The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail

How can we apply decision-making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

Our understanding of decision-making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision-making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision-making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi-destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision-making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio-ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human-induced rapid environmental change.

Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review

Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions.

Simple and rationale-providing SMS reminders to promote accelerometer use: a within-trial randomised trial comparing persuasive messages

BACKGROUND

Literature on persuasion suggests compliance increases when requests are accompanied with a reason (i.e. the "because-heuristic"). The reliability of outcomes in physical activity research is dependent on sufficient accelerometer wear-time. This study tested whether SMS reminders-especially those that provided a rationale-are associated with increased accelerometer wear-time.

METHODS

We conducted a within-trial partially randomised controlled trial during baseline data collection in a school-based physical activity intervention trial. Of 375 participants (mean age = 18.1), 280 (75%) opted to receive daily SMS reminders to wear their accelerometers. These 280 participants were then randomised to receive either succinct reminders or reminders including a rationale. Data was analyzed across groups using both frequentist and Bayesian methods.

RESULTS

No differences in total accelerometer wear minutes were detected between the succinct reminder group (Mdn = 4909, IQR = 3429-5857) and the rationale group (Mdn = 4808, IQR = 3571-5743); W = 8860, p = 0.65, CI95 = - 280.90-447.20. Similarly, we found no differences in wear time between participants receiving SMS reminders (Mdn = 4859, IQR = 3527-5808) and those not receiving them (Mdn = 5067, IQR = 3201-5885); W = 10,642.5, p = 0.77, CI95 = - 424.20-305.30. Bayesian ANOVA favored a model of equal weartime means, over one of unequal means, by a Bayes Factor of 12.05. Accumulated days of valid accelerometer wear data did not differ either. Equivalence testing indicated rejection of effects more extreme than a Cohen's d (standardised mean difference) of ±~0.3.

CONCLUSIONS

This study casts doubt on the effectiveness of using the because-heuristic via SMS messaging, to promote accelerometer wear time among youth. The because-heuristic might be limited to face-to-face communication and situations where no intention for or commitment to the behavior has yet been made. Other explanations for null effects include non-reading of messages, and reminder messages undermining the self-reminding strategies which would occur naturally in the absence of reminders.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

DRKS DRKS00007721 . Registered 14.04.2015. Retrospectively registered.