Can I Get me out of my Head? Exploring Strategies for Controlling the Self-Referential Aspects of the Mind-Wandering State during Reading

A dual process model of spontaneous conscious thought

In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.

The relationship between mind wandering and reading comprehension: A meta-analysis

Mind wandering (MW), a shift of attention away from external tasks toward internally generated thoughts, has been frequently associated with costs in reading comprehension (RC), although with some contrasting results and many reported potential intervening factors. The aim of the meta-analysis was to evaluate the relationship between MW and RC, considering the role of participants' and text's characteristics, as well as methodological issues in the measurement of the two constructs. From a set of 25 selected full texts (73 correlation coefficients), pooled correlation (r = -0.21) revealed a negative significant relationship. Using trait-based questionnaires to assess MW compared with online probes resulted in an average significant change of 0.30 in the correlation between MW and RC, leading to a null correlation. A significant effect of age was also found, with more negative correlations with increasing age. None of the other moderating variables considered (i.e., language, text type, text length, RC assessment, text difficulty, text interest, and working memory) resulted in a significant effect. From the present meta-analysis, we might suggest that MW and RC are partially overlapping and vary, within a swing effect, in relation to a set of shared factors, such as working memory, interest, and text length. There might also be side-specific factors that drive the movement of primarily one side of the swing, and future research should further consider the role of individual differences in RC. Implications for research and educational settings are discussed.

Perceptual coupling and decoupling of the default mode network during mind-wandering and reading

While reading, our mind can wander to unrelated autobiographical information, creating a perceptually decoupled state detrimental to narrative comprehension. To understand how this mind-wandering state emerges, we asked whether retrieving autobiographical content necessitates functional disengagement from visual input. In Experiment 1, brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in an experimental situation mimicking naturally occurring mind-wandering, allowing us to precisely delineate neural regions involved in memory and reading. Individuals read expository texts and ignored personally relevant autobiographical memories, as well as the opposite situation. Medial regions of the default mode network (DMN) were recruited during memory retrieval. In contrast, left temporal and lateral prefrontal regions of the DMN, as well as ventral visual cortex, were recruited when reading for comprehension. Experiment two used functional connectivity both at rest and during tasks to establish that (i) DMN regions linked to memory are more functionally decoupled from regions of ventral visual cortex than regions in the same network engaged when reading; and (ii) individuals with more self-generated mental contents and poorer comprehension, while reading in the lab, showed more decoupling between visually connected DMN sites important for reading and primary visual cortex. A similar pattern of connectivity was found in Experiment 1, with greater coupling between this DMN site and visual cortex when participants reported greater focus on reading in the face of conflict from autobiographical memory cues; moreover, the retrieval of personally relevant memories increased the decoupling of these sites. These converging data suggest we lose track of the narrative when our minds wander because generating autobiographical mental content relies on cortical regions within the DMN which are functionally decoupled from ventral visual regions engaged during reading.

As your eyes scan these words, you may be thinking about what to make for dinner, how to address an unexpected hurdle at work, or how many emails are sitting, unread, in your inbox. This type of mind-wandering disrupts our focus and limits how much information we comprehend, whilst also being conducive to creative thinking and problem-solving.

Despite being an everyday occurrence, exactly how our mind wanders remains elusive. One possible explanation is that the brain disengages from visual information from the external world and turns its attention inwards. A greater understanding of which neural circuits are involved in this process could reveal insights about focus, attention, and reading comprehension.

Here, Zhang et al. investigated whether the brain becomes disengaged from visual input when our mind wanders while reading. Recalling personal events was used as a proxy for mind-wandering. Brain activity was recorded as participants were shown written statements; sometimes these were preceded by cues to personal memories. People were asked to focus on reading the statements or they were instructed to concentrate on their memories while ignoring the text. The analyses showed that recalling memories and reading stimulated distinct parts of the brain, which were in direct competition during mind-wandering.

Further work examined how these regions were functionally connected. In individuals who remained focused on reading despite memory cues, the areas activated by reading showed strong links to the visual cortex. Conversely, these reading-related areas became ‘decoupled’ from visual processing centres in people who were focusing more on their internal thoughts.

These results shed light on why we lose track of what we are reading when our mind wanders: recalling personal memories activates certain brain areas which are functionally decoupled from the regions involved in processing external information – such as the words on a page.

In summary, the work by Zhang et al. builds a mechanistic understanding of mind-wandering, a natural feature of our daily brain activity. These insights may help to inform future interventions in education to improve reading, comprehension and focus.

