Emotional expression and vocabulary learning in adults and children

Faces of different socio-cultural identities impact emotional meaning learning for L2 words

This study investigated how exposure to Caucasian and Chinese faces influences native Mandarin-Chinese speakers' learning of emotional meanings for English L2 words. Participants were presented with English pseudowords repeatedly paired with either Caucasian faces or Chinese faces showing emotions of disgust, sadness, or neutrality as a control baseline. Participants' learning was evaluated through both within-modality (i.e., testing participants with new sets of faces) and cross-modality (i.e., testing participants with sentences expressing the learned emotions) generalization tests. When matching newly learned L2 words with new faces, participants from both groups were more accurate under the neutral condition compared to sad condition. The advantage of neutrality extended to sentences as participants matched newly learned L2 words with neutral sentences more accurately than with both disgusting and sad ones. Differences between the two groups were also found in the cross-modality generalization test in which the Caucasian-face Group outperformed the Chinese-face Group in terms of accuracy in sad trials. However, the Chinese-face Group was more accurate in neutral trials in the same test. We thus conclude that faces of diverse socio-cultural identities exert different impacts on the emotional meaning learning for L2 words.

Facial impressions of niceness influence children's interpretations of peers' ambiguous behavior

Children infer personality traits from faces when they are asked explicitly which face appears nice or mean. Less is known about how children use face-trait information implicitly to make behavioral evaluations. We used the Ambiguous Situations Protocol to explore how children use face-trait information to form interpretations of ambiguous situations when the behavior or intention of the target child was unclear. On each trial, children (N = 144, age range = 4-11.95 years; 74 girls, 67 boys, 3 gender not specified; 70% White, 10% other or mixed race, 5% Asian, 4% Black, 1% Indigenous, 9% not specified) viewed a child's face (previously rated high or low in niceness) before seeing the child's face embedded within an ambiguous scene (Scene Task) or hearing a vignette about a misbehavior done by that child (Misbehavior Task). Children described what was happening in each scene and indicated whether each misbehavior was done on purpose or by accident. Children also rated the behavior of each child and indicated whether the child would be a good friend. Facial niceness influenced children's interpretations of ambiguous behavior (Scene Task) by 4 years of age, and ambiguous intentions (Misbehavior Task) by 6 years. Our results suggest that the use of face-trait cues to form interpretations of ambiguous behavior emerges early in childhood, a bias that may lead to differential treatment for peers perceived with a high-nice face versus a low-nice face.

Does Lexical Coordination Affect Epistemic and Practical Trust? The Role of Conceptual Pacts

The present study investigated whether humans are more likely to trust people who are coordinated with them. We examined a well-known type of linguistic coordination, lexical entrainment, typically involving the elaboration of "conceptual pacts," or partner-specific agreements on how to conceptualize objects. In two experiments, we manipulated lexical entrainment in a referential communication task and measured the effect of this manipulation on epistemic and practical trust. Our results showed that participants were more likely to trust a coordinated partner than an uncoordinated one, but only when the latter broke previously established conceptual pacts.

Epistemic trust: a comprehensive review of empirical insights and implications for developmental psychopathology

Originally rooted in philosophy and sociology, the concept of epistemic trust has recently transitioned to developmental psychopathology, illuminating social-cognitive processes in psychopathology. This narrative review synthesizes empirical evidence on epistemic trust to inform future research. A literature search highlighted 3 areas: i) the development of selective trust in children; ii) epistemic trust in non-clinical adults; iii) its link to mental health. Young children demonstrate selective learning from reliable sources using epistemic cues. Empirical studies beyond childhood were greatly facilitated in the last 2 years with the introduction of the Epistemic Trust, Mistrust and Credulity Questionnaire, a self-report scale measuring epistemic stance. Cross-sectional studies pinpointed dysfunctional epistemic strategies as factors in mental health vulnerability, and some qualitative work offered initial evidence linking restored epistemic trust to effective psychotherapy. For future research, we propose focusing on 3 primary areas. First, empirical investigations in adolescent samples are needed, as adolescence seems to be a pivotal phase in the development of epistemic trust. Second, more experimental research is required to assess dysfunctional and functional epistemic stances and how they relate to vulnerability to mental health disorders. Finally, intervention studies should explore the dynamics of epistemic stances within and between therapy sessions and their impact on therapeutic outcomes.

Effects of emotional cues on novel word learning in typically developing children in relation to broader autism traits

Emotion can influence various cognitive processes. Communication with children often involves exaggerated emotional expressions and emotive language. Children with autism spectrum disorder often show a reduced tendency to attend to emotional information. Typically developing children aged 7 to 9 years who varied in their level of autism-like traits learned the nonsense word names of nine novel toys, which were presented with either happy, fearful, or neutral emotional cues. Emotional cues had no influence on word recognition or recall performance. Eye-tracking data showed differences in visual attention depending on the type of emotional cues and level of autism-like traits. The findings suggest that the influence of emotion on attention during word learning differs according to whether the children have lower or higher levels of autism-like traits, but this influence does not affect word learning outcomes.

