Origins of the concepts cause, cost, and goal in prereaching infants

Infants rationally infer the goals of other people's reaches in the absence of first-person experience with reaching actions

Does knowledge of other people's minds grow from concrete experience to abstract concepts? Cognitive scientists have hypothesized that infants' first-person experience, acting on their own goals, leads them to understand others' actions and goals. Indeed, classic developmental research suggests that before infants reach for objects, they do not see others' reaches as goal-directed. In five experiments (N = 117), we test an alternative hypothesis: Young infants view reaching as undertaken for a purpose but are open-minded about the specific goals that reaching actions are aimed to achieve. We first show that 3-month-old infants, who cannot reach for objects, lack the expectation that observed acts of reaching will be directed to objects rather than to places. Infants at the same age learned rapidly, however, that a specific agent's reaching action was directed either to an object or to a place, after seeing the agent reach for the same object regardless of where it was, or to the same place regardless of what was there. In a further experiment, 3-month-old infants did not demonstrate such inferences when they observed an actor engaging in passive movements. Thus, before infants have learned to reach and manipulate objects themselves, they infer that reaching actions are goal-directed, and they are open to learning that the goal of an action is either an object or a place. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: In the present experiments, 3-month-old prereaching infants learned to attribute either object goals or place goals to other people's reaching actions. Prereaching infants view agents' actions as goal-directed, but do not expect these acts to be directed to specific objects, rather than to specific places. Prereaching infants are open-minded about the specific goal states that reaching actions aim to achieve.

Toddlers Prefer Agents Who Help Those Facing Harder Tasks

Capacities to understand and evaluate others' actions are fundamental to human social life. Infants and toddlers are sensitive to the costs of others' actions, infer others' values from the costs of the actions they take, and prefer those who help others to those who hinder them, but it is largely unknown whether and how cost considerations inform early understanding of third-party prosocial actions. In three experiments (N = 94), we asked whether 16-month-old toddlers value agents who selectively help those who need it most. Presented with two agents who attempted two tasks, toddlers preferentially looked to and touched someone who helped the agent in greater need, both when one agent's task required more effort and when the tasks were the same but one agent was weaker. These results provide evidence that toddlers engage in need-based evaluations of helping, applying their understanding of action utilities to their social evaluations.

Better Together: 14-Month-Old Infants Expect Agents to Cooperate

Humans engage in cooperative activities from early on and the breadth of human cooperation is unparalleled. Human preference for cooperation might reflect cognitive and motivational mechanisms that drive engagement in cooperative activities. Here we investigate early indices of humans' cooperative abilities and test whether 14-month-old infants expect agents to prefer cooperative over individual goal achievement. Three groups of infants saw videos of agents facing a choice between two actions that led to identical rewards but differed in the individual costs. Our results show that, in line with prior research, infants expect agents to make instrumentally rational choices and prefer the less costly of two individual action alternatives. In contrast, when one of the action alternatives is cooperative, infants expect agents to choose cooperation over individual action, even though the cooperative action demands more effort from each agent to achieve the same outcome. Finally, we do not find evidence that infants expect agents to choose the less costly alternative when both options entail cooperative action. Combined, these results indicate an ontogenetically early expectation of cooperation, and raise interesting implications and questions regarding the nature of infants' representations of cooperative actions and their utility.

Infants' understanding of the causal power of agents and tools

Tools are objects that are manipulated by agents with the intention to cause an effect in the world. We show that the cognitive capacity to understand tools is present in young infants, even if these tools produce arbitrary, causally opaque effects. In experiments 1-2, we used pupillometry to show that 8-mo-old infants infer an invisible causal contact to account for the-otherwise unexplained-motion of a ball. In experiments 3, we probed 8-mo-old infants' account of a state change event (flickering of a cube) that lies outside of the explanatory power of intuitive physics. Infants repeatedly watched an intentional agent launch a ball behind an occluder. After a short delay, a cube, positioned at the other end of the occluder began flickering. Rare unoccluded events served to probe infants' representation of what happened behind the occluder. Infants exhibited larger pupil dilation, signaling more surprise, when the ball stopped before touching the cube, than when it contacted the cube, suggesting that infants inferred that the cause of the state change was contact between the ball and the cube. This effect was canceled in experiment 4, when an inanimate sphere replaced the intentional agent. Altogether, results suggest that, in the infants' eyes, a ball (an inanimate object) has the power to cause an arbitrary state change, but only if it inherits this power from an intentional agent. Eight-month-olds are thus capable of representing complex event structures, involving an intentional agent causing a change with a tool.

