Delusions and reasoning: a study involving cognitive behavioural therapy

A systematic review of performance-based assessment studies on cognitive biases in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states: A summary of 40 years of research

Cognitive models of psychosis have stimulated empirical studies on cognitive biases involved in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and their symptoms. This systematic review aimed to summarize the studies on the role of cognitive biases as assessed in different performance-based tasks in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states. We focused on five cognitive biases linked to psychosis, i.e., aberrant salience, attentional biases, source monitoring biases, jumping to conclusions, and bias against disconfirmatory evidence. We identified N = 324 studies published in N = 308 articles fulfilling inclusion criteria. Most studies have been cross-sectional and confirmed that the schizophrenia spectrum psychoses are related to exaggerated cognitive biases compared to healthy controls. On the contrary, less evidence suggests a higher tendency for cognitive biases in the UHR sample. The only exceptions were source monitoring and jumping to conclusions, which were confirmed to be exaggerated in both clinical groups. Hallucinations and delusions were the most frequent symptoms studied in the context of cognitive biases. Based on the findings, we presented a hypothetical model on the role of interactions between cognitive biases or additive effects of biases in shaping the risk of psychosis. Future research is warranted for further development of cognitive models for psychosis.

Fast and slow thinking in distressing delusions: A review of the literature and implications for targeted therapy

The recent literature on reasoning biases in psychosis and delusions is reviewed. The state-of-the-art knowledge from systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the evidence for jumping to conclusions is briefly summarised, before a fuller discussion of the more recent empirical literature on belief flexibility as applied to delusions. The methodology and evidence in relation to studies of belief flexibility and the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) across the delusional continuum will be critically appraised, and implications drawn for improving cognitive therapy. It will be proposed that dual process models of reasoning, which Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011) popularised as 'fast and slow thinking', provide a useful theoretical framework for integrating further research and informing clinical practice. The emergence of therapies which specifically target fast and slow thinking in people with distressing delusions will be described.

A psychometric investigation of the Chinese version of the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (C-IPSAQ)

The IPSAQ is a self-administered instrument designed to evaluate individuals' attributional style (AS). The purpose of this study is to examine the psychometric properties of the Chinese version of the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (C-IPSAQ). We also investigate if patients with depression and patients with delusions exhibit attributional biases. The English version of IPSAQ was translated into Chinese and back-translated into English for use in this study. 200 normal control individuals, 47 depressed patients, and 41 delusional patients diagnosed with schizophrenia were recruited for this study. Psychometric properties of this questionnaire were evaluated. The IPSAQ was found to have good internal consistency as a scale. The mean Cronbach's alpha of the six subscales was 0.697. The inter-rater reliability was also acceptable. The concurrent validity analysis revealed that the C-IPSAQ was significantly correlated with ASQ. The group-comparison analyses showed differences in attributional style between patients with depression and patients with delusions compared to normal controls. We confirmed the reliability and validity of the C-IPSAQ, and that the instrument can discriminate specific attributional biases between different patient populations. The C-IPSAQ is a valid instrument to assess attributional style in delusional and depressed patients.

A quasi-randomized feasibility pilot study of specific treatments to improve emotion recognition and mental-state reasoning impairments in schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Impaired ability to make inferences about what another person might think or feel (i.e., social cognition impairment) is recognised as a core feature of schizophrenia and a key determinant of the poor social functioning that characterizes this illness. The development of treatments to target social cognitive impairments as a causal factor of impaired functioning in schizophrenia is of high priority. In this study, we investigated the acceptability, feasibility, and limited efficacy of 2 programs targeted at specific domains of social cognition in schizophrenia: "SoCog" Mental-State Reasoning Training (SoCog-MSRT) and "SoCog" Emotion Recognition Training (SoCog-ERT).

METHOD

Thirty-one participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were allocated to either SoCog-MSRT (n = 19) or SoCog-ERT (n = 12). Treatment comprised 12 twice-weekly sessions for 6 weeks. Participants underwent assessments of social cognition, neurocognition and symptoms at baseline, post-training and 3-months after completing training.

RESULTS

Attendance at training sessions was high with an average of 89.29 % attendance in the SoCog-MSRT groups and 85.42 % in the SoCog-ERT groups. Participants also reported the 2 programs as enjoyable and beneficial. Both SoCog-MSRT and SoCog-ERT groups showed increased scores on a false belief reasoning task and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test. The SoCog-MSRT group also showed reduced personalising attributional biases in a small number of participants, while the SoCog-ERT group showed improved emotion recognition.

