Contradictions of emotion in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia, the very idea: On self-disorder, hyperreflexivity, and the diagnostic concept

The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

The slippery and the sane: Decolonizing psychology through a study of the Indian girl-child

This article makes a case against the export of psychological intervention, as developed and practiced in the Global North, to the Indian sub-continent. It is based on the premise that differences between these places are not only sociological and cultural but also at the level of the structure of subjectivity. Leaning on my theoretical understanding of the Indian female subject’s constitution and my empirical work on participants in rural Uttarakhand, India, I posit that our call for decolonization cannot be partial.

De-othering “schizophrenia”

Do psychiatry and clinical psychology have an “other”? This article critically addresses the clinical-scientific fascination with diagnostic challenges and other psychiatric mysteries, focusing on the example of “schizophrenia,” often seen as the most severe and enigmatic of all mental disorders. Over a century of clinical and scientific discourse on schizophrenia has painted a portrait of something indecipherable at the very foundation of psychiatric inquiry. Despite entrenched beliefs, mounting evidence from both qualitative-phenomenological and quantitative research suggests that the experience of psychosis can be meaningfully understood. Further, there is a wealth of data indicating that persons with lived experience of psychosis can lead self-actualized lives, and new studies have revealed that psychotic experiences are common in non-clinical populations. Yet traditional views of psychosis persist in the face of this mounting evidence. I suggest that the key to de-othering schizophrenia may lie in an emerging body of research on “social defeat,” marginalization, and alienation. More specifically, the experiences and behaviors commonly designated as psychosis arise in social and interpersonal contexts that are distinctly alienating, including the psychiatric encounter. It follows that schizophrenia may not be the elusive empirical object of debates about unintelligibility or “ununderstandability,” but rather a social configuration that is manifest within the deadlock of this debate itself.

Respiratory Variability during Different Auditory Stimulation Periods in Schizophrenia Patients

Background: Schizophrenic patients are known to have difficulty processing emotions and to exhibit impairment in stimuli discrimination. However, there is limited knowledge regarding their physiological responsivity to auditory stimuli.

Objectives: The purpose of this study was to compare the respiratory effects of two types of auditory stimuli with emotional content, classical Turkish music (CTM) and white noise (WN), on schizophrenia patients and healthy control subjects.

Methods: Forty-six individuals participated in the experiment, and respiratory signals derived from a strain-gauge were recorded. Two important respiratory patterns, respiration rate and depth, were analyzed.

Results: The results indicated that the patients presented a significantly higher respiration rate than control subjects during the initial baseline and WN exposure periods. Although CTM evoked an increase in respiration rates and a decrease in respiration depths in the control group, no significant differences were found during the stimulation periods in the patient group. The respiration rate was lower in the post-stimulation period than during the initial baseline period, and no respiration depth differences were found for the WN, music or post-stimulation periods in the schizophrenia group. Patients exhibited a greater respiration depth than the control subjects over all periods; however, a significant difference between the patient and control groups was obtained in the second resting condition and CTM exposure period. Furthermore, to analyze the effect of symptom severity on respiratory patterns, patients were divided into two classes according to their Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale score.

Conclusions: Further studies are needed to correlate respiratory differences with emotionally evocative stimuli and to refine our understanding of the dynamics of these types of stimuli in relation to clinical state and medication effects.

Rethinking Schizophrenia in the Context of the Person and Their Circumstances: Seven Reasons

We know a great deal about schizophrenia, but the current state of the art is one of uncertainty. Researchers are confused, and patients feel misunderstood. This situation has been identified as due largely to the fact that the dominant neurobiological perspective leaves out the person. The aim of the present article is to review and integrate a series of clinical, phenomenological, historical, cultural, epidemiological, developmental, epigenetic, and therapeutic phenomena in support of a suggestion that schizophrenia is above all a disorder of the person rather than of the brain. Specifically, we review seven phenomena, beginning with the conception of schizophrenia as a particular disorder of the self. We continue by looking at its recent origin, as a modern phenomenon, its juvenile onset, related to the formation of the self, the better prognosis in developing countries compared to developed countries, and the high incidence of the disorder among migrants. In the context of these phenomena of a marked socio-cultural nature, we consider the so-called "genetic myth," according to which schizophrenia would have a genetic origin. On reviewing the current genetic emphasis in the light of epigenetics, it emerges that the environment and behavior recover their prominent role in the vicissitudes of development. The seventh reason, which closes the circle of the argument, concerns the role of interpersonal "chemistry" in recovery of the sense of self.

