuz
- Department of Psychology, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, 09010 Efeler/Aydın, Turkey
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4
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Meristo M, Surian L, Strid K. False belief understanding in deaf children: what are the difficulties? Front Psychol 2024; 15:1238505. [PMID: 38304920 PMCID: PMC10832997 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1238505] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2023] [Accepted: 01/05/2024] [Indexed: 02/03/2024] Open
Abstract
Children with cochlear implants (CIs) demonstrate proficiency in verbal-story elicited-response (VS-ER) false-belief tasks, such as the Sally & Ann task, at a similar age as typically developing hearing children. However, they face challenges in non-verbal spontaneous-response (NV-SR) false-belief tasks, measured via looking times, which hearing infants typically pass by around 2 years of age, or earlier. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether these difficulties remain in a non-verbal-story elicited-response (NVS-ER) false-belief task, in which children are offered the opportunity to provide an elicited response to a non-verbal-story task. A total of thirty 4- to 8-year-old children with CI-s and hearing children completed three different kinds of false-belief tasks. The results showed that children with CI-s performed above chance level on the verbal task (i.e., VS-ER task), but not on the two non-verbal tasks, (i.e., NVS-ER and NV-SR tasks). The control group of typically developing hearing children performed above chance on all three kinds of tasks (one-tailed significance level). Our findings highlight the importance of external narrative support for children with CIs in tasks that involve mental perspective-taking, and specifically predicting actions based on false beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marek Meristo
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
| | - Karin Strid
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
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5
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Taylor D, Gönül G, Alexander C, Züberbühler K, Clément F, Glock HJ. Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2023; 98:2028-2048. [PMID: 37408142 DOI: 10.1111/brv.12994] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2022] [Revised: 06/14/2023] [Accepted: 06/19/2023] [Indexed: 07/07/2023]
Abstract
Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.
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Affiliation(s)
- Derry Taylor
- Faculty of Science, Institute of Biology, Department of Comparative Cognition, University of Neuchâtel, Rue-Emile-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, 2000, Switzerland
| | - Gökhan Gönül
- Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Institute of Language and Communication Sciences, Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Pierre-à-Mazel 7, Neuchâtel, 2000, Switzerland
| | - Cameron Alexander
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, Zurich, CH-8044, Switzerland
| | - Klaus Züberbühler
- Faculty of Science, Institute of Biology, Department of Comparative Cognition, University of Neuchâtel, Rue-Emile-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, 2000, Switzerland
| | - Fabrice Clément
- Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Institute of Language and Communication Sciences, Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Pierre-à-Mazel 7, Neuchâtel, 2000, Switzerland
| | - Hans-Johann Glock
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, Zurich, CH-8044, Switzerland
- Institute for the Study of Language Evolution, University of Zürich, Affolternstrasse 56, Zürich, CH-8050, Switzerland
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Sauciuc GA, Persson T. Empirical challenges from the comparative and developmental literature to the Shared Intentionality Theory - a review of alternative data on recursive mind reading, prosociality, imitation and cumulative culture. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1157137. [PMID: 37901066 PMCID: PMC10613111 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1157137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2023] [Accepted: 09/28/2023] [Indexed: 10/31/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans have an irresistible inclination to coordinate actions with others, leading to species-unique forms of cooperation. According to the highly influential Shared Intentionality Theory (SITh), human cooperation is made possible by shared intentionality (SI), typically defined as a suite of socio-cognitive and motivational traits for sharing psychological states with others, thereby enabling individuals to engage in joint action in the mutually aware pursuit of shared goals. SITh theorises that SI evolved as late as 400,000 years ago, when our ancestors (in particular, Homo heidelbergensis) turned to a kind of food procurement that obligatorily required joint coordinated action. SI is, thus, hypothesized to be absent in other extant species, including our closest genetic relatives, the nonhuman great apes ("apes"). According to SITh, ape psychology is exclusively driven by individualistic motivations, as opposed to human psychology which is uniquely driven by altruistic motivations. The evolutionary scenario proposed by SITh builds on a series of findings from socio-cognitive research with apes and human children, and on the assumption that abilities expressed early in human development are human universals, unlikely to have been shaped by socio-cultural influences. Drawing on the primatological and developmental literature, we provide a systematic - albeit selective - review of SITh-inconsistent findings concerning psychological and behavioural traits theorised to be constitutive of SI. The findings we review pertain to all three thematic clusters typically addressed in SITh: (i) recursive mind reading; (ii) prosociality; (iii) imitation and cumulative culture. We conclude that such alternative data undermine two core SITh claims: the late evolutionary emergence of SI and the radical divide between ape and human psychology. We also discuss several conceptual and methodological limitations that currently hamper reliable comparative research on SI, in particular those engendered by Western-centric biases in the social sciences, where an overreliance on Western samples has promoted the formulation of Western-centric conceptualisations, operationalisations and methodologies.
