The politics of insight

Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio-cognitive polarization

Recent research has proposed a relationship between rigid political ideologies and underlying 'cognitive styles'. However, there remain discrepancies in how both social and cognitive rigidity are defined and measured. Problem-solving, or the ability to generate novel ideas by exploring unusual reasoning paths and challenging rigid perspectives around us, is often used to operationalize cognitive flexibility. Thus, we hypothesized a relation between forms of social rigidity, including Socio-cognitive polarization (i.e., a factor capturing conservative political ideology, absolutism/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia), bullshit receptivity (i.e., overestimating pseudo-profound statements), overclaiming (tendency to self-enhance), and cognitive rigidity (i.e., problem-solving). Our results showed differences in performance on problem-solving tasks between four latent profiles of social rigidity identified in our sample. Specifically, those low in socio-cognitive polarization, bullshit, and overclaiming (i.e., less rigid) performed the best on problem-solving. Thus, we conclude that social and cognitive rigidity may share an underlying socio-cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially rigid are also more likely to be also cognitively rigid when processing non-social information.

Not Getting Vaccinated? It Is a Matter of Problem-Solving Abilities and Socio-Cognitive Polarization

The anti-COVID-19 vaccination campaign in the United States provided a significant contribution to the control of the virus spread. Despite the recommendations by public health institutions, vaccine skepticism and hesitancy contributed to low vaccine uptake, thus possibly disrupting the management of preventable diseases associated with the COVID-19 infection. The process that led individuals to accept COVID-19 vaccines required the ability to gather, synthesize, and weigh-up information within a novel, dynamically changing, complex, and ambiguous context. To deal with such complexity, we hypothesized that both the ability of reflection and flexible adaptation played a fundamental role. Based on previous research on cognitive predictors of vaccine refusal, we decided to investigate the combined role of two constructs, namely, problem-solving skills and socio-cognitive polarization (SCP), on vaccine acceptance and uptake. Two-hundred-seventy-seven US participants completed an online survey aimed to measure problem-solving ability, through a rebus puzzles task, and SCP, through a composite measure of absolutist thinking, political conservatism, and xenophobia. Mediation analyses indicated that SCP mediated the association between problem-solving ability and vaccine acceptance, so lower problem-solving abilities associated with higher polarization predicted vaccine rejection. Thus, our findings suggested that low problem-solving skills may represent a risk factor for COVID-19 vaccine refusal, with cognitive and social rigidity playing a crucial role in undermining the anti-COVID-19 vaccine uptake.

Insight Problem Solving Ability Predicts Reduced Susceptibility to Fake News, Bullshit, and Overclaiming

The information humans are exposed to has grown exponentially. This has placed increased demands upon our information selection strategies resulting in reduced fact-checking and critical-thinking time. Prior research shows that problem solving (traditionally measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test-CRT) negatively correlates with believing in false information. We argue that this result is specifically related to insight problem solving. Solutions via insight are the result of parallel processing, characterized by filtering external noise, and, unlike cognitively controlled thinking, it does not suffer from the cognitive overload associated with processing multiple sources of information. We administered the Compound Remote Associate Test (problems used to investigate insight problem solving) as well as the CRT, 20 fake and real news headlines, the bullshit, and overclaiming scales to a sample of 61 participants. Results show that insight problem solving predicts better identification of fake news and bullshit (over and above traditional measures i.e., the CRT), and is associated with reduced overclaiming. These results have implications for understanding individual differences in susceptibility to believing false information.

The Effect of Dopaminergic Replacement Therapy on Creative Thinking and Insight Problem-Solving in Parkinson's Disease Patients

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients when “on” and “off” dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients “on” medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were “on” medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while “on” medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias).

