Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Seeking a Philosophical Basis for Trait Psychology

I summarize an early effort to provide a conceptual basis for psychology. Natural science studies material objects, and its methods and assumptions may not be appropriate for the study of persons. Persons exist within the natural attitude and are characterized by such properties as temporality, responsibility, normality, and identity. Contemporary theories of mind focus on people's understanding of how minds make decisions and shape behavior, but say little about the nature of the entity that possesses a mind; ethnopsychologies are concerned with cultural variations in beliefs about accidental rather than essential aspects of human psychology. The lay philosophical view of the person sketched here is intended to be broader and deeper. It is particularly relevant to trait psychology, appears to have been implicit in much trait research, and is generally consistent with empirical findings on personality traits.

A Relational Conception of Emotional Development

In this article, I outline a relational-developmental conception of emotion that situates emotional activity within a broader conception of persons as holistic, relational beings. In this model, emotions consist of felt forms of engagement with the world. As felt aspects of ongoing action, uninhibited emotional experiences are not private states that are inaccessible to other people; instead, they are revealed directly through their bodily expressions. As multicomponent processes, emotional experiences exhibit both continuity and dramatic change in development. Building on these ideas, I describe an intersubjective methodology for studying developmental changes in the structure of emotional experience. I illustrate the approach with an analysis of developmental changes in the structure of anger from birth to adulthood.

Inching Toward a Unified Metatheory for Psychology

Zagaria et al. (2020) have aptly suggested that as a discipline, psychology is a giant with feet of clay. Drawing on the content of introductory textbooks, the authors show that there is little coherence and consensus about the meaning of key psychological terms - including such terms as psychology, mind, behavior. Drawing on evidence marking psychology is a "soft" science, the authors suggest that psychology can profit by adopting the "hard" foundation of evolutionary psychology as its metatheory. While Zagaria et al.'s characterization of psychology's fractious foundation has deep merit, their desire to erect a psychological metatheory on evolutionary psychology is unlikely to solve the problem they so aptly identify. At the least, I suggest a unified metatheory must: (a) establish a shared psychological lexicon; (b) elaborate a methodology that coordinates first-, second- and third-person modes of inquiry, and (c) develop a process model that describes psychological functioning at the biological, psychological and socio-cultural levels of analysis. To illustrate, I describe how contemporary relational and systems frameworks provide a framework that can move us in these directions.