Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

Personality systems interactions theory: an integrative framework complementing the study of the motivational and volitional dynamics underlying adjustment to chronic pain

In the endeavor to advance our understanding of interindividual differences in dealing with chronic pain, numerous motivational theories have been invoked in the past decade. As they focus on relevant, yet different aspects of the dynamic, multilevel processes involved in human voluntary action control, research findings seem fragmented and inconsistent. Here we present Personality Systems Interactions theory as an integrative meta-framework elucidating how different motivational and volitional processes work in concert under varying contextual conditions. PSI theory explains experience and behavior by the relative activation of four cognitive systems that take over different psychological functions during goal pursuit. In this way, it may complement existing content-related explanations of clinical phenomena by introducing a functional, third-person perspective on flexible goal management, pain acceptance and goal maintenance despite pain. In line with emerging evidence on the central role of emotion regulation in chronic pain, PSI theory delineates how the self-regulation of positive and negative affect impacts whether behavior is determined by rigid stimulus-response associations (i.e., habits) or by more abstract motives and values which afford more behavioral flexibility. Along with testable hypotheses, multimodal interventions expected to address intuitive emotion regulation as a central process mediating successful adaptation to chronic pain are discussed.

Associations of locus of control, information processing style and anti-reflexivity with climate change scepticism in an Australian sample

A proportion of the Australian public remains sceptical about the reality of climate change, its causes, impacts and the need for mitigatory action. To date, scepticism research largely focuses on factors highly resistant to change, particularly socio-demographic and value factors. This mixed-methods study investigated whether more malleable psychological factors: locus of control; information processing style; and anti-reflexivity, predicted climate change scepticism above and beyond socio-demographic and value factors. A sample of 390 participants (Mean age = 41.31, standard deviation = 18.72; 230 male) completed an electronic survey. Using hierarchical regression, trust in forces of anti-reflexivity and external locus of control predicted impact scepticism. Decreased trust in forces of reflexivity also predicted attribution and impact scepticism. Finally, external locus of control predicted response scepticism. Key qualitative themes identified were, trust in alternative science; mistrust of climate science; belief in natural cycles; predictions not becoming reality; and ulterior motives of interested parties.

Motivation towards novel learning content: Perceived similarity of learning content, but not need for cognition, moderates the generalization of motivation

BACKGROUND

The generalization of established motivation hypothesis states that individuals use established motivational beliefs to predict motivational beliefs regarding novel learning content on the basis of the perceived similarity between academic domains.

AIMS

This study tests the generalization hypothesis by investigating the assumed moderating role of the extent of perceived similarity between known and novel learning content and need for cognition (NFC).

SAMPLE(S)

Participants were adult students (n = 576) from various study programs (Study 1) and non-students (n = 628) of whom the majority held at least a bachelor's degree (Study 2).

METHODS

In this prospective correlational survey study, we used online self-report measures to assess participants' self-concept of ability (SCA) and intrinsic task value (ITV) regarding their established and anticipated motivational beliefs regarding a set of school subjects (known learning content) and fields of study (novel learning content), perceptions of similarity, and their NFC. Data was analysed using structural equation modelling with latent interaction variables.

RESULTS

We found support for the generalization hypothesis and documented that the perceived similarity moderated the generalizing effect (i.e., SCA and ITV had stronger predictive validity for learning content that was perceived as more similar). However, the results obtained for the moderating effect of NFC were mostly nonsignificant.

CONCLUSION

Individuals generalize established motivation regarding known learning content to anticipated motivation regarding novel learning content perceived as being similar. The extent of perceived similarity enhances this effect, whereas NFC does not. Future research should address the underlying automatic and deliberate cognitive processes of generalization.

Intuition as Emergence: Bridging Psychology, Philosophy and Organizational Science

Accelerating environmental uncertainty and the need to cope with increasingly complex market and social demands, combine to create high value for the intuitive approach to decision-making at the strategic level. Research on intuition suffers from marked fragmentation, due to the existence of disciplinary silos based on diverse, apparently irreconcilable, ontological and epistemological assumptions. Not surprisingly, there is no integrated interdisciplinary framework suitable for a rich account of intuition, contemplating how affect and cognition intertwine in the intuitive process, and how intuition scales up from the individual to collective decision-making. This study contributes to the construction of a broad conceptual framework, suitable for a multi-level account of intuition and for a fruitful dialogue with distant research areas. It critically discusses two mainstream conceptualizations of intuition which claim to be grounded in a cross-disciplinary consensus. Drawing on the complexity paradigm, it then proposes a conceptualization of intuition as emergence. Finally, it explores the theoretical and practical implications.