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Bridgers S, De Simone C, Gweon H, Ruggeri A. Children seek help based on how others learn. Child Dev 2023; 94:1259-1280. [PMID: 37185813 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13926] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2020] [Revised: 01/02/2023] [Accepted: 01/24/2023] [Indexed: 05/17/2023]
Abstract
Do children consider how others learned when seeking help? Across three experiments, German children (N = 536 3-to-8 year olds, 49% female, majority White, tested 2017-2019) preferred to learn from successful active learners selectively by context: They sought help solving a problem from a learner who had independently discovered the solution to a previous problem over those who had learned through instruction or observation, but only when the current problem was novel, yet related, to the learners' problem (Experiment 1). Older, but not younger, children preferred the active learner even when she was offered help (Experiment 2), though only when her discovery was deliberate (Experiment 3). Although a preference to learn from successful active learners emerges early, a genuine appreciation for process beyond outcome increases across childhood.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sophie Bridgers
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
| | - Costanza De Simone
- Max Planck Research Group iSearch, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
| | - Hyowon Gweon
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
| | - Azzurra Ruggeri
- Max Planck Research Group iSearch, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
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8
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Ni Q, Shoyer J, Bautista Z, Raport A, Moll H. Toddlers' expressions indicate that they track agent-object interactions but do not detect false object representations. J Exp Child Psychol 2023; 231:105639. [PMID: 36863171 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105639] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2022] [Revised: 01/10/2023] [Accepted: 01/22/2023] [Indexed: 03/04/2023]
Abstract
In the theory of mind debate, a middle position between nativism and conceptual change theory has gained traction. This position states that children younger than 4 years track agent-object relations (by building "records" of others' experiences) without cognizing how agents represent-or misrepresent-the objects they encounter. We tested these claims with 3.5-year-olds using puppet shows geared to evoke suspenseful expressions. In two experiments (N = 90), children watched an agent approach an object that looked like her favorite food but was inedible. In Experiment 1, children showed tense expressions when an agent's real food item was, unbeknownst to her, replaced with a fake food item. Children, however, showed no signs of understanding that the agent would mistake the deceptive object for food. Consistent with this, children's expressions in Experiment 2 did not differ when the agent approached a deceptive object compared with when she approached a non-deceptive object. The experiments support the middle position's view that toddlers track agent-object interactions but fail to recognize when agents misrepresent objects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qianhui Ni
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA.
| | - Jake Shoyer
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Zoë Bautista
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Alexandra Raport
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Henrike Moll
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
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9
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Abstract
We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.
