Is the self special in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex? An fMRI study

Dissociating neural sensitivity to target identity and mental state content type during inferences about other minds

Predicting and inferring what other people think and feel (mentalizing) is central to social interaction. Since the discovery of the brain's "mentalizing network", fMRI studies have probed the lines along which the activity of different regions in this network converges and dissociates. Here, we use fMRI meta-analysis to aggregate across the stimuli, paradigms, and contrasts from past studies in order to definitively test two sources of possible sensitivity among brain regions of this network with particular theoretical relevance. First, it has been proposed that mentalizing processes depend on aspects of target identity (whose mind is considered), with self-projection or simulation strategies engaging disproportionately for psychologically close targets. Second, it has been proposed that mentalizing processes depend on content type (what the inference is), with inferences about epistemic mental states (e.g. beliefs and knowledge) engaging different processes than mentalizing about other types of content (e.g. emotions or preferences). Overall, evidence supports the conclusion that different mentalizing regions are sensitive to target identity and content type, respectively, but with some points of divergence from previous claims. Results point to fruitful directions for future studies, with implications for theories of mentalizing.

Similarity in activity and laterality patterns in the angular gyrus during autobiographical memory retrieval and self-referential processing

Long-term memory is arguably one of the key cognitive functions. At the neural level, the lateral parietal cortex and the angular gyrus, particularly in the left hemisphere, exhibit strong activations during autobiographical and episodic memory retrieval. In a separate sub-field, left-lateralized activations of the angular gyrus are also found during self-referential processing, defined as higher activity when a trait term is judged by participants as being related to them vs. related to someone else. The question is whether episodic/autobiographical memory retrieval and self-referential processing effects are related. In the present study, thirty participants participated in the fMRI study with two separate experiments: autobiographical memory retrieval (Experiment 1) and self-referential processing (Experiment 2). In a series of analyses, including the most critical spatial correlation analysis between experiments, we found neural similarity between autobiographical memory retrieval and self-referential processing. Given that self-referential processing was identified in a selective way, the most plausible interpretation of our findings is that self-referential processing might partly explain the activation of the left angular gyrus during autobiographical memory retrieval. Our results are in line with the seminal view of Endel Tulving that the sense of self is a fundamental attribute of long-term memory recollection. However, it should be emphasized that: a) our results do not imply that the left angular gyrus is not involved in the retrieval of episodic memory details; and b) given that our experiment included an autobiographical memory task, generalization of our results to the episodic memory laboratory tasks has yet to be tested.

Looking into a Deluded Brain through a Neuroimaging Lens

Delusions are irrational, tenacious, and incorrigible false beliefs that are the most common symptom of a range of brain disorders including schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, and Parkinson's disease. In the case of schizophrenia and other primary delusional disorders, their appearance is often how the disorder is first detected and can be sufficient for diagnosis. At this time, not much is known about the brain dysfunctions leading to delusions, and hindering our understanding is that the complexity of the nature of delusions, and their very unique relevance to the human experience has hampered elucidation of their underlying neurobiology using either patients or animal models. Advances in neuroimaging along with improved psychiatric and cognitive modeling offers us a new opportunity to look with more investigative power into the deluded brain. In this article, based on data obtained from neuroimaging studies, we have attempted to draw a picture of the neural networks involved when delusion is present and evaluate whether different manifestations of delusions engage different regions of the brain.

Individual differences in envy experienced through perspective-taking involves functional connectivity of the superior frontal gyrus

Envy is the painful or resentful awareness of another’s advantage combined with a desire to possess that same advantage. Recent neuroscientific research has begun to shed light on the brain regions that process the experience of envy, including regions of the prefrontal cortex involved in emotional processing and social cognition. It is still unclear, however, which regions of the brain are functionally connected during the experience of envy. We recorded functional neuroimaging data while inducing simulated envy in participants, experienced through a perspective-taking hypothetical scenario task. In this task, participants took the perspective of a protagonist portrayed in a written description and compared themselves to either i) a self-similar/superior individual, ii) a self-dissimilar/superior individual, or iii) a self-dissimilar/average individual. During each comparison, participants also reported how much envy they experienced while taking the protagonists perspective. We demonstrate an inverse relationship in the connectivity of the left superior frontal gyrus to both the right supramarginal gyrus and the precuneus with respect to self-reported envy ratings across participants. In other words, we show that the greater the functional connectivity that the left superior frontal gyrus shares with the right supramarginal gyrus and precuneus, the less reported envy a participant experiences. Overall, our results are in line with previous research implicating the superior frontal gyrus in the reappraisal of negative emotions and extend these findings by showing this region is also involved in modulating the simulated experience of the social comparative, negative emotion of envy.