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Secondary factors

Schizophrenia is a diverse and varying syndrome that defies most attempts at classification and pathogenetic explanation. This is the second of two articles offering a comprehensive model meant to integrate an understanding of schizophrenia-related forms of subjectivity, especially anomalous core-self experience (disturbed ipseity), with neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental findings. Previously we discussed the primary or foundational role of disturbed intermodal perceptional integration ("perceptual dys-integration"). Here we discuss phenomenological alterations that can be considered secondary in a pathogenetic sense--whether as consequential products downstream from a more originary disruption, or as defensive reactions involving quasi-intentional or even volitional compensations to the more primary disruptions. These include secondary forms of: 1, hyperreflexivity, 2, diminished self-presence (self-affection), and 3. disturbed "rip" or "hold" on the cognitive/perceptual field of awareness. We consider complementary relations between these secondary abnormal experiences while also considering their temporal relationships and pathogenetic intertwining with the more primary phenomenological alterations discussed previously, all in relation to the neurodevelopmental model. The secondary phenomena can be understood as highly variable factors involving overall orientations or attitudes toward experience; they have some affinities with experiences of meditation, introspectionism, and depersonalization defense. Also, they seem likely to become more pronounced during adolescence as a result of new cognitive capacities related to development of the prefrontal lobes, especially attention allocation, executive functions, abstraction, and meta-awareness. Heterogeneity in these secondary alterations might help explain much of the clinical diversity in schizophrenia, both between patients and within individual patients over time--without however losing sight of key underlying commonalities.

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Primary factors

Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous syndrome, varying between persons and over course of illness. In this and a companion article, we argue that comprehension of this condition or set of conditions may require combining a phenomenological perspective emphasizing disorders of basic-self experience ("ipseity disturbance") with a multidimensional appreciation of possible neurobiological correlates--both primary and secondary. Previous attempts to link phenomenology and neurobiology generally focus on a single neurocognitive factor. We consider diverse aspects of schizophrenia in light of a diverse, albeit interacting, set of neurocognitive abnormalities, examining both synchronic (structural) interdependence and diachronic (temporal) succession. In this article we focus on the primary or foundational role of early perceptual and motoric disturbances that affect perceptual organization and especially intermodal or multisensory perceptual integration (“perceptual dys-integration”). These disturbances are discussed in terms of their implications for three interconnected aspects of selfhood in schizophrenia, primary forms of: disrupted "hold" or "grip" on the world, hyperreflexivity, diminished self-presence (self-affection). Disturbances of organization or integration imply forms of perceptual incoherence or diminished cognitive coordination. The effect is to disrupt one's ability to apprehend the world in holistic, vital, or contextually grounded fashion, or to fully identify with or experience the unity of one's own body or thinking--thereby generating an early and profound (albeit often subtle) disruption or diminishment of basic or core self and of the sense of existing in a coherent world. We discuss interrelationships or possible complementarities between these three aspects, and consider their relevance for a neurodevelopmental account of schizophrenia.

Faces of Intersubjectivity

Here we consider interpersonal experience in schizophrenia, melancholia, and mania. Our goal is to improve understanding of similarities and differences in how other people can be experienced in these disorders, through a review of first-person accounts and case examples and of contemporary and classic literature on the phenomenology of these disorders. We adopt a tripartite/dialectical structure: first we explore main differences as traditionally described; next we consider how the disorders may resemble each other; finally we discuss more subtle but perhaps foundational ways in which the phenomenology of these disorders may nonetheless be differentiated. These involve disruptions of common sense and conventionality, abnormalities of empathy, distinct forms of paranoia and the sense of personal centrality, and altered perceptions of intentionality, deadness, and artificiality. We end by considering some neurocognitive research relevant to these abnormal forms of subjectivity, including work on theory of mind, experience of human movement, and perception of faces.

The phenomenology of emotion experience in first-episode psychosis

BACKGROUND

Although it has been suggested that disturbances in emotion experience and regulation play a central role in the aetiology and psychopathology of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, the phenomenology of emotion experience in schizophrenia remains under-researched.

SAMPLING AND METHODS

In-depth interviews were conducted twice with each of the 20 participants (firstly at admission and secondly 6 months later). Data collection and analysis were guided by the principles of phenomenological study of lived experience.

RESULTS

The emotion experiences described by our participants vary greatly in both quality and intensity, but appear to have a common phenomenology. Anxiety is reported as the basic emotion which buffers, transforms and sometimes supplants all others. Emotions in general are experienced as foreign, unstable and perturbing, thereby contributing greatly to feelings of ambivalence, perplexity and an unstable sense of self in general.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study have important therapeutic and theoretical implications because they suggest that emotion experiences in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may underlie a wide range of psychopathological phenomena in both the cognitive and social functioning domains. Due to the relatively small sample size and its selection from psychotherapeutic units, the results may not be generalizable to all schizophrenia patients.

