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Berent I. Consciousness isn't "hard"-it's human psychology that makes it so! Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae016. [PMID: 38585293 PMCID: PMC10996123 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2023] [Revised: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 03/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/09/2024] Open
Abstract
Consciousness arguably presents a "hard problem" for scholars. An influential position asserts that the "problem" is rooted in ontology-it arises because consciousness "is" distinct from the physical. "Problem intuitions" are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, "problem intuitions" are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender "problem intuitions."
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02115, USA
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Bennett EM, McLaughlin PJ. Neuroscience explanations really do satisfy: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the seductive allure of neuroscience. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE (BRISTOL, ENGLAND) 2024; 33:290-307. [PMID: 37906516 DOI: 10.1177/09636625231205005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/02/2023]
Abstract
Extraneous neuroscience information improves ratings of scientific explanations, and affects mock juror decisions in many studies, but others have yielded little to no effect. To establish the magnitude of this effect, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis using 60 experiments from 28 publications. We found a mild but highly significant effect, with substantial heterogeneity. Planned subgroup analyses revealed that within-subjects studies, where people can compare the same material with and without neuroscience, and those using text, have stronger effects than between-subjects designs, and studies using brain image stimuli. We serendipitously found that effect sizes were stronger on outcomes of evaluating satisfaction or metacomprehension, compared with jury verdicts or assessments of convincingness. In conclusion, there is more than one type of neuroscience explanations effect. Irrelevant neuroscience does have a seductive allure, especially on self-appraised satisfaction and understanding, and when presented as text.
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Berent I, Sansiveri A. Davinci the Dualist: The Mind-Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners. Open Mind (Camb) 2024; 8:84-101. [PMID: 38435703 PMCID: PMC10898781 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/05/2023] [Accepted: 01/10/2024] [Indexed: 03/05/2024] Open
Abstract
A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Furthermore, Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). Human learners, however, are also endowed with innate systems of core knowledge, and recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022). The resulting question, then, is whether the acquisition of Dualism requires core knowledge, or whether Dualism is learnable from experience alone, via domain-general mechanism. Since human learners are equipped with both systems, the evidence from humans cannot decide this question. Accordingly, here, we probe for a mind-body divide in Davinci-a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner's inductive potential. Thus, davinci (which forms part of the GPT-3 suite) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a stronger bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied-as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain). Unlike humans, GPT 3.5 categorically rejected the persistence of the psyche after death. Still, when probed about life, GPT 3.5 showed robust Dualist tendencies. These results demonstrate that the mind-body divide is partly learnable from experience. While results from LLMs cannot fully determine how humans acquire Dualism, they do place a higher burden of proof on nativist theories that trace Dualism to innate core cognition (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022).
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
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Paxton A. The Dynamical Hypothesis in Situ: Challenges and Opportunities for a Dynamical Social Approach to Interpersonal Coordination. Top Cogn Sci 2023. [PMID: 38029348 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2023] [Revised: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 11/08/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023]
Abstract
Over the past three decades, Van Gelder's dynamical hypothesis has been instrumental in reconceptualizing the ways in which perception-action-cognition unfolds over time and in context. Here, I examine how the dynamical approach has enriched the theoretical understanding of social dynamics within cognitive science, with a particular focus on interpersonal coordination. I frame this review around seven principles in dynamical systems: three that are well-represented in interpersonal coordination research to date (emergent behavior, context-sensitive behavior, and attractors) and four that could be useful opportunities for future growth (hysteresis, sensitivity to initial conditions, equifinality, and reciprocal compensation). In addition to identifying specific promising lines of theoretical inquiry, I focus on the significant potential afforded by computationally intensive science-especially in naturally occurring data or trace data. Building on the foundation laid over the past three decades, I argue that looking to increasingly situated and naturalistic settings (and data) is not only necessary to realize the full commitment to the dynamical hypothesis but is also critical to building parsimonious and principled theories of social phenomena.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexandra Paxton
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut
- Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut
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Berent I. How to Tell a Dualist? Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13380. [PMID: 37992196 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13380] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2022] [Revised: 10/24/2023] [Accepted: 11/06/2023] [Indexed: 11/24/2023]