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10
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Moll H, Ni Q, Stekeler-Weithofer P. Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs: From practical to theoretical. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2073211] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Henrike Moll
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Qianhui Ni
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States
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11
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Firestein MR, Myers MM, Feder KJ, Ludwig RJ, Welch MG. Effects of Family Nurture Intervention in the NICU on Theory of Mind Abilities in Children Born Very Preterm: A Randomized Controlled Trial. CHILDREN (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 9:284. [PMID: 35205004 PMCID: PMC8870221 DOI: 10.3390/children9020284] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/27/2021] [Revised: 02/16/2022] [Accepted: 02/17/2022] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
Preterm infants are at risk for socioemotional deficits, neurodevelopmental disorders, and potentially theory of mind (ToM) deficits. Preterm infants enrolled in a randomized controlled trial in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) received Standard Care (SC) or Family Nurture Intervention (FNI). Children (N = 72; median age 61.8 ± 2.6 months; FNI: 35 (55%), SC:2 9 (45%)) completed a ToM task, of whom 64 (54% male; born to White (43.8%), Black (18.7%), and Hispanic (25.0%) mothers) contributed to this analysis. FNI and SC infants born extremely preterm to very preterm differed significantly: 78% (14 of 18) of FNI children passed vs. 30% (3 of 10) SC children (p = 0.01, effect size = 1.06). This large effect size suggests that FNI in the NICU may ameliorate deficits in social-cognitive skills of extreme to very preterm infants by school age.
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Affiliation(s)
- Morgan R. Firestein
- Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA; (M.M.M.); (M.G.W.)
| | - Michael M. Myers
- Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA; (M.M.M.); (M.G.W.)
- Department of Pediatrics, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA;
| | | | - Robert J. Ludwig
- Department of Pediatrics, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA;
| | - Martha G. Welch
- Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA; (M.M.M.); (M.G.W.)
- Department of Pediatrics, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, NY 10032, USA;
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Explicit and implicit theory of mind and social competence: A social information processing framework. NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2021.100915] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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13
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Kaltefleiter LJ, Schuwerk T, Wiesmann CG, Kristen-Antonow S, Jarvers I, Sodian B. Evidence for goal- and mixed evidence for false belief-based action prediction in two- to four-year-old children: A large-scale longitudinal anticipatory looking replication study. Dev Sci 2021; 25:e13224. [PMID: 34962028 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13224] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/11/2021] [Revised: 12/17/2021] [Accepted: 12/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in three- to four-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. [2017]. Developmental Science, 20(5), e12445). The present study is a large-scale replication attempt of this paradigm. The task was administered three times to the same sample of N = 185 children at two, three, and four years of age. Using the original stimuli, we did not replicate the original finding of above-chance belief-congruent looking in a combined score of two false belief conditions in either of the three age groups. Interestingly, the overall pattern of results was comparable to the original study. Post-hoc analyses revealed, however, that children performed above chance in one false belief condition (FB1) and below chance in the other false belief condition (FB2), thus yielding mixed evidence of children's false belief-based action predictions. Similar to the original study, participants' performance did not change with age and was not related to children's general language skills. This study demonstrates the importance of large-scaled replications and adds to the growing number of research questioning the validity and reliability of anticipatory looking false belief paradigms as a robust measure of children's implicit tracking of beliefs. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Tobias Schuwerk
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
- Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | | | - Irina Jarvers
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
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15