Comorbidity of schizotypy and psychopathy: skin conductance to affective pictures

Prior research indicates a relationship between psychopathy and schizophrenia, elucidating a specific trajectory toward violence. Recent research has suggested that this relationship exists at the nonclinical trait level of schizotypy; however, this finding has not been examined objectively. To explore this relationship using both subjective and objective measures, 54 undergraduates (50% male; mean age 20.41) who endorsed a wide range of schizotypy on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) completed a laboratory-based protocol. Participants viewed 15 pictures (five neutral, five threatening, and five of others in distress) from the International Affective Pictures System while electrodermal activity was recorded. As expected, all participants exhibited increased skin conductance levels (SCL) to threat and distress pictures compared to neutral pictures; however, no difference in SCL was found between threat and distress pictures. A unique relationship between psychopathy and schizotypy was found (i.e., schizotypy was related to higher Self-Centered Impulsivity and lower Fearless Dominance); however, schizotypy was related to increased SCL in response to emotional and neutral pictures. Although results do not support autonomic hyporesponsiveness often found in clinical psychopathy, a positive relationship was found between schizotypy and self-reported physical aggression. Findings highlight the need to examine other trajectories of violence within the schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for schizophrenia: a critical evaluation of its theoretical framework from a clinical-phenomenological perspective

BACKGROUND

Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has played an increasingly important role in psychotherapy for schizophrenia since the 1990s, but it has also encountered many theoretical and practical limitations. For example, methodologically rigorous meta-analyses have recently found only modest overall effect sizes of CBT treatment, and therefore questions have emerged about forwhat and for whom it actually works.

METHOD

The focus of the present paper is to elucidate the theoretical assumptions underlying CBT for schizophrenia and to examine their consistency with abnormalities of experience and self-awareness frequently reported by schizophrenia patients and systematically studied in phenomenological psychopathology from the beginning of the 20th century.

RESULTS

We argue that a strong theoretical emphasis on cognitive appraisals with only subsidiary attention devoted to affective and behavioral processes - as is characteristic of many forms of CBT - cannot satisfactorily account for the complex subjective experiences of schizophrenia patients. We further argue that certain theoretical strategies widely employed in CBT to explore and explain mental disorders, which involve atomization and, at times, a reification of mental phenomena, can be problematic and may result in a loss of explanatory potential. Finally, we provide a detailed account of how negative symptoms and delusions are conceptualized in CBT and consider the question of how these concepts fit the actual phenomenology of schizophrenia.

CONCLUSION

We suggest that further advancement of CBT theory and practice can benefit from a dialogue with phenomenological psychiatry in the search for effective psychotherapeutic strategies for schizophrenia patients.

From depersonalization to hallucination

Henri Ey suggested that all hallucinations occur against the background of depersonalization, which is an alteration in experience that people find hard to describe, where the subject feels a strangeness pervading the world and her/his own body, emotions and thoughts. Embracing Ey's proposal, this paper draws a comparison between depersonalization in hallucinations and depersonalization in some delusional states (especially the Capgras and the Cotard syndromes), which by the most recent models used in cognitive neuroscience is considered to be a disruption in so-called 'affective familiarity'. Sensory information regarding the world is divided into the 'overt pathway' of perceptual inputs and the 'covert pathway' of 'atmospheric cues'. In hallucinating subjects, we suggest that a breakdown of the grasping of atmospheric qualities in the environment triggers a compensatory process consisting of the production of hypotheses that make sense of the world perceived. Finally, we report on a case that illustrates our proposal.

Physiological reactivity and facial expression to emotion-inducing films in patients with schizophrenia

The present study aimed to investigate the physiological reactivity and recognition to emotional stimuli in outpatients with schizophrenia and in healthy controls. Skin conductance response, skin conductance level, heart rate, respiration, corrugator muscle, and orbicularis muscle were all measured using five emotion-eliciting film clips. The patients reported lower intensity of experienced anger and disgust than controls. The patient and control groups did not differ in accuracy to recognize emotions except anger. Anger, fear, amusement, and sadness had a discriminative effect on physiological responses in the two groups. These findings provide helpful physiological evidence influenced by harmful or favorable emotional stimuli. Future directions may include to clarify how physiological reactivity and subject experience to emotion are related to their functioning.

Recent developments in philosophy of psychopathology

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

To survey recent developments in the English-language philosophy of psychopathology.

RECENT FINDINGS

First, we present books - by Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) and by Thompson (2007) -that integrate phenomenology with cognitive science and neuroscience. This is followed by discussion of critical assessments of the DSM-III operational legacy and practical consequences recently offered by various psychiatrists, including Andreasen, Mullen,and Maj. These very bleak assessments are considered in light of certain new trends in explanatory models of psychiatry and associated metaphysical concerns. Finally, we concentrate on the phenomenological approach to schizophrenia, enjoying a renaissance in psychiatric literature. We emphasize the recent work on the issue of self disorders as a core aspect of psychopathology of schizophrenia and criticize the accuracy of a recent survey (published in this journal) of phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia, thereby rectifying important misunderstandings.

SUMMARY

The review emphasizes the fundamental importance of philosophy of psychopathology in clarifying concepts, highlighting epistemological problems, and helping to provide adequate distinctions at the phenomenological level for use in empirical research.