CONCLUSIONS

The results are promising and support the feasibility and acceptability of the 2 SoCog programs as well as limited efficacy to improve social cognitive abilities in schizophrenia. There is also some evidence that skills for the recognition of basic facial expressions need specific training.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12613000978763 . Retrospectively registered 3/09/2013.

The nature of delusion: psychologically explicable? psychologically inexplicable? philosophically explicable? Part 2

The first part of this article dealt with the extant formulations of delusion, psychiatric and psychological, suggestions which, respectively, regard delusion as psychologically inexplicable or explicable. All this was subjected to critique. This second part puts forward informed philosophical thesis whereby delusion can be explained within the philosophical movement known as phenomenology and, in particular, Max Scheler's version of this.

Cognitive styles and psychotic experiences in a community sample

INTRODUCTION

In clinical populations paranoid delusions are associated with making global, stable and external attributions for negative events. Paranoia is common in community samples but it is not known whether it is associated with a similar cognitive style. This study investigates the association between cognitive style and paranoia in a large community sample of young adults.

METHODS

2694 young adults (mean age 17.8, SD 4.6) from the ALSPAC cohort provided data on psychotic experiences and cognitive style. Psychotic experiences were assessed using a semi-structured interview and cognitive style was assessed using the Cognitive Styles Questionnaire-Short Form (CSQ-SF) on the same occasion. Logistic regression was used to investigate associations between paranoia and CSQ-SF scores, both total and domain-related (global, stable, self, external). The role of concurrent self-reported depressive symptoms in the association was explored.

RESULTS

Paranoia was associated with Total CSQ-SF scores (adjusted OR 1.69 95% CI 1.29, 2.22), as well as global (OR 1.56 95% CI 1.17, 2.08), stable (OR 1.56 95% CI 1.17, 2.08) and self (OR 1.37 95% CI 1.05, 1.79) domains, only Total score and global domain associations remained after additional adjustment for self-reported depression. There was no association between paranoia and external cognitive style (OR 1.10 95% CI 0.83, 1.47).

CONCLUSION

Paranoid ideation in a community sample is associated with a global rather than an external cognitive style. An external cognitive style may be a characteristic of more severe paranoid beliefs. Further work is required to determine the role of depression in the association between cognitive style and paranoia.

Jumping to conclusions and delusions: the impact of discussion of the bias on the bias

The present study was an investigation of the impact a brief intervention designed to raise awareness of a cognitive bias known to be robust for individuals with delusions has on the reasoning strategies of individuals with delusions. Individuals with delusions (n=57) were randomly assigned either to receive or not to receive a discussion of the jumping to conclusions bias and its pitfalls. Participants' performance on 3 reasoning trials - 1 emotionally neutral (beads) and 2 emotionally salient (self-referred survey words) - was then assessed; the number of stimuli participants requested before making a decision was evaluated to determine if the Jumping to Conclusions Discussion resulted in increased data gathering. There was no difference between groups (those who received and those who did not receive the Jumping to Conclusions Discussion) in terms of how many beads they gathered (p=.36), but there were significant differences on both reasoning trials of emotionally salient stimuli (p's<.05), such that participants who received the Jumping to Conclusions Discussion requested more stimuli on those tasks than individuals who did not receive the discussion. Thus, results suggest that discussion of the jumping to conclusions bias may impact the bias directly, at least for material that is emotional in nature. Results are discussed in terms of their relevance to cognitive behavioral therapies for psychosis and existing research on reasoning and delusions.

An open clinical trial assessing a novel training program for social cognitive impairment in schizophrenia

OBJECTIVE

Social cognition is profoundly impaired in patients with schizophrenia. This study describes 'Mental-State Reasoning Training for Social Cognitive Impairment' (SoCog-MSRT), a 5-week program developed to improve social cognition in patients with schizophrenia. We aimed to investigate the feasibility of implementing SoCog-MSRT in a rehabilitation setting and to evaluate whether our training methods produced improvements. METHOD The feasibility and benefits of SoCog-MSRT were evaluated in an open clinical trial with 14 participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. Training comprised 10 twice-weekly sessions, for 5 weeks, with a pre- and post-training assessment.