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Kaltefleiter LJ, Sodian B, Kristen-Antonow S, Grosse Wiesmann C, Schuwerk T. Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years? Infant Behav Dev 2021; 64:101575. [PMID: 34020154 DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2021.101575] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2020] [Revised: 05/07/2021] [Accepted: 05/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children's mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday. In the present study, we investigated longitudinally whether an early sensitivity to complement syntax is related to early development of Theory of Mind abilities in a sample of N = 159 German-speaking 27- to 36-month-old children. Children's sensitivity to formal properties of complement syntax at 33 months was associated with their perspective-taking skills and their metacognition of own ignorance three months later. This relation remained significant when controlling for the effects of general language abilities. Furthermore, children's sensitivity to complement syntax was concurrently related to their early false belief understanding. These findings support the view that complement syntax shares representational demands with an understanding of epistemic states and that language begins to support the acquisition of epistemic concepts earlier than was previously thought.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | | | - Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
- Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Tobias Schuwerk
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
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16
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Ma Q, Heleven E, Funghi G, Pu M, Baetens K, Deroost N, Van Overwalle F. Implicit Learning of True and False Belief Sequences. Front Psychol 2021; 12:643594. [PMID: 33841278 PMCID: PMC8032999 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.643594] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2020] [Accepted: 02/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
To investigate whether people can implicitly learn regularities in a social context, we developed a new implicit sequence learning task combining elements from classic false belief and serial reaction time tasks. Participants learned that protagonists were offered flowers at four locations. The protagonists' beliefs concerning the flowers were true or false, depending on their orientation, respectively, toward the scene (so that the flowers could be seen) or away from it. Unbeknown to the participants, there was a fixed belief-related sequence involving three dimensions (identity of the two protagonists, true-false belief orientation held by the protagonists, and flower location as believed by the protagonists). Participants had to indicate as fast as possible where the flowers were located (Experiment 1), or how many flowers were given (Experiment 2) according to the protagonists. Experiment 1 combined perceptual and motor processes (as both the belief-related sequence and motor responses referred to location), whereas Experiment 2 unconfounded the sequence and motor responses, allowing to investigate pure perceptual implicit learning. For reasons of comparison, two non-social conditions were created in Experiment 2 by replacing the protagonists with two non-social objects-colored cameras or shapes. Results revealed significant implicit sequence learning of all belief-related dimensions in Experiment 1, and of true-false belief orientation in Experiment 2, even without a motor confound. Importantly, there were faster reaction times and stronger sequence learning effects in the social than in the non-social conditions. The present findings demonstrate for the first time that people are able to implicitly learn belief-related sequences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qianying Ma
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Elien Heleven
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Giulia Funghi
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Min Pu
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Kris Baetens
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Natacha Deroost
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Frank Van Overwalle
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
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Rafetseder E, O'Brien C, Leahy B, Perner J. Extended difficulties with counterfactuals persist in reasoning with false beliefs: Evidence for teleology-in-perspective. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 204:105058. [PMID: 33341018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.105058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2019] [Revised: 11/06/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
Increasing evidence suggests that counterfactual reasoning is involved in false belief reasoning. Because existing work is correlational, we developed a manipulation that revealed a signature of counterfactual reasoning in participants' answers to false belief questions. In two experiments, we tested 3- to 14-year-olds and found high positive correlations (r = .56 and r = .73) between counterfactual and false belief questions. Children were very likely to respond to both questions with the same answer, also committing the same type of error. We discuss different theories and their ability to account for each aspect of our findings and conclude that reasoning about others' beliefs and actions requires similar cognitive processes as using counterfactual suppositions. Our findings question the explanatory power of the traditional frameworks, theory theory and simulation theory, in favor of views that explicitly provide for a relationship between false belief reasoning and counterfactual reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eva Rafetseder
- Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK; Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany.