Infants are sensitive to the social signaling value of shared inefficient behaviors

Actions that are blatantly inefficient to achieve non-social goals are often used to convey information about agents' social affiliation, as in the case of rituals. We argue that when reproduced, actions that are individually inefficient acquire a social signaling value owing to the mechanisms that support humans' intuitive analysis of actions. We tested our hypothesis on 15-month-old infants who were familiarized with an agent that reproduced or merely observed the actions of efficient and inefficient individuals. Subsequently, we measured the infants' expectations of the agent's preferences for efficient and inefficient individuals. Our results confirmed that when agents act alone, infants expect a third-party to prefer efficient over inefficient agents. However, this pattern is entirely flipped if the third-party reproduces the agents' actions. In that case, infants expect inefficient agents to be preferred over efficient ones. Thus, reproducing actions whose rational basis is elusive can serve a critical social signaling function, accounting for why such behaviors are pervasive in human groups.

Précis of What Babies Know

Where does human knowledge begin? Research on human infants, children, adults, and nonhuman animals, using diverse methods from the cognitive, brain, and computational sciences, provides evidence for six early emerging, domain-specific systems of core knowledge. These automatic, unconscious systems are situated between perceptual systems and systems of explicit concepts and beliefs. They emerge early in infancy, guide children's learning, and function throughout life.

Novel objects with causal event schemas elicit selective responses in tool- and hand-selective lateral occipitotemporal cortex

Tool-selective lateral occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC) responds preferentially to images of tools (hammers, brushes) relative to non-tool objects (clocks, shoes). What drives these responses? Unlike other objects, tools exert effects on their surroundings. We tested whether LOTC responses are influenced by event schemas that denote different temporal relations. Participants learned about novel objects embedded in different event sequences. Causer objects moved prior to the appearance of an environmental event (e.g. stars), while Reactor objects moved after an event. Visual features and motor association were controlled. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants viewed still images of the objects. We localized tool-selective LOTC and non-tool-selective parahippocampal cortex (PHC) by contrasting neural responses to images of familiar tools and non-tools. We found that LOTC responded more to Causers than Reactors, while PHC did not. We also measured responses to images of hands, which elicit overlapping responses with tools. Across inferior temporal cortex, voxels' tool and hand selectivity positively predicted a preferential response to Causers. We conclude that an event schema typical of tools is sufficient to drive LOTC and that category-preferential responses across the temporal lobe may reflect relational event structures typical of those domains.

Commonsense psychology in human infants and machines

Human infants are fascinated by other people. They bring to this fascination a constellation of rich and flexible expectations about the intentions motivating people's actions. Here we test 11-month-old infants and state-of-the-art learning-driven neural-network models on the "Baby Intuitions Benchmark (BIB)," a suite of tasks challenging both infants and machines to make high-level predictions about the underlying causes of agents' actions. Infants expected agents' actions to be directed towards objects, not locations, and infants demonstrated default expectations about agents' rationally efficient actions towards goals. The neural-network models failed to capture infants' knowledge. Our work provides a comprehensive framework in which to characterize infants' commonsense psychology and takes the first step in testing whether human knowledge and human-like artificial intelligence can be built from the foundations cognitive and developmental theories postulate.

Intention-based evaluations of distributive actions by 4-month-olds

Four-month-olds' ability to consider the intentions of agents performing distributive actions was investigated in four experiments, using the Violation of Expectation paradigm (VoE) (Experiments 1-3) and the Preferential Looking paradigm (Experiment 4). In Experiment 1, infants were presented with two events showing two types of failed attempts to perform a distribution. In an attempt to distribute fairly, the distributor first tried to reach one of the recipients to deliver an apple, he failed, and then attempted to reach the other recipient to deliver a second apple and also failed. In an attempt to distribute unfairly, a different distributor tried unsuccessfully to bring resources always to the same recipient. Infants looked reliably longer at failed fair distribution events, suggesting that they did not just react to the actions outcomes and they attended to agents' intentions. Experiments 2 and 3 assessed alternative explanations based on perceptual factors or affiliative behaviors. In Experiment 4, during the test trials, infants were shown both distributors simultaneously and they preferred to look at the fair rather than at the unfair distributor. Overall, these findings reveal an early ability to take into account distributors' intentions and a preference for watching agents that tried to distribute resources fairly.

