Ecological Representations

Reaching conceptual stability by re-articulating empirical and theoretical work on affordances

Theoretical developments on affordances have proliferated, resulting in a lack of conceptual stability and a potential compromise in scientific validity. However, affordances should not be discarded, given their centrality in post-cognitive theories and their widespread reuse across various research domains. Empirical research on affordances remains sparse, out of sync with theoretical advancements, and thus unable to contribute effectively to scientific progress due to its disarticulation with theoretical work. That is why re-articulating theoretical and empirical investigations on affordances is needed to pave a more fruitful path for the concept's advancement. To accomplish this objective, emphasis must be placed on empirical research, leveraging recent theoretical propositions and devising corresponding empirical methodologies. The proposed requirements and framework represent a step in this endeavor.

An "in vivo" analysis of crafts practices and creativity-Why affordances provide a productive lens

Scholars are increasingly recognizing that creativity is grounded in the active sensorimotor engagement with the environment and materiality. Affordances-recognizable pointers to action opportunities in the ecology-provide a helpful prism for analyzing how this happens. Creative practitioners, as they seek aesthetic opportunities or innovation, depend on their sensitivity toward potentialities in their action space. Presently, we apply a high-zoom lens to a crafts process, giving our micro-genetic research design an affordance focus. By investigating one of the authors, a ceramicist and a practitioner-researcher, through her process of making of a vase, we tracked how affordances are responded to, developed, shaped, invited or, where necessary, rejected, as the ceramicist "routes" her creative trajectory. Several insights emerge: (1) The ceramicist's decisions-initially about general directions, then about aesthetic details-unfold while engaging with the clay; they emerge in stepwise fashion, but with a holistic orientation. (2) Choosing among affordances requires parallel sensitivities to object functionality, aesthetics and creativity, as well as technical feasibility; adhering to the proper technical procedure that provides the very basis for creatively relevant affordances to later arise. (3) While the hands and eyes engage with short-lived affordances the ceramicist must keep in view higher-timescale affordances that ensure a good task progression for making a vase, and affordances for the material's overall "workability". (4) The ceramicist typically relates to momentary affordances in light of expected as well as imagined others, to ensure a coherent end product. (5) Affordances contribute to material creativity in more ways than typically recognized in the literature. They range from serendipitous "finds" to options developed with a large degree of creative autonomy; affordances may also be indirectly invited and practitioners strategically change probability distributions as well as providing an enabling background for generative action. Thus, a crafts practitioner brings forth unconventional affordances through active engagement, using a mix of exploration, strategy, and imaginative potential. Affordance theorists err when stressing the possibility to just "find" creative options or that perceptual acuity is the sole skill.

On the psychological origins of tool use

The ubiquity of tool use in human life has generated multiple lines of scientific and philosophical investigation to understand the development and expression of humans' engagement with tools and its relation to other dimensions of human experience. However, existing literature on tool use faces several epistemological challenges in which the same set of questions generate many different answers. At least four critical questions can be identified, which are intimately intertwined-(1) What constitutes tool use? (2) What psychological processes underlie tool use in humans and nonhuman animals? (3) Which of these psychological processes are exclusive to tool use? (4) Which psychological processes involved in tool use are exclusive to Homo sapiens? To help advance a multidisciplinary scientific understanding of tool use, six author groups representing different academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology, neuroscience) and different theoretical perspectives respond to each of these questions, and then point to the direction of future work on tool use. We find that while there are marked differences among the responses of the respective author groups to each question, there is a surprising degree of agreement about many essential concepts and questions. We believe that this interdisciplinary and intertheoretical discussion will foster a more comprehensive understanding of tool use than any one of these perspectives (or any one of these author groups) would (or could) on their own.

Plant Bioinspired Ecological Robotics

Plants are movers, but the nature of their movement differs dramatically from that of creatures that move their whole body from point A to point B. Plants grow to where they are going. Bio-inspired robotics sometimes emulates plants' growth-based movement; but growing is part of a broader system of movement guidance and control. We argue that ecological psychology's conception of "information" and "control" can simultaneously make sense of what it means for a plant to navigate its environment and provide a control scheme for the design of ecological plant-inspired robotics. In this effort, we will outline several control laws and give special consideration to the class of control laws identified by tau theory, such as time to contact.

Ecological mechanisms in cognitive science

In 2010, Bechtel and Abrahamsen defined and described what it means to be a dynamic causal mechanistic explanatory model. They discussed the development of a mechanistic explanation of circadian rhythms as an exemplar of the process and challenged cognitive science to follow this example. This article takes on that challenge. A mechanistic model is one that accurately represents the real parts and operations of the mechanism being studied. These real components must be identified by an empirical programme that decomposes the system at the correct scale and localises the components in space and time. Psychological behaviour emerges from the nature of our real-time interaction with our environments—here we show that the correct scale to guide decomposition is picked out by the ecological perceptual information that enables that interaction. As proof of concept, we show that a simple model of coordinated rhythmic movement, grounded in information, is a genuine dynamical mechanistic explanation of many key coordination phenomena.