| | - Christine O'Brien
- Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Brian Leahy
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Josef Perner
- Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Centre for Neurocognitive Research, University of Salzburg, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
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18
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Changeux JP, Goulas A, Hilgetag CC. A Connectomic Hypothesis for the Hominization of the Brain. Cereb Cortex 2021; 31:2425-2449. [PMID: 33367521 PMCID: PMC8023825 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhaa365] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2020] [Revised: 10/30/2020] [Accepted: 11/02/2020] [Indexed: 02/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Cognitive abilities of the human brain, including language, have expanded dramatically in the course of our recent evolution from nonhuman primates, despite only minor apparent changes at the gene level. The hypothesis we propose for this paradox relies upon fundamental features of human brain connectivity, which contribute to a characteristic anatomical, functional, and computational neural phenotype, offering a parsimonious framework for connectomic changes taking place upon the human-specific evolution of the genome. Many human connectomic features might be accounted for by substantially increased brain size within the global neural architecture of the primate brain, resulting in a larger number of neurons and areas and the sparsification, increased modularity, and laminar differentiation of cortical connections. The combination of these features with the developmental expansion of upper cortical layers, prolonged postnatal brain development, and multiplied nongenetic interactions with the physical, social, and cultural environment gives rise to categorically human-specific cognitive abilities including the recursivity of language. Thus, a small set of genetic regulatory events affecting quantitative gene expression may plausibly account for the origins of human brain connectivity and cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jean-Pierre Changeux
- CNRS UMR 3571, Institut Pasteur, 75724 Paris, France
- Communications Cellulaires, Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France
| | - Alexandros Goulas
- Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Eppendorf, Hamburg University, 20246 Hamburg, Germany
| | - Claus C Hilgetag
- Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Eppendorf, Hamburg University, 20246 Hamburg, Germany
- Department of Health Sciences, Boston University, Boston, MA 02115, USA
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19
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Ghrear S, Baimel A, Haddock T, Birch SAJ. Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0244141. [PMID: 33606742 PMCID: PMC7894954 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0244141] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a 'Theory of Mind') is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the 'Sally-Anne Task', because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one's understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children-the 'curse of knowledge' (the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old's (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children's performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Siba Ghrear
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
- * E-mail:
| | - Adam Baimel
- Department of Psychology, Health and Professional Development, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Taeh Haddock
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
| | - Susan A. J. Birch
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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20
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Van Overwalle F, Manto M, Cattaneo Z, Clausi S, Ferrari C, Gabrieli JDE, Guell X, Heleven E, Lupo M, Ma Q, Michelutti M, Olivito G, Pu M, Rice LC, Schmahmann JD, Siciliano L, Sokolov AA, Stoodley CJ, van Dun K, Vandervert L, Leggio M. Consensus Paper: Cerebellum and Social Cognition. CEREBELLUM (LONDON, ENGLAND) 2020; 19:833-868. [PMID: 32632709 PMCID: PMC7588399 DOI: 10.1007/s12311-020-01155-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 186] [Impact Index Per Article: 46.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
The traditional view on the cerebellum is that it controls motor behavior. Although recent work has revealed that the cerebellum supports also nonmotor functions such as cognition and affect, only during the last 5 years it has become evident that the cerebellum also plays an important social role. This role is evident in social cognition based on interpreting goal-directed actions through the movements of individuals (social "mirroring") which is very close to its original role in motor learning, as well as in social understanding of other individuals' mental state, such as their intentions, beliefs, past behaviors, future aspirations, and personality traits (social "mentalizing"). Most of this mentalizing role is supported by the posterior cerebellum (e.g., Crus I and II). The most dominant hypothesis is that the cerebellum assists in learning and understanding social action sequences, and so facilitates social cognition by supporting optimal predictions about imminent or future social interaction and cooperation. This consensus paper brings together experts from different fields to discuss recent efforts in understanding the role of the cerebellum in social cognition, and the understanding of social behaviors and mental states by others, its effect on clinical impairments such as cerebellar ataxia and autism spectrum disorder, and how the cerebellum can become a potential target for noninvasive brain stimulation as a therapeutic intervention. We report on the most recent empirical findings and techniques for understanding and manipulating cerebellar circuits in humans. Cerebellar circuitry appears now as a key structure to elucidate social interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Frank Van Overwalle
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
| | - Mario Manto
- Mediathèque Jean Jacquy, Service de Neurologie, CHU-Charleroi, Charleroi, Belgium
- Service des Neurosciences, Université de Mons, Mons, Belgium
| | - Zaira Cattaneo
