The effect of recent reminder setting on subsequent strategy and performance in a prospective memory task

Primacy Effects in Extended Cognitive Strategy Choice: Initial Speed Benefits Outweigh Later Speed Benefits

BACKGROUND

Human performers often recruit environment-based assistance to acquire or process information, such as relying on a smartphone app, a search engine, or a conversational agent. To make informed choices between several of such extended cognitive strategies, performers need to monitor the performance of these options.

OBJECTIVE

In the present study, we investigated whether participants monitor an extended cognitive strategy's performance-here, speed-more closely during initial as compared to later encounters.

METHODS

In three experiments, 737 participants were asked to first observe speed differences between two competing cognitive strategies-here, two competing algorithms that can obtain answers to trivia questions-and eventually choose between both strategies based on the observations.

RESULTS

Participants were sensitive to subtle speed differences and selected strategies accordingly. Most remarkably, even when participants performed identically with both strategies across all encounters, the strategy with superior speed in the initial encounters was preferred. Worded differently, participants exhibited a technology-use primacy effect. Contrarily, evidence for a recency effect was weak at best.

CONCLUSION

These results suggest that great care is required when performers are first acquainted with novel ways to acquire or process information. Superior initial performance has the potential to desensitize the performer for inferior later performance and thus prohibit optimal choice.

APPLICATION

Awareness of primacy enables users and designers of extended cognitive strategies to actively remediate suboptimal behavior originating in early monitoring episodes.

Self-reported strategy use and prospective memory: The roles of cue focality and task importance

Interest in the metacognitive aspects of prospective memory (PM) is growing. Yet, the interplay between participants' metacognitive awareness of PM task demands and features that contribute to successful PM require further attention. To this aim, participants in the current study completed laboratory-based PM tasks of varying difficulty (cue focality: focal, nonfocal-category, or nonfocal-syllable) and reported their strategy use and perceptions of PM task importance. Most participants reported using a strategy regardless of cue focality. However, only under the most challenging condition (i.e., nonfocal-syllable) did participants who reported using a strategy exhibit better PM performance compared to those who did not use a strategy. Additionally, strategy use and cue focality were independently associated with greater costs to ongoing task performance: strategy users exhibited greater slowing relative to individuals who did not use a strategy, and the extent of slowing was greater as the task difficulty increased across cue focality. Finally, perceived task importance appeared to play an important role in the interactive link between cue focality and strategy use on PM performance for the more challenging, nonfocal PM tasks. Specifically, moderation analyses suggested that greater perceived task importance alone may improve the likelihood of PM success for moderately challenging PM tasks (i.e., nonfocal-category), but for the most challenging PM tasks (i.e., nonfocal-syllable), individuals' strategy use was still associated with better PM performance. The present study expands our understanding of metacognition's role in PM performance and has implications for everyday PM performance.

Perseveration on cognitive strategies

To acquire and process information, performers can frequently rely on both internal and extended cognitive strategies. However, after becoming acquainted with two strategies, performers in previous studies exhibited a pronounced behavioral preference for just one strategy, which we refer to as perseveration. What is the origin of such perseveration? Previous research suggests that a prime reason for cognitive strategy choice is performance: Perseveration could reflect the preference for a superior strategy as determined by accurately monitoring each strategy's performance. However, following our preregistered hypotheses, we conjectured that perseveration persisted even if the available strategies featured similar performances. Such persisting perseveration could be reasonable if costs related to decision making, performance monitoring, and strategy switching would be additionally taken into account on top of isolated strategy performances. Here, we used a calibration procedure to equalize performances of strategies as far as possible and tested whether perseveration persisted. In Experiment 1, performance adjustment of strategies succeeded in equating accuracy but not speed. Many participants perseverated on the faster strategy. In Experiment 2, calibration succeeded regarding both accuracy and speed. No substantial perseveration was detected, and residual perseveration was conceivably related to metacognitive performance evaluations. We conclude that perseveration on cognitive strategies is frequently rooted in performance: Performers willingly use multiple strategies for the same task if performance differences appear sufficiently small. Surprisingly, other possible reasons for perseveration like effort or switch cost avoidance, mental challenge seeking, satisficing, or episodic retrieval of previous stimulus-strategy-bindings, were less relevant in the present study.

