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The Creative Breakthrough Model of Goal Reorientation:Explicit questions drive implicit processes. JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jrp.2023.104360] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/02/2023]
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Consciously over Unconsciously Perceived Rewards Facilitate Self-face Processing: An ERP Study. Sci Rep 2017; 7:7836. [PMID: 28798417 PMCID: PMC5552778 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-08378-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2017] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Consciously and unconsciously perceived rewards are thought to modulate essential cognitive processes in different ways. However, little is known about whether and how they modulate higher-order social cognitive processes. The present ERP study aimed to investigate the effect of consciously and unconsciously perceived rewards on the temporal course of self-face processing. After a monetary reward (high or low) was presented either supraliminally or subliminally, participants gain this reward by rapidly and correctly judging whether the mouth shape of a probe face and a target face (self, friend, and stranger) were same. Results showed a significant three-way interaction between reward value, reward presentation type, and face type observed at the P3 component. For the supraliminal presentations, self-faces elicited larger P3 after high compared to low reward cues; however, friend-faces elicited smaller P3 and stranger-faces elicited equivalent P3 under this condition. For the subliminal presentations, self-faces still elicited larger P3 for high reward cues, whereas there were no significant P3 differences for friend-faces or stranger-faces. Together, these results suggest that consciously processed rewards have distinct advantages over unconsciously processed rewards in facilitating self-face processing by flexibly and effectively integrating reward value with self-relevance.
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Garcia AC, Bhangal S, Velasquez AG, Geisler MW, Morsella E. Metacognition of Working Memory Performance: Trial-by-Trial Subjective Effects from a New Paradigm. Front Psychol 2016; 7:927. [PMID: 27445897 PMCID: PMC4914569 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00927] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2016] [Accepted: 06/06/2016] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Investigators have begun to examine the fleeting urges and inclinations that subjects experience when performing tasks involving response interference and working memory. Building on this research, we developed a paradigm in which subjects, after learning to press certain buttons when presented with certain letters, are presented with two action-related letters (the memoranda) but must withhold responding (4 s) until cued to emit the response associated with only one of the two letters. In the Congruent condition, the action corresponds to the cue (e.g., memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = B); in the Incongruent condition, the action corresponds to the other item of the memoranda (e.g., memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = A). After each trial, subjects inputted a rating regarding their subjectively experienced “urge to err” on that trial. These introspection-based data revealed that, as found in previous research, urges to err were strongest for incongruent trials. Our findings reveal, first, that subjects can successfully perform this new task, even though it is more complex than that of previous studies, and second, that, in this new paradigm, reliable subjective, metacognitive data can be obtained on a trial-by-trial basis. We hope that our novel paradigm will serve as a foundation for future experimental projects on the relationship between working memory performance and consciousness—an under-explored nexus whose investigation is likely to reveal insights about working memory, cognitive control, and metacognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew C Garcia
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Delaware Newark, DE, USA
| | - Sabrina Bhangal
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA
| | - Anthony G Velasquez
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA
| | - Mark W Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State UniversitySan Francisco, CA, USA; Department of Neurology, University of California, San FranciscoSan Francisco, CA, USA
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Berger CC, Dennehy TC, Bargh JA, Morsella E. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) Revisited: The Little That We Can Know and Can Tell. SOCIAL COGNITION 2016. [DOI: 10.1521/soco.2016.34.3.167] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
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Bhangal S, Allen AK, Geisler MW, Morsella E. Conscious contents as reflexive processes: Evidence from the habituation of high-level cognitions. Conscious Cogn 2016; 41:177-88. [PMID: 26946295 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2015] [Revised: 12/08/2015] [Accepted: 02/20/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Reflexes are often insuppressible, predictable, and susceptible to external control. In contrast, conscious thoughts have been regarded as whimsical, 'offline,' and shielded from external control. Recent advances suggest that conscious thoughts are more reflex-like and susceptible to external control than previously thought. In one paradigm, high-level conscious thoughts (subvocalizations) are triggered by external control, as a function of external stimuli and experimenter-induced action sets. It has been hypothesized that these conscious contents are activated involuntarily and in a reflex-like manner. If such is the case, then these activations should possess a well-known property of the reflex: habituation. Accordingly, we found that involuntary high-level cognitions (subvocalizations) habituated (i.e., were less likely to arise) after repeated stimulation. As in the case of the habituation of a reflex, this novel effect was stimulus-specific. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories about consciousness and about psychopathological phenomena involving undesired, involuntary cognitions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sabrina Bhangal
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Allison K Allen
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Mark W Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States.