Abstract
People exhibit conflicting intuitions concerning the mind/body links. Here, I explore a novel explanation for these inconsistencies: Dualism is a violable constraint that interacts with Essentialism. Two experiments probe these interactions. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated the emergence of psychological traits in either a replica of one's body, or in the afterlife-after the body's demise. In line with Dualism, epistemic (i.e., disembodied) traits (e.g., knowing the contrast between good/bad) were considered more likely to emerge (relative to sensorimotor/affective traits) only in the afterlife. However, so were innate traits (in line with Essentialism). To further gauge Essentialism, Experiment 2 presented the same traits to innateness judgments. Here, sensorimotor/affective (i.e., embodied) traits were considered more likely to be innate, suggesting that innateness intuitions are informed by embodiment. Moreover, innateness judgments (in Experiment 2) and embodiment intuitions (in Experiment 1) correlated. These results suggest that Dualism tacitly constrains reasoning about one's innate origins and its persistence after death. But since Dualism is "soft" and interacts with Essentialism, supernatural intuitions are chimeric, not purely ethereal.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University
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Berent I. The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" Arises from Human Psychology. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:564-587. [PMID: 37637301 PMCID: PMC10449398 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2023] [Accepted: 07/06/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Consciousness presents a "hard problem" to scholars. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Why consciousness is "hard", however, is uncertain. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology-because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Here, I show how the "hard problem" emerges from two intuitive biases that lie deep within human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism. To determine whether a subjective experience is transformative, people judge whether the experience pertains to one's essence, and per Essentialism, one's essence lies within one's body. Psychological states that seem embodied (e.g., "color vision" ∼ eyes) can thus give rise to transformative experience. Per intuitive Dualism, however, the mind is distinct from the body, and epistemic states (knowledge and beliefs) seem particularly ethereal. It follows that conscious perception (e.g., "seeing color") ought to seem more transformative than conscious knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how color vision works). Critically, the transformation arises precisely because the conscious perceptual experience seems readily embodied (rather than distinct from the physical body, as the ontological account suggests). In line with this proposal, five experiments show that, in laypeople's view (a) experience is transformative only when it seems anchored in the human body; (b) gaining a transformative experience effects a bodily change; and (c) the magnitude of the transformation correlates with both (i) the perceived embodiment of that experience, and (ii) with Dualist intuitions, generally. These results cannot solve the ontological question of whether consciousness is distinct from the physical. But they do suggest that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological.
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Berent I. The illusion of the mind-body divide is attenuated in males. Sci Rep 2023; 13:6653. [PMID: 37095109 PMCID: PMC10126148 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33079-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/23/2022] [Accepted: 04/06/2023] [Indexed: 04/26/2023] Open
Abstract
A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they tend to perceive the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here, we ask whether Dualism emanates from within the human psyche, guided, in part, by theory of mind (ToM). Past research has shown that males are poorer mind-readers than females. If ToM begets Dualism, then males should exhibit weaker Dualism, and instead, lean towards Physicalism (i.e., they should view bodies and minds alike). Experiments 1-2 show that males indeed perceive the psyche as more embodied-as more likely to emerge in a replica of one's body, and less likely to persist in its absence (after life). Experiment 3 further shows that males are less inclined towards Empiricism-a putative byproduct of Dualism. A final analysis confirms that males' ToM scores are lower, and ToM scores further correlate with embodiment intuitions (in Experiments 1-2). These observations (from Western participants) cannot establish universality, but the association of Dualism with ToM suggests its roots are psychological. Thus, the illusory mind-body divide may arise from the very workings of the human mind.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 125 Nightingale Hall, 360 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