A Systematic Review of Creativity-Related Studies Applying the Remote Associates Test From 2000 to 2019

The study examines how the remote associates test (RAT) has been used to examine theories of creativity through a review of recent studies on creativity. Creativity-related studies published between 2000 and 2019 were retrieved from the SCOPUS database. A total of 172 papers were chosen for further analysis. Content analysis shows that research on creativity using RAT mainly concerns remote association, insight problem-solving, general creative process, test development, individual difference, effect of treatment, clinical case, social interaction effect, and predictor or criterion. The study constructs a theoretical framework based on the 4P (Product–Person–Process–Place) model and demonstrates how empirical studies using the RAT explore the individual differences, internal processes, and external influences of creative thinking. In addition, the most commonly used version of the RAT is the Compound Remote Associates Problems (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a). Current research shows a trend whereby the creative thinking process has been receiving greater attention. In particular, a growing number of studies in this field have been carried out using cognitive neuroscience technologies. These findings suggest that the RAT provides researchers with a way to deepen their understanding of different levels of creativity.

Oculometric signature of switch into awareness? Pupil size predicts sudden insight whereas microsaccades predict problem-solving via analysis

According to the Gestalt theorists, restructuring is an essential component of insight problem-solving, contributes to the "Aha!" experience, and is similar to the perceptual switch experienced when reinterpreting ambiguous figures. Previous research has demonstrated that pupil diameter increases during the perceptual switch of ambiguous figures, and indexes norepeinephrine functioning mediated by the locus coeruleus. In this study, we investigated if pupil diameter similarly predicts the switch into awareness people experience when solving a problem via insight. Additionally, we explored eye movement dynamics during the same task to investigate if the problem-solving strategies used are linked to specific oculomotor behaviors. In 38 participants, pupil diameter increased about 500 msec prior to solution only in trials for which subjects report having an insight. In contrast, participants increased their microsaccade rate only prior to non-insight solutions. Pupil dilation and microsaccades were not reliably related, but both appear to be robust markers of how people solve problems (with or without insight). The pupil size change seen when people have an "Aha!" moment represents an indicator of the switch into awareness of unconscious processes humans depend upon for insight, and suggests important involvement of norepinephrine, via the locus coeruleus, in sudden insight.

The relation between state and trait risk taking and problem-solving

People can solve problems in two main styles: through a methodical analysis, or by a sudden insight (also known as 'Aha!' or 'Eureka!' experience). Analytical solutions are achieved primarily with conscious deliberation in a trial-and-error fashion. 'Aha!' moments, instead, happen suddenly, often without conscious deliberation and are considered a critical facet of creative cognition. Previous research has indicated an association between creativity and risk taking (a personality trait); however, few studies have investigated how a short-term situational state of risk modulates these two different problem-solving styles. In this research, we looked at how both state and trait risks taking is related to different problem-solving styles. To measure risk as a personality trait, we administered the Balloon Analog Risk Task. To investigate risk as a state, we created a scenario, where people had to bet on their problem-solving performance at the beginning of each trial, and we compared the performance of this group with a control group that did not have to bet. The results show no association between risk as a trait and problem-solving style; however, the risk state scenario did produce a shift in dominant problem-solving style with participants in the risk scenario group solving more problems via analysis. We also found that two factors are related to problem-solving accuracy: the amount bet (i.e., when people place higher bets, they solve more problems), and success on the previous trial, especially if the solution was achieved via analysis. Furthermore, the data reveal that when under risk, females are better problem solvers than males.

Validation of the Italian Remote Associate Test

The scientific approach to the study of creative problem solving has shifted from using classic insight problems (e.g., the Nine-dots problem), towards sets of problems that have more robust psychometric properties, such as the Remote Associate Test (RAT). Because it is homogeneous, compact, quickly solvable, and easy to score, the RAT has been used more frequently in recent creativity studies. We applied the Item Response Theory (IRT) to develop an Italian version of this task. The final 51-item test was reliable (α = .89) and provided information over a wide range of ability levels, as revealed by the IRT analysis. The RAT correlated with five measures of creative performance: The Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), three classic insight problems, a set of anagrams purposefully developed, the fluency and flexibility scores of the Alternative Uses Task (AUT), and the Creative Achievements Questionnaire (CAQ). The new measure provided is meant to encourage the study of creativity and problem solving in the Italian language.