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Bhangal S, Cho H, Geisler MW, Morsella E. The Prospective Nature of Voluntary Action: Insights from the Reflexive Imagery Task. REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1037/gpr0000071] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Voluntary action is peculiar in several ways. For example, it is highly prospective in nature, requiring the activation of the representations of anticipated action-effects (e.g., a button pressed). These prospective action-effects can represent outcomes in the short-term (e.g., fingers snapping or uttering “cheers”) or in the long-term (e.g., building a house). In this review about the prospective nature of voluntary action, we first discuss in brief ideomotor theory, a theoretical approach that illuminates both the nature of the prospective representations in voluntary action and how these representations are acquired and subsequently used in the control of behavior. In this framework, prospective action-effects could be construed as ‘action options’ that, residing in consciousness, may or may not influence upcoming behavior, depending on the nature of the other prospective action-effects that happen to be coactivated at that time. In ideomotor theory, there is no homunculus that selects one prospective action-effect over another. Many of these prospective action-effects enter consciousness automatically. Second, we introduce the principle of atemporality and discuss the prospective nature of determining tendencies and mental simulation, all in the context of new findings from the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT). The RIT reveals that, as a function of external control, prospective action-effects can enter consciousness in a reflex-like, automatic, and insuppressible manner. The RIT and its associated theoretical framework shed light on why the activation of such representations, though often undesired, is nonetheless adaptive and why not all of these prospective representations lead to overt action.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University
| | | | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, and Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco
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Abstract
Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the "implementation" level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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Moylan LB. A Conceptual Model for Nurses' Decision-making with the Aggressive Psychiatric Patient. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2015; 36:577-82. [PMID: 26379131 DOI: 10.3109/01612840.2015.1019019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
Violence in the acute care psychiatric setting is an ongoing serious problem. Maintenance of a safe therapeutic environment is a paramount responsibility of nurses practicing in this area. Ethical and legal standards demand that the nurse intervenes in aggressive situations in a manner that employs the least intrusive and restrictive measures necessary to provide safety. Therefore, accurate and effective decision-making in aggressive situations, which can escalate rapidly, is of great importance. This paper discusses a theoretical model for decision-making in selecting interventions with aggressive psychiatric patients. This model may provide a basis for the development of training and education programs for effective decision-making in this area.
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Abstract
What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.
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Dennehy TC, Cooper S, Molapour T, Morsella E. Is There Release from Masking from Isomorphism between Perception and Action? Brain Sci 2014; 4:220-39. [PMID: 24961759 PMCID: PMC4101475 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci4020220] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2013] [Revised: 02/13/2014] [Accepted: 03/11/2014] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
The phenomenon of "entry into awareness" is one of the most challenging puzzles in neuroscience. Research has shown how entry is influenced by processes that are "bottom-up" (e.g., stimulus salience, motion, novelty, incentive and emotional quality) and associated with working memory. Although consciousness is intimately related to action, action-based entry remains under-explored. We review research showing that action-related processing influences the nature of percepts already in conscious awareness and present three experiments that, using a "release-from-masking" technique, examine whether action plans can also influence that which enters awareness in the first place. The present data, though intriguing and consistent with previous research, are not definitive. The limitations and theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. We hope that these experiments will spur further investigation of this understudied topic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tara C Dennehy
- Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA.
| | - Shanna Cooper
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA.
| | - Tanaz Molapour
- Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm SE-17177, Sweden.
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, EP 301, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA.
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A new perspective on human reward research: How consciously and unconsciously perceived reward information influences performance. COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2014; 14:493-508. [DOI: 10.3758/s13415-013-0241-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/01/2023]
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12
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Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research. Conscious Cogn 2013; 22:1318-31. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/06/2013] [Revised: 08/05/2013] [Accepted: 08/06/2013] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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Heintzelman SJ, King LA. On knowing more than we can tell: Intuitive processes and the experience of meaning. JOURNAL OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/17439760.2013.830758] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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14
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Gray JR, Bargh JA, Morsella E. Neural correlates of the essence of conscious conflict: fMRI of sustaining incompatible intentions. Exp Brain Res 2013; 229:453-65. [DOI: 10.1007/s00221-013-3566-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2012] [Accepted: 05/06/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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Addressing Conceptual Confusions About Evolutionary Theorizing: How and Why Evolutionary Psychology and Feminism Do Not Oppose Each Other. SEX ROLES 2012. [DOI: 10.1007/s11199-012-0226-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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Molapour T, Berger CC, Morsella E. Did I read or did I name? Diminished awareness of processes yielding identical ‘outputs’. Conscious Cogn 2011; 20:1776-80. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2010] [Revised: 02/24/2011] [Accepted: 03/04/2011] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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