Gene drive and resilience through renewal with next generation Cleave and Rescue selfish genetic elements

Cleave and Rescue gamete killers create conditions for gene drive in plants

Gene drive elements promote the spread of linked traits and can be used to change the composition or fate of wild populations. Cleave and Rescue (ClvR) drive elements sit at a fixed chromosomal position and include a DNA sequence-modifying enzyme such as Cas9/gRNAs that disrupts endogenous versions of an essential gene and a recoded version of the essential gene resistant to cleavage. ClvR spreads by creating conditions in which those lacking ClvR die because they lack functional versions of the essential gene. Here we demonstrate the essential features of the ClvR gene drive in the plant Arabidopsis thaliana through killing of gametes that fail to inherit a ClvR that targets the essential gene YKT61. Resistant alleles, which can slow or prevent drive, were not observed. Modelling shows plant ClvRs are robust to certain failure modes and can be used to rapidly drive population modification or suppression. Possible applications are discussed.

Genetic and geographic population structure in the malaria vector, Anopheles farauti, provides a candidate system for pioneering confinable gene-drive releases

Indoor insecticide applications are the primary tool for reducing malaria transmission in the Solomon Archipelago, a region where Anopheles farauti is the only common malaria vector. Due to the evolution of behavioural resistance in some An. farauti populations, these applications have become less effective. New malaria control interventions are therefore needed in this region, and gene-drives provide a promising new technology. In considering developing a population-specific (local) gene-drive in An. farauti, we detail the species' population genetic structure using microsatellites and whole mitogenomes, finding many spatially confined populations both within and between landmasses. This strong population structure suggests that An. farauti would be a useful system for developing a population-specific, confinable gene-drive for field release, where private alleles can be used as Cas9 targets. Previous work on Anopheles gambiae has used the Cardinal gene for the development of a global population replacement gene-drive. We therefore also analyse the Cardinal gene to assess whether it may be a suitable target to engineer a gene-drive for the modification of local An. farauti populations. Despite the extensive population structure observed in An. farauti for microsatellites, only one remote island population from Vanuatu contained fixed and private alleles at the Cardinal locus. Nonetheless, this study provides an initial framework for further population genomic investigations to discover high-frequency private allele targets in localized An. farauti populations. This would enable the development of gene-drive strains for modifying localised populations with minimal chance of escape and may provide a low-risk route to field trial evaluations.

Cleave and Rescue gamete killers create conditions for gene drive in plants

Gene drive elements promote the spread of linked traits, even when their presence confers a fitness cost to carriers, and can be used to change the composition or fate of wild populations. Cleave and Rescue (ClvR) drive elements sit at a fixed chromosomal position and include a DNA sequence-modifying enzyme such as Cas9/gRNAs (the Cleaver/Toxin) that disrupts endogenous versions of an essential gene, and a recoded version of the essential gene resistant to cleavage (the Rescue/Antidote). ClvR spreads by creating conditions in which those lacking ClvR die because they lack functional versions of the essential gene. We demonstrate the essential features of ClvR gene drive in the plant Arabidopsis thaliana through killing of gametes that fail to inherit a ClvR that targets the essential gene YKT61, whose expression is required in male and female gametes for their survival. Resistant (uncleavable but functional) alleles, which can slow or prevent drive, were not observed. Modeling shows plant ClvRs are likely to be robust to certain failure modes and can be used to rapidly drive population modification or suppression. Possible applications in plant breeding, weed control, and conservation are discussed.

Manipulating the Destiny of Wild Populations Using CRISPR

Genetic biocontrol aims to suppress or modify populations of species to protect public health, agriculture, and biodiversity. Advancements in genome engineering technologies have fueled a surge in research in this field, with one gene editing technology, CRISPR, leading the charge. This review focuses on the current state of CRISPR technologies for genetic biocontrol of pests and highlights the progress and ongoing challenges of using these approaches.

Making waves: Comparative analysis of gene drive spread characteristics in a continuous space model

With their ability to rapidly increase in frequency, gene drives can be used to modify or suppress target populations after an initial release of drive individuals. Recent advances have revealed many possibilities for different types of drives, and several of these have been realized in experiments. These drives have advantages and disadvantages related to their ease of construction, confinement and capacity to be used for modification or suppression. Though characteristics of these drives have been explored in modelling studies, assessment in continuous space environments has been limited, often focusing on outcomes rather than fundamental properties. Here, we conduct a comparative analysis of many different gene drive types that have the capacity to form a wave of advance in continuous space using individual-based simulations in continuous space. We evaluate the drive wave speed as a function of drive performance and ecological parameters, which reveals substantial differences between drive performance in panmictic versus spatial environments. In particular, we find that suppression drive waves are uniquely vulnerable to fitness costs and undesired CRISPR cleavage activity in embryos by maternal deposition. Some drives, however, retain robust performance even with widely varying efficiency parameters. To gain a better understanding of drive waves, we compare their panmictic performance and find that the rate of wild-type allele removal is correlated with drive wave speed, though this is also affected by other factors. Overall, our results provide a useful resource for understanding the performance of drives in spatially continuous environments, which may be most representative of potential drive deployment in many relevant scenarios.

tgCRISPRi: efficient gene knock-down using truncated gRNAs and catalytically active Cas9

CRISPR-interference (CRISPRi), a highly effective method for silencing genes in mammalian cells, employs an enzymatically dead form of Cas9 (dCas9) complexed with one or more guide RNAs (gRNAs) with 20 nucleotides (nt) of complementarity to transcription initiation sites of target genes. Such gRNA/dCas9 complexes bind to DNA, impeding transcription of the targeted locus. Here, we present an alternative gene-suppression strategy using active Cas9 complexed with truncated gRNAs (tgRNAs). Cas9/tgRNA complexes bind to specific target sites without triggering DNA cleavage. When targeted near transcriptional start sites, these short 14-15 nts tgRNAs efficiently repress expression of several target genes throughout somatic tissues in Drosophila melanogaster without generating any detectable target site mutations. tgRNAs also can activate target gene expression when complexed with a Cas9-VPR fusion protein or modulate enhancer activity, and can be incorporated into a gene-drive, wherein a traditional gRNA sustains drive while a tgRNA inhibits target gene expression.

Simulations Reveal High Efficiency and Confinement of a Population Suppression CRISPR Toxin-Antidote Gene Drive

Though engineered gene drives hold great promise for spreading through and suppressing populations of disease vectors or invasive species, complications such as resistance alleles and spatial population structure can prevent their success. Additionally, most forms of suppression drives, such as homing drives or driving Y chromosomes, will generally spread uncontrollably between populations with even small levels of migration. The previously proposed CRISPR-based toxin-antidote system called toxin-antidote dominant embryo (TADE) suppression drive could potentially address the issues of confinement and resistance. However, it is a relatively weak form of drive compared to homing drives, which might make it particularly vulnerable to spatial population structure. In this study, we investigate TADE suppression drive using individual-based simulations in a continuous spatial landscape. We find that the drive is actually more confined than in simple models without space, even in its most efficient form with low cleavage rate in embryos from maternally deposited Cas9. Furthermore, the drive performed well in continuous space scenarios if the initial release requirements were met, suppressing the population in a timely manner without being severely affected by chasing, a phenomenon in which wild-type individuals avoid the drive by recolonizing empty areas. At higher embryo cut rates, the drive loses its ability to spread, but a single, widespread release can often still induce rapid population collapse. Thus, if TADE suppression gene drives can be successfully constructed, they may play an important role in control of disease vectors and invasive species when stringent confinement to target populations is desired.