Switching between different cognitive strategies induces switch costs as evidenced by switches between manual and mental object rotation

Switching between tasks entails costs when compared to repeating the same task. It is unclear whether switch costs also occur when repeating the same task but switching the underlying cognitive strategy (CS). Here, we investigated whether CS switch costs exist despite overlap in mental processing between CSs and a lack of abstract goal (always "solve task X") or answer key binding switches. Specifically, we asked participants to judge the identity of two misaligned objects by either mental or manual computer-mediated object rotation. In each trial of Block 1, to measure switch costs without choice-related cognitive processes, a cue indicated which CS (mental/manual) to use. In Block 2, the CS was freely chosen. Participants exhibited considerable CS switch costs for both cued and freely chosen switches. Moreover, Block 1 switch costs moderately predicted Block 2 switch frequency, while an overall tendency for CS repetition was observed. In sum, we found that switch costs are not confined to situations in which tasks are switched but generalize to situations in which the task stays identical and the CS is switched instead. The results have implications for modern computerized cognitive environments in which a multitude of cognitive strategies is available for the same task.

Assessing time-based prospective memory online: A comparison study between laboratory-based and web-based testing

Prospective memory (PM, i.e., the ability to remember and perform future intentions) is assessed mainly within laboratory settings; however, in the last two decades, several studies have started testing PM online. Most part of those studies focused on event-based PM (EBPM), and only a few assessed time-based PM (TBPM), possibly because time keeping is difficult to control or standardise without experimental control. Thus, it is still unclear whether time monitoring patterns in online studies replicate typical patterns obtained in laboratory tasks. In this study, we therefore aimed to investigate whether the behavioural outcome measures obtained from the traditional TBPM paradigm in the laboratory-accuracy and time monitoring-are comparable with an online version in a sample of 101 younger adults. Results showed no significant difference in TBPM performance in the laboratory versus online setting, as well as no difference in time monitoring. However, we found that participants were somewhat faster and more accurate at the ongoing task during the laboratory assessment, but those differences were not related to holding an intention in mind. The findings suggest that, although participants seemed generally more distracted when tested remotely, online assessment yielded similar results in key temporal characteristics and behavioural performance as for the laboratory assessment. The results are discussed in terms of possible conceptual and methodological implications for online testing.

Effect of cognitive style on time-based prospective memory

Field-independent and field-dependent individuals have different reference patterns and cognitive processing preferences. Field-independent individuals tend to rely on internal capabilities and use internal references to process information, while field-dependent individuals mainly rely on external references and focus on external information. Individuals with two cognitive styles have different attention patterns to perform time-based prospective memory (TBPM) tasks, with different effects on their TBPM performance. This study explored the influence of field-independent and field-dependent cognitive styles on TBPM. In Experiment 1, the attention load was manipulated by the difficulty of the ongoing task. The results showed that the field-independent individuals performed better than the field-dependent individuals only under a low-difficulty condition, indicating that the field-independent individuals had advantages in TBPM but were easily affected by the attention load. Experiment 2 further introduced external reminders to provide individuals with more external information and reduce individual attention consumption in internal time information processing to manipulate attention load. The results showed that external cues eliminated the difference between field-independent and field-dependent individuals in TBPM.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders

Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals’ offloading behavior.