Bifurcation in the evolution of certainty in a small decision-making group by consensus

In a previous paper, the evolution of certainty measured during a consensus-based small-group decision process was shown to oscillate to an equilibrium value for about two-thirds of the participants in the experiment. Starting from the observation that experimental participants are split into two groups, those for whom the evolution of certainty oscillates and those for whom it does not, in this paper we perform an analysis of this bifurcation with a more accurate model and answer two main questions: what is the meaning of this bifurcation, and is this bifurcation amenable to the approximation method or numerical procedure? Firstly, we have to refine the mathematical model of the evolution of certainty to a function explicitly represented in terms of the model parameters and to verify its robustness to the variation of parameters, both analytically and by computer simulation. Then, using the previous group decision experimental data, and the model proposed in this paper, we run the curve-fitting software on the experimental data. We also review a series of interpretations of the bifurcated behaviour. We obtain a refined mathematical model and show that the empirical results are not skewed by the initial conditions, when the proposed model is used. Thus, we reveal the analytical and empirical existence of the observed bifurcation. We then propose that sensitivity to the absolute value of certainty and to its rate of change are considered as potential interpretations of this split in behaviour, along with certainty/uncertainty orientation, uncertainty interpretation, and uncertainty/certainty-related intuition and affect.

Examining Effort in 1D Uncertainty Communication Using Individual Differences in Working Memory and NASA-TLX

As uncertainty visualizations for general audiences become increasingly common, designers must understand the full impact of uncertainty communication techniques on viewers' decision processes. Prior work demonstrates mixed performance outcomes with respect to how individuals make decisions using various visual and textual depictions of uncertainty. Part of the inconsistency across findings may be due to an over-reliance on task accuracy, which cannot, on its own, provide a comprehensive understanding of how uncertainty visualization techniques support reasoning processes. In this work, we advance the debate surrounding the efficacy of modern 1D uncertainty visualizations by conducting converging quantitative and qualitative analyses of both the effort and strategies used by individuals when provided with quantile dotplots, density plots, interval plots, mean plots, and textual descriptions of uncertainty. We utilize two approaches for examining effort across uncertainty communication techniques: a measure of individual differences in working-memory capacity known as an operation span (OSPAN) task and self-reports of perceived workload via the NASA-TLX. The results reveal that both visualization methods and working-memory capacity impact participants' decisions. Specifically, quantile dotplots and density plots (i.e., distributional annotations) result in more accurate judgments than interval plots, textual descriptions of uncertainty, and mean plots (i.e., summary annotations). Additionally, participants' open-ended responses suggest that individuals viewing distributional annotations are more likely to employ a strategy that explicitly incorporates uncertainty into their judgments than those viewing summary annotations. When comparing quantile dotplots to density plots, this work finds that both methods are equally effective for low-working-memory individuals. However, for individuals with high-working-memory capacity, quantile dotplots evoke more accurate responses with less perceived effort. Given these results, we advocate for the inclusion of converging behavioral and subjective workload metrics in addition to accuracy performance to further disambiguate meaningful differences among visualization techniques.

Is intuition allied with jumping to conclusions in decision-making? An intensive longitudinal study in patients with delusions and in non-clinical individuals

Research suggests that a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, excessive intuition, and reduced analysis in information processing may favor suboptimal decision-making, both in non-clinical and mentally disordered individuals. The temporal relationship between processing modes and JTC bias, however, remains unexplored. Therefore, using an experience sampling methodology (ESM) approach, this study examines the temporal associations between intuitive/analytical information processing, JTC bias, and delusions in non-clinical individuals and patients with schizophrenia. Specifically, we examine whether a high use of intuitive and/or a low use of analytical processing predicts subsequent JTC bias and paranoid conviction. In a smartphone-based ESM study, participants will be prompted four times per day over three consecutive days to answer questionnaires designed to measure JTC bias, paranoid conviction, and preceding everyday-life intuition/analysis. Our hierarchical data will be analyzed using multilevel modelling for hypothesis testing. Results will further elucidate the role of aberrant human reasoning, particularly intuition, in (non-)clinical delusions and delusion-like experiences, and also inform general information processing models.