TDCS to the right anterior temporal lobe facilitates insight problem-solving

Problem-solving is essential for advances in cultural, social, and scientific knowledge. It is also one of the most challenging cognitive processes to facilitate. Some problem-solving is deliberate, but frequently people solve problems with a sudden insight, also known as a Eureka or "Aha!" moment. The advantage of solving problems via insight is that these solutions are more accurate, relying on a unique pattern of neural activity, compared to deliberative strategies. The right Anterior Temporal Lobe (rATL), putatively involved in semantic integration, is distinctively activated when people experience an insight. The rATL may contribute to the recognition of distant semantic relations that support insight solutions, although fMRI and EEG evidence for its involvement is, by nature, correlational. In this study, we investigate if focal sub-threshold neuromodulation to the rATL facilitates insight problem-solving. In three different groups, using a within- and between-subjects design, we tested the causal role of this brain region in problem-solving, by applying High Definition Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to the rATL (active and sham condition) or the left frontopolar region while participants attempted to solve Compound Remote Associates problems before, during and after stimulation. Participants solved a higher percentage of problems, overall, and specifically by insight when they received rATL stimulation, compared to pre-stimulation, and compared to sham and left frontopolar stimulation. These results confirm the crucial role played by the rATL in insight problem-solving.

Political Orientation and Belief in Science in a U.S. College Sample

Lay skepticism toward empirically supported scientific research has increased significantly in recent years. Given that part of the social contract of science is the betterment of society, it is critical for the scientific community to identify factors underlying public dismissal versus support of scientific evidence. The current study explores how individual differences in political ideology influence acceptance of factual and nonfactual information, with differences in truth-seeking values as a potential mediating variable. Participants rated their agreement with true and untrue (i.e., nonempirically supported) statements and completed self-report assessments of political ideology and personal endorsement of values associated with promoting truth. More politically, liberal individuals reported greater agreement with both scientific facts and untrue statements. Furthermore, endorsement of truth-seeking values mediated the relation between liberal ideology and agreement with facts (but not nonfactual statements). Results suggest that interventions to increase individuals' acceptance of facts may benefit from stimulating greater support for truth-seeking values and behavior.

The effects of expected reward on creative problem solving

Creative problem solving involves search processes, and it is known to be hard to motivate. Reward cues have been found to enhance performance across a range of tasks, even when cues are presented subliminally, without being consciously detected. It is uncertain whether motivational processes, such as reward, can influence problem solving. We tested the effect of supraliminal and subliminal reward on participant performance on problem solving that can be solved by deliberate analysis or by insight. Forty-one participants attempted to solve 100 compound remote associate problems. At the beginning of each problem, a potential reward cue (1 or 25 cents) was displayed, either subliminally (17 ms) or supraliminally (100 ms). Participants earned the displayed reward if they solved the problem correctly. Results showed that the higher subliminal reward increased the percentage of problems solved correctly overall. Second, we explored if subliminal rewards preferentially influenced solutions that were achieved via a sudden insight (mostly processed below awareness) or via a deliberate analysis. Participants solved more problems via insight following high subliminal reward when compared with low subliminal reward, and compared with high supraliminal reward, with no corresponding effect on analytic solving. Striatal dopamine (DA) is thought to influence motivation, reinforce behavior, and facilitate cognition. We speculate that subliminal rewards activate the striatal DA system, enhancing the kinds of automatic integrative processes that lead to more creative strategies for problem solving, without increasing the selectivity of attention, which could impede insight.

Expectation Violation in Political Decision Making: A Psychological Case Study

Since the early Gestaltists there has been a strong interest in the question of how problem solvers get stuck in a mental impasse. A key idea is that the repeated activation of a successful strategy from the past results in a mental set (‘Einstellung’) which determines and constrains the option space to solve a problem. We propose that this phenomenon, which mostly was tested by fairly restricted experiments in the lab, could also be applied to more complex problem constellations and naturalistic decision making. We aim at scrutinizing and reconstructing how a mental set determines the misinterpretation of facts in the field of political decision making and leads in consequence to wrong expectations and an ill-defined problem representation. We will exemplify this psychological mechanism considering a historical example, namely the unexpected stabilization of the Franco regime at the end of World War II and its survival thereafter. A specific focus will be drawn to the significant observation that erroneous expectations were taken as the basis for decisions. This is congruent with the notion that in case of discrepancy between preconceived notions and new information, the former prevails over the new findings. Based on these findings, we suggest a theoretical model for expectation violation in political decision making and develop novel approaches for cognitive empirical research on the mechanisms of expectation violation and its maintenance in political decision making processes.