First impressions of child faces: Facial trustworthiness influences adults' interpretations of children's behavior in ambiguous situations

Despite the profound behavioral consequences that first impressions of trustworthiness have on adult populations, few studies have examined how adults' first impressions of trustworthiness influence behavioral outcomes for children. Using a novel task design, we examined adults' perceptions of children's behavior in ambiguous situations. After a brief presentation of a child's face (high trust or low trust), participants viewed the child's face embedded within an ambiguous scene involving two children (Scene Task) or read a vignette about a misbehavior done by that child (Misbehavior Task). In the Scene Task, participants described what they believed to be happening in each scene; in the Misbehavior Task, participants indicated whether the behavior was done on purpose or by accident. In both tasks, participants also rated the behavior of the target child and indicated whether that child would be a good friend. In Experiment 1, young adults (n = 61) and older adults (n = 57) viewed unaltered face images. In Experiment 2, young adults (N = 59) completed the same tasks while viewing images of child faces morphed toward high-trust and low-trust averages. In both experiments, ambiguous scenes and misbehaviors were interpreted more positively when the target child had a high-trust face versus a low-trust face, with comparable patterns of results for the two age groups. Collectively, our results demonstrate that a child's facial trustworthiness biases how adults interpret children's behavior-a heuristic that may have lasting behavioral consequences for children through a self-fulfilling prophecy.

How Children Learn From Others: An Analysis of Selective Word Learning

One way children are remarkable learners is that they learn from others. Critically, children are selective when assessing from whom to learn, particularly in the domain of word learning. We conducted an analysis of children's selective word learning, reviewing 63 papers on 6,525 participants. Children's ability to engage in selective word learning appeared to be present in the youngest samples surveyed. Their more metacognitive understanding that epistemic competence indicates reliability or that others are good sources of knowledge has more of a developmental trajectory. We also found that various methodological factors used to assess children influence performance. We conclude with a synthesis of theoretical accounts of how children learn from others.

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children's selective trust: Three meta-analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children's selective trust. Three meta-analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3- to 6-year-old children's selective trust in an informant based on the informant's epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children's selective trust decisions. The first and second meta-analyses found that children displayed medium-to-large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4-year-olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3-year-olds. The third meta-analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3-year-old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4- to 6-year-olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta-analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant's testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children's selective trust are discussed.

The influence of subtle facial expressions on children's first impressions of trustworthiness and dominance is not adult-like

Adults' first impressions of others are influenced by subtle facial expressions; happy faces are perceived as high in trustworthiness, whereas angry faces are rated as low in trustworthiness and high in threat and dominance. Little is known about the influence of emotional expressions on children's first impressions. Here we examined the influence of subtle expressions of happiness, anger, and fear on children's implicit judgments of trustworthiness and dominance with the aim of providing novel insights about both the development of first impressions and whether children are able to utilize emotional expressions when making implicit, rather than explicit, judgments of traits. In the context of a computerized storybook, children (4- to 11-year-olds) and adults selected one of two twins (two images of the same identity displaying different emotional expressions) to help them face a challenge; some challenges required a trustworthy partner, and others required a dominant partner. One twin posed a neutral expression, and the other posed a subtle emotional expression of happiness, fear, or anger. Whereas adults were more likely to select a happy partner on trust trials than on dominance trials and were more likely to select an angry partner on dominance trials than on trust trials, we found no evidence that children's choices reflected a combined influence of desirable trait and emotion. Follow-up experiments involving explicit trait judgments, explicit emotion recognition, and implicit first impression judgments in the context of intense emotional expressions provide valuable insights into the slow development of implicit trait judgments based on first impressions.

Asymmetric neural responses for facial expressions and anti-expressions

Face recognition requires identifying both the invariant characteristics that distinguish one individual from another and the variations within the individual that correspond to emotional expressions. Both have been postulated to be represented via a norm-based code, in which identity or expression are represented as deviations from an average or neutral prototype. We used Fast Periodic Visual Stimulation (FPVS) with electroencephalography (EEG) to compare neural responses for neutral faces, expressions and anti-expressions. Anti-expressions are created by projecting an expression (e.g. a happy face) through the neutral face to form the opposite facial shape (anti-happy). Thus expressions and anti-expressions differ from the norm by the same "configural" amount and thus have equivalent but opposite status with regard to their shape, but differ in their ecological validity. We examined whether neural responses to these complementary stimulus pairs were equivalent or asymmetric, and also tested for norm-based coding by comparing whether stronger responses are elicited by expressions and anti-expressions than neutral faces. Observers viewed 20 s sequences of 6 Hz alternations of neutral faces and expressions, neutral faces and anti-expressions, and expressions and anti-expressions. Responses were analyzed in the frequency domain. Significant responses at half the frequency of the presentation rate (3 Hz), indicating asymmetries in responses, were observed for all conditions. Inversion of the images reduced the size of this signal, indicating these asymmetries are not solely due to differences in the low-level properties of the images. While our results do not preclude a norm-based code for expressions, similar to identity, this representation (as measured by the FPVS EEG responses) may also include components sensitive to which configural distortions form meaningful expressions.