Salience effects in information acquisition: No evidence for a top-down coherence influence

The Integrated Coherence-Based Decision and Search (iCodes) model proposed by Jekel et al. (Psychological Review, 125 (5), 744-768, 2018) formalizes both decision making and pre-decisional information search as coherence-maximization processes in an interactive network. Next to bottom-up attribute influences, the coherence of option information exerts a top-down influence on the search processes in this model, predicting the tendency to continue information search with the currently most attractive option. This hallmark "attraction search effect" (ASE) has been demonstrated in several studies. In three experiments with 250 participants altogether, a more subtle prediction of an extended version of iCodes including exogenous influence factors was tested: The salience of information is assumed to have both a direct (bottom-up) and an indirect (top-down) effect on search, the latter driven by the match between information valence and option attractiveness. The results of the experiments largely agree in (1) showing a strong ASE, (2) demonstrating a bottom-up salience effect on search, but (3) suggesting the absence of the hypothesized indirect top-down salience effect. Hence, only two of three model predictions were confirmed. Implications for various implementations of exogenous factors in the iCodes model are discussed.

Extracting Summary Statistics of Rapid Numerical Sequences

We examine the ability of observers to extract summary statistics (such as the mean and the relative-variance) from rapid numerical sequences of two digit numbers presented at a rate of 4/s. In four experiments (total N = 100), we find that the participants show a remarkable ability to extract such summary statistics and that their precision in the estimation of the sequence-mean improves with the sequence-length (subject to individual differences). Using model selection for individual participants we find that, when only the sequence-average is estimated, most participants rely on a holistic process of frequency based estimation with a minority who rely on a (rule-based and capacity limited) mid-range strategy. When both the sequence-average and the relative variance are estimated, about half of the participants rely on these two strategies. Importantly, the holistic strategy appears more efficient in terms of its precision. We discuss implications for the domains of two pathways numerical processing and decision-making.

The bright homunculus in our head: Individual differences in intuitive sensitivity to logical validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called "logical intuition." In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgements were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument's conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, to evaluate the extent to which "logical intuitions" were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable, and more physically bright than invalid statements. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgements (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of "logical intuition." We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Judging fast and slow: The truth effect does not increase under time-pressure conditions

Due to the information overload in today’s digital age, people may sometimes feel pressured to process and judge information especially fast. In three experiments, we examined whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect — the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as “true” than novel statements. Based on the Heuristic-Systematic Model, a dual-process model in the field of persuasion research, we expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably heuristic cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and systematic process that determines truth judgments. However, contrary to our expectation, time pressure did not moderate the truth effect. Importantly, this was the case for difficult statements, for which most people lack prior knowledge, as well as for easy statements, for which most people hold relevant knowledge. Overall, the findings clearly speak against the conception of fast, fluency-based truth judgments versus slow, knowledge-based truth judgments. In contrast, the results are compatible with a referential theory of the truth effect that does not distinguish between different types of truth judgments. Instead, it assumes that truth judgments rely on the coherence of localized networks in people’s semantic memory, formed by both repetition and prior knowledge.

What’s not to like about evidence-based management: a hyper-rational fad?

Purpose

A topic currently receiving significant academic and practitioner attention is called evidence-based management. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that this approach is sometimes over-sold and may be a fad. Additionally, evidence-based management fails to fully recognize the importance of tacit knowledge, what Kahneman calls system 1. Evidence-based management does provide tools to better use what Kahneman calls system 2, rationality. Decision-makers need to take advantage of both rational and beyond rational processes.

Design/methodology/approach

This is an essay, it is not a report of a study. At this point in time, this paper needs thinking, reflection, pondering, more than a data-based study.

Findings

Advocates promote evidence-based management in part to help avoid fads, yet evidence-based management itself has many of the characteristics of a fad. Evidence-based management is based on an objective rational view of the world and suggests highly rational methods of decision-making. However, a rational fact-based might not give sufficient credit to instinct and feelings. Decision-makers should take into account facts, evidence, when making decisions, but not ignore intuition, hunches and feelings. This study is learning that decisions use a galaxy of approaches, with both cognitive and affective flexibility.

Research limitations/implications

As with any opinion-based paper, this lacks empirical support. Proponents ask us to believe in evidence-based management. Neither we, the authors of this paper, nor the proponents of evidence-based management can empirically support the ideas offered. An additional limitation is that the paper is written in one language, English. Translation into another language might yield different meanings.