- University of Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milan, Italy
- IRCCS Mondino Foundation, Pavia, Italy
| | - Silvia Clausi
- Ataxia Laboratory, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, 00179 Rome, Italy
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | | | - John D. E. Gabrieli
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
| | - Xavier Guell
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
- Ataxia Unit, Cognitive Behavioral Neurology Unit, Laboratory for Neuroanatomy and Cerebellar Neurobiology, Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA USA
| | - Elien Heleven
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
| | - Michela Lupo
- Ataxia Laboratory, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, 00179 Rome, Italy
| | - Qianying Ma
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
| | - Marco Michelutti
- Service de Neurologie & Neuroscape@NeuroTech Platform, Département des Neurosciences Cliniques, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV), Service de Neurologie Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
- Department of Neurosciences, University of Padua, Padua, Italy
| | - Giusy Olivito
- Ataxia Laboratory, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, 00179 Rome, Italy
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Min Pu
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
| | - Laura C. Rice
- Department of Psychology and Department of Neuroscience, American University, Washington, DC USA
| | - Jeremy D. Schmahmann
- Ataxia Unit, Cognitive Behavioral Neurology Unit, Laboratory for Neuroanatomy and Cerebellar Neurobiology, Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA USA
| | - Libera Siciliano
- Program in Behavioral Neuroscience, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Arseny A. Sokolov
- Service de Neurologie & Neuroscape@NeuroTech Platform, Département des Neurosciences Cliniques, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV), Service de Neurologie Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
- Department of Neurology, University Neurorehabilitation, University Hospital Inselspital, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London (UCL), London, UK
- Neuroscape Center, Weill Institute for Neurosciences, Department of Neurology, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA USA
| | - Catherine J. Stoodley
- Department of Psychology and Department of Neuroscience, American University, Washington, DC USA
| | - Kim van Dun
- Neurologic Rehabilitation Research, Rehabilitation Research Institute (REVAL), Hasselt University, 3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium
| | - Larry Vandervert
- American Nonlinear Systems, 1529 W. Courtland Avenue, Spokane, WA 99205-2608 USA
| | - Maria Leggio
- Ataxia Laboratory, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, 00179 Rome, Italy
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
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Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D. Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals. Front Psychol 2020; 11:547680. [PMID: 33071864 PMCID: PMC7536113 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2020] [Accepted: 08/18/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants' understanding of motivational mental states, such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent - they did not perceive beliefs as person specific. These findings indicate that the mechanisms that underlie infants' implicit attribution of beliefs differ from those assumed for explicit reasoning about beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly Burnside
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
| | - Cassandra Neumann
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
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22
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Hoyos C, Horton WS, Simms NK, Gentner D. Analogical Comparison Promotes Theory-of-Mind Development. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12891. [PMID: 32918371 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12891] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/04/2018] [Revised: 06/16/2020] [Accepted: 07/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Theory-of-mind (ToM) is an integral part of social cognition, but how it develops remains a critical question. There is evidence that children can gain insight into ToM through experience, including language training and explanatory interactions. But this still leaves open the question of how children gain these insights-what processes drive this learning? We propose that analogical comparison is a key mechanism in the development of ToM. In Experiment 1, children were shown true- and false-belief scenarios and prompted to engage in multiple comparisons (e.g., belief vs. world). In Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3, children saw a series of true- and false-belief events, varying in order and in their alignability. Across these experiments, we found that providing support for comparing true- and false-belief scenarios led to increased performance on false-belief tests. These findings show that analogical comparison can support ToM learning.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Nina K Simms
- Spatial Intelligence and Learning Center, Northwestern University
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23
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Theory of mind development: State of the science and future directions. PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 2020; 254:141-166. [PMID: 32859285 DOI: 10.1016/bs.pbr.2020.05.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/07/2023]
Abstract
This chapter offers a brief overview of how research on theory of mind development has developed over the recent years, with a focus on current research and theoretical accounts of theory of mind during the infancy period. The topics covered include the factors contributing to individual differences in theory of mind skills in preschoolers, the current replication crisis in theory of mind in infancy, the stability of theory of mind from infancy to childhood, and recent research suggesting that infants' concept of false belief is, at best, immature (e.g., overattribution to inanimate agents). Future directions in theory of mind research are suggested.
