What people believe about memory

When is memory more reliable? Scientific findings, theories, and myths

The question of whether human memory is reliable generated extensive research. Memory is open to reconstruction and false retrieval of unpresented information or unexperienced events. These can create problems in judgments and decisions that rely on memory accuracy. In the case of eyewitness testimony, these problems can result in injustice. Then again, memory is also reliable enough. Information acquisition, processing, and retrieval capacity of our memory made it possible to survive the course of evolution. Our memory also makes it possible to continue our daily lives, most of the time without major problems. In the present review, we suggest that the right question to ask may not be whether memory is reliable, but rather to ask when and under what circumstances memory is more reliable. The review's educational aim is to identify the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, and its theoretical aim is to discuss memory reliability. We reviewed the literature on situational, emotional, social, and individual difference variables that affect memory reliability, identified the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, summarized these outcomes as easy-to-reach items, and discussed them in the light of major theories. Our discussion also touched upon the differentiation of societal myths about the reliability of memory from scientific findings, since believing in memory myths can also affect the reliability of memory. Awareness of the specific circumstances under which memory is more reliable can lead to the consideration of how much memory can be trusted under those specific circumstances.

The influence of general knowledge test performance on self-ratings of and perceived relationships between intelligence, knowledge, and memory

The present study examined how taking a general knowledge (GK) test affects perceptions of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge and the relationship between these three constructs. Participants rated their abilities on each construct and the strength of the relationships between them before and after completing an easy or hard GK test or control task. In Experiment 1, participants were (mis)informed that GK questions were correctly answered by 50% of the population; in Experiment 2, no such information was provided. Regardless of (mis)information about others' performance, participants in the Hard condition believed they had a worse memory, were less knowledgeable, and were less intelligent post-task. However, the strength of the perceived relationship between GK and intelligence decreased only when participants were misled. Judgments of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge can be manipulated by taking a GK test, and individuals engage in self-protective behavior to reduce the potential threat to one's self-concept.

Ruling out feigned crime-related amnesia? A response to Acklin (2022)

In a recent paper, Acklin discussed a case of possible amnesia for a murder in terms of neurobiology, psychoanalysis, and personality assessment. Acklin accepted the defendant's claim of amnesia for the crime as genuine. The considerable literature that takes a skeptical view of crime-related amnesia was not cited, and the possibility of feigning or malingering was "ruled out" with a single sentence that does not withstand scrutiny. A review of the literature on feigned amnesia suggests that it may not be possible to rule out malingering even if the best available tools are used: There has been minimal investigation of most validity tests and estimates of base rates of feigned amnesia for a crime vary widely and make estimates of Negative Predictor Power highly unreliable. Although one cannot know from the information presented if Acklin's defendant legitimately experienced amnesia, feigning could not be ruled out using an interview and the test data cited by Acklin. I call for a moratorium on publication of further articles on crime specific amnesia that do not conscientiously examine other potential explanations and do not use current best practices for assessing negative response bias.

Lay Definitions of Intelligence, Knowledge, and Memory: Inter- and Independence of Constructs

The present study examined how lay participants define the following concepts used widely in psychology: being intelligent, knowing, and remembering. In the scientific community, knowledge overlaps with the contents of semantic memory, crystallized intelligence reflects the accumulation of knowledge, knowledge and event memory interact, and fluid intelligence and working memory correlate. Naturally, the lay public has implicit theories of these constructs. These theories mainly distinguish between intelligent and unintelligent behaviors and tend to include characteristics outside psychometric studies of intelligence, such as emotional intelligence. Here, we asked lay participants from the online platform Prolific to explain "what does being intelligent mean to you?" as well as "knowing" and "remembering" to understand their degree of alignment with theoretical conceptualizations in the research community. Qualitative coding of participant definitions showed that intelligence and knowledge are closely related, but asymmetrically-when defining what it means to be intelligent, participants reference knowledge, but intelligence is not considered in explaining knowing. Although participants note that intelligence is multi-faceted and related to problem-solving, there is an emphasis (in terms of frequency of mentions) on the crystallized side of intelligence (i.e., knowledge). A deeper understanding of lay participants' mental models of these constructs (i.e., their metacognitions) is essential for bridging gaps between experts and the general public.