Practical implications

There are advantages for scholars and practitioners to look at the best available evidence. There can be disadvantages in overlooking non-quantifiable factors.

Social implications

Those who use evidence-based management should also take into account feelings, ethics, aesthetics, creativity, for the betterment of society. To solve wicked problems one needs more than facts and rational analysis.

Originality/value

The overwhelming majority of those writing about evidence-based management are supporters. This study offers a different view. This paper brings new ideas and new thinking to both the extensive fad literature and the huge evidence-based management literature. Evidence-based management is discussed widely. Google Scholar lists more than two million papers in 2019, 2020 and 2021 on evidence-based management. Readers of this journal should critically evaluate this popular set of ideas.

From perception to inference: Utilization of probabilities as decision weights in children

In a probabilistic inference task (three probabilistic cues predict outcomes for two options), we examined decisions from 233 children (5-6 vs. 9-10 years). Contiguity (low vs. high; i.e., position of probabilistic information far vs. close to options) and demand for selectivity (low vs. high; i.e., showing predictions of desired vs. desired and undesired outcomes) were varied as configural aspects of the presentation format. Probability utilization was measured by the frequency of following the predictions of the highest validity cue in choice. High contiguity and low demand for selectivity strongly and moderately increased probability utilization, respectively. Children are influenced by presentation format when using probabilities as decision weights. They benefit from perception-like presentations that present probabilities and options as compounds.

Twitter Communication During an Outbreak of Hepatitis A in San Diego, 2016-2018

Objectives. To examine how and what information is communicated via social media during an infectious disease outbreak.Methods. In the context of the 2016 through 2018 hepatitis A outbreak in San Diego County, California, we used a grounded theory-based thematic analysis that employed qualitative and quantitative approaches to uncover themes in a sample of public tweets (n = 744) from Twitter, a primary platform used by key stakeholders to communicate to the public during the outbreak.Results. Tweets contained both general and hepatitis A-specific information related to the outbreak, restatements of policy and comments critical of government responses to the outbreak, information with the potential to shape risk perceptions, and expressions of concern regarding individuals experiencing homelessness and their role in spreading hepatitis A. We also identified misinformation and common channels of content driving themes that emerged in our sample.Conclusions. Public health professionals may identify real-time public risk perceptions and concerns via social media during an outbreak and target responses that fulfill the informational needs of those who seek direction and reassurance during times of uncertainty.

The Love of Large Numbers Revisited: A Coherence Model of the Popularity Bias

Preferences are often based on social information such as experiences and recommendations of other people. The reliance on social information is especially relevant in the case of online shopping, where buying decisions for products may often be based on online reviews by other customers. Recently, Powell, Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017, Psychological Science, 28, 1432-1442) showed that, when deciding between two products, people do not consider the number of product reviews in a statistically appropriate way as predicted by a Bayesian model but rather exhibit a bias for popular products (i.e., products with many reviews). In the present work, we propose a coherence model of the cognitive mechanism underlying this empirical phenomenon. The new model assumes that people strive for a coherent representation of the available information (i.e., the average review score and the number of reviews). To test this theoretical account, we reanalyzed the data of Powell and colleagues and ran an online study with 244 participants using a wider range of stimulus material than in the original study. Besides replicating the popularity bias, the study provided clear evidence for the predicted coherence effect, that is, decisions became more confident and faster when the available information about popularity and quality was congruent.

Improving judgment accuracy by sequential adjustment

Judging an object’s value based on relevant cues can be challenging. We propose a simple method to improve judgment accuracy: Instead of estimating a value after seeing all available cues simultaneously, individuals view cues sequentially, one after another, making and adjusting their estimate at each step. The sequential procedure may alleviate computational difficulties in cue integration, leading to higher judgment accuracy. We tested this hypothesis in two real-world tasks in which participants judged either the price of diamonds or the fuel economy of cars. Two studies with professional jewelers and car salespeople show that most participants indeed judged more accurately with a sequential than with a simultaneous procedure. Another two studies with college students further support this finding and show additionally that the sequential procedure could raise the judgment accuracy of inexperienced students to the same level as that of professionals judging with the simultaneous procedure.

Development and Psychometric Evaluation of an Instrument to Measure the Use of Intuition in Clinical Practice by Critical Care Nurses

BACKGROUND

The current study was conducted to develop and validate an instrument to measure the use of intuition in clinical practice by critical care nurses.