RESULTS

There were significant improvements on: (a) a classic false-belief test of Theory of Mind (ToM); (b) inferring complex mental states from the eyes; and (c) a self-reported measure of social understanding. Some of these improvements were associated with baseline levels of working memory and premorbid Intelligence Quotient (IQ). CONCLUSIONS SoCog-MSRT can improve ToM abilities and social understanding, but individuals with poorer working memory and lower premorbid IQ may be less able to benefit from this type of training.

"That's not my arm": a hypnotic analogue of somatoparaphrenia

INTRODUCTION

"Instrumental hypnosis" allows researchers to model clinical symptoms in the laboratory, creating "virtual patients" with reversible disturbances in, for example, perception, action, memory, or belief. We used hypnosis to temporarily recreate somatoparaphrenia, a delusional belief that one's own limb belongs to someone else.

METHODS

We compared a "Fully Formed" somatoparaphrenia suggestion with a "Factor 1 + Factor 2" suggestion that attempted to generate the delusional belief from analogues of its hypothesised underlying factors (i.e., paralysis plus disrupted critical belief evaluation). We tested and then challenged subjects' responses to these suggestions.

RESULTS

Although many hypnotic subjects experienced temporary paralysis, only a minority claimed their arm did not belong to them. Notably, the Fully Formed suggestion was more successful in recreating features of somatoparaphrenia than the Factor 1 + Factor 2 suggestion. In response to the challenges, some of those who developed temporary somatoparaphrenia maintained their belief throughout the hypnosis session. CONCLUSIONS. We discuss these findings in terms of the "two-factor" theory of delusions and we highlight the advantages versus disadvantages of using hypnosis to explore such delusional beliefs in the laboratory.

In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions

Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are in-between perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quite-beliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and Maura Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are important differences between clinical delusions and non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms.

Emotions, self-esteem, and paranoid episodes: an experience sampling study

OBJECTIVES. The evidence to date for a causal role of emotions in the generation of paranoid symptoms is scarce, mainly because of a lack of studies investigating the longitudinal association between emotional processes and paranoia. The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether momentary emotional experiences (anxiety, depression, anger/irritability) and self-esteem predicted the onset and duration of a paranoid episode. We also studied whether levels of emotional experiences and self-esteem were respectively higher and lower during a paranoid episode. DESIGN. A 1-week, prospective momentary assessment study. METHODS. Data were collected using the experience sampling method, a structured self-assessment diary technique. The sample consisted of 158 individuals who ranged across the paranoia continuum. Participants with a psychotic disorder were recruited from in-patient and out-patient mental health services. Participants without psychotic disorder were sampled from the general population. RESULTS. Specific aspects of emotional experience were implicated in the onset and persistence of paranoid episodes. Both an increase in anxiety and a decrease in self-esteem predicted the onset of paranoid episodes. Cross-sectionally, paranoid episodes were associated with high levels of all negative emotions and low level of self-esteem. Initial intensity of paranoia and depression was associated with longer, and anger/irritability with shorter duration of paranoid episodes. CONCLUSIONS. Paranoid delusionality is driven by negative emotions and reductions in self-esteem, rather than serving an immediate defensive function against these emotions and low self-esteem. Clinicians need to be aware of the central role of emotion-related processes and especially self-esteem in paranoid thinking.

'Jumping to conclusions' in first-episode psychosis

AIM

People with psychotic symptoms are reported to have a characteristic reasoning style in which they jump to conclusions (JTC). The aims of this research were threefold. The first was to establish how prevalent this style is in people with first-episode psychosis. The second was to examine the specificity of JTC to delusions. The third was to examine explanatory factors that may account for the JTC style. This was investigated by attempting to replicate, with a large sample, previous studies indicating that JTC is associated with specific psychotic and non-psychotic symptoms and processes.

METHODS

Seventy-seven service users were recruited from a first-episode service and completed measures of reasoning and psychotic and non-psychotic symptomatologies. A well-established criterion was used to compare the JTC performance of those people with and without JTC.

RESULTS

JTC was present in over 40% of the sample, which is consistent with previous studies of people with long-standing psychotic symptoms. Unlike previous research, no strong associations were found in relation to symptoms and other processes.

CONCLUSIONS

JTC is a phenomenon common in many people in first-episode services. In this large cohort sample, no clear associations with symptoms or other psychological processes were evident. Hence, the reason people JTC is still unclear.