Spatial memory and explicit knowledge: an effect of instruction on representational momentum

Setting the scene for boundary extension: Methods, findings, connections, and theories

A previously viewed scene is often remembered as containing a larger extent of the background than was actually present, and information that was likely present just outside the boundaries of that view is often incorporated into the representation of that scene. This has been referred to as boundary extension. Methodologies used in studies on boundary extension (terminology, stimulus presentation, response measures) are described. Empirical findings regarding effects of characteristics of the stimulus (whether the stimulus depicts a scene, semantics of the scene, view angle, object size, object cropping, object orientation, object color, number of objects, depth of field, object distance, viewpoint production, scene orientation, motion, faces, emotions, modality, whether the scene is multimodal), characteristics of the display (aperture shape, aperture size, target duration, retention interval), and characteristics of the observer (allocation of attention, imagination, age, expectations and strategies, eye fixation, eye movements, monocular or binocular view, vantage point, confinement, prior exposure, expertise, arousal, pathology) on boundary extension are reviewed. Connections of boundary extension to other cognitive phenomena and processes (evolutionary adaptation, Gestalt principles, illusions, psychophysics, invariant physical principles, aesthetics, temporal boundary extension, normalization) are noted, and theories and theoretical considerations regarding boundary extension (multisource model, boundary transformation, mental imagery, 4E cognition, cognitive modularity, neurological mechanisms of scene representation) are discussed.

Does across-trial target behavior influence representational momentum?

Whether behaviors of targets presented on other trials could influence representational momentum of a current target was examined. In Experiment 1, each participant received a stimulus set in which (a) 80% of trials presented a moving target and 20% of trials presented a stationary target or (b) 20% of trials presented a moving target and 80% of trials presented a stationary target. In Experiment 2, each participant received a stimulus set in which (a) 80% of trials presented rightward motion and 20% of trials presented leftward motion, (b) 50% of trials presented rightward motion and 50% of trials presented leftward motion, or (c) 20% of trials presented rightward motion and 80% of trials presented leftward motion. Representational momentum of a moving target was not influenced by whether the majority of other trials in the stimulus set presented a stationary target, motion in the same direction, or motion in the opposite direction. The results suggest that behavior of targets on other trials was not effective in creating expectations that influenced representational momentum of the current target. Implications for theories of representational momentum are noted.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory

Humans interpret others' behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal "reference" trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action's biological motion profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore confirm that the perception of others' actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.

Perceptual teleology: expectations of action efficiency bias social perception

Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others to achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological stance is prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive models of social cognition, a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory would be generated from prior knowledge against which the observed action is evaluated, distorting the perception of unexpected inefficient actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach for an object with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last seen screen position of the hand. Judgements of inefficient actions were biased towards the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target). These corrections increased when the obstruction's presence/absence was explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory was explicitly predicted. Additional supplementary experiments demonstrated that these biases occur during ongoing visual perception and/or immediately after motion offset. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, providing an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated.

The neuroelectric dynamics of the emotional anticipation of other people's pain

When we observe a dynamic emotional facial expression, we usually automatically anticipate how that expression will develop. Our objective was to study a neurocognitive biomarker of this anticipatory process for facial pain expressions, operationalized as a mismatch effect. For this purpose, we studied the behavioral and neuroelectric (Event-Related Potential, ERP) correlates, of a match or mismatch, between the intensity of an expression of pain anticipated by the participant, and the intensity of a static test expression of pain displayed with the use of a representational momentum paradigm. Here, the paradigm consisted in displaying a dynamic facial pain expression which suddenly disappeared, and participants had to memorize the final intensity of the dynamic expression. We compared ERPs in response to congruent (intensity the same as the one memorized) and incongruent (intensity different from the one memorized) static expression intensities displayed after the dynamic expression. This paradigm allowed us to determine the amplitude and direction of this intensity anticipation by measuring the observer's memory bias. Results behaviorally showed that the anticipation was backward (negative memory bias) for high intensity expressions of pain (participants expected a return to a neutral state) and more forward (memory bias less negative, or even positive) for less intense expressions (participants expected increased intensity). Detecting mismatch (incongruent intensity) led to faster responses than detecting match (congruent intensity). The neuroelectric correlates of this mismatch effect in response to the testing of expression intensity ranged from P100 to LPP (Late Positive Potential). Path analysis and source localization suggested that the medial frontal gyrus was instrumental in mediating the mismatch effect through top-down influence on both the occipital and temporal regions. Moreover, having the facility to detect incongruent expressions, by anticipating emotional state, could be useful for prosocial behavior and the detection of trustworthiness.

