Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories

Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence

The current study examined how people's metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust - the subjective appraisal of one's memory functioning - as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

Retracted memories in the general population: are there differences between eastern and western countries?

The main purpose of the current studies was to examine retracted experiences in the general population from various cultural backgrounds. More specifically, in two studies, we examined the details of memory retraction experiences, the reasons for retraction, and the outcomes of retraction in participants from China and other countries, mainly the United States of America. It was found that memory retraction experiences appeared to be quite common. In the sample of Chinese participants (Study 1: N = 1380), 50.58% reported at least one such an experience, whereas in respondents from other countries (Study 2; N = 425), a significantly lower but still substantial prevalence rate of 35% was found. In general, the retracted memories predominantly involved positive events and some respondents experienced pressure during the withdrawal. Social feedback and event plausibility were the two main reasons for the withdrawal. Compared to recollection scores, belief scores decreased significantly after withdrawal, and some respondents even formed nonbelieved memories. After retracting the memories, most respondents felt they gained benefits (e.g., they had resolved a psychological problem that had bothered them for years). These studies give us a more general understanding of retracted memory experiences in the general population.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways

People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

On the role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in the future occurrence of imagined events

Recent studies suggest that different forms of episodic simulation—mental representations of past, future, or atemporal events—recruit many of the same underlying cognitive and neural processes. This leads to the question whether there are distinctive hallmark characteristics of episodic future thinking: the subjective sense that imagined events belong to and will occur in the personal future. In this study, we aimed at shedding light on the cognitive ingredients that contribute to this sense of future occurrence by asking participants to imagine personal and experimenter-provided future events associated with high or low degrees of belief in future occurrence and then to reflect on the bases for their beliefs. Results showed that contextualising autobiographical knowledge (i.e., articulating links between items of information associated with imagined future events, goals, and personal characteristics) is a critical aspect of belief in future occurrence, and autobiographical knowledge can be flexibly used to either support or suppress belief in future occurrence. These findings indicate that episodic future thought not only depends on simulation processes (i.e., the construction of detailed mental representations for future events) but also requires that imagined events are meaningfully integrated within an autobiographical context.

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events, but for different reasons

The age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.

False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.