Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm

Effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false memory

Whereas the effects of emotional intensity (the perceived strength of an item's valence or arousal) have long been studied in true- and false-memory research, emotional ambiguity (the uncertainty that attaches to perceived emotional intensity) has only been studied recently. Available evidence suggests that emotional ambiguity has reliable effects on true memory that are distinct from those of emotional intensity. However, those findings are mostly restricted to recall, and the effects of emotional ambiguity on false memory remain unexplored. The current study addressed both limitations by measuring the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false recognition. In two experiments, we manipulated valence ambiguity and valence intensity (Experiment 1) and arousal ambiguity and arousal intensity (Experiment 2) of Deese/Roediger/McDermott lists. Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted for Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the combined data of the experiments to separate the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity. Our results showed that both valence ambiguity and arousal ambiguity improved true recognition, and the effects of valence ambiguity remained robust even when controlling for valence intensity, arousal intensity, and arousal ambiguity. More importantly, for both valence and arousal, there was an interaction between ambiguity and intensity in false memory. Specifically, we found that valence ambiguity increased false recognition with positive valence, while arousal ambiguity amplified the effect of arousal intensity on false recognition. Our results are discussed in the context of the emotional ambiguity hypothesis and fuzzy-trace theory.

Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence

The current study examined how people's metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust - the subjective appraisal of one's memory functioning - as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

Inducing emotionally negative nonbelieved memories using negative pictures

Memories that can be recalled but are no longer believed are termed nonbelieved memories. The current studies examined the creation of emotionally negative nonbelieved memories after viewing negatively valenced pictures. In both experiments, participants took part in two sessions. In Session 1, after being presented with a set of neutral and negative pictures, participants had to rate their emotional state. One week later, in Session 2, participants had to complete a recognition task to identify pictures that had appeared during the previous session. During this task, participants' memories for some pictures were challenged by telling them that their answers were incorrect in order to evoke nonbelieved memories. The experimental procedure was successful in creating nonbelieved memories in the participants. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (N = 35), we induced nonbelieved true memories for both negative and neutral pictures. We found a significant decrease in both belief and recollection after the challenge, with the change in belief being twice as large as the change in recollection. In Experiment 2 (N = 43), we successfully induced both nonbelieved true and false memories for negative pictures. Again, the reduction of belief was significantly greater than that of recollection. In general, participants evinced better memory for negative pictures, but following challenges people were just as likely to accept false social feedback and change their memories regarding other types of pictures. In both experiments, our challenges did not lead to notable changes in emotional state. In general, our findings show that emotionally negative nonbelieved memories can be successfully evoked in an experimental setting.

Traits and Distorted Symptom Presentation: a Scoping Review

Are personality traits related to symptom overreporting and/or symptom underreporting? With this question in mind, we evaluated studies from 1979 to 2020 (k = 55), in which personality traits were linked to scores on stand-alone validity tests, including symptom validity tests (SVTs) and measures of socially desirable responding (SDR) and/or supernormality. As to symptom overreporting (k = 14), associations with depression, alexithymia, apathy, dissociation, and fantasy proneness varied widely from weak to strong (rs .27 to .79). For underreporting (k = 41), inconsistent links (rs − .43 to .63) were found with narcissism, whereas alexithymia and dissociation were often associated with lower SDR tendencies, although effect sizes were small. Taken together, the extant literature mainly consists of cross-sectional studies on single traits and contexts, mostly offering weak correlations that do not necessarily reflect causation. What this field lacks is an overarching theory relating traits to symptom reporting. Longitudinal studies involving a broad range of traits, samples, and incentives would be informative. Until such studies have been done, traits are best viewed as modest concomitants of symptom distortion.

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.