Should I learn from you? Seeing expectancy violations about action efficiency hinders social learning in infancy

Infants generate basic expectations about their physical and social environment. This early knowledge allows them to identify opportunities for learning, preferring to explore and learn about objects that violate their prior expectations. However, less is known about how expectancy violations about people's actions influence infants' subsequent learning from others and about others. Here, we presented 18-month-old infants with an agent who acted either efficiently (expected action) or inefficiently (unexpected action) and then labeled an object. We hypothesized that infants would prefer to learn from the agent (label-object association) if she previously acted efficiently, but they would prefer to learn about the agent (voice-speaker association) if she previously acted inefficiently. As expected, infants who previously saw the agent acting efficiently showed greater attention to the demonstrated object and learned the new label-object association, but infants presented with the inefficient agent did not. However, there was no evidence that infants learned the voice-speaker association in any of the conditions. In summary, expectancy violations about people's actions may signal a situation to avoid learning from them. We discussed the results in relation to studies on surprise-induced learning, motionese, and selective social learning, and we proposed other experimental paradigms to investigate how expectancy violations influence infants' learning about others.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.

Preschoolers' attention to and learning from on-screen characters that vary by effort and efficiency: An eye-tracking study

Prior findings are mixed regarding the extent to which children understand others' effort in early childhood. Especially, little is known about how character effort impacts children's selective attention and learning. This study examined preschoolers' visual attention to and learning from two on-screen characters: One character exerting high effort with low efficiency and another character exerting low effort with high efficiency in solving problems successfully. Children between 3.5 and 6.5 years of age (N = 70) watched a video of the two on-screen characters successfully solving problems. Children's eye movements were recorded during viewing. Each of the two on-screen characters consistently displayed either high effort/low efficiency or low effort/high efficiency to solve four problems (familiarization). For the final problem (testing), the two characters exerted the same level of effort as each other and used unique solutions to solve the problem. Children then solved the final problem themselves using real objects. Children could selectively use either character's solution demonstrated in the video. Lastly, children explicitly judged how good the characters were at solving problems. Younger children were more likely to use the solution demonstrated by the character with high effort/low efficiency, whereas older children were more likely to use the solution provided by another character with low effort/high efficiency. Younger children allocated more attention to the high effort/low efficiency character than the low effort/high efficiency character, but this pattern was modified by age such that children's gaze to the low effort/high efficiency character increased with age. Children's explicit credibility judgments did not differ by character or child age. The findings are discussed with respect to preschoolers' understanding of effort and implications for children's learning from screen media.

Neural event segmentation of continuous experience in human infants

How infants experience the world is fundamental to understanding their cognition and development. A key principle of adult experience is that, despite receiving continuous sensory input, we perceive this input as discrete events. Here we investigate such event segmentation in infants and how it differs from adults. Research on event cognition in infants often uses simplified tasks in which (adult) experimenters help solve the segmentation problem for infants by defining event boundaries or presenting discrete actions/vignettes. This presupposes which events are experienced by infants and leaves open questions about the principles governing infant segmentation. We take a different, data-driven approach by studying infant event segmentation of continuous input. We collected whole-brain functional MRI (fMRI) data from awake infants (and adults, for comparison) watching a cartoon and used a hidden Markov model to identify event states in the brain. We quantified the existence, timescale, and organization of multiple-event representations across brain regions. The adult brain exhibited a known hierarchical gradient of event timescales, from shorter events in early visual regions to longer events in later visual and associative regions. In contrast, the infant brain represented only longer events, even in early visual regions, with no timescale hierarchy. The boundaries defining these infant events only partially overlapped with boundaries defined from adult brain activity and behavioral judgments. These findings suggest that events are organized differently in infants, with longer timescales and more stable neural patterns, even in sensory regions. This may indicate greater temporal integration and reduced temporal precision during dynamic, naturalistic perception.