Altered neural basis of self-reflective processing in schizophrenia: An fMRI study

BACKGROUND

Impaired self-awareness has often been described in schizophrenia. Recent neuroimaging studies examining the self-reflection processes in schizophrenia have produced inconsistent results.

METHOD

We examined the self-reflective neural network using self- and other-evaluation tasks in schizophrenia. Fifteen schizophrenia patients and fifteen age- and sex-matched healthy subjects underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjects were required to decide whether the sentence described their own personal trait (self-evaluation) and that of their close friends (other-evaluation).

RESULTS

Unlike normal control subjects, the schizophrenia patients did not have greater activation of the left posterior cingulate gyrus and hippocampus during self-evaluation than during other-evaluation. On the other hand, the schizophrenia patients had higher activation of the right superior frontal and right supramarginal gyri during self-evaluation than control subjects. Only the patient group exhibited hyperactivation in the left hippocampus and right external capsule associated with the other-evaluation task.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings provide evidence for an altered neural basis of self-reflective processing, which may underlie the self-awareness deficits in schizophrenia.

Change in emotional self-concept following socio-cognitive training relates to structural plasticity of the prefrontal cortex

INTRODUCTION

Self-referential processing is a key component of the emotional self-concept. Previous studies have shown that emotional self-referential processing is related to structure and function of cortical midline areas such as medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and that it can be altered on a behavioral level by specific mental training practices. However, it remains unknown how behavioral training-related change in emotional self-concept content relates to structural plasticity.

METHODS

To address this issue, we examined the relationship between training-induced change in participant's emotional self-concept measured through emotional word use in the Twenty Statement Test and change in cortical thickness in the context of a large-scale longitudinal mental training study called the ReSource Project.

RESULTS

Based on prior behavioral findings showing increased emotional word use particularly after socio-cognitive training targeting perspective-taking capacities, this study extended these results by revealing that individual differences in the degree to which participants changed their emotional self-concept after training was positively related to cortical thickness change in right mPFC extending to dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). Furthermore, increased self-related negative emotional word use after training was positively associated with cortical thickness change in left pars orbitalis and bilateral dlPFC.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings reveal training-related structural brain change in regions known to be involved in self-referential processing and cognitive control, and could indicate a relationship between restructuring of the emotional self-concept content as well as reappraisal of negative aspects and cortical thickness change. As such, our findings can guide the development of psychological interventions targeted to alter specific facets of the self-concept.

Toward a Neuroscience of Adult Cognitive Developmental Theory

Piaget's genetic epistemology has provided the constructivist approach upon which child developmental theories were founded, in that infants are thought to progress through distinct cognitive stages until they reach maturity in their early 20's. However, it is now well established that cognition continues to develop after early adulthood, and several “neo-Piagetian” theories have emerged in an attempt to better characterize adult cognitive development. For example, Kegan's Constructive Developmental Theory (CDT) argues that the thought processes used by adults to construct their reality change over time, and reaching higher stages of cognitive development entails becoming objectively aware of emotions and beliefs that were previously in the realm of the subconscious. In recent years, neuroscience has shown a growing interest in the biological substrates and neural mechanisms encompassing adult cognitive development, because psychological and psychiatric disorders can arise from deficiencies therein. In this article, we will use Kegan's CDT as a framework to discuss adult cognitive development in relation to closely correlated existing constructs underlying social processing, such as the perception of self and others. We will review the functional imaging and electrophysiologic evidence behind two key concepts relating to these posited developmental changes. These include self-related processing, a field that distinguishes between having conscious experiences (“being a self”) and being aware of oneself having conscious experiences (“being aware of being a self”); and theory of mind, which is the objective awareness of possessing mental states such as beliefs and desires (i.e., having a “mind”) and the understanding that others possess mental states that can be different from one's own. We shall see that cortical midline structures, including the medial prefrontal cortex and cingulate gyrus, as well as the temporal lobe, are associated with psychological tasks that test these models. In addition, we will review computational modeling approaches to cognitive development, and show how mathematical modeling can provide insights into how sometimes continuous changes in the neural processing substrate can give rise to relatively discrete developmental stages. Because deficiencies in adult cognitive development can result in disorders such as autism and depression, bridging the gaps between developmental psychology, neuroscience, and modeling has potential implications for clinical practice. As neuromodulation techniques such as deep brain and transcranial stimulation continue to advance, interfacing with these systems may lead to the emergence of novel investigational methods and therapeutic strategies in adults suffering from developmental disorders.

Unisensory and multisensory Self-referential stimulation of the lower limb: An exploratory fMRI study on healthy subjects

BACKGROUND

The holistