Self-recognition and abstraction abilities in the common chimpanzee studied with distorting mirrors

Fish self-awareness: limits of current knowledge and theoretical expectations

Animal self-awareness is divided into three levels: bodily, social, and introspective self-awareness. Research has focused mainly on the introspection of so-called higher organisms such as mammals. Herein, we turn our attention to fish and provide opinions on their self-awareness based on a review of the scientific literature. Our specific aims are to discuss whether fish (A) could have a neural substrate supporting self-awareness and whether they display signs of (B) social and (C) introspective self-awareness. The present knowledge does not exclude the possibility that fish could have a simple neocortex or other structures that support certain higher cognitive processes, as the function of the primate cerebral cortex can be replaced by other neurological structures. Fish are known to display winner, loser, and audience effects, which could be interpreted as signs of social self-awareness. The audience effect may be explained not only by ethological cost and benefit theory but also by the concept of public self-awareness, which comes from human studies. The behavioural and neural manifestations of depression may be induced in fish under social subordination and may be viewed as certain awareness of a social status. The current findings on fish introspective self-awareness have been debated in the scientific community and, therefore, demand replication to provide more evidence. Further research is needed to verify the outlined ideas; however, the current knowledge indicates that fish are capable of certain higher cognitive processes, which raises questions and implications regarding ethics and welfare in fish-related research and husbandry.

Graded Mirror Self-Recognition by Clark's Nutcrackers

The traditional ‘mark test’ has shown some large-brained species are capable of mirror self-recognition. During this test a mark is inconspicuously placed on an animal’s body where it can only be seen with the aid of a mirror. If the animal increases the number of actions directed to the mark region when presented with a mirror, the animal is presumed to have recognized the mirror image as its reflection. However, the pass/fail nature of the mark test presupposes self-recognition exists in entirety or not at all. We developed a novel mirror-recognition task, to supplement the mark test, which revealed gradation in the self-recognition of Clark’s nutcrackers, a large-brained corvid. To do so, nutcrackers cached food alone, observed by another nutcracker, or with a regular or blurry mirror. The nutcrackers suppressed caching with a regular mirror, a behavioural response to prevent cache theft by conspecifics, but did not suppress caching with a blurry mirror. Likewise, during the mark test, most nutcrackers made more self-directed actions to the mark with a blurry mirror than a regular mirror. Both results suggest self-recognition was more readily achieved with the blurry mirror and that self-recognition may be more broadly present among animals than currently thought.

Five-year-olds can show the self-reference advantage

The current study developed a new paradigm to determine the age at which children begin to show the self-reference advantage in memory. Four-, 5-, and 10-year-olds studied lists of colourful object pictures presented together with self or other face image, and participants were asked to report aloud “who is pointing at the (object).” Then incidental free recall was carried out, followed by source judgments based on the earlier test where participants had to distinguish who pointed to the object. In Experiment 1, only 5-year-old children showed self-reference advantage in the recall, but not in source judgments. By increasing task demand in Experiment 2, 5 and 10-year-olds also showed the self-reference advantage in the recall, but not in source judgments. These results indicated that the new paradigm is appropriate to measure children's self-reference effect in memory, and children as young as 5 years begin to show this effect.

Mirror self-recognition: a review and critique of attempts to promote and engineer self-recognition in primates

We review research on reactions to mirrors and self-recognition in nonhuman primates, focusing on methodological issues. Starting with the initial demonstration in chimpanzees in 1970 and subsequent attempts to extend this to other species, self-recognition in great apes is discussed with emphasis on spontaneous manifestations of mirror-guided self-exploration as well as spontaneous use of the mirror to investigate foreign marks on otherwise nonvisible body parts-the mark test. Attempts to show self-recognition in other primates are examined with particular reference to the lack of convincing examples of spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration, and efforts to engineer positive mark test responses by modifying the test or using conditioning techniques. Despite intensive efforts to demonstrate self-recognition in other primates, we conclude that to date there is no compelling evidence that prosimians, monkeys, or lesser apes-gibbons and siamangs-are capable of mirror self-recognition.

The perception of self-agency in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

The ability to distinguish actions and effects caused by oneself from events occurring in the external environment is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. Underlying such distinctions, self-monitoring processes are often assumed, in which predicted events accompanied by one's own volitional action are compared with actual events observed in the external environment. Although many studies have examined the absence or presence of a certain type of self-recognition (i.e. mirror self-recognition) in non-human animals, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unclear. Here, we provide, to our knowledge, the first behavioural evidence that chimpanzees can perform self/other distinction for external events on the basis of self-monitoring processes. Three chimpanzees were presented with two cursors on a computer display. One cursor was manipulated by a chimpanzee using a trackball, while the other displayed motion that had been produced previously by the same chimpanzee. Chimpanzees successfully identified which cursor they were able to control. A follow-up experiment revealed that their performance could not be explained by simple associative responses. A further experiment with one chimpanzee showed that the monitoring process occurred in both temporal and spatial dimensions. These findings indicate that chimpanzees and humans share the fundamental cognitive processes underlying the sense of being an independent agent.

Delayed Intermodal Contingency Affects Young Children's Recognition of Their Current Self

This study investigated whether 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds use their video feedback as a reflection of their current state, even when their feedback was presented with a short temporal delay. In Experiment 1, the effects of 1- and 2-s delayed feedback were examined on an analog of the mark test. In the case of live and 1-s delayed feedback, 3-year-olds passed the test; however, they failed in the case of 2-s delayed feedback. Experiment 2 examined the effect of prior experience of delayed contingency and explorative behavior. The results showed a significant effect of prior experience. These results suggest that detection of visual-proprioceptive contingency contributes to recognition of visual feedback as one's current self.

The Right Hemisphere and the Dark Side of Consciousness

Self-awareness and Theory of Mind comprise the main elements of higher-order consciousness. In attempting to localize these abilities, it appears that regions of the right hemisphere including fronto-temporal regions are capable of sustaining a sense of self-awareness. The right hemisphere appears dominant for tasks involving Theory of Mind as well as deception, which may be important for understanding the brain and laterality in terms of evolution. These findings are critical for our understanding of hemispheric differences in terms of higher-order consciousness.

Current issues and emerging theories in animal cognition

Comparative cognition is an emerging interdisciplinary field with contributions from comparative psychology, cognitive/experimental and developmental psychology, animal learning, and ethology, and is poised to move toward greater understanding of animal and human information-processing, reasoning, memory, and the phylogenetic emergence of mind. This chapter highlights some current issues and discusses four areas within comparative cognition that are yielding new approaches and hypotheses for studying basic conceptual capacities in nonhuman species. These include studies of imitation, tool use, mirror self-recognition, and the potential for attribution of mental states by nonhuman animals. Though a very old question in psychology, the study of imitation continues to provide new avenues for examining the complex relationships among and between the levels of imitative behaviors exhibited by many species. Similarly, recent work in animal tool use, mirror self-recognition (with all its contentious issues), and recent attempts to empirically study the potential for attributional capacities in nonhumans, all continue to provide fresh insights and novel paradigms for addressing the defining characteristics of these complex phenomena.

A critical review of methodology and interpretation of mirror self-recognition research in nonhuman primates

In this paper we critically review conceptual and methodological issues of mirror self-exploration research. We conclude that: (1) mirror self-exploration provides evidence for mirror self-recognition; (2) inter- and intraspecies differences in terms of presence or absence of mirror self-recognition are not yet sufficiently clear, that is, whether its absence in species and individuals is methodological (false negative with respect to trait) or ontological (true negative with respect to trait) in nature; and (3) proposals of hypotheses to account phylogenetically for the existence of inter- and intraspecies differences in mirror self-recognition are premature. Before hypotheses such as these are advanced, the impact of rearing conditions on mirror self-recognition should be examined further. Copyright 1999 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.