Temporal Preparation Decreases Perceptual Latency: Evidence from a Clock Paradigm

A spatial-attentional mechanism underlies action-related distortions of time judgment

Temporal binding has been understood as an illusion in timing judgment. When an action triggers an outcome (e.g. a sound) after a brief delay, the action is reported to occur later than if the outcome does not occur, and the outcome is reported to occur earlier than a similar outcome not caused by an action. We show here that an attention mechanism underlies the seeming illusion of timing judgment. In one method, participants watch a rotating clock hand and report event times by noting the clock hand position when the event occurs. We find that visual spatial attention is critically involved in shaping event time reports made in this way. This occurs because action and outcome events result in shifts of attention around the clock rim, thereby biasing the perceived location of the clock hand. Using a probe detection task to measure attention, we show a difference in the distribution of visual spatial attention between a single-event condition (sound only or action only) and a two-event agency condition (action plus sound). Participants accordingly report the timing of the same event (the sound or the action) differently in the two conditions: spatial attentional shifts masquerading as temporal binding. Furthermore, computational modeling based on the attention measure can reproduce the temporal binding effect. Studies that use time judgment as an implicit marker of voluntary agency should first discount the artefactual changes in event timing reports that actually reflect differences in spatial attention. The study also has important implications for related results in mental chronometry obtained with the clock-like method since Wundt, as attention may well be a critical confounding factor in the interpretation of these studies.

The moment of awareness influences the content of awareness in orientation repulsion

Through the neurally evolving process of dynamic contextual modulation of perceptual contents, it remains unclear how the content of awareness is determined. Here we quantified the visual illusion of orientation repulsion, wherein the target appears tilted against the surrounding's orientation, and examined whether its extent changed when the target awareness was quickened by a preceding flanker. Independently of spatial cueing, repulsion was reduced when the flanker preceded the target by 100 ms compared with when they appeared simultaneously. We confirmed that the preceding flanker quickened the awareness of a nearby target relative to distant ones by 40 ms. Furthermore, the preceding flanker that was greater than 7 degrees away from the target still evoked such reduction of repulsion. These findings imply that the content of awareness is determined by the temporal interaction of two distinct processes: one controls the moment of awareness, and the other represents the perceptual content.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Temporal productions in a variable environment: timing starts from stimulus identification rather than onset

Timing an interval is integral in everyday life, from crossing a street or boiling an egg to playing sports and chatting with friends. In the current article, participants were asked to produce durations ranging from 500 to 1250 ms by either terminating an automatically initiated duration, or by maintaining a key press. When participants expected this production to start was manipulated using a variable foreperiod. Further, between subjects, the durations required for production were either variable or constant within a block. Together, these manipulations set up a temporally-and event-uncertain environment. When participants both initiated and terminated an interval, the uncertainty of the environment did not systematically affect productions. However, when productions were only terminated, productions were longer and given more uncertainty. While the effects of timing onset could be attributed to when a participant registers a stimulus, the effects of uncertainty with regards to what duration would be required for production indicates that participants appear to register what a stimulus is prior to initiating their timing. This finding indicates that timing may relate to when a stimulus is identified, rather than when it is first perceived. Alternatively, perhaps the onset of timing is postponed by event uncertainty.

Time-Based Expectancy for Task Relevant Stimulus Features

When a particular target stimulus appears more frequently after a certain interval than after another one, participants adapt to such regularity, as evidenced by faster responses to frequent interval-target combinations than to infrequent ones. This phenomenon is known as time-based expectancy. Previous research has suggested that time-based expectancy is primarily motor-based, in the sense that participants learn to prepare a particular response after a specific interval. Perceptual time-based expectancy — in the sense of learning to perceive a certain stimulus after specific interval — has previously not been observed. We conducted a Two-Alternative-Forced-Choice experiment with four stimuli differing in shape and orientation. A subset of the stimuli was frequently paired with a certain interval, while the other subset was uncorrelated with interval. We varied the response relevance of the interval-correlated stimuli, and investigated under which conditions time-based expectancy transfers from trials with interval-correlated stimuli to trials with interval-uncorrelated stimuli. Transfer was observed only where transfer of perceptual expectancy and transfer of response expectancy predicted the same behavioral pattern, not when they predicted opposite patterns. The results indicate that participants formed time-based expectancy for stimuli as well as for responses. However, alternative interpretations are also discussed.

Multimodal Integration of Time

Recent studies suggest that the accuracy of duration discrimination for visually presented intervals is strongly impaired by concurrently presented auditory intervals of different duration, but not vice versa. Because these studies rely mostly on accuracy measures, it remains unclear whether this impairment results from changes in perceived duration or rather from a decrease in perceptual sensitivity. We therefore assessed complete psychometric functions in a duration discrimination task to disentangle effects on perceived duration and sensitivity. Specifically, participants compared two empty intervals marked by either visual or auditory pulses. These pulses were either presented unimodally, or accompanied by task-irrelevant pulses in the respective other modality, which defined conflicting intervals of identical, shorter, or longer duration. Participants were instructed to base their temporal judgments solely on the task-relevant modality. Despite this instruction, perceived duration was clearly biased toward the duration of the intervals marked in the task-irrelevant modality. This was not only found for the discrimination of visual intervals, but also, to a lesser extent, for the discrimination of auditory intervals. Discrimination sensitivity, however, was similar between all multimodal conditions, and only improved compared to the presentation of unimodal visual intervals. In a second experiment, evidence for multisensory integration was even found when the task-irrelevant modality did not contain any duration information, thus excluding noncompliant attention allocation as a basis of our results. Our results thus suggest that audiovisual integration of temporally discrepant signals does not impair discrimination sensitivity but rather alters perceived duration, presumably by means of a temporal ventriloquism effect.