METHODS

Item generation and psychometric evaluation were developed. In the psychometric, content validity index and content validity ratio were calculated to establish initial instrument validity through the use of expert ratings, as well as, construct and criterion validity.

RESULTS

The original items reduced to 25. Using principal components analysis and orthogonal varimax rotation, three factors had an eigenvalue >1, with 60.05% variance (Factor 1: 47.9%; Factor 2: 7.56%; and Factor 3: 5.05%). The tool had an acceptable correlation to criterion of the instrument (r = .769, p < .001), a Cronbach alpha consistency of 0.953, and a stability level of r = .945 and p < .001.

CONCLUSION

In this study, a valid and reliable instrument was developed to measure intuition.

Gender role orientation, thinking style preference and facets of adult paranormality: A mediation analysis

This study examines the extent to which masculine and feminine gender role orientations predict self-reported anomalous experiences, belief, ability and fear once relevant correlates including biological sex are controlled for. The extent to which rational versus intuitive thinking style preference mediates these relationships is also examined. Path analysis (n = 332) found heightened femininity directly predicts stronger intuitive preference plus more anomalous experiences, belief and fear with, additionally, intuitive preference mediating several gender role-paranormality relationships. By comparison, heightened masculinity directly predicts both thinking styles plus lower anomalous fear. The latter relationship is also shaped by the nature of mediators with (a) more anomalous experiences and belief associated with more anomalous fear and (b) either heightened rationality else more anomalous ability linked to, conversely, less anomalous fear. The extent to which findings support a gender (or social) role account of adult paranormality, together with methodological limitations and ideas for future research, is discussed.

Truth by Repetition: Explanations and Implications

People believe repeated information more than novel information; they show a repetition-induced truth effect. In a world of “alternative facts,” “fake news,” and strategic information management, understanding this effect is highly important. We first review explanations of the effect based on frequency, recognition, familiarity, and coherent references. On the basis of the latter explanation, we discuss the relations of these explanations. We then discuss implications of truth by repetition for the maintenance of false beliefs and ways to change potentially harmful false beliefs (e.g., “Vaccination causes autism”), illustrating that the truth-by-repetition phenomenon not only is of theoretical interest but also has immediate practical relevance.

It was intuitive, and it felt good: a daily diary study on how people feel when making decisions

In daily life, people make plenty of decisions, either intuitively or based on analysis. So far, research has examined when decision-making leads to correct or biased outcomes. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective and explored how decision-making is associated with how people feel. In an observational study, 134 healthy participants retrospectively reported on six evenings which decisions they had made during that day (total N = 3,850 decisions). They were also asked to indicate how they had felt before/after each decision. Multilevel regression analyses revealed that (a) people reported having felt better prior to intuitive as compared to analytical decisions, (b) people reported having felt better after as compared to before the decision, and (c) this increase in positive feeling was more pronounced for intuitive decisions. The latter two associations were robust to statistically controlling for the life domain in which the decisions occurred, the decisions' importance and ease, and daily mood. The retrospective design and the single-item measure of mood are among the limitations of this study. Altogether, the results are in line with the idea that making everyday life decisions intuitively makes people feel good.

Children’s application of decision strategies in a compensatory environment

Adaptive actors must be able to use probabilities as decision weights. In a computerized multi-attribute task, the authors examined the decisions of children (5–6 years, n = 44; 9–10 y., n = 39) and adults (21–22 y., n = 31) in an environment that fosters the application of a weighted-additive strategy that uses probabilities as weights (WADD: choose option with highest sum of probability-value products). Applying a Bayesian outcome-based strategy classification procedure from adult research, we identified the utilization of WADD and several other strategies (lexicographic, equal weight, naïve Bayes, guessing, and saturated model) on the individual level. As expected based on theory, the prevalence of WADD-users in adults was high. In contrast, no preschoolers could be classified as users of probability-sensitive strategies. Nearly one-third of third-graders used probability-sensitive strategies.

When knowledge activated from memory intrudes on probabilistic inferences from description - the case of stereotypes

To make decisions in probabilistic inference tasks, individuals integrate relevant information partly in an automatic manner. Thereby, potentially irrelevant stimuli that are additionally presented can intrude on the decision process (e.g., Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014). We investigate whether such an intrusion effect can also be caused by potentially irrelevant or even misleading knowledge activated from memory. In four studies that combine a standard information board paradigm from decision research with a standard manipulation from social psychology, we investigate the case of stereotypes and demonstrate that stereotype knowledge can yield intrusion biases in probabilistic inferences from description. The magnitude of these biases increases with stereotype accessibility and decreases with a clarification of the rational solution.