What do laypeople believe about the voluntary and involuntary retrieval of memories?

People can remember experiences from their past, either deliberately or spontaneously-that is, memories can be voluntarily or involuntarily retrieved. People tend to report that their voluntary and involuntary memories have different properties. But people's reports about their mental phenomena can be open to bias or mistaken, shaped in part by their lay beliefs about those phenomena. Therefore, we investigated what laypeople believe about the properties of their voluntarily- and involuntarily-retrieved memories-and how well those beliefs align with the literature. We adopted a funnelled approach, progressively giving subjects more information about the kinds of retrievals of interest and asking them about the typical properties of those retrievals. We found that laypeople have some beliefs that align well with the literature, and others that align less well. Our findings suggest that researchers should consider how their experimental conditions may shape their subjects' reports about voluntary and involuntary memories.

Laypeople's perceptions of the effects of event repetition, reporting delay, and emotion on children's and adults' memory

For crimes such as child abuse and family violence, jurors' assessments of memory reports from key witnesses are vital to case outcomes in court. Since jurors are not experts on memory, the present research measured laypeople's (i.e., non-experts') beliefs about how three key factors affect witnesses' memory reports for an experienced event: how frequently an event was experienced (repeated, single), the delay between experiencing and reporting the event, and the emotional valence of the event. Across two studies, lay participants completed an online survey that measured their beliefs about each factor. In Study 1, 51 participants completed a survey about how the three factors affect children's memory. In Study 2, another 51 participants completed a survey about how the three factors affect adult's memory. Across both studies, delays were believed to worsen memory, and emotion was believed to improve memory. Beliefs about single and repeated events showed different patterns across the studies. In Study 1, participants' beliefs about children's memory for repeated experience were variable. In Study 2, participants believed that adults' memory was worse for repeated events than single events. Overall, laypeople demonstrated many accurate beliefs about memory, but showed some confusion about children's memory for repeated events.

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one's original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.

What do people really think of when they claim to believe in repressed memory? Methodological middle ground and applied issues

What do people really think of when they say they believe in repressed traumatic memory? In two studies (N_{Study 1}= 3158; N_{Study 2}= 305) using an integrative method taking into account recent methodological discussions, we found that, in total, 2458 participants (71% of the two combined samples) reported that they believed in repressed memory. In Study 1, based on separate questions on the whole group, we found 71% of agreement with the concept of repression, 74% with the concept of unconscious repression, and 54% with the concept of deliberate memory suppression. Participants with no memory of childhood abuse endorsed unconscious and deliberate mechanisms less than those with such memories. In Study 2, the order in which the items were presented was not associated with the beliefs in the different statements. Overall, our results show that people see repression as an unconscious mechanism. We suggest the use of within-subject designs and/or follow-up questions to determine how people understand the concept of repression. Such adherence to this controversial concept can have adverse implications in the clinical and legal arenas.

What science tells us about false and repressed memories

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

"I Didn't Do That!" Event Valence and Child Age Influence Adults' Discernment of Preschoolers' True and False Statements

Justice can hinge on adults' abilities to distinguish accurate from inaccurate child testimony. Yet relatively little is known about factors that affect adults' abilities to determine the accuracy of children's eyewitness reports. In this study, adults (N = 108) viewed videoclips of 3- and 5-year-olds answering open-ended and leading questions about positive and negative actually experienced ("true") events or never experienced ("false") events that the children either affirmed or denied. Analyses revealed that adults were more accurate at determining the veracity of negative compared with positive incidents, particularly when children said that they had experienced the event. Moreover, adults' accuracy was at chance for older children's false denials. Psycholegal implications are discussed.

Reports of Recovered Memories in Therapy in Undergraduate Students

Psychologists have debated the wisdom of recovering traumatic memories in therapy that were previously unknown to the client, with some concerns over accuracy and memory distortions. The current study surveyed a sample of 576 undergraduates in the south of the United States. Of 188 who reported attending therapy or counselling, 8% reported coming to remember memories of abuse, without any prior recollection of that abuse before therapy. Of those who reported recovered memories, 60% cut off contact with some of their family. Within those who received therapy, those who had a therapist discuss the possibility of repressed memory were 28.6 times more likely to report recovered memories, compared to those who received therapy without such discussion. These findings mirror a previous survey of US adults and suggest attempts to recover repressed memories in therapy may continue in the forthcoming generation of adults.

Laypeople's beliefs about memory: disentangling the effects of age and time

Cognitive scientists have firmly established that memory is vulnerable to decay and distortion. Yet laypeople - who may be required to evaluate memory evidence as jurors - have shown less awareness of memory fallibility. Although we might expect laypeople's knowledge of memory to have improved over time, research has yet to explore this issue while accounting for possible age-related changes. We administered a modified version of the Beliefs about Memory Survey (BAMS) to a community sample, investigating patterns of beliefs relating to memory permanence, repression of traumatic memories, and memory reconstruction. Older participants were more likely than younger participants to believe that traumatic memories can be repressed, while younger participants were more likely than their older counterparts to believe that memory is permanent, but also that memory is malleable. We assessed whether these beliefs were stable over time, by comparing our data to a sample of data collected 25 years earlier. Although contemporary beliefs about the repression of traumatic memories and memory reconstruction were more aligned with expert opinion than those of 25 years ago, beliefs about memory permanence were not. These findings highlight the need for continued education about memory and its shortcomings. We discuss ways of improving decisions about memory evidence.

The Return of the Repressed: The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma

Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.

When psychological science fails to be heard: the lack of evidence-based arguments in a ministerial report on child sexual abuse

One of the most debated issues in relation to child sexual abuse (CSA) is whether there should be a limitation period for prosecutions. In 2017 a French ministerial report was released proposing extension of the limitation period in part because of the sometimes long delay between the alleged events and the disclosure of the abuse. For this, the report relied on dissociative amnesia. It also advocated for the development of child victim interview protocols by victim associations. We show that dissociative amnesia is not consensual within the scientific community. Instead, we recommend scientifically reliable cognitive principles to explain the lack of memory. Moreover, interviewing techniques for children have already been designed by memory researchers to enhance recall and report of CSA, from which any uncontrolled deviation might put the child's testimony at risk. We conclude by advocating for the use of evidence-based psychology, and for co-operation between practitioners, judges and researchers.

Memory judgements: the contribution of detail and emotion to assessments of believability and reliability

In legal settings, jury members, police, and legal professionals often have to make judgements about witnesses' or victims' memories of events. Without a scientific understanding of memory, (often erroneous) beliefs are used to make decisions. Evaluation of the literature identified two prevalent beliefs that could influence judgements: (1) memory operates like a video recorder therefore, accounts that are detailed are more believable than those containing vague descriptions, and (2) memories recalled with congruent emotion are more believable than those recalled with incongruent emotion. A 2 (emotionality: emotional, non-emotional) × 2 (detail: high, low) factorial design was generated. In line with previous research, participants made believability judgements (Experiment 1) but uniquely, participants were also asked to judge the reliability of the rememberer's recall (Experiment 2). Self-reported confidence, personality measures, and political orientation were also recorded. Believability judgements did not vary as a function of detail or emotion but detailed accounts were judged as more reliable than vague accounts. Confidence and believability were positively correlated, whereas the confidence-reliability relationship was more complex. Personality and political measures were independent of judgements of both constructs. Our results suggest that believability and reliability are distinct constructs and should be examined as such in future research.

Testing Claims of Crime-Related Amnesia

Many violent offenders report amnesia for their crime. Although this type of memory loss is possible, there are reasons to assume that many claims of crime-related amnesia are feigned. This article describes ways to evaluate the genuineness of crime-related amnesia. A recent case is described in which several of these strategies yielded evidence for feigned crime-related amnesia.

Common Beliefs About Child Sexual Abuse and Disclosure: A College Sample

Adults' common beliefs about child sexual abuse and disclosure were explored. Participants (N = 670) were questioned about key areas of child sexual abuse that could affect decision-making processes of jurors evaluating child sexual abuse cases. These areas included victim and perpetrator characteristics, medical and behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse, memories for the event, and disclosure of the event. The scientific literature pertaining to these same areas are reviewed. While individual beliefs were consistent with some areas of the scientific literature (e.g., victim and perpetrator characteristics), they strongly contrasted the literature in other important areas (e.g., memories for the event, indicators of child sexual abuse, and the likelihood of denial and recantation). Implications, including the option of providing expert testimony to reduce discrepancies, are discussed.