Distorted subjective reports of stimulus onsets under dual-task conditions: Delayed conscious perception or estimation bias?

We investigated whether selecting a response for one task delays the conscious perception of another stimulus (delayed conscious perception hypothesis). In two experiments, participants watched a revolving clock hand while performing two tasks in close succession (i.e. a dual-task). Two stimuli were presented with varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). After each trial, participants separately estimated the onsets of the two stimuli on the clock face. Across two experiments and four conditions, we manipulated response requirements and assessed their impact on perceived stimulus onsets. Results showed that (a) providing speeded responses to the stimuli did lead to greater SOA-dependent misperceptions of both stimulus onsets as compared to a solely perceptual condition, and (b) that response grouping reduced these misperceptions. Overall, the results provide equivocal evidence for the delayed conscious perception hypothesis. They rather suggest that participants' estimates of the two stimulus onsets are biased by the interval between their responses.

Attention and the speed of information processing: posterior entry for unattended stimuli instead of prior entry for attended stimuli

Why are nearly simultaneous stimuli frequently perceived in reversed order? The origin of errors in temporal judgments is a question older than experimental psychology itself. One of the earliest suspects is attention. According to the concept of prior entry, attention accelerates attended stimuli; thus they have "prior entry" to perceptive processing stages, including consciousness. Although latency advantages for attended stimuli have been revealed in psychophysical studies many times, these measures (e.g. temporal order judgments, simultaneity judgments) cannot test the prior-entry hypothesis completely. Since they assess latency differences between an attended and an unattended stimulus, they cannot distinguish between faster processing of attended stimuli and slower processing of unattended stimuli. Therefore, we present a novel paradigm providing separate estimates for processing advantages respectively disadvantages of attended and unattended stimuli. We found that deceleration of unattended stimuli contributes more strongly to the prior-entry illusion than acceleration of attended stimuli. Thus, in the temporal domain, attention fulfills its selective function primarily by deceleration of unattended stimuli. That means it is actually posterior entry, not prior entry which accounts for the largest part of the effect.

Arousal modulates temporal preparation under increased time uncertainty: Evidence from higher-order sequential foreperiod effects

When the foreperiod (FP) is unpredictably varied in reaction-time tasks, responses are slow at short but fast at long FPs (variable-FP effect), and further vary asymmetrically as a function of FP sequence (sequential FP effect). A trace-conditioning model attributes these phenomena to time-related associative learning, while a dual-process model views them as resulting from combined effects of strategic preparation and trial-to-trial changes in arousal. Sometimes, responses are slower in long-long than in short-long FP sequences. This pattern is not predicted from the trace-conditioning account, since FP repetitions should speed up, rather than slow down, responses (due to reinforcement). The effect, however, might indicate the contribution of arousal, which according to the dual-process model, is heightened after a short FP(n-1) but decreased after a long FP(n-1). In five experiments, we examined higher-order sequential FP effects on performance, with a particular emphasis on analyzing performance in long-FP(n) trials as a function of FP length in the two preceding trials, varying temporal FP context (i.e. average FP length) and reaction mode (simple vs. choice reaction). Slower responses in long-long-long (compared with short-short-long) FP sequences were not found within a short-FP context (Exps. 1 & 2) but clearly emerged within a long-FP context (Exps. 3-5). This pattern supports the notion that transient arousal changes contribute to sequential performance effects in variable-FP tasks, in line with the dual-process account of temporal preparation.

Distraction by irrelevant sound during foreperiods selectively impairs temporal preparation

When the interval between a warning signal (WS) and an imperative signal (IS), termed the foreperiod (FP), is variable across trials, reaction time (RT) to the IS typically decreases with increasing FP length. Here we examined the auditory filled-FP effect, which refers to a performance decrement after FPs filled with irrelevant auditory stimulation compared to FPs without additional stimulation. According to one account, irrelevant stimulation distracts individuals from processing time and probability information during the FP (distraction-during-FP hypothesis). This should predominantly affect long-FP trials. Alternatively, the filled-FP effect may arise from a failure to shift attention from FP modality to IS modality (attention-to-modality hypothesis). The first hypothesis focuses on preparatory processing, predicting a selective RT increase on long-FP trials, whereas the second hypothesis focuses on target processing, only predicting a global RT increase irrespective of FP length. Across four experiments, a filled-FP (compared to a blank-FP) condition consistently yielded a selective RT increase on long-FP trials, irrespective of FP-IS modality pairing. This pattern of results contradicts the attention-to-modality hypothesis but corroborates the distraction-during-FP hypothesis. More generally, these data have theoretical implications by supporting a multi-process view of temporal preparation under time uncertainty.