The effects of increased dopamine-levels on attentional control during reading and reading comprehension

The aim of the present study was to gain insight into the neurobiological processes, particularly the dopaminergic processes, underlying attentional control during reading and reading comprehension. In order to test the effects of increased levels of dopamine (DA) in the brain, female university students (N = 80), half of them being carriers of the DRD4-7R allele and half of them not, participated in a double-blind placebo-controlled within-subjects experiment in which they were orally administered levodopa or a placebo before reading a text. After reading the text, participants reported on their attentional control during reading and completed comprehension questions. Pharmacologically increasing DA levels in the brain negatively influenced reading comprehension. This effect was moderate (ηp2 = .13). No interaction effects of condition and DRD4 genotype were found, for either attentional control or reading comprehension. Exploratory analyses showed that increased DA levels in the brain positively influenced fluctuations in attentional control, but only in a group of slow readers. No effects of increased DA were found for the two other attentional control measures used in the present study and no effects of increased DA on attentional control were found for fast readers. Results are discussed from the perspective of the inverted U-shape theory and the possible dopamine-related mechanisms.

Do your eyes give you away? A validation study of eye-movement measures used as indicators for mindless reading

Identifying eye-movement measures as objective indicators of mind wandering seems to be a work in progress. We reviewed research comparing eye movements during self-categorized episodes of normal versus mindless reading and found little consensus regarding the specific measures that are sensitive to attentional decoupling during mind wandering. To address this issue of inconsistency, we conducted a new, high-powered eye-tracking experiment and considered all previously identified mind-wandering indicators. In our experiment, only three measures (reading time, fixation count, and first-fixation duration) positively predicted self-categorized mindless reading. Aside from these single measures, the word-frequency effect was found to be generally less pronounced during mindless-reading than during normal-reading episodes. To additionally test for convergent validity between the objective and subjective mind-wandering measures, we utilized eye-movement measures as well as thought reports, to examine the effect of metacognitive awareness on mind-wandering behavior. We expected that participants anticipating a difficult comprehension test would mind wander less during reading than would those anticipating an easy test. Although we were able to induce metacognitive expectancies about task difficulty, we found no evidence that these difficulty expectancies affected either subjectively reported or objectively measured mind wandering.

Hello, is that me you are looking for? A re-examination of the role of the DMN in social and self relevant aspects of off-task thought

Neural activity within the default mode network (DMN) is widely assumed to relate to processing during off-task states, however it remains unclear whether this association emerges from a shared role in self or social content that is common in these conditions. In the current study, we examine the possibility that the role of the DMN in ongoing thought emerges from contributions to specific features of off-task experience such as self-relevant or social content. A group of participants described their experiences while performing a laboratory task over a period of days. In a different session, neural activity was measured while participants performed Self/Other judgements (e.g., Does the word ‘Honest’ apply to you (Self condition) or Barack Obama (Other condition)). Despite the prominence of social and personal content in off-task reports, there was no association with neural activity during off-task trait adjective judgements. Instead, during both Self and Other judgements we found recruitment of caudal posterior cingulate cortex—a core DMN hub—was above baseline for individuals whose laboratory experiences were characterised as detailed. These data provide little support for a role of the DMN in self or other content in the off-task state and instead suggest a role in how on-going thought is represented.

Distinct individual differences in default mode network connectivity relate to off-task thought and text memory during reading

Often, as we read, we find ourselves thinking about something other than the text; this tendency to mind-wander is linked to poor comprehension and reduced subsequent memory for texts. Contemporary accounts argue that periods of off-task thought are related to the tendency for attention to be decoupled from external input. We used fMRI to understand the neural processes that underpin this phenomenon. First, we found that individuals with poorer text-based memory tend to show reduced recruitment of left middle temporal gyrus in response to orthographic input, within a region located at the intersection of default mode, dorsal attention and frontoparietal networks. Voxels within these networks were taken as seeds in a subsequent resting-state study. The default mode network region (i) had greater connectivity with medial prefrontal cortex, falling within the same network, for individuals with better text-based memory, and (ii) was more decoupled from medial visual regions in participants who mind-wandered more frequently. These findings suggest that stronger intrinsic connectivity within the default mode network is linked to better text processing, while reductions in default mode network coupling to the visual system may underpin individual variation in the tendency for our attention to become disengaged from what we are reading.

Reconsidering the Mind-Wandering Reader: Predictive Processing, Probability Designs, and Enculturation

Studies on mind-wandering frequently use reading as an experimental task. In these studies, reading is conceived as a cognitive process that potentially offers a contrast to mind-wandering, because it seems to be task-related, goal-directed and stimulus-dependent. More recent work attempts to avoid the dichotomy of successful cognitive processes and processes of mind-wandering found in earlier studies. We approach the issue from the perspective that texts provoke modes of cognitive involvement different from the information processing and recall account that underlies many early mind-wandering studies. After all, reading itself is an umbrella term for activities that are characterized by a variety of phenomenological and functional signatures. We conceptualize reading and mind-wandering in relation to each other through the framework of enculturated predictive processing, which is informed by research in literary studies. Earlier accounts think of reading predominantly in terms of the construction of situation models that organize textual information. By contrast, enculturated predictive processing foregrounds shifting stances readers can take in relation to the text. Characters featuring in literary texts might be mind-wandering themselves, or passages in literary style might make the construction of a clearly defined situational model impossible. Furthermore, we take into account that texts often elicit mind-wandering through the construction of task-relevant and attention-driven virtual scenarios in readers' minds. This more complex account of reading can enrich recent attempts to understand mind-wandering as a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon. The study of mind-wandering can benefit, we argue, from a closer attention to the process of reading and to the texts it deploys as stimuli. The emerging perspective from enculturated predictive processing and literary studies makes distinctions in reading that in turn enable research on mind-wandering to ask more precise questions about (1) different kinds of mind-wandering, (2) different modes of reading, and (3) how and where they interconnect across time.