Assessment of distant-site rescue elements for CRISPR toxin-antidote gene drives

Gene drive is a genetic engineering technology that can enable super-mendelian inheritance of specific alleles, allowing them to spread through a population. New gene drive types have increased flexibility, offering options for confined modification or suppression of target populations. Among the most promising are CRISPR toxin-antidote gene drives, which disrupt essential wild-type genes by targeting them with Cas9/gRNA. This results in their removal, increasing the frequency of the drive. All these drives rely on having an effective rescue element, which consists of a recoded version of the target gene. This rescue element can be at the same site as the target gene, maximizing the chance of efficient rescue, or at a distant site, which allows useful options such as easily disrupting another essential gene or increasing confinement. Previously, we developed a homing rescue drive targeting a haplolethal gene and a toxin-antidote drive targeting a haplosufficient gene. These successful drives had functional rescue elements but suboptimal drive efficiency. Here, we attempted to construct toxin-antidote drives targeting these genes with a distant-site configuration from three loci in Drosophila melanogaster. We found that additional gRNAs increased cut rates to nearly 100%. However, all distant-site rescue elements failed for both target genes. Furthermore, one rescue element with a minimally recoded sequence was used as a template for homology-directed repair for the target gene on a different chromosomal arm, resulting in the formation of functional resistance alleles. Together, these results can inform the design of future CRISPR-based toxin-antidote gene drives.

A CRISPR endonuclease gene drive reveals distinct mechanisms of inheritance bias

CRISPR/Cas gene drives can bias transgene inheritance through different mechanisms. Homing drives are designed to replace a wild-type allele with a copy of a drive element on the homologous chromosome. In Aedes aegypti, the sex-determining locus is closely linked to the white gene, which was previously used as a target for a homing drive element (wGDe). Here, through an analysis using this linkage we show that in males inheritance bias of wGDe did not occur by homing, rather through increased propagation of the donor drive element. We test the same wGDe drive element with transgenes expressing Cas9 with germline regulatory elements sds3, bgcn, and nup50. We only find inheritance bias through homing, even with the identical nup50-Cas9 transgene. We propose that DNA repair outcomes may be more context dependent than anticipated and that other previously reported homing drives may, in fact, bias their inheritance through other mechanisms.

Testing non-autonomous antimalarial gene drive effectors using self-eliminating drivers in the African mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae

Gene drives for mosquito population modification are novel tools for malaria control. Strategies to safely test antimalarial effectors in the field are required. Here, we modified the Anopheles gambiae zpg locus to host a CRISPR/Cas9 integral gene drive allele (zpg^D) and characterized its behaviour and resistance profile. We found that zpg^D dominantly sterilizes females but can induce efficient drive at other loci when it itself encounters resistance. We combined zpg^D with multiple previously characterized non-autonomous payload drives and found that, as zpg^D self-eliminates, it leads to conversion of mosquito cage populations at these loci. Our results demonstrate how self-eliminating drivers could allow safe testing of non-autonomous effector-traits by local population modification. They also suggest that after engendering resistance, gene drives intended for population suppression could nevertheless serve to propagate subsequently released non-autonomous payload genes, allowing modification of vector populations initially targeted for suppression.

Gene drive is a method that allows the genetic modification of entire populations of harmful organisms. Their application to tackle invasive species, agricultural pests or insect disease vectors has been suggested. For example, they could reduce the capacity of malaria mosquitoes to transmit this deadly disease to humans by producing effector molecules inhibiting the development of the Plasmodium parasite in the mosquito vector. We describe a strategy to modularize and test multiple transgenes destined for release, and to introduce only the minimal set of modifications needed into a mosquito population. We show how some elements, once no longer needed, can be made to self-eliminate from populations and we also study how several independent gene drive traits, located in different parts of the genome, can interact and propagate at the level of mosquito cage populations.

Experimental demonstration of tethered gene drive systems for confined population modification or suppression

BACKGROUND

Homing gene drives hold great promise for the genetic control of natural populations. However, current homing systems are capable of spreading uncontrollably between populations connected by even marginal levels of migration. This could represent a substantial sociopolitical barrier to the testing or deployment of such drives and may generally be undesirable when the objective is only local population control, such as suppression of an invasive species outside of its native range. Tethered drive systems, in which a locally confined gene drive provides the CRISPR nuclease needed for a homing drive, could provide a solution to this problem, offering the power of a homing drive and confinement of the supporting drive.

RESULTS

Here, we demonstrate the engineering of a tethered drive system in Drosophila, using a regionally confined CRISPR Toxin-Antidote Recessive Embryo (TARE) drive to support modification and suppression homing drives. Each drive was able to bias inheritance in its favor, and the TARE drive was shown to spread only when released above a threshold frequency in experimental cage populations. After the TARE drive had established in the population, it facilitated the spread of a subsequently released split homing modification drive (to all individuals in the cage) and of a homing suppression drive (to its equilibrium frequency).

CONCLUSIONS

Our results show that the tethered drive strategy is a viable and easily engineered option for providing confinement of homing drives to target populations.

Intronic gRNAs for the Construction of Minimal Gene Drive Systems

Gene drives are promising tools for the genetic control of insect vector or pest populations. CRISPR-based gene drives are generally highly complex synthetic constructs consisting of multiple transgenes and their respective regulatory elements. This complicates the generation of new gene drives and the testing of the behavior of their constituent functional modules. Here, we explored the minimal genetic components needed to constitute autonomous gene drives in Drosophila melanogaster. We first designed intronic gRNAs that can be located directly within coding transgene sequences and tested their functions in cell lines. We then integrated a Cas9 open reading frame hosting such an intronic gRNA within the Drosophila rcd-1r locus that drives the expression in the male and female germlines. We showed that upon removal of the fluorescent transformation marker, the rcd-1r^d allele supports efficient gene drive. We assessed the propensity of this driver, designed to be neutral with regards to fitness and host gene function, to propagate in caged fly populations. Because of their simplicity, such integral gene drives could enable the modularization of drive and effector functions. We also discussed the possible biosafety implications of minimal and possibly recoded gene drives.

Modelling homing suppression gene drive in haplodiploid organisms

Gene drives have shown great promise for suppression of pest populations. These engineered alleles can function by a variety of mechanisms, but the most common is the CRISPR homing drive, which converts wild-type alleles to drive alleles in the germline of heterozygotes. Some potential target species are haplodiploid, in which males develop from unfertilized eggs and thus have only one copy of each chromosome. This prevents drive conversion, a substantial disadvantage compared to diploids where drive conversion can take place in both sexes. Here, we study homing suppression gene drives in haplodiploids and find that a drive targeting a female fertility gene could still be successful. However, such drives are less powerful than in diploids and suffer more from functional resistance alleles. They are substantially more vulnerable to high resistance allele formation in the embryo owing to maternally deposited Cas9 and guide RNA and also to somatic cleavage activity. Examining spatial models where organisms move over a continuous landscape, we find that haplodiploid suppression drives surprisingly perform nearly as well as in diploids, possibly owing to their ability to spread further before inducing strong suppression. Together, these results indicate that gene drive can potentially be used to effectively suppress haplodiploid populations.

Symbionts and gene drive: two strategies to combat vector-borne disease

Mosquitoes bring global health problems by transmitting parasites and viruses such as malaria and dengue. Unfortunately, current insecticide-based control strategies are only moderately effective because of high cost and resistance. Thus, scalable, sustainable, and cost-effective strategies are needed for mosquito-borne disease control. Symbiont-based and genome engineering-based approaches provide new tools that show promise for meeting these criteria, enabling modification or suppression approaches. Symbiotic bacteria like Wolbachia are maternally inherited and manipulate mosquito host reproduction to enhance their vertical transmission. Genome engineering-based gene drive methods, in which mosquitoes are genetically altered to spread drive alleles throughout wild populations, are also proving to be a potentially powerful approach in the laboratory. Here, we review the latest developments in both symbionts and gene drive-based methods. We describe some notable similarities, as well as distinctions and obstacles, relating to these promising technologies.

Gene drive escape from resistance depends on mechanism and ecology

Gene drives can potentially be used to suppress pest populations, and the advent of CRISPR technology has made it feasible to engineer them in many species, especially insects. What remains largely unknown for implementations is whether antidrive resistance will evolve to block the population suppression. An especially serious threat to some kinds of drive is mutations in the CRISPR cleavage sequence that block the action of CRISPR, but designs have been proposed to avoid this type of resistance. Various types of resistance at loci away from the cleavage site remain a possibility, which is the focus here. It is known that modest‐effect suppression drives can essentially “outrun” unlinked resistance even when that resistance is present from the start. We demonstrate here how the risk of evolving (unlinked) resistance can be further reduced without compromising overall suppression by introducing multiple suppression drives or by designing drives with specific ecological effects. However, we show that even modest‐effect suppression drives remain vulnerable to the evolution of extreme levels of inbreeding, which halt the spread of the drive without actually interfering with its mechanism. The landscape of resistance evolution against suppression drives is therefore complex, but avenues exist for enhancing gene drive success.