Subliminally and Supraliminally Acquired Long-Term Memories Jointly Bias Delayed Decisions

Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on delayed (30-40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min, participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person: low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H₀), supraliminal information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on decision-making is noteworthy.

Measuring the Zero-Risk Bias

Abstract. Uncertainty is a dynamic state that is perceived as discomforting and individuals are highly motivated to reduce these feelings. With regard to risky decision making, people tend to overweigh the value of certainty and opt for zero-risk solutions, even if this results in a less favorable outcome. This phenomenon is referred to as the zero-risk bias and it has been demonstrated in varying contexts and with different methods. However, there is a high variance in the emergence of the bias reported by the existing literature, leaving it unclear to what extent the bias was evoked by the method or whether other psychological factors influenced people’s decision making. Four studies were conducted in order to investigate methodological and situational factors on the bias, comparing its emergence within different task formats (questionnaires vs. behavioral tasks), decision types (forced choice vs. free resource allocation), and different decision domains. Results indicate that the zero-risk bias is persistent over different methods but highly sensitive to contextual factors: abstractness of the task, decision domain, and appropriateness of the zero-risk option. First, its emergence varied between the task formats, in that it was shown more often in abstract than in concrete tasks. Second, participants’ choice of zero-risk did not correlate between different tasks, indicating effects of decision domain. Third, a zero-risk strategy seemed to be appropriate for dividing risks on objects (lottery urns in a gambling task) but not on persons (in a health scenario). In the latter situation, aspects like fairness influenced choice. Future research is needed to explore the relation between these factors and identify their underlying mechanisms.

Intuitive Cognition and Models of Human-Automation Interaction

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to provide an analysis of the implications of the dominance of intuitive cognition in human reasoning and decision making for conceptualizing models and taxonomies of human-automation interaction, focusing on the Parasuraman et al. model and taxonomy.

BACKGROUND

Knowledge about how humans reason and make decisions, which has been shown to be largely intuitive, has implications for the design of future human-machine systems.

METHOD

One hundred twenty articles and books cited in other works as well as those obtained from an Internet search were reviewed. Works were deemed eligible if they were published within the past 50 years and common to a given literature.

RESULTS

Analysis shows that intuitive cognition dominates human reasoning and decision making in all situations examined. The implications of the dominance of intuitive cognition for the Parasuraman et al. model and taxonomy are discussed. A taxonomy of human-automation interaction that incorporates intuitive cognition is suggested.

APPLICATION

Understanding the ways in which human reasoning and decision making is intuitive can provide insight for future models and taxonomies of human-automation interaction.

Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition-based and priming-based decisions with fMRI

INTRODUCTION

Intuition has been defined as the instantaneous, experience-based impression of coherence elicited by cues in the environment. In a context of discovery, intuitive decision-making processes can be conceptualized as occurring within two stages, the first of which comprises an implicit perception of coherence that is not (yet) verbalizable. Through a process of spreading activation, this initially non-conscious perception gradually crosses over a threshold of awareness and thereby becomes explicable. Because of its experiential basis, intuition shares conceptual similarities with implicit memory processes. Based on these, the study addresses two research questions: (1) Is the gradual nature of intuitive processes reflected on a neural level? (2) Do intuition-based decisions differ neurally from priming-based decisions?

METHODS

To answer these questions, we conducted an fMRI study using the triads task and presented participants with coherent word triads that converge on a common fourth concept, and incoherent word triads that do not converge on a common fourth concept. Participants had to perform semantic coherence judgments as well as to indicate whether they immediately knew the fourth concept. To enable investigating intuition-based and priming-based decisions within the same task and with the same participants, we implemented a conceptual priming procedure into the coherence judgment task. We realized this by priming participants with concepts associated with incoherent triads in separate priming blocks prior to the coherence judgments.

RESULTS

For intuition-based decisions, imaging results mainly revealed activity within the orbitofrontal cortex, within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. Activity suppression in the right temporo-occipital complex was observed for priming-based decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

With respect to research question 1, our data support a continuity model of intuition because the two intuitive stages show quantitatively distinct brain activation patterns. Regarding research question 2, we can draw the preliminary conclusion of a qualitative difference between intuition-based and priming-based decisions.