Study effort and the memory cost of external store availability

Previous work demonstrates that individuals often recall less information if, at study, there is expectation that an external memory store will be available at test. One explanation for this effect is that when individuals can expect access to an external memory store, they forgo intentional, controlled efforts at encoding. The present work offers a novel test of this account by examining study effort, indexed by study time and self-reported strategy use, as a function of instructed external store availability. In two preregistered experiments, participants studied lists of to-be-remembered items for a free recall test and were either instructed that they could use their study list to support them at test or that they could not. Critically, participants controlled their own study time, and no participant had their study list at test, regardless of instruction. Consistent with the effort at encoding account, external store availability influenced both study time and strategy use, and there was evidence that these effects mediated the influence of external store availability on recall performance. Interestingly, much of the memory cost remained when controlling for study effort, thus, suggesting that the cost is potentially multiply determined.

The Geneva Space Cruiser: a fully self-administered online tool to assess prospective memory across the adult lifespan

The current study aimed to examine whether the Geneva Space Cruiser - a new online adaptation of the Cruiser - represents a valid, reliable and useful tool to assess prospective memory (PM) across the adult lifespan via fully self-administered online testing. Therefore, an adult lifespan sample of 252 adults (19-86 years old) performed the Geneva Space Cruiser in the laboratory and online, at home, and also performed a more traditional laboratory PM task. A second sample of 224 young adults (19-35 years old) participated in a test-retest online assessment of the Geneva Space Cruiser. Bayesian analyses showed that the Geneva Space Cruiser yielded similar results when administered in the laboratory versus online, both in terms of data distribution as well as of key outcome measures (i.e., PM performance and monitoring). Results further showed very good test-retest reliability and acceptable construct validity. Finally, the online tool was sensitive for detecting age-differences similar to those typically observed in laboratory studies. Together, our findings suggest that the Geneva Space Cruiser represents a rather valid, moderately to highly reliable, and generally useful tool to assess PM in online testing across wide ranges of the adult lifespan, with certain limitations for the oldest participants and for women.

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict benefits to memory from intention offloading

Research suggests that individuals with lower working memory have difficulty remembering to fulfil delayed intentions. The current study examined whether the ability to offload intentions onto the environment mitigated these deficits. Participants (N = 268) completed three versions of a delayed intention task with and without the use of reminders, along with three measures of working memory capacity. Results showed that individuals with higher working memory fulfilled more intentions when having to rely on their own memory, but this difference was eliminated when offloading was permitted. Individuals with lower working memory chose to offload more often, suggesting that they were less willing to engage in effortful maintenance of internal representations when given the option. Working memory was not associated with metacognitive confidence or optimal offloading choices based on point value. These findings suggest offloading may help circumvent capacity limitations associated with maintaining and remembering delayed intentions.

Harder Than You Think: How Outside Assistance Leads to Overconfidence

Cognitive ability consists not only of one's internal competence but also of the augmentation offered by the outside world. How much of our cognitive success is due to our own abilities, and how much is due to external support? Can we accurately draw that distinction? Here, we explored when and why people are unaware of their reliance on outside assistance. Across eight experiments (N = 2,440 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk), people showed improved metacognitive calibration when assistance occurred after a delay or required active choice. Furthermore, these findings apply across a wide range of cognitive tasks, including semantic memory (Experiments 1a and 1b), episodic memory (Experiments 2a and 2b), and problem solving (Experiments 3a-3d). These experiments offer important insights into how we understand our own abilities when we rely on outside help.

Excessive use of reminders: Metacognition and effort-minimisation in cognitive offloading

People often use external reminders to help remember delayed intentions. This is a form of "cognitive offloading". Individuals sometimes offload more often than would be optimal (Gilbert et al., 2020). This bias has been linked to participants' erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. However, underconfidence is unlikely to fully explain the bias. An additional, previously-untested factor that may contribute to the offloading bias is a preference to avoid cognitive effort associated with remembering internally. The present Registered Report examined evidence for this hypothesis. One group of participants received payment contingent on their performance of the task (hypothesised to increase cognitive effort, and therefore reduce the bias towards offloading); another group received a flat payment for taking part, as in the earlier experiment. The offloading bias was significantly reduced (but not eliminated) in the rewarded group, suggesting that a preference to avoid cognitive effort influences cognitive offloading.