Latent variables underlying the memory beliefs of Chartered Clinical Psychologists, Hypnotherapists and undergraduate students

In courts in the United Kingdom, understanding of memory phenomena is often assumed to be a matter of common sense. To test this assumption 337 UK respondents, consisting of 125 Chartered Clinical Psychologists, 88 individuals who advertised their services as Hypnotherapists (HTs) in a classified directory, the Yellow Pages^TM, and 124 first year undergraduate psychology students, completed a questionnaire that assessed their knowledge of 10 memory phenomena about which there is a broad scientific consensus. HTs' responses were the most inconsistent with the scientific consensus, scoring lowest on six of these ten items. Principal Components Analysis indicated two latent variables - reflecting beliefs about memory quality and malleability - underlying respondents' responses. In addition, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of the academic memory literature in general. There was no significant relationship between participants' self reported knowledge and their actual knowledge (as measured by their responses to the 10-item questionnaire). There was evidence of beliefs among the HTs that could give rise to some concern (e.g., that early memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and are retrievable).

Building metamemorial knowledge over time: insights from eye tracking about the bases of feeling-of-knowing and confidence judgments

Metamemory processes depend on different factors across the learning and memory time-scale. In the laboratory, subjects are often asked to make prospective feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments about target retrievability, or are asked to make retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) about the retrieved target. We examined distinct and shared contributors to metamemory judgments, and how they were built over time. Eye movements were monitored during a face-scene associative memory task. At test, participants viewed a studied scene, then rated their FOK that they would remember the associated face. This was followed by a forced choice recognition test and RCJs. FOK judgments were less accurate than RCJ judgments, showing that the addition of mnemonic experience can increase metacognitive accuracy over time. However, there was also evidence that the given FOK rating influenced RCJs. Turning to eye movements, initial analyses showed that higher cue fluency was related to both higher FOKs and higher RCJs. However, further analyses revealed that the effects of the scene cue on RCJs were mediated by FOKs. Turning to the target, increased viewing time and faster viewing of the correct associate related to higher FOKs, consistent with the idea that target accessibility is a basis of FOKs. In contrast, the amount of viewing directed to the chosen face, regardless of whether it was correct, predicted higher RCJs, suggesting that choice experience is a significant contributor RCJs. We also examined covariates of the change in RCJ rating from the FOK rating, and showed that increased and faster viewing of the chosen face predicted raising one's confidence above one's FOK. Taken together these results suggest that metamemory judgments should not be thought of only as distinct subjective experiences, but complex processes that interact and evolve as new psychological bases for subjective experience become available.

Effects of child interview tactics on prospective jurors' decisions

Although decisions in child sexual abuse (CSA) cases are influenced by many factors (e.g., child age, juror gender), case and trial characteristics (e.g., interview quality) can strongly influence legal outcomes. In the present study, 319 prospective jurors read about a CSA investigation in which the alleged victim was interviewed at a child advocacy center (CAC) or traditional police setting. The prospective jurors then provided legally relevant ratings (e.g., child credibility, interview quality, defendant guilt). Structural equation modeling techniques revealed that child credibility predicted greater confidence in guilt decisions and also mediated all associations with such decisions. Having fewer negative prior opinions and rating the interview as of better quality were associated with higher child credibility ratings. Mitigating factors (e.g., interview quality), as opposed to proxy indicators (e.g., participant gender), better predicted CSA case outcomes. Similar associations across groups (e.g., CAC interviews did not make child victims more or less credible) permit a tentative conclusion that CACs do not positively or negatively affect decisions made in hypothetical CSA cases. Ideas for future studies examining factors influencing decisions in CSA cases are discussed.

Are the "memory wars" over? A scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs about repressed memory

The "memory wars" of the 1990s refers to the controversy between some clinicians and memory scientists about the reliability of repressed memories. To investigate whether such disagreement persists, we compared various groups' beliefs about memory and compared their current beliefs with beliefs expressed in past studies. In Study 1, we found high rates of belief in repressed memory among undergraduates. We also found that greater critical-thinking ability was associated with more skepticism about repressed memories. In Study 2, we found less belief in repressed memory among mainstream clinicians today compared with the 1990s. Groups that contained research-oriented psychologists and memory experts expressed more skepticism about the validity of repressed memories relative to other groups. Thus, a substantial gap between the memory beliefs of clinical-psychology researchers and those of practitioners persists today. These results hold implications for the potential resolution of the science-practice gap and for the dissemination of memory research in the training of mental-health professionals.

