The misinformation effect is unrelated to the DRM effect with and without a DRM warning

Contradictory findings in the study of emotional false memory: a review on the inadvisability of controlling valence and arousal

Emotional false memories are the erroneous recollection of events accompanied by an emotional experience. In high-risk domains like psychotherapy and the legal system, emotional false memories are of particular importance. Despite the systematic research conducted on emotional false memories in recent years, findings remain contradictory. Some studies have suggested that negative emotion reduces false memories, while others have suggested that negative emotion increases false memories. Research has mainly employed words and pictures as experimental stimuli, and studies using both types of memory stimuli are reviewed here. From this examination, it emerged that the main reasons for contradictory findings are as follows: (1) different materials have varying effects on inducing false memories, with pictures demonstrating a memory advantage compared to words; (2) recall and recognition tests have been used interchangeably, leading to different false-memory effects depending on the memory test employed; and (3) different studies have adopted different levels of control over valence and arousal when manipulating emotional variables. Future studies should distinguish between the use of different memory materials, examine specific differences in recall and recognition tests, and measure the impact of specific emotions on false memory beyond the dimensions of valence and arousal.

How do forewarnings and post-warnings affect misinformation reliance? The impact of warnings on the continued influence effect and belief regression

People often continue to rely on certain information in their reasoning, even if this information has been retracted; this is called the continued influence effect (CIE) of misinformation. One technique for reducing this effect involves explicitly warning people that there is a possibility that they might have been misled. The present study aimed to investigate these warnings' effectiveness, depending on when they were given (either before or after misinformation). In two experiments (N = 337), we found that while a forewarning did reduce reliance on misinformation, retrospectively warned participants (when the warning was placed either between the misinformation and the retraction or just before testing) relied on the misinformation to a similar degree as unwarned participants. However, the protective effect of the forewarning was not durable, as shown by the fact that reliance on the misinformation increased for over 7 days following the first testing, despite continued memory of the retraction.

The Impact of Linguistic Prediction Violations on Downstream Recognition Memory and Sentence Recall

Predicting upcoming words during language comprehension not only affects processing in the moment but also has consequences for memory, although the source of these memory effects (e.g., whether driven by lingering pre-activations, re-analysis following prediction violations, or other mechanisms) remains underspecified. Here, we investigated downstream impacts of prediction on memory in two experiments. First, we recorded EEG as participants read strongly and weakly constraining sentences with expected, unexpected but plausible, or semantically anomalous endings ("He made a holster for his gun / father / train") and were tested on their recognition memory for the sentence endings. Participants showed similar rates of false alarms for predicted but never presented sentence endings whether the prediction violation was plausible or anomalous, suggesting that these arise from pre-activation of the expected words during reading. During sentence reading, especially in strongly constraining sentences, plausible prediction violations elicited an anterior positivity; anomalous endings instead elicited a posterior positivity, whose amplitude was predictive of later memory for those anomalous words. ERP patterns at the time of recognition differentiated plausible and anomalous sentence endings: Words that had been plausible prediction violations elicited enhanced late positive complex amplitudes, suggesting greater episodic recollection, whereas anomalous sentence endings elicited greater N1 amplitudes, suggesting attentional tagging. In a follow-up behavioral study, a separate group of participants read the same sentence stimuli and were tested for sentence-level recall. We found that recall of full sentences was impaired when sentences ended with a prediction violation. Taken together, the results suggest that prediction violations draw attention and affect encoding of the violating word, in a manner that depends on plausibility, and that this, in turn, may impair future memory of the gist of the sentence.

The illusion of insight: detailed warnings reduce but do not prevent false "Aha!" moments

False "Aha!" moments can be elicited experimentally using the False Insight Anagram Task (FIAT), which combines semantic priming and visual similarity manipulations to lead participants into having "Aha!" moments for incorrect anagram solutions. In a preregistered experiment (N = 255), we tested whether warning participants and explaining to them exactly how they were being deceived, would reduce their susceptibility to false insights. We found that simple warnings did not reduce the incidence of false insights. On the other hand, participants who were given a detailed explanation of the methods used to deceive them experienced a small reduction in false insights compared to participants given no warning at all. Our findings suggest that the FIAT elicits a robust false insight effect that is hard to overcome, demonstrating the persuasive nature of false insights when the conditions are ripe for them.

Associations between the misinformation effect, trauma exposure and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and depression

This research aimed to conduct an initial investigation into the relationships between the "misinformation effect" and trauma exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Study 1 was a pilot study developing an online misinformation paradigm that could assess the influence of emotion and arousal on memory distortions. Participants (n = 162, M_age = 39.90; SD = 10.90) were recruited through TurkPrime. In Study 2 community members (n = 116, M_age = 28.96; SD = 10.33) completed this misinformation paradigm and measures of trauma exposure, PTSD, and depression. Study 1 found memory for central details was better for high-arousal than low-arousal and neutral-arousal images. Peripheral memory appeared worse for negative and neutral images than positive images. Study 2 found that, when controlling for age and gender, PTSD symptoms significantly predicted proportion of correct responses on control items. However, there was no evidence to indicate that trauma exposure, PTSD symptoms nor depression symptoms, were associated with proportion of correct responses on misled items. Valence and arousal did not influence these associations. These findings have important implications in clinical and legal contexts where individuals with a history of trauma, or who are experiencing symptoms of PTSD or depression, are often required to recall emotionally-laden events. There is a surprising dearth of research into the misinformation effect in clinical populations and further research is required.

A systematic review of the relationship between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation

Inaccurate memory reports can have serious consequences within forensic and clinical settings, where emotion and misinformation are two common sources of memory distortion. Many studies have investigated how these factors are related; does emotion protect memory or leave it more vulnerable to the distorting effects of misinformation? The findings remain diffused. Thus, the present review aimed to clarify the relationship between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation. 39 eligible studies were reviewed. Results varied according to the type and dimension of emotion measured. Level of arousal may be unrelated to susceptibility to misinformation when retrieval occurs without delay; studies including delayed retrieval were limited. Stimuli valence may be associated with increased susceptibility to peripheral misinformation but unrelated to other misinformation. The following results were reported by limited studies: short-term distress and moderate levels of stress may decrease susceptibility, while anger and greater cortisol response to stress may increase susceptibility to misinformation. Source memory may also be unaffected by emotion. The results have important potential implications for forensic and clinical practice, for example by highlighting the value of enquiring witnesses' source memory. Methodological recommendations for future studies are made.

Partisan bias in false memories for misinformation about the 2021 U.S. Capitol riot

ABSTRACTMemory for events can be biased. For example, people tend to recall more events that support than oppose their current worldview. The present study examined partisan bias in memory for events related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot in the United States. Participants rated their memory for true and false events that were either favourable to their political party or the other major political party in the United States. For both true and false events, participants remembered more events that favoured their political party. Regression analyses showed that the number of false memories that participants reported was positively associated with their tendency to support conspiracy beliefs and with their self-reported engagement with the Capitol riot. These results suggest that Democrats and Republicans remember the Capitol Riot differently and that certain individual difference factors can predict the formation of false memories in this context. Misinformation played an influential role in the Capitol riot and understanding differences in memory for this event is beneficial to avoiding similar tragedies in the future.

Playing "guess who?": when an episodic specificity induction increases trace distinctiveness and reduces memory errors during event reconstruction

The constructive nature of memory implies a possible confusion between details of similar events. Memory interventions should thus target the reduction of memory errors. We postulate that a brief intervention called Episodic Specificity Induction (ESI) facilitates the sensorimotor simulation of event-related details by improving the distinctiveness of the event memory trace. As such, ESI should reduce memory errors only when event memory traces are strongly overlapping based on their sensorimotor features. Participants memorised videos showing characters performing an action on a given object. The characters were either visually very similar to each other or very distinct (low vs. high distinctiveness condition). Next, participants performed either an imagination version of the ESI or a control induction. Finally, a voice announced one of the actions seen and a character was then briefly displayed. The participants had to indicate whether the association was correct. For incorrect associations, in the low distinctiveness condition, false alarms were more likely than in the high distinctiveness condition and were reduced after the ESI. It suggests that facilitating the simulation of specific details through the ESI increased trace distinctiveness and reduced memory errors at the critical time of event reconstruction. Future clinical applications might be possible.

Linking creativity and false memory: Common consequences of a flexible memory system

Episodic retrieval plays a functional-adaptive role in supporting divergent thinking, the ability to creatively combine different pieces of information. However, the same constructive memory process that provides a functional-adaptive benefit can also leave memory prone to error. In two experiments, we employed an individual differences approach to examine the relationship between different forms of creative thinking (divergent and convergent thinking) and false memory generation in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. In Experiment 1, and replicating prior findings, false recognition was significantly predicted by convergent thinking performance. Critically, we also observed a novel predictive relationship between false recognition and quantitative metrics of divergent thinking performance. In Experiment 2, these findings were replicated and we further showed that false recall was predicted by quantitative metrics of divergent thinking. Our findings suggest that constructive memory processes link creative thinking with the production of memory errors.

Investigating the Relations Among Different Measures of False Memory

Researchers have used the term false memory to describe various memory errors, including the incorporation of erroneous information into a memory, misremembering a word presented as a picture, and the construction of a detailed memory of an event that did not occur. Whether such diverse manifestations of false memory are assessing the same construct has not been evaluated. The purpose of this study is to examine the relations among a set of variables that have been used in the literature to measure false memory. The sample consisted of 112 college students who completed four false memory measures, including the commonly used Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and the misinformation tasks. Zero-order correlations indicated that there are little to no associations between false memories in the DRM and the misinformation tasks, as well as the other false memory tasks. A confirmatory factor analysis of the DRM and misinformation variables further suggested that the false memory variables share little variance in common and may not be represented by a unitary factor. Thus, the results of the current study suggest that tasks intended to measure false memory may be measuring different types of memory errors. 

Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: "No". In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory "trait". In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.

Phonological false recognition produced by bottom-up automatic activation in young and older people

Two experiments explored a new procedure to implicitly induce phonological false memories in young and older people. On the study tasks, half of the words were formed from half of the letters in the alphabet, whereas the remaining words were formed from all the letters in the alphabet. On the recognition tests, there were three types of non-studied new words: critical lures formed from the same half of the letters as the studied words; distractors formed from the other half of the letters not used, and distractors formed from all the letters in the alphabet. In both experiments, the results showed that, in both young and older people, critical lures produced more false recognitions than distractors composed of all the letters in the alphabet, which, in turn, produced more false alarms than distractors composed of the letters not used during the study. These results support the predictions of the activation/monitoring models, which assume that false memories are partly due to activation spreading from items (semantically or phonologically) related to the critical words.

Attentional responses on an auditory oddball predict false memory susceptibility

Attention and memory are highly integrated processes. Building on prior behavioral investigations, this study assesses the link between individual differences in low-level neural attentional responding and false memory susceptibility on the misinformation effect, a paradigm in which false event memories are induced via misleading post-event information. Twenty-four subjects completed the misinformation effect paradigm after which high-density (256-channel) EEG data was collected as they engaged in an auditory oddball task. Temporal-spatial decomposition was used to extract two attention-related components from the oddball data, the P3b and Classic Slow Wave. The P3b was utilized as an index of individual differences in salient target attentional responding while the slow wave was adopted as an index of variability in task-level sustained attention. Analyses of these components show a significant negative relationship between slow-wave responses to oddball non-targets and perceptual false memory endorsements, suggestive of a link between individual differences in levels of sustained attention and false memory susceptibility. These findings provide the first demonstrated link between individual differences in basic attentional responses and false memory. These results support prior behavioral work linking attention and false memory and highlight the integration between attentional processes and real-world episodic memory.

What Drives False Memories in Psychopathology? A Case for Associative Activation

In clinical and court settings, it is imperative to know whether posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression may make people susceptible to false memories. We conducted a review of the literature on false memory effects in participants with PTSD, a history of trauma, or depression. When emotional associative material was presented to these groups, their levels of false memory were raised relative to those in relevant comparison groups. This difference did not consistently emerge when neutral or nonassociative material was presented. Our conclusion is supported by a quantitative comparison of effect sizes between studies using emotional associative or neutral, nonassociative material. Our review suggests that individuals with PTSD, a history of trauma, or depression are at risk for producing false memories when they are exposed to information that is related to their knowledge base.

Individual differences in susceptibility to false memories: The effect of memory specificity

Previous research has highlighted the wide individual variability in susceptibility to the false memories produced by the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure. This study investigated whether susceptibility to false memories is influenced by individual differences in the specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval. Memory specificity was measured using the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT). Memory specificity did not correlate with correct recognition, but a specific retrieval style was positively correlated with levels of false recognition. It is proposed that the contextual details that frequently accompany false memories of non-studied lures are more accessible in individuals with specific retrieval styles.

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) Task: A Simple Cognitive Paradigm to Investigate False Memories in the Laboratory

The Deese, Roediger and McDermott (DRM) task is a false memory paradigm in which subjects are presented with lists of semantically related words (e.g., nurse, hospital, etc.) at encoding. After a delay, subjects are asked to recall or recognize these words. In the recognition memory version of the task, subjects are asked whether they remember previously presented words, as well as related (but never presented) critical lure words ('doctor'). Typically, the critical word is recognized with high probability and confidence. This false memory effect has been robustly demonstrated across short (e.g., immediate, 20 min) and long (e.g., 1, 7, 60 d) delays between encoding and memory testing. A strength of using this task to study false memory is its simplicity and short duration. If encoding and retrieval components of the task occur in the same session, the entire task can take as little as 2 - 30 min. However, although the DRM task is widely considered a 'false memory' paradigm, some researchers consider DRM illusions to be based on the activation of semantic memory networks in the brain, and argue that such semantic gist-based false memory errors may actually be useful in some scenarios (e.g., remembering the forest for the trees; remembering that a word list was about "doctors", even though the actual word "doctor" was never presented for study). Remembering the gist of experience (instead of or along with individual details) is arguably an adaptive process and this task has provided a great deal of knowledge about the constructive, adaptive nature of memory. Therefore, researchers should use caution when discussing the overall reach and implications of their experiments when using this task to study 'false memory', as DRM memory errors may not adequately reflect false memories in the real world, such as false memory in eyewitness testimony, or false memories of sexual abuse.

Do emotional stimuli enhance or impede recall relative to neutral stimuli? An investigation of two "false memory" tasks

Many eyewitness memory situations involve negative and distressing events; however, many studies investigating "false memory" phenomena use neutral stimuli only. The aim of the present study was to determine how both the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure and the Misinformation Effect Paradigm tasks were related to each other using distressing and neutral stimuli. Participants completed the DRM (with negative and neutral word lists) and viewed a distressing or neutral film. Misinformation for the film was introduced and memory was assessed. Film accuracy and misinformation susceptibility were found to be greater for those who viewed the distressing film relative to the neutral film. Accuracy responses on both tasks were related, however, susceptibility to the DRM illusion and Misinformation Effect were not. The misinformation findings support the Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis that negative stimuli will lead to remembering more accurate details but also greater likelihood of memory distortion. However, the PNE hypothesis was not supported for the DRM results. The findings also suggest that the DRM and Misinformation tasks are not equivalent and may have differences in underlying mechanisms. Future research should focus on more ecologically valid methods of assessing false memory.

False memories with age: Neural and cognitive underpinnings

As we age we become increasingly susceptible to memory distortions and inaccuracies. Over the past decade numerous neuroimaging studies have attempted to illuminate the neural underpinnings of aging and false memory. Here we review these studies, and link their findings with those concerning the cognitive properties of age-related changes in memory accuracy. Collectively this evidence points towards a prominent role for age-related declines in medial temporal and prefrontal brain areas, and corresponding impairments in associative binding and strategic monitoring. A resulting cascade of cognitive changes contributes to the heightened vulnerability to false memories with age, including reduced recollective ability, a reliance on gist information and familiarity-based monitoring mechanisms, as well as a reduced ability to inhibit irrelevant information and erroneous binding of features between memory traces. We consider both theoretical and applied implications of research on aging and false memories, as well as questions remaining to be addressed in future research.