Gene drives gaining speed

Gene drives are selfish genetic elements that are transmitted to progeny at super-Mendelian (>50%) frequencies. Recently developed CRISPR-Cas9-based gene-drive systems are highly efficient in laboratory settings, offering the potential to reduce the prevalence of vector-borne diseases, crop pests and non-native invasive species. However, concerns have been raised regarding the potential unintended impacts of gene-drive systems. This Review summarizes the phenomenal progress in this field, focusing on optimal design features for full-drive elements (drives with linked Cas9 and guide RNA components) that either suppress target mosquito populations or modify them to prevent pathogen transmission, allelic drives for updating genetic elements, mitigating strategies including trans-complementing split-drives and genetic neutralizing elements, and the adaptation of drive technology to other organisms. These scientific advances, combined with ethical and social considerations, will facilitate the transparent and responsible advancement of these technologies towards field implementation.

Facilitating the Conversation: Gene Drive Classification

Gene drives are an emerging technology with tremendous potential to impact public health, agriculture, and conservation. While gene drives can be described simply as selfish genetic elements (natural or engineered) that are inherited at non-Mendelian rates, upon closer inspection, engineered gene drive technology is a complex class of biotechnology that uses a diverse number of genetic features to bias rates of inheritance. As a complex technology, gene drives can be difficult to comprehend, not only for the public and stakeholders, but also to risk assessors, risk managers, and decisionmakers not familiar with gene drive literature. To address this difficulty, we describe a gene drive classification system based on 5 functional characteristics. These characteristics include a gene drive's objective, mechanism, release threshold, range, and persistence. The aggregate of the gene drive's characteristics can be described as the gene drive's architecture. Establishing a classification system to define different gene drive technologies should make them more comprehensible to the public and provide a framework to guide regulatory evaluation and decisionmaking.

Gene drive that results in addiction to a temperature-sensitive version of an essential gene triggers population collapse in Drosophila

One strategy for population suppression seeks to use gene drive to spread genes that confer conditional lethality or sterility, providing a way of combining population modification with suppression. Stimuli of potential interest could be introduced by humans, such as an otherwise benign virus or chemical, or occur naturally on a seasonal basis, such as a change in temperature. Cleave and Rescue (ClvR) selfish genetic elements use Cas9 and guide RNAs (gRNAs) to disrupt endogenous versions of an essential gene while also including a Rescue version of the essential gene resistant to disruption. ClvR spreads by creating loss-of-function alleles of the essential gene that select against those lacking it, resulting in populations in which the Rescue provides the only source of essential gene function. As a consequence, if function of the Rescue, a kind of Trojan horse now omnipresent in a population, is condition dependent, so too will be the survival of that population. To test this idea, we created a ClvR in Drosophila in which Rescue activity of an essential gene, dribble, requires splicing of a temperature-sensitive intein (TS-ClvRdbe ). This element spreads to transgene fixation at 23 °C, but when populations now dependent on Ts-ClvRdbe are shifted to 29 °C, death and sterility result in a rapid population crash. These results show that conditional population elimination can be achieved. A similar logic, in which Rescue activity is conditional, could also be used in homing-based drive and to bring about suppression and/or killing of specific individuals in response to other stimuli.

Demystifying the Risk Assessment Process for Laboratory-Based Experiments Utilizing Invasive Genetic Elements: It Is More Than Gene Drive

Advances in recombinant DNA approaches have resulted in the development of transgene architectures that severely bias their own inheritance, a process commonly referred to as "gene drive." The rapid pace of development, combined with the complexity of many gene drive approaches, threatens to overwhelm those responsible for ensuring its safe use in the laboratory, as even identifying that a specific transgene is capable of gene drive may not be intuitive. Although currently gene drive experiments have been limited to just a few species (mosquitoes, flies, mice, and yeast), the range of organisms used in gene drive research is expected to increase substantially in the coming years. Here the defining features of different gene drive approaches are discussed. Although this will start with a focus on identifying when gene drive could or could not occur, the emphasis will also be on establishing risk profiles based on anticipated level of invasiveness and persistence of transgenes in the surrounding environment. Attention is also called to the fact that transgenes can be considered invasive without being considered gene drive (and vice versa). This further supports the notion that adequate risk assessment requires information regarding the specific circumstances a given transgene or set of transgenes is capable of invading a corresponding population. Finally, challenges in the review and evaluation of work involving gene drive organisms are discussed.