Self-Referential Memory Encoding and Mind- Wandering in Younger and Older Adults

Self-referencing, the relating of information to oneself, is a successful encoding strategy that improves memory across the lifespan. Mind-wandering, the shifting of thoughts from a task to selffocused information, is characterised by decreased cognitive performance and is reported by older adults less frequently than by younger adults. In the present study, we investigated a hypothetical relationship between mind-wandering and self-referential memory and whether this relationship decouples in healthy aging. Younger and older adults rated adjectives on how descriptive they were of themselves, Albert Einstein or assessed the commonness of the adjective. Participants were interrupted during the encoding task with randomly timed mind-wandering prompts and then completed a surprise free recall test. Results replicated prior demonstrations of enhanced memory for self-referenced information, whereas age and self-focus decreased reports of mind-wandering. In terms of effects of interest, we found that encoding condition as well as age impacted the number of words recalled and reports of mind-wandering. However, a single mechanism does not appear to account for both of these effects, and there was no compelling evidence for age differences in the relationships amongst the factors. Future research should further examine the relationships amongst self, memory, and mind-wandering across the lifespan.

Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

According to Thomas Metzinger, many human cognitive processes in the waking state are spontaneous and are deprived of the experience of epistemic agency. He considers mind wandering as a paradigm example of our recurring loss of epistemic agency. I will enrich this view by extending the scope of the concept of epistemic agency to include cases of depressive rumination and creative cognition, which are additional types of spontaneous cognition. Like mind wandering, they are characterized by unique phenomenal and functional properties that give rise to varying degrees of epistemic agency. The main claim of this paper will be that the experience of being an epistemic agent within a certain time frame is a relational phenomenon that emerges from the organism’s capacity to interact with its cognitive niche. To explore this relation, I develop a new framework that integrates phenomenological considerations on epistemic agency with a functional account of the reciprocal coupling of the embodied organism with its cognitive niche. This account rests upon dynamical accounts of strong embodied and embedded cognition and recent work on cognitive niche construction. Importantly, epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling are gradual phenomena ranging from weak to strong realizations. The emerging framework will be employed to analyze mind wandering, depressive rumination, and creative cognition as well as their commonalities and differences. Mind wandering and depressive rumination are cases of weak epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. However, there are also important phenomenological, functional, and neuronal differences. In contrast, creative cognition is a case of strong epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. By providing a phenomenological and functional analysis of these distinct types of spontaneous cognition, we can gain a better understanding of the importance of organism-niche interaction for the realization of epistemic agency.

The verbal nature of worry in generalized anxiety: Insights from the brain

Background

The Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry argues that worry is a cognitive strategy adopted to control the physiological arousal associated with anxiety. According to this theory, pathological worry, as in Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), is verbal in nature, negative and abstract, rather than concrete. Neuroimaging studies link the expression of worry to characteristic modes of brain functional connectivity, especially in relation to the amygdala. However, the distinctive features of worry (verbal, abstract, negative), and their relationship to physiological arousal, have not so far been mapped to brain function.

Methods

We addressed this omission by undertaking a resting-state functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging study of 19 patients with GAD and 21 controls, before and after induction of perseverative cognitions, while measuring emotional bodily arousal from heart rate (HR). Seed-based analyses quantified brain changes in whole brain functional connectivity from the amygdala.

Results

In GAD, the induction increased negative thoughts and their verbal content. In line with predictions, the verbal expression of worry in GAD was associated with higher HR at baseline and attenuated HR increases after induction of perseverative cognitions. Within brain, the increased use of words during worry, and the associated dampening of HR after induction were mediated by the strength of functional connectivity between the amygdala and default mode network ‘hubs’ and the opercular cortex. The negative content of worry was further related to functional communication between amygdala and cingulo-opercular and temporal cortices.

Conclusions

Findings provide a neurobiological basis for the impact of verbal worry on HR in GAD.

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More negative worrisome thoughts have more words in GAD and more images in controls.

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Thinking in words is associated with reduced cardiac reactivity during worry.

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Verbal, abstract, and negative features of worry have unique neural correlates.

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Amygdala functional connectivity mediates use of words and HR decrease during worry.

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A neurobiological basis for the impact of verbal worry on HR in GAD is provided.