Toward a general theory of momentum-like effects

The future actions, behaviors, and outcomes of objects, individuals, and processes can often be anticipated, and some of these anticipations have been hypothesized to result from momentum-like effects. Five types of momentum-like effects (representational momentum, operational momentum, attentional momentum, behavioral momentum, psychological momentum) are briefly described. Potential similarities involving properties of momentum-like effects (continuation, coherence, role of chance or guessing, role of sensory processing, imperviousness to practice or error feedback, shifts in memory for position, effects of changes in velocity, rapid occurrence, effects of retention interval, attachment to an object rather than an abstract frame of reference, nonrigid transformation) are described, and potential constraints on a future theory of momentum-like effects (dynamic representation, nature of extrapolation, sensitivity to environmental contingencies, bridging gaps between stimulus and response, increasing adaptiveness to the environment, serving as a heuristic for perception and action, insensitivity to stimulus format, importance of subjective consequences, role of knowledge and belief, automaticity of occurrence, properties of functional architecture) are discussed. The similarity and ubiquity of momentum-like effects suggests such effects might result from a single or small number of mechanisms that operate over different dimensions, modalities, and time-scales and provide a fundamental adaptation for perception and action.

Perceived displacement explains wolfpack effect

We investigate the influence of perceived displacement of moving agent-like stimuli on the performance in dynamic interactive tasks. In order to reliably measure perceived displacement we utilize multiple tasks with different task demands. The perceived center of an agent's body is displaced in the direction in which the agent is facing and this perceived displacement is larger than the theoretical position of the center of mass would predict. Furthermore, the displacement in the explicit judgment is dissociated from the displacement obtained by the implicit measures. By manipulating the location of the pivot point, we show that it is not necessary to postulate orientation as an additional cue utilized by perception, as has been suggested by earlier studies. These studies showed that the agent's orientation influences the detection of chasing motion and the detection-related performance in interactive tasks. This influence has been labeled wolfpack effect. In one of the demonstrations of the wolfpack effect participants control a green circle on a display with a computer mouse. It has been shown that participants avoid display areas with agents pointing toward the green circle. Participants do so in favor of areas where the agents point in the direction perpendicular to the circle. We show that this avoidance behavior arises because the agent's pivot point selected by the earlier studies is different from where people locate the center of agent's body. As a consequence, the nominal rotation confounds rotation and translation. We show that the avoidance behavior disappears once the pivot point is set to the center of agent's body.

Boundary extension: findings and theories

A view of a scene is often remembered as containing information that might have been present just beyond the actual boundaries of that view, and this is referred to as boundary extension. Characteristics of the view (e.g., scene or nonscene; close-up or wide-angle; whether objects are cropped, static, or in motion, emotionally neutral or emotionally charged), display (e.g., aperture shape and size; target duration; retention interval; whether probes of memory involve magnification/minification or change in physical distance), and observer (e.g., allocation of attention; age; planned fixation, gaze direction, and eye movements; monocular or binocular viewing; prior exposure; neurological correlates) that influence boundary extension are reviewed. Proposed mechanisms of boundary extension (perceptual, memory, or motion schema; extension-normalization; attentional selection; errors in source monitoring) are discussed, and possible relationships of boundary extension to other cognitive processes (e.g., representational momentum; remembered distance and remembered size; amodal completion; transsaccadic memory) are briefly addressed.