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24
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Zeng Y, Zhao Y, Zhang T, Zhao D, Zhao F, Lu E. A Brain-Inspired Model of Theory of Mind. Front Neurorobot 2020; 14:60. [PMID: 32982714 PMCID: PMC7483660 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2020.00060] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2020] [Accepted: 07/27/2020] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, and to understand that others have beliefs that are different from one's own. Although functional neuroimaging techniques have been widely used to establish the neural correlates implicated in ToM, the specific mechanisms are still not clear. We make our efforts to integrate and adopt existing biological findings of ToM, bridging the gap through computational modeling, to build a brain-inspired computational model for ToM. We propose a Brain-inspired Model of Theory of Mind (Brain-ToM model), and the model is applied to a humanoid robot to challenge the false belief tasks, two classical tasks designed to understand the mechanisms of ToM from Cognitive Psychology. With this model, the robot can learn to understand object permanence and visual access from self-experience, then uses these learned experience to reason about other's belief. We computationally validated that the self-experience, maturation of correlate brain areas (e.g., calculation capability) and their connections (e.g., inhibitory control) are essential for ToM, and they have shown their influences on the performance of the participant robot in false-belief task. The theoretic modeling and experimental validations indicate that the model is biologically plausible, and computationally feasible as a foundation for robot theory of mind.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yi Zeng
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
- Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
- National Laboratory of Pattern Recognition, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
- School of Artificial Intelligence, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Yuxuan Zhao
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Tielin Zhang
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Dongcheng Zhao
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
- School of Artificial Intelligence, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Feifei Zhao
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Enmeng Lu
- Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
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Sodian B, Kristen‐Antonow S, Kloo D. How Does Children’s Theory of Mind Become Explicit? A Review of Longitudinal Findings. CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 2020. [DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology Ludwig‐Maximilian‐University
| | | | - Daniela Kloo
- Department of Psychology Ludwig‐Maximilian‐University
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26
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2.5-year-olds succeed in identity and location elicited-response false-belief tasks with adequate response practice. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 198:104890. [PMID: 32653728 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104890] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2020] [Revised: 05/01/2020] [Accepted: 05/03/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Researchers have argued that traditional elicited-response false-belief tasks involve considerable processing demands and hence underestimate children's false-belief understanding. Consistent with this claim, Setoh et al. (2016) recently found that when processing demands were sufficiently reduced, children could succeed in an elicited-response task as early as 2.5 years of age. Here we examined whether 2.5-year-olds could also succeed in a low-demand elicited-response task involving false beliefs about identity, which have been argued to provide a critical test of whether children truly represent beliefs, while also clarifying how the practice trials in Setoh et al.'s task facilitated children's elicited-response performance. 2.5-year-olds were tested in a version of Setoh et al.'s elicited-response task in which they heard a location or identity false-belief story. We varied whether the practice trials had the same type of wh-question as the test trial. Children who heard the same type of wh-question on all trials succeeded regardless of which story they heard (location or identity) and performance did not differ across belief type. This replicates Setoh et al.'s positive results and demonstrates that when processing demands are sufficiently reduced, children can succeed in elicited-response tasks involving false beliefs about object location or identity. This suggests that children are capable of attributing genuine false beliefs prior to 4 years of age. However, children performed at chance if the practice trials involved a different type of wh-question than the test trials, suggesting that at this age practice with the wh-question used in the test trial is essential to children's success.