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Wang J, Beecher K, Chehrehasa F, Moody H. The limitations of investigating appetite through circuit manipulations: are we biting off more than we can chew? Rev Neurosci 2022; 34:295-311. [PMID: 36054842 DOI: 10.1515/revneuro-2022-0072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2022] [Accepted: 07/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Disordered eating can underpin a number of debilitating and prevalent chronic diseases, such as obesity. Broader advances in psychopharmacology and biology have motivated some neuroscientists to address diet-induced obesity through reductionist, pre-clinical eating investigations on the rodent brain. Specifically, chemogenetic and optogenetic methods developed in the 21st century allow neuroscientists to perform in vivo, region-specific/projection-specific/promoter-specific circuit manipulations and immediately assess the impact of these manipulations on rodent feeding. These studies are able to rigorously conclude whether a specific neuronal population regulates feeding behaviour in the hope of eventually developing a mechanistic neuroanatomical map of appetite regulation. However, an artificially stimulated/inhibited rodent neuronal population that changes feeding behaviour does not necessarily represent a pharmacological target for treating eating disorders in humans. Chemogenetic/optogenetic findings must therefore be triangulated with the array of theories that contribute to our understanding of appetite. The objective of this review is to provide a wide-ranging discussion of the limitations of chemogenetic/optogenetic circuit manipulation experiments in rodents that are used to investigate appetite. Stepping into and outside of medical science epistemologies, this paper draws on philosophy of science, nutrition, addiction biology and neurophilosophy to prompt more integrative, transdisciplinary interpretations of chemogenetic/optogenetic appetite data. Through discussing the various technical and epistemological limitations of these data, we provide both an overview of chemogenetics and optogenetics accessible to non-neuroscientist obesity researchers, as well as a resource for neuroscientists to expand the number of lenses through which they interpret their circuit manipulation findings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Wang
- School of Clinical Sciences, Faculty of Health, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane 4000, QLD, Australia
| | - Kate Beecher
- UQ Centre for Clinical Research, Faculty of Medicine, University of Queensland, Building 71/918 Royal Brisbane and Women's Hospital Campus, Herston 4029, QLD, Australia
| | - Fatemeh Chehrehasa
- School of Biomedical Sciences, Faculty of Health, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane 4000, QLD, Australia
| | - Hayley Moody
- Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane 4000, QLD, Australia
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Berent I. Can the Mind Command the Body? Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e13067. [PMID: 34882834 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13067] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2020] [Revised: 10/18/2021] [Accepted: 10/31/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal-as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2-5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind-body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., "thinking") but not to physical states ("activation"). Together, these results suggest that mind-body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University
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Berent I, Platt M. Public misconceptions about dyslexia: The role of intuitive psychology. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0259019. [PMID: 34855765 PMCID: PMC8638985 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0259019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2020] [Accepted: 10/11/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite advances in its scientific understanding, dyslexia is still associated with rampant public misconceptions. Here, we trace these misconceptions to the interaction between two intuitive psychological principles: Dualism and Essentialism. We hypothesize that people essentialize dyslexia symptoms that they anchor in the body. Experiment 1 shows that, when dyslexia is associated with visual confusions (b/d reversals)—symptoms that are naturally viewed as embodied (in the eyes), laypeople consider dyslexia as more severe, immutable, biological, and heritable, compared to when dyslexia is linked to difficulties with phonological decoding (a symptom seen as less strongly embodied). Experiments 2–3 show that the embodiment of symptoms plays a causal role in promoting essentialist thinking. Experiment 2 shows that, when participants are provided evidence that the symptoms of dyslexia are embodied (i.e., they “show up” in a brain scan), people are more likely to consider dyslexia as heritable compared to when the same symptoms are diagnosed behaviorally (without any explicit evidence for the body). Finally, Experiment 3 shows that reasoning about the severity of dyslexia symptoms can be modulated by manipulating people’s attitudes about the mind/body links, generally. These results show how public attitudes towards psychological disorders arise from the very principles that make the mind tick.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Melanie Platt
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
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Abstract
Few questions in science are as controversial as human nature. At stake is whether our basic concepts and emotions are all learned from experience, or whether some are innate. Here, I demonstrate that reasoning about innateness is biased by the basic workings of the human mind. Psychological science suggests that newborns possess core concepts of "object" and "number." Laypeople, however, believe that newborns are devoid of such notions but that they can recognize emotions. Moreover, people presume that concepts are learned, whereas emotions (along with sensations and actions) are innate. I trace these beliefs to two tacit psychological principles: intuitive dualism and essentialism. Essentialism guides tacit reasoning about biological inheritance and suggests that innate traits reside in the body; per intuitive dualism, however, the mind seems ethereal, distinct from the body. It thus follows that, in our intuitive psychology, concepts (which people falsely consider as disembodied) must be learned, whereas emotions, sensations, and emotions (which are considered embodied) are likely innate; these predictions are in line with the experimental results. These conclusions do not speak to the question of whether concepts and emotions are innate, but they suggest caution in its scientific evaluation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115
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