Pervasive olfactory impairment after bilateral limbic system destruction

Olfactory dysfunction after autoimmune encephalitis depending on the antibody type and limbic MRI pathologies

Objective

Patients' olfactory function after autoimmune encephalitis (AE) involving limbic structures may be impaired. This study aimed to characterize olfactory function in patients after autoimmune encephalitides.

Methods

A case-control study was performed including 11 AE patients with antibodies against NMDAR (n = 4), GAD (n = 3), VGKC (n = 3) and antibody-negative AE (n = 1) and a control group of 12 patients with pneumococcal meningo-encephalitis (PC). In subgroup analyses, AE patients with and without NMDAR-antibodies were compared. Olfactory function was assessed using the Sniffin Sticks test and the resulting TDI-score (threshold, discrimination, identification). Involvement of limbic structures was evaluated on imaging data (MRI). Statistical analyses were performed to test for correlations of TDI-score and MRI results.

Results

The overall olfactory function of the AE-group and the PC-group was comparable (mean TDI 32.0 [CI 27.3-36.7], 32.3 [CI 28.5-36.0)]. The proportions of hyposmic patients were similar compared to the general population. However, AE patients of the non-NMDAR group had significantly lower TDI-scores (28.9 ± 6,8) than NMDAR patients (37.4 ± 3.5) (p = 0.046) and a significantly lower discrimination capability than the NMDAR patients (9.9 ± 2.0 vs. 14.5 ± 0.6) (p = 0.002). The non-NMDAR patients had significantly more limbic MRI pathologies (6/7) compared to the NMDAR patients (0/4) (p = 0.015). Furthermore, a correlation between limbic MRI pathologies and worse capability of smelling discrimination was found (p = 0.016, r = -0.704, n = 11).

Conclusion

Our results indicate that patients with NMDAR autoimmune encephalitis have normal long term olfactory function. However, patients with non-NMDAR autoimmune encephalitis appear to have a persistently impaired olfactory function, probably mediated by encephalitic damage to limbic structures.

Olfactory and Gustatory Dysfunction in Patients With Autoimmune Encephalitis

Objective: To test the hypothesis that olfactory (OF) and gustatory function (GF) is disturbed in patients with autoimmune encephalitides (AE). Methods: The orthonasal OF was tested in 32 patients with AE and 32 age- and sex-matched healthy controls (HC) with the standardized Threshold Discrimination Identification (TDI) score. This validated olfactory testing method yields individual scores for olfactory threshold (T), odor discrimination (D), and identification (I), along with a composite TDI score. The GF was determined by the Taste Strip Test (TST). Results: Overall, 24/32 (75%) of patients with AE, but none of 32 HC (p < 0.001) had olfactory dysfunction in TDI testing. The results of the threshold, discrimination and identification subtests were significantly reduced in patients with AE compared to HC (all p < 0.001). Assessed by TST, 5/19 (26.3%) of patients with AE, but none of 19 HC presented a significant limitation in GF (p < 0.001). The TDI score was correlated with the subjective estimation of the olfactory capacity on a visual analog scale (VAS; r_s = 0.475, p = 0.008). Neither age, sex, modified Rankin Scale nor disease duration were associated with the composite TDI score. Conclusions: This is the first study investigating OF and GF in AE patients. According to unblinded assessment, patients with AE have a reduced olfactory and gustatory capacity compared to HC, suggesting that olfactory and gustatory dysfunction are hitherto unrecognized symptoms in AE. Further studies with larger number of AE patients would be of interest to verify our results.

Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

Preserved self-awareness following extensive bilateral brain damage to the insula, anterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortices

It has been proposed that self-awareness (SA), a multifaceted phenomenon central to human consciousness, depends critically on specific brain regions, namely the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Such a proposal predicts that damage to these regions should disrupt or even abolish SA. We tested this prediction in a rare neurological patient with extensive bilateral brain damage encompassing the insula, ACC, mPFC, and the medial temporal lobes. In spite of severe amnesia, which partially affected his “autobiographical self”, the patient's SA remained fundamentally intact. His Core SA, including basic self-recognition and sense of self-agency, was preserved. His Extended SA and Introspective SA were also largely intact, as he has a stable self-concept and intact higher-order metacognitive abilities. The results suggest that the insular cortex, ACC and mPFC are not required for most aspects of SA. Our findings are compatible with the hypothesis that SA is likely to emerge from more distributed interactions among brain networks including those in the brainstem, thalamus, and posteromedial cortices.