The Creative Process: Effort and Effortless Cognition

Education at its best allows students to experience the fruitfulness and joy of the creative process. One complexity of applying research findings to education is that creative work unfolds in phases and the various phases engage distinctively different cognitive processes. Since Wallas first described four phases, psychologists have elaborated on them and pointed to additional phases and subphases. Some involve effortful conscious processes; others entail implicit cognition and/or effortless attention. The field has benefitted from research in related areas as well as from direct studies of conditions that enhance various phases of creative performance. This article reviews current knowledge on the phases and incorporates findings from related areas. The challenge for educators is to structure student work in ways which support the different phases—both deliberate phases such as preparation and evaluation and those which appear to emerge spontaneously such as insight and flow. The findings underscore of the value of specific classroom activities, activities which scaffold and/or invite the different phases of creative work. The cognitive processes engaged by the creative process also benefit from other activities which enhance executive function, elevate mood, and allow opportunities for flow.

Trust: An Integrative Review from a Person–Situation Perspective

Trust is a key aspect of various social interactions. Correspondingly, trust has been heavily studied across different scientific disciplines. However, an integration of the diverse research and literature is still missing. Addressing this issue, we review several hundred articles on interpersonal trust among strangers and integrate them into a coherent framework, explaining trust behavior among unfamiliar agents based on an interaction between situational features and distinct personality characteristics. Understanding trust as a decision under risk, we distill 3 core components of trust behavior from the extant literature: attitudes toward risky prospects (i.e., risk aversion and loss aversion), trustworthiness expectations, and betrayal sensitivity. Each of these refers to a distinct set of causal determinants, including personality characteristics (anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness) which can be localized in the space defined by models of basic personality structure (e.g., the Five-Factor Model and the HEXACO model of personality). In sum, the review contributes to the understanding of trust behavior by linking and integrating the findings from various fields of trust research. Additionally, it provides fruitful directions and implications for future research.

Adaptive Spontaneous Transitions between Two Mechanisms of Numerical Averaging

We investigated the mechanism with which humans estimate numerical averages. Participants were presented with 4, 8 or 16 (two-digit) numbers, serially and rapidly (2 numerals/second) and were instructed to convey the sequence average. As predicted by a dual, but not a single-component account, we found a non-monotonic influence of set-size on accuracy. Moreover, we observed a marked decrease in RT as set-size increases and RT-accuracy tradeoff in the 4-, but not in the 16-number condition. These results indicate that in accordance with the normative directive, participants spontaneously employ analytic/sequential thinking in the 4-number condition and intuitive/holistic thinking in the 16-number condition. When the presentation rate is extreme (10 items/sec) we find that, while performance still remains high, the estimations are now based on intuitive processing. The results are accounted for by a computational model postulating population-coding underlying intuitive-averaging and working-memory-mediated symbolic procedures underlying analytical-averaging, with flexible allocation between the two.

Deconstructing management fad adoption: towards a conceptual model

Purpose

– The purpose of this paper is to propose that adoption of new ideas is a more involved cognitive process than has been recognised and this paper seeks to redress the trivialisation of ideas as emerging management ideas (“fads”). The embracing of “fads” for performance improvement and competitive advantage has received considerable attention in the academic literature, resulting in a rather one-sided view.

Design/methodology/approach

– Cognitive decision-making, evidence-based management and complexity theory are examined to illustrate cognitive process, skills and experiences used when making decisions and several propositions are derived from these ideas.

Findings

– An conceptual model of “fad” adoption, integrating the ideas and propositions is presented. This model provides a more pragmatic examination of “fad” adoption decisions and encourages an in depth consideration of their introduction. The model offers a more sophisticated, focused tool for examining the adoption of new management ideas and provides a springboard from which more detailed, integrated models can be developed, and hopefully will stimulate discussion. Implications for theory and practice are also considered.

Originality/value

– Examination of the literature on management “fads” revealed significant material that focused on the negative aspects of “fad” adoption, but an absence of material that examined how manager’s made their adoption decisions. This paper, therefore, provides a valuable contribution to both theory and practice by examining factors which contribute to how and why management decisions to adopt “fads” are made and develops a model to illustrate how these are integrated to contribute to the process of decision-making.

