Framing, Filtering and Hermeneutical Injustice in the Public Conversation about Mental Health

Epistemic Injustice and Nonmaleficence

Epistemic injustice has undergone a steady growth in the medical ethics literature throughout the last decade as many ethicists have found it to be a powerful tool for describing and assessing morally problematic situations in healthcare. However, surprisingly scarce attention has been devoted to how epistemic injustice relates to physicians' professional duties on a conceptual level. I argue that epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial, collides with physicians' duty of nonmaleficence and should thus be actively fought against in healthcare encounters on the ground of professional conduct. I do so by fleshing out how Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice conflicts with the duty of nonmaleficence as defined in Beauchamp and Childress on theoretical grounds. From there, I argue that testimonial injustice produces two distinct types of harm, epistemic and non-epistemic. Epistemic harms are harms inflicted by the physician to the patient qua knower, whereas non-epistemic harms are inflicted to the patient qua patient. This latter case holds serious clinical implications and represent a failure of the process of due care on the part of the physician. I illustrate this through examples taken from the literature on fibromyalgia syndrome and show how testimonial injustice causes wrongful harm to patients, making it maleficent practice. Finally, I conclude on why nonmaleficence as a principle will not be normatively enough to fully address the problem of epistemic injustice in healthcare but nevertheless may serve as a good starting point in attempting to do so.

The Lost Social Context of Recovery Psychiatrization of a Social Process

From being a concept questioning the core of psychiatric knowledge and practice, recovery has been adopted as a guiding vison for mental health policy and practice by different local, national, and international organizations. The aim of this article is to contextualize the different understandings of recovery and its psychiatrization through the emergence of an individualizing and de-contextualized definition which have gained a dominant position. It ends with an attempt to formulate a new definition of recovery which integrates people in their social context. Research results from various follow-up studies showing the possibility of recovery from severe mental distress have stressed the importance of societal, social and relational factors as well of the person's own agency when facing their distress and reactions from their environment. These researches were published in the 1970s and 80s; a period of struggle for liberation from colonialism, of struggle by women and black people for their civil rights, and a time of de-institutionalization of services directed toward the poor, elderly, handicapped, prisoners, and people with mental health problems. Recovery research pointed at the central role of individuals in their recovery journey and it was understood as a personal process in a social context. However, with neo-liberal political agenda, the personal role of individuals and their own responsibility for their well-being was stressed, and contextual understandings and the role of social, material and cultural changes to promote recovery faded away. Thus, during recent decades recovery has been mostly defined as an individualistic journey of changing the persons and their perception of their situation, but not of changing this situation. Contextual aspects are almost absent. The most quoted definition accepts the limits posed by an illness-based model. This kind of definition might be a reason for the wide acceptance of a phenomenon that was initially experienced as a break with the bio-medical paradigm. Recently, this dominant individualized understanding of recovery has been criticized by service users, clinicians and researchers, making possible a redefinition of recovery as a social process in material and cultural contexts.