Common (mis)beliefs about memory: a replication and comparison of telephone and Mechanical Turk survey methods

Incorrect beliefs about memory have wide-ranging implications. We recently reported the results of a survey showing that a substantial proportion of the United States public held beliefs about memory that conflicted with those of memory experts. For that survey, respondents answered recorded questions using their telephone keypad. Although such robotic polling produces reliable results that accurately predicts the results of elections, it suffers from four major drawbacks: (1) telephone polling is costly, (2) typically, less than 10 percent of calls result in a completed survey, (3) calls do not reach households without a landline, and (4) calls oversample the elderly and undersample the young. Here we replicated our telephone survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to explore the similarities and differences in the sampled demographics as well as the pattern of results. Overall, neither survey closely approximated the demographics of the United States population, but they differed in how they deviated from the 2010 census figures. After weighting the results of each survey to conform to census demographics, though, the two approaches produced remarkably similar results: In both surveys, people averaged over 50% agreement with statements that scientific consensus shows to be false. The results of this study replicate our finding of substantial discrepancies between popular beliefs and those of experts and shows that surveys conducted on MTurk can produce a representative sample of the United States population that generates results in line with more expensive survey techniques.

Emotional facial expressions differentially influence predictions and performance for face recognition

This study examined how participants' predictions of future memory performance are influenced by emotional facial expressions. Participants made judgements of learning (JOLs) predicting the likelihood that they would correctly identify a face displaying a happy, angry, or neutral emotional expression in a future two-alternative forced-choice recognition test of identity (i.e., recognition that a person's face was seen before). JOLs were higher for studied faces with happy and angry emotional expressions than for neutral faces. However, neutral test faces with studied neutral expressions had significantly higher identity recognition rates than neutral test faces studied with happy or angry expressions. Thus, these data are the first to demonstrate that people believe happy and angry emotional expressions will lead to better identity recognition in the future relative to neutral expressions. This occurred despite the fact that neutral expressions elicited better identity recognition than happy and angry expressions. These findings contribute to the growing literature examining the interaction of cognition and emotion.

Unawareness of olfactory dysfunction and its association with cognitive functioning in middle aged and old adults

The objective of this study was (a) to investigate the accordance of self-reported and objectively assessed olfactory functioning and (b) to compare performance on cognitive tests of individuals unaware of their olfactory dysfunction with individuals aware of their olfactory status. Two hundred forty participants, constituting two age groups, were evaluated with the Scandinavian Odor Identification Test, a question of self-evaluated olfactory function, tests of cognitive function, and a memory questionnaire. The proportion of individuals being unaware of an olfactory dysfunction was high in both middle aged (86%) and old (78%) participants. Performance on neuropsychological tests showed that persons unaware of their olfactory dysfunction performed poorer on tests of verbal learning and memory and attention/processing speed compared to individuals aware of a normal olfactory status as well as individuals aware of their olfactory dysfunction. The clinical relevance of unawareness of olfactory dysfunction, as suggested earlier, needs further investigation and stresses the need of an extensive multi-modal and longitudinal assessment of unawareness of sensory and cognitive function to learn more about the facets of the concept of unawareness.

Neural basis for recognition confidence in younger and older adults

Although several studies have examined the neural basis for age-related changes in objective memory performance, less is known about how the process of memory monitoring changes with aging. The authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine retrospective confidence in memory performance in aging. During low confidence, both younger and older adults showed behavioral evidence that they were guessing during recognition and that they were aware they were guessing when making confidence judgments. Similarly, both younger and older adults showed increased neural activity during low- compared to high-confidence responses in the lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and left intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, older adults showed more high-confidence errors than younger adults. Younger adults showed greater activity for high compared to low confidence in medial temporal lobe structures, but older adults did not show this pattern. Taken together, these findings may suggest that impairments in the confidence-accuracy relationship for memory in older adults, which are often driven by high-confidence errors, may be primarily related to altered neural signals associated with greater activity for high-confidence responses.