When Relevance Matters

Studies on anchoring effects indicate that judgments can be biased by previous comparisons to high- or low-anchor values. Anchoring effects have been demonstrated in many domains and they have been found both for relevant anchors that provide partially valid information concerning the assessed target as well as for irrelevant anchors that clearly don’t. Based on previous findings it has been argued that anchoring effects are independent of the relevance of the anchor. In research on multiple-cue inferences it has, however, been found that individuals are highly sensitive to the relevance (validity) of cues. In two studies on sentencing decisions we show that relevant anchors influence sentencing decisions to a larger degree than irrelevant ones. We consistently find an effect of relevance for high anchors. Results still remain a bit mixed since the effect of relevance did not hold for low anchors that were introduced in the second study.

Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics

Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.

Utilizing probabilities as decision weights in closed and open information boards: a comparison of children and adults

Decisions in preschoolers (6 years), elementary schoolers (9.7 years), and adults (21 years) were studied with an information board crossing three probabilistic cues (validities: .83, .67, .50) with two options. Experiment 1 (n=215) applied a standard version of the information board (closed presentation format), in which information must be searched sequentially and kept in mind for the decision. Experiment 2 (n=217) applied an open format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), in which all information was visible during decision making. Elementary schoolers but not preschoolers benefited from an open format—indicated by an increase in using probabilities as decision weights. In the open but not closed format, choices were biased by normatively irrelevant information (the lure). Variations in the prediction patterns of the cues influenced decisions in all age groups. Effects for presentation format, pattern, and lure jointly indicate that even children are capable of considering multiple information in their decisions.

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a "take-the-best" (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the "irrelevant" information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.

Cognitive integration of recognition information and additional cues in memory-based decisions

Glöckner and Bröder (2011) have shown that for 77.5% of their participants’ decision making behavior in decisions involving recognition information and explicitly provided additional cues could be better described by weighted-compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) Models than by non-compensatory strategies such as recognition heuristic (RH) or Take the Best (TTB). We investigate whether this predominance of PCS models also holds in memory-based decisions in which information retrieval is effortful and cognitively demanding. Decision strategies were analyzed using a maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. In contrast to the memory-based-RH hypothesis, results show that also in memory-based decisions for 62% of the participants behavior is best explained by a compensatory PCS model. There is, however, a slight increase in participants classified as users of the non-compensatory strategies RH and TTB (32%) compared to the previous study, mirroring other studies suggesting effects of costly retrieval.

Clarifying values: an updated review

BACKGROUND

Consensus guidelines have recommended that decision aids include a process for helping patients clarify their values. We sought to examine the theoretical and empirical evidence related to the use of values clarification methods in patient decision aids.

METHODS

Building on the International Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration's 2005 review of values clarification methods in decision aids, we convened a multi-disciplinary expert group to examine key definitions, decision-making process theories, and empirical evidence about the effects of values clarification methods in decision aids. To summarize the current state of theory and evidence about the role of values clarification methods in decision aids, we undertook a process of evidence review and summary.

RESULTS

Values clarification methods (VCMs) are best defined as methods to help patients think about the desirability of options or attributes of options within a specific decision context, in order to identify which option he/she prefers. Several decision making process theories were identified that can inform the design of values clarification methods, but no single "best" practice for how such methods should be constructed was determined. Our evidence review found that existing VCMs were used for a variety of different decisions, rarely referenced underlying theory for their design, but generally were well described in regard to their development process. Listing the pros and cons of a decision was the most common method used. The 13 trials that compared decision support with or without VCMs reached mixed results: some found that VCMs improved some decision-making processes, while others found no effect.

CONCLUSIONS

Values clarification methods may improve decision-making processes and potentially more distal outcomes. However, the small number of evaluations of VCMs and, where evaluations exist, the heterogeneity in outcome measures makes it difficult to determine their overall effectiveness or the specific characteristics that increase effectiveness.

Do people learn option or strategy routines in multi-attribute decisions? The answer depends on subtle factors

Various studies have shown that established decision routines may become detrimental in changing environments. Routines can be formed at the level of options or at the level of strategies which has been demonstrated in different lines of research. It is unclear, however, which routinization level is spontaneously preferred if both are possible and equally successful. The first experiment demonstrates that a typical multi-attribute decision task using the MouseLab procedure clearly invites strategy routinization. However, the second experiment shows that this level of routinization is massively context-dependent and will be shifted in line with subtle context cues that direct attention to different aspects of the feedback during learning. Theoretical implications for learning models of decision making are discussed.