An Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Human Self-awareness and Theory of Mind

Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Mirror self-recognition in ghost crab (Ocypode quadrata)

Mirror self-recognition has been examined primarily in vertebrate species, largely through the use of a mirror mark test. Recently, however, there has been growing interest in the notion that all animals likely need some form of self-representation to successfully interact with their environment (Kohda et al. in Plos Biol https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001529 , 2022; de Waal in Plos Biol https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000112 , 2019). Our knowledge of this trait in invertebrate species is particularly limited, while there are several species potentially well suited for mirror mark tests. To better understand this trait and its distribution, the current research examines mirror self-recognition in ghost crab (Ocypode quadrata) using a visual mirror mark test. In an initial phase, animals were exposed to a flat oriented mirror for an extended period. In a subsequent testing phase, subjects were either (1) marked (green sticker) or sham marked (clear sticker) and exposed to a mirror, (2) marked and placed in a tank without a mirror, or (3) marked and shown video of a marked conspecific. Results showed that marked, relative to sham marked, animals were significantly more likely to remove marks when exposed to mirrors. Findings also suggests this behavior was not driven by the perception of mirror images as conspecifics, or issues related to mark placement. These data are interpreted in support of a rudimentary form of self-awareness in this species. Discussions highlight potential cognitive mechanisms that facilitate this type of self-representation and the need for additional research that informs about more sophisticated forms of self-awareness.

Prospective associations between maternal mind-mindedness, child theory of mind, and brain morphology in school-aged children

Mentalizing is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. In the context of parental behavior, parents' tendency to comment on their child's mental activities refers to the concept of mind-mindedness (MM). MM has been positively associated with various developmental outcomes in children, notably their own ability to mentalize, known as theory of mind (ToM). Although parental (MM) and child (ToM) mentalizing have important implications during childhood, their associations with children's neural structures are largely unknown. Among 62 mother-child dyads, maternal MM was rated from free-play sequences when children were aged 1 year, child ToM was assessed using a first-order false-belief task at 4 years of age, and structural MRI images were acquired at 10 years of age. Maternal MM was positively associated with gray matter volumes (GMV) in the dorsal prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal pole. Child ToM abilities were positively associated with GMV in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Though cortical regions associated with MM and ToM showed no anatomical overlap, many are functionally connected through a neural network highly involved in self-referential strategies for mentalizing. These findings suggest that MM and ToM may contribute to distinct sub-processes that collectively support social cognition development.

The Self Course: Lessons Learned from Students' Weekly Questions

In this paper, I tentatively answer 50 questions sampled from a pool of over 10,000 weekly questions formulated by students in a course entitled "The Self". The questions pertain to various key topics related to self-processes, such as self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-regulation, self-talk, self-esteem, and self-regulation. The students' weekly questions and their answers highlight what is currently known about the self. Answers to the student questions also allow for the identification of some recurrent lessons about the self. Some of these lessons include: all self-processes are interconnected (e.g., prospection depends on autobiography), self-terms must be properly defined (e.g., self-rumination and worry are not the same), inner speech plays an important role in self-processes, controversies are numerous (are animals self-aware?), measurement issues abound (e.g., self-recognition as an operationalization of self-awareness), deficits in some self-processes can have devastating effects (e.g., self-regulatory deficits may lead to financial problems), and there are lots of unknowns about the self (e.g., gender differences in Theory-of-Mind).

Developing Self-Awareness in Robots via Inner Speech

The experience of inner speech is a common one. Such a dialogue accompanies the introspection of mental life and fulfills essential roles in human behavior, such as self-restructuring, self-regulation, and re-focusing on attentional resources. Although the underpinning of inner speech is mostly investigated in psychological and philosophical fields, the research in robotics generally does not address such a form of self-aware behavior. Existing models of inner speech inspire computational tools to provide a robot with this form of self-awareness. Here, the widespread psychological models of inner speech are reviewed, and a cognitive architecture for a robot implementing such a capability is outlined in a simplified setup.

Toward a Glossary of Self-related Terms

Some scholars have noted that an impressive number of self-related terms have been gradually introduced in the scientific literature. Several of these terms are either ill-defined or synonymous, creating confusion, and redundancy. In an effort to minimize this problem, I present a novel and systematic way of looking at possible relations between several key self-terms. I also propose a tentative classification scheme of self-terms as follows: (1) basic terms related to the overall process of self-perception (e.g., self-awareness), (2) non self-terms that are importantly associated to some other self-terms (e.g., consciousness and Theory of Mind), (3) processes related to the executive self and involving agency, volition, and self-control (e.g., self-regulation), and (4) self-views, that is, the content and feelings about the self (e.g., self-esteem). Three additional categories not discussed in this paper are self-biases, reactions to the self, and interpersonal style. Arguably unambiguous definitions for some of the most important and frequently used self-terms are suggested. These are presented in tables meant for the reader to search for definitions as well as related terms.

Neuroscientific Insights Into Management Development

Research from the interdisciplinary field of social cognitive neuroscience provides insights as to how managers learn and develop, resulting in theoretical propositions and practical implications. Third-generation management development is applied as a conceptual framework for the organization and presentation of relevant evidence from the neuroscience literature. Neuroscience offers potential to theoretically advance our understanding of management development as well as practically enhance managerial capacity to (a) reflect with a deeper sense of self-awareness, (b) analyze with greater balance across hard and soft data, (c) position organizations within broader perspectives, (d) collaborate interpersonally by establishing relationships that engender egalitarianism and trust, and (e) enact change in a nonlinear manner. Ten propositions are developed linking neurological processes to management development. Practical implications are suggested as well as research considerations for future integration between neuroscience and management development.

Mindreading in individuals with an empathizing versus systemizing cognitive style: An fMRI study

Our fMRI study compares the neural correlates of face-based mindreading in healthy individuals with an empathizing (n=12) versus systemizing cognitive style (n=12). The empathizing group consists of individuals that score high on empathizing and low on systemizing, while the systemizing group consists of individuals with an opposite cognitive pattern. We hypothesize that the empathizing group will show stronger simulation-type neural activity (e.g., in mirror neuron areas, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex) or simulation-related neural activity (e.g., in areas involved in perspective taking and experiential processing) compared to the systemizing group. As hypothesized, our study reveals that the empathizing group shows significantly stronger activity in mirror neuron areas of the brain, such as the left inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe, and in temporal areas involved in perspective taking and autobiographical memory. Moreover, the empathizing group, but not the systemizing group, shows activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex which have been related to simulation-type neural activity in the brain and are central to mindreading. Also, the systemizing group shows significantly stronger activity in the left parahippocampal gyrus. In conclusion, both the empathizing and systemizing individuals show simulation-type and simulation-related neural activity during face-based mindreading. However, more neural activity indicative of simulation-based processing is seen in the empathizing individuals, while more neural activity indicative of non-simulation-based processing is seen in the systemizing individuals.