A common gene drive language eases regulatory process and eco-evolutionary extensions

Background

Synthetic gene drive technologies aim to spread transgenic constructs into wild populations even when they impose organismal fitness disadvantages. The extraordinary diversity of plausible drive mechanisms and the range of selective parameters they may encounter makes it very difficult to convey their relative predicted properties, particularly where multiple approaches are combined. The sheer number of published manuscripts in this field, experimental and theoretical, the numerous techniques resulting in an explosion in the gene drive vocabulary hinder the regulators’ point of view. We address this concern by defining a simplified parameter based language of synthetic drives.

Results

Employing the classical population dynamics approach, we show that different drive construct (replacement) mechanisms can be condensed and evaluated on an equal footing even where they incorporate multiple replacement drives approaches. Using a common language, it is then possible to compare various model properties, a task desired by regulators and policymakers. The generalization allows us to extend the study of the invasion dynamics of replacement drives analytically and, in a spatial setting, the resilience of the released drive constructs. The derived framework is available as a standalone tool.

Conclusion

Besides comparing available drive constructs, our tool is also useful for educational purpose. Users can also explore the evolutionary dynamics of future hypothetical combination drive scenarios. Thus, our results appraise the properties and robustness of drives and provide an intuitive and objective way for risk assessment, informing policies, and enhancing public engagement with proposed and future gene drive approaches.

Risk management recommendations for environmental releases of gene drive modified insects

The ability to engineer gene drives (genetic elements that bias their own inheritance) has sparked enthusiasm and concerns. Engineered gene drives could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in the control of insect disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species. However, risk concerns and uncertainty associated with potential environmental release of gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have led some stakeholders to call for a global moratorium on such releases or the application of other strict precautionary measures to mitigate perceived risk assessment and risk management challenges. Instead, we provide recommendations that may help to improve the relevance of risk assessment and risk management frameworks for environmental releases of GDMIs. These recommendations include: (1) developing additional and more practical risk assessment guidance to ensure appropriate levels of safety; (2) making policy goals and regulatory decision-making criteria operational for use in risk assessment so that what constitutes harm is clearly defined; (3) ensuring a more dynamic interplay between risk assessment and risk management to manage uncertainty through closely interlinked pre-release modelling and post-release monitoring; (4) considering potential risks against potential benefits, and comparing them with those of alternative actions to account for a wider (management) context; and (5) implementing a modular, phased approach to authorisations for incremental acceptance and management of risks and uncertainty. Along with providing stakeholder engagement opportunities in the risk analysis process, the recommendations proposed may enable risk managers to make choices that are more proportionate and adaptive to potential risks, uncertainty and benefits of GDMI applications, and socially robust.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment

Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.

Converting endogenous genes of the malaria mosquito into simple non-autonomous gene drives for population replacement

Gene drives for mosquito population replacement are promising tools for malaria control. However, there is currently no clear pathway for safely testing such tools in endemic countries. The lack of well-characterized promoters for infection-relevant tissues and regulatory hurdles are further obstacles for their design and use. Here we explore how minimal genetic modifications of endogenous mosquito genes can convert them directly into non-autonomous gene drives without disrupting their expression. We co-opted the native regulatory sequences of three midgut-specific loci of the malaria vector Anopheles gambiae to host a prototypical antimalarial molecule and guide-RNAs encoded within artificial introns that support efficient gene drive. We assess the propensity of these modifications to interfere with the development of Plasmodium falciparum and their effect on fitness. Because of their inherent simplicity and passive mode of drive such traits could form part of an acceptable testing pathway of gene drives for malaria eradication.