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27
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Conceptual continuity in the development of intent-based moral judgment. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 194:104812. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104812] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2019] [Revised: 01/16/2020] [Accepted: 01/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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28
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Doherty MJ, Perner J. Mental files: Developmental integration of dual naming and theory of mind. DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.dr.2020.100909] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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29
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Setoh P, Scott R, Baillargeon R. Reply to Fenici and Garofoli: Why Would Toddlers Act on Low-Level Associations Only when Processing Demands Are Reduced? Hum Dev 2020. [DOI: 10.1159/000506805] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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30
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Symeonidou I, Dumontheil I, Ferguson HJ, Breheny R. Adolescents are delayed at inferring complex social intentions in others, but not basic (false) beliefs: An eye-movement investigation. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2020; 73:1640-1659. [PMID: 32238036 PMCID: PMC7534202 DOI: 10.1177/1747021820920213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Most developmental research on Theory of Mind (ToM)—our ability to infer the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others—has focused on the preschool years. This is unsurprising as it was previously thought that ToM skills are developed between the ages of 2 and 7 years. Over the last couple of decades however, studies have provided evidence for significant structural and functional changes in the brain areas involved in ToM (the “social brain”) not only during childhood but also during adolescence. Importantly, some of these findings suggest that the use of ToM shows a prolonged development through middle childhood and adolescence. Although evidence from previous studies suggests a protracted development of ToM, the factors that constrain performance during middle childhood and adolescence are only just beginning to be explored. In this article, we report two visual-world eye-tracking studies that focus on the timecourse of predictive inferences. We establish that when the complexity of ToM inferences are at a level which is comparable with standard change-of-location false-belief tasks, then adolescents and adults generate predictions for other agents’ behaviour in the same timecourse. However, when inferences are socially more complex, requiring inferences about higher order mental states, adolescents generate predictive gaze bias at a marked delay relative to adults. Importantly, our results demonstrate that these developmental differences go beyond differences in executive functions (inhibitory control or working memory) and point to distinct expectations between groups and greater uncertainty when predicting actions based on conflicting desires.
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Affiliation(s)
- Irine Symeonidou
- Department of Linguistics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Iroise Dumontheil
- Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development, Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
| | | | - Richard Breheny
- Department of Linguistics, University College London, London, UK
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31
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Fenici M, Garofoli D. An Associationist Bias Explains Different Processing Demands for Toddlers in Different Traditional False-Belief Tasks. Hum Dev 2020. [DOI: 10.1159/000505208] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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Priewasser B, Fowles F, Schweller K, Perner J. Mistaken max befriends Duplo girl: No difference between a standard and an acted-out false belief task. J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 191:104756. [PMID: 31865246 PMCID: PMC7104353 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104756] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2019] [Revised: 11/06/2019] [Accepted: 11/06/2019] [Indexed: 12/02/2022]
Abstract
With their Duplo task, Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2013) challenged the assumption that children under 4 years of age cannot pass the standard false belief test. In an attempt to replicate this task on a sample of 73 children aged 32–51 months, we added a standard change of location false belief task as well as a Duplo true belief task. Performance on the latter is crucial for interpreting answers in the Duplo false belief task as to whether they reflect evidence for understanding or merely exhibit a difference in guessing rate. We found (a) a greater variability of response types in both Duplo tasks, (b) no evidence that responses in the Duplo tasks reveal earlier competence than those in the standard false belief test, and (c) a reassuring correlation between false belief tasks, suggesting that the Duplo task does pick up understanding of belief in light of the standard test.
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Affiliation(s)
- Beate Priewasser
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria.
| | - Franziska Fowles
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Katharina Schweller
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Josef Perner
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria
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33
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Machine Learning: From Expert Systems to Deep Learning. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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34
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The Prehistory of Cognitive Science. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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35
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Preface. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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36
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Bibliography. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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37
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Bayesianism in Cognitive Science. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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38
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Object Perception and Folk Physics. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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39
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Glossary. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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40
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Strategies for Brain Mapping. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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41
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Modules and Architectures. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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42
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Introduction. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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43
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The Discipline Matures: Three Milestones. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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44
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Models of Language Learning. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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45
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Applying Dynamical Systems Theory to Model the Mind. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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46
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Exploring Mindreading. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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47
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Robotics: From GOFAI to Situated Cognition and Behavior-Based Robotics. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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48
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The Cognitive Science of Consciousness. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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49
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The Turn to the Brain. Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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50
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Index for Cognitive Science (3rd edition). Cogn Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1017/9781108339216.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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