The impact of emotional expressions on children's trust judgments

Research on the development of selective trust has shown that young children do not indiscriminately trust all potential informants. They are likely to seek and endorse information from individuals who have proven competent or benign in the past. However, research on trust among adults raises the possibility that children might also be influenced by the emotions expressed by potential informants. In particular, they might trust individuals expressing more positive emotion. Indeed, young children's trust in particular informants based on their past behaviour might be undermined by their currently expressed emotions. To examine this possibility, we tested the selective trust of fifty 4- and 5-year-olds in two steps. We first confirmed that children are likely to invest more trust in individuals expressing more positive emotion. We then showed that even if children have already formed an impression of two potential informants based on their behavioural record, their choices about whose claims to trust are markedly influenced by the degree of positive emotion currently expressed by the two informants. By implication, the facial emotions expressed by potential informants can undermine young children's selective trust based on the behavioural record of those informants.

The boss is always right: Preschoolers endorse the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate

Recent research has shown that young children rely on social cues to evaluate testimony. For instance, they prefer to endorse testimony provided by a consensual group than by a single dissenter. Given that dominance is pervasive in children's social environment, it can be hypothesized that children also use dominance relations in their selection of testimony. To test this hypothesis, a dominance asymmetry was induced between two characters either by having one repeatedly win in physical contests (physical power; Experiment 1) or by having one repeatedly impose her goals on the other (decisional power; Experiment 2). In two subsequent testimony tasks, 3- to 5-year-old children significantly tended to endorse the testimony of the dominant over that of the subordinate. These results suggest that preschoolers take dominance into account when evaluating testimony. In conclusion, we discuss two potential explanations for these findings.

Epistemology for Beginners: Two- to Five-Year-Old Children's Representation of Falsity

This paper investigates the ontogeny of human's naive concept of truth. Surprisingly, children find it hard to treat assertions as false before their fifth birthday. Yet, we show in six studies (N = 140) that human's concept of falsity develops early. Two-year-olds use truth-functional negation to exclude one term in an alternative (Study 1). Three-year-olds can evaluate discrepancies between the content of a representation and what it aims at representing (Study 2). They use this knowledge to treat beliefs and assertions as false (Study 3). Four-year-olds recognise the involutive nature of falsity ascriptions: they properly infer 'p' from 'It is not true that "It is not true that "p""' (Study 4), an inference that rests on second-order representations of representations. Controls confirm that children do not merely equate being mistaken with failing to achieve one's goal (Studies 5 and 6). These results demonstrate remarkable capacities to evaluate representations, and indicate that in the absence of formal training, young children develop the building blocks of a theory of truth and falsity-a naive epistemology. We suggest that children's difficulties in discarding false assertions need not reflect any conceptual lacuna, and may originate from their being trustful.

The medium helps the message: Early sensitivity to auditory fluency in children's endorsement of statements

Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the cues used by children to selectively accept testimony. In parallel, several studies with adults have shown that the fluency with which information is provided influences message evaluation: adults evaluate fluent information as more credible than dysfluent information. It is therefore plausible that the fluency of a message could also influence children's endorsement of statements. Three experiments were designed to test this hypothesis with 3- to 5-year-olds where the auditory fluency of a message was manipulated by adding different levels of noise to recorded statements. The results show that 4 and 5-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, are more likely to endorse a fluent statement than a dysfluent one. The present study constitutes a first attempt to show that fluency, i.e., ease of processing, is recruited as a cue to guide epistemic decision in children. An interpretation of the age difference based on the way cues are processed by younger children is suggested.

Inferring character from faces: a developmental study

Human adults attribute character traits to faces readily and with high consensus. In two experiments investigating the development of face-to-trait inference, adults and children ages 3 through 10 attributed trustworthiness, dominance, and competence to pairs of faces. In Experiment 1, the attributions of 3- to 4-year-olds converged with those of adults, and 5- to 6-year-olds' attributions were at adult levels of consistency. Children ages 3 and above consistently attributed the basic mean/nice evaluation not only to faces varying in trustworthiness (Experiment 1) but also to faces varying in dominance and competence (Experiment 2). This research suggests that the predisposition to judge others using scant facial information appears in adultlike forms early in childhood and does not require prolonged social experience.