1
|
de Bruin B. Knowledge attribution, socioeconomic status, and education: new results using the Great British Class Survey. SYNTHESE 2021; 199:7615-7657. [PMID: 34538964 PMCID: PMC8435110 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03131-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2019] [Accepted: 11/16/2020] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
UNLABELLED This paper presents new evidence on the impact of socioeconomic status (SES) and education on knowledge attribution. I examine a variety of cases, including vignettes where agents have been Gettiered, have false beliefs, and possess knowledge (according to orthodoxy). Early work investigated whether SES might be associated with knowledge attribution (Weinberg et al. in Philos Top 29(1-2):429-460, 2001; Seyedsayamdost in Episteme 12(1):95-116, 2014). But these studies used college education as a dummy variable for SES. I use the recently developed Great British Class Survey (Savage et al. in Sociology 47(2):219-250, 2013) to measure SES. The paper reports evidence against an association between SES and patterns of knowledge ascription, and reports mixed evidence about education effects. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-021-03131-6.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Boudewijn de Bruin
- Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands
- Economics, University of Groningen, Nettelbosje 2, 9747 AE Groningen, The Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
De Block A, Hens K. A plea for an experimental philosophy of medicine. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2021; 42:81-89. [PMID: 34919172 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-021-09551-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/17/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Andreas De Block
- Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium.
| | - Kristien Hens
- Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
- Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Starmans C, Friedman O. Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12850. [PMID: 32583918 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12850] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2019] [Revised: 04/17/2020] [Accepted: 05/04/2020] [Indexed: 01/17/2023]
Abstract
Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N = 1,581) and compare these judgments to those of philosophers (N = 204) and laypeople (N = 336). We find that academics and laypeople share a similar concept of knowledge, while philosophers have a substantially different concept. These experiments show that (a) in contrast to philosophers, other academics and laypeople attribute knowledge to others in some "Gettier" situations; (b) academics and laypeople are much less likely to attribute knowledge when reminded of the possibility of error, but philosophers are not affected by this reminder; and (c) non-philosophy academics are overall more skeptical about knowledge than laypeople or philosophers. These findings suggest that academics across a wide range of disciplines share a similar concept of knowledge, and that this concept aligns closely with the intuitions held by laypeople, and differs considerably from the concept of knowledge described in the philosophical literature, as well as the epistemic intuitions of philosophers themselves.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
|
5
|
Schmittat SM, Burgmer P. Lay beliefs in moral expertise. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2020.1719053] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
|
6
|
Devitt M, Porot N. The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions. Cogn Sci 2018; 42:1552-1585. [PMID: 29687466 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12609] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/22/2017] [Revised: 01/19/2018] [Accepted: 02/16/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Experiments on theories of reference have mostly tested referential intuitions. We think that experiments should rather be testing linguistic usage. Substantive Aim (I): to test classical description theories of proper names against usage by "elicited production." Our results count decisively against those theories. Methodological Aim (I): Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc () claim that truth-value judgment experiments test usage. Martí () disagrees. We argue that Machery et al. are right and offer some results that are consistent with that conclusion. Substantive Aim (II): Machery et al. provide evidence that the usage of a name varies, being sometimes descriptive, sometimes not. In seven out of eight tests of usage, we did not replicate this variation. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of referential intuitions by comparing them with linguistic usage. Earlier studies led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable, but we did not. Our results add to evidence that tests of referential intuition are susceptible to unpredictable wording effects.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michael Devitt
- Philosophy Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York
| | - Nicolas Porot
- Philosophy Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
|
8
|
Kneer M, Bourgeois-Gironde S. Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed. Cognition 2017; 169:139-146. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.08.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2016] [Revised: 08/23/2017] [Accepted: 08/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
|
9
|
Affiliation(s)
- Philip A. Ebert
- Department of Law and Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
| | | | - Ian Durbach
- Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
- African Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Cape Town, South Africa
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Abstract
Research on moral judgment often employs bipolar rating scales to assess whether the difference between two contrasted options is judged to be morally relevant. We give an account of how different numbers of response options provided on such scales (odd vs. even) change the meaning of the test question by communicating different implicit presuppositions. We demonstrate experimentally that these changes can qualitatively affect the moral relevance judgments that subjects express in response to a given judgment problem. Several alternative explanations in terms of trivial measurement distortion are tested and refuted, and we present suggestive evidence as to what kind of factors might be prone to scale effects. The findings underscore that expressed moral judgments are constructed ad hoc and do not necessarily reflect the content of underlying stable moral commitments. We discuss implications for theories and methodology in moral psychology and in judgment and decision-making research more generally.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jonas Nagel
- 1 Department of Psychology, University of Göttingen, Germany
| | - Andrej Rybak
- 1 Department of Psychology, University of Göttingen, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
|
12
|
Felletti S, Paglieri F. The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1172304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
|
13
|
Schwitzgebel E, Cushman F. Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection. Cognition 2015; 141:127-37. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 106] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/07/2015] [Revised: 04/23/2015] [Accepted: 04/24/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
|
14
|
Maynes J. Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2015. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.815987] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
|
15
|
Baz A. On going (and getting) nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2015. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.1003133] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
|
16
|
Schwartz PH. Reframing the Disease Debate and Defending the Biostatistical Theory. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2014; 39:572-89. [DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhu039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
|
17
|
|
18
|
Affiliation(s)
- Derek Leben
- Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown
| | | |
Collapse
|
19
|
|
20
|
|
21
|
|
22
|
|
23
|
Liao SM, Wiegmann A, Alexander J, Vong G. Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2012. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.627536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/15/2022]
|
24
|
Starmans C, Friedman O. The folk conception of knowledge. Cognition 2012; 124:272-83. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 86] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/23/2011] [Revised: 05/22/2012] [Accepted: 05/23/2012] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
|
25
|
Schulz E, Cokely ET, Feltz A. Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense. Conscious Cogn 2011; 20:1722-31. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 101] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2010] [Revised: 04/05/2011] [Accepted: 04/10/2011] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
|
26
|
|
27
|
|
28
|
|