Infants expect agents to minimize the collective cost of collaborative actions

This paper argues that human infants address the challenges of optimizing, recognizing, and interpreting collaborative behaviors by assessing their collective efficiency. This hypothesis was tested by using a looking-time study. Fourteen-month-olds (N = 32) were familiarized with agents performing a collaborative action in computer animations. During the test phase, the looking times were measured while the agents acted with various efficiency parameters. In the critical condition, the agents' actions were individually efficient, but their combination was either collectively efficient or inefficient. Infants looked longer at test events that violated expectations of collective efficiency (p = .006, d = 0.79). Thus, preverbal infants apply expectations of collective efficiency to actions involving multiple agents.

What makes us act together? On the cognitive models supporting humans’ decisions for joint action

We face tasks every day that we can solve alone but decide to solve together with others. When do we choose to act together vs. alone? How long do we persist in working together when doing so is difficult? Do we prefer to act together when times are uncertain? An open question in joint action research is under what conditions humans prefer to act together or alone to achieve a certain goal, and whether their preference is based on a utility calculus that takes into account the costs and benefits associated with individual and joint action alternatives. Research on cooperation reveals that frequent engagement in joint activities provides high survival benefits, as it allows individuals to achieve goals together that are otherwise unavailable. Yet, survival advantage does not wholly explain the reasons for human cooperative behavior. In fact, humans are motivated to cooperate even when it is not necessary to achieve an outcome. Research in cognitive science suggests that navigating the potential costs of joint actions is a challenge for humans, and that joint actions might provide individuals with rewards that go beyond the achievement of instrumental goals. We here address the influence of key factors on the decision to engage in joint action, such as the coordination costs arising when acting together compared to alone and the social and instrumental rewards expected when acting together compared to alone. Addressing these questions will provide critical insight for the design of cognitive models of human decisions for cooperation.

Nonverbal Action Interpretation Guides Novel Word Disambiguation in 12-Month-Olds

Whether young infants can exploit sociopragmatic information to interpret new words is a matter of debate. Based on findings and theories from the action interpretation literature, we hypothesized that 12-month-olds should distinguish communicative object-directed actions expressing reference from instrumental object-directed actions indicative of one’s goals, and selectively use the former to identify referents of novel linguistic expressions. This hypothesis was tested across four eye-tracking experiments. Infants watched pairs of unfamiliar objects, one of which was first targeted by either a communicative action (e.g., pointing) or an instrumental action (e.g., grasping) and then labeled with a novel word. As predicted, infants fast-mapped the novel words onto the targeted objects after pointing (Experiments 1 and 4) but not after grasping (Experiment 2) unless the grasping action was preceded by an ostensive signal (Experiment 3). Moreover, whenever infants mapped a novel word onto the object indicated by a communicative action, they tended to map a different novel word onto the distractor object, displaying a mutual exclusivity effect. This reliance on nonverbal action interpretation in the disambiguation of novel words indicates that sociopragmatic inferences about reference likely supplement associative and statistical learning mechanisms from the outset of word learning.

Adopted Utility Calculus: Origins of a Concept of Social Affiliation

To successfully navigate their social world, humans need to understand and map enduring relationships between people: Humans need a concept of social affiliation. Here I propose that the initial concept of social affiliation, available in infancy, is based on the extent to which one individual consistently takes on the goals and needs of another. This proposal grounds affiliation in intuitive psychology, as formalized in the naive-utility-calculus model. A concept of affiliation based on interpersonal utility adoption can account for findings from studies of infants' reasoning about imitation, similarity, helpful and fair individuals, "ritual" behaviors, and social groups without the need for additional innate mechanisms such as a coalitional psychology, moral sense, or general preference for similar others. I identify further tests of this proposal and also discuss how it is likely to be relevant to social reasoning and learning across the life span.

Human adults prefer to cooperate even when it is costly

Joint actions are cooperative activities where humans coordinate their actions to achieve individual and shared goals. While the motivation to engage in joint action is clear when a goal cannot be achieved by individuals alone, we asked whether humans are motivated to act together even when acting together is not necessary and implies incurring additional costs compared to individual goal achievement. Using a utility-based empirical approach, we investigated the extent of humans' preference for joint action over individual action, when the instrumental costs of performing joint actions outweigh the benefits. The results of five experiments showed that human adults have a stable preference for joint action, even if individual action is more effective to achieve a certain goal. We propose that such preferences can be understood as ascribing additional reward value to performing actions together.

Children acknowledge physical constraints less when actors behave stereotypically: Gender stereotypes as a case study

A fundamental part of understanding structural inequality is recognizing that constrained choices, particularly those that align with societal stereotypes, are poor indicators of a person's desires. This study examined whether children (N = 246 U.S. children, 53% female; 61% White, 24% Latinx; 5-10 years) acknowledge constraints in this way when reasoning about gender-stereotypical choices, relative to gender-neutral and gender-counterstereotypical choices. Results indicated that children more frequently inferred preferences regardless of whether the actor was constrained when reasoning about gender-stereotypical choices, as compared to gender-neutral or gender-counterstereotypical choices. We also found evidence of an age-related increase in the general tendency to acknowledge constraints. We discuss the broader implications of these results for children's understanding of constraints within society.

Observing inefficient action can induce infant preference and learning

'Motionese' can be defined as an exaggerated and repetitive action. It induces preference and learning in infants. However, which action component of motionese promotes infants' preference and learning remains largely unknown. In this study, we focused on inefficiency and toward-ness of action. Our study demonstrates that observing an inefficient holding out action can induce a visual preference in 4-month-old infants and learning in 10-month-old infants through eight experiments (N = 192). We found that when infants observe inefficient holding out action, the action attracts their attention and facilitates learning about the identity of the toy object accompanying it, especially when people direct inefficient actions towards them. Our findings indicate that both action efficiency and toward-ness may be key factors in infant learning.

The role of language in building abstract, generalized conceptual representations of one- and two-place predicates: A comparison between adults and infants

Theories of relations between language and conceptual development benefit from empirical evidence for concepts available in infancy, but such evidence is comparatively scarce. Here, we examine early representations of specific concepts, namely, sets of dynamic events corresponding either to predicates involving two variables with a reversible, asymmetric relation between them (such as the set of all events that correspond to a linguistic phrase like "a dog is pushing a car,") or to comparatively simpler, one-variable predicates (such as the set of events corresponding to a phrase like "a dog is jumping."). We develop a non-linguistic, anticipatory eye-tracking task that can be administered to both infants and adults, and we use this task to gather evidence for the formation and use of such one-and two-place-predicate classes (which we refer to as event sortals) in 12-24-mo-old infants, and in adults with and without concurrent verbal prose shadowing. Using visually similar stimuli for both the simpler (one-place) and the more complex (reversible, asymmetric, two-place) concepts, we find that infants only show evidence for forming and generalizing one-place event sortals, and, while adults succeed with both kinds in the absence of verbal shadowing, shadowing hampers their ability to form and use the asymmetric two-place event sortals. In a subsequent experiment with adults, we find that if the shadowing material is grammatically impoverished, adults now succeed in forming and using both one- and two-place event sortals. We discuss implications of these results for theories of concept acquisition, and the role of language in this process.

The sticky mittens paradigm: A critical appraisal of current results and explanations

Almost two decades ago, the sticky mittens paradigm was demonstrated as a way to train reaching and grasping behaviors in pre‐reaching infants, and consequently improve visual attentional abilities. In that first study, Needham and colleagues fitted 3‐month‐old infants with Velcro loop‐covered mittens and allowed them to interact with Velcro hook‐covered toys over the course of 2 weeks. In this review, we scrutinize the 17 studies that have followed those first sticky mittens results in regards to the motor, social perception, and visual attentional domains. Furthermore, we discuss the proposed mechanisms of the sticky mittens training. Current evidence strongly suggests that sticky mittens training facilitates social perception, which is consistent with prior correlational work showing links between action production and action perception. However, studies targeting motor and visual attentional abilities have too diverse results to warrant firm conclusions. We conclude that future research should focus on uncovering if there is a connection between sticky mittens training and motor behavior.

The Science of Meaning in Life

Meaning in life has long been a mystery of human existence. In this review, we seek to demystify this construct. Focusing on the subjective experience of meaning in life, we review how it has been measured and briefly describe its correlates. Then we review evidence that meaning in life, for all its mystery, is a rather commonplace experience. We then define the construct and review its constituent facets: comprehension/coherence, purpose, and existential mattering/significance. We review the many experiences that have been shown to enhance meaning in life and close by considering important remaining research questions about this fascinating topic.

Human tool cognition relies on teleology

Osiurak and Reynaud's account of human tool cognition misses key element: human capacity for functional representations and teleological inferences. I argue that the teleofunctional approach accounts better for some features of human tool cognition and points to a viable candidate for the cognitive "difference-maker" behind human technological success.