A confinable home-and-rescue gene drive for population modification

Homing-based gene drives, engineered using CRISPR/Cas9, have been proposed to spread desirable genes throughout populations. However, invasion of such drives can be hindered by the accumulation of resistant alleles. To limit this obstacle, we engineer a confinable population modification home-and-rescue (HomeR) drive in Drosophila targeting an essential gene. In our experiments, resistant alleles that disrupt the target gene function were recessive lethal and therefore disadvantaged. We demonstrate that HomeR can achieve an increase in frequency in population cage experiments, but that fitness costs due to the Cas9 insertion limit drive efficacy. Finally, we conduct mathematical modeling comparing HomeR to contemporary gene drive architectures for population modification over wide ranges of fitness costs, transmission rates, and release regimens. HomeR could potentially be adapted to other species, as a means for safe, confinable, modification of wild populations.

Split versions of Cleave and Rescue selfish genetic elements for measured self limiting gene drive

Gene drive elements promote the spread of linked traits, providing methods for changing the composition or fate of wild populations. Drive mechanisms that are self-limiting are attractive because they allow control over the duration and extent of trait spread in time and space, and are reversible through natural selection as drive wanes. Self-sustaining Cleave and Rescue (ClvR) elements include a DNA sequence-modifying enzyme such as Cas9/gRNAs that disrupts endogenous versions of an essential gene, a tightly linked recoded version of the essential gene resistant to cleavage (the Rescue), and a Cargo. ClvR spreads by creating loss-of-function (LOF) conditions in which those without ClvR die because they lack functional copies of the essential gene. We use modeling to show that when the Rescue-Cargo and one or both components required for LOF allele creation (Cas9 and gRNA) reside at different locations (split ClvR), drive of Rescue-Cargo is self-limiting due to a progressive decrease in Cas9 frequency, and thus opportunities for creation of LOF alleles, as spread occurs. Importantly, drive strength and duration can be extended in a measured manner-which is still self-limiting-by moving the two components close enough to each other that they experience some degree of linkage. With linkage, Cas9 transiently experiences drive by hitchhiking with Rescue-Cargo until linkage disequilibrium between the two disappears, a function of recombination frequency and number of generations, creating a novel point of control. We implement split ClvR in Drosophila, with key elements on different chromosomes. Cargo/Rescue/gRNAs spreads to high frequency in a Cas9-dependent manner, while the frequency of Cas9 decreases. These observations show that measured, transient drive, coupled with a loss of future drive potential, can be achieved using the simple toolkit that make up ClvR elements-Cas9 and gRNAs and a Rescue/Cargo.

Engineering the Composition and Fate of Wild Populations with Gene Drive

Insects play important roles as predators, prey, pollinators, recyclers, hosts, parasitoids, and sources of economically important products. They can also destroy crops; wound animals; and serve as vectors for plant, animal, and human diseases. Gene drive-a process by which genes, gene complexes, or chromosomes encoding specific traits are made to spread through wild populations, even if these traits result in a fitness cost to carriers-provides new opportunities for altering populations to benefit humanity and the environment in ways that are species specific and sustainable. Gene drive can be used to alter the genetic composition of an existing population, referred to as population modification or replacement, or to bring about population suppression or elimination. We describe technologies under consideration, progress that has been made, and remaining technological hurdles, particularly with respect to evolutionary stability and our ability to control the spread and ultimate fate of genes introduced into populations.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

Gene Drive Dynamics in Natural Populations: The Importance of Density Dependence, Space, and Sex

The spread of synthetic gene drives is often discussed in the context of panmictic populations connected by gene flow and described with simple deterministic models. Under such assumptions, an entire species could be altered by releasing a single individual carrying an invasive gene drive, such as a standard homing drive. While this remains a theoretical possibility, gene drive spread in natural populations is more complex and merits a more realistic assessment. The fate of any gene drive released in a population would be inextricably linked to the population's ecology. Given the uncertainty often involved in ecological assessment of natural populations, understanding the sensitivity of gene drive spread to important ecological factors is critical. Here we review how different forms of density dependence, spatial heterogeneity, and mating behaviors can impact the spread of self-sustaining gene drives. We highlight specific aspects of gene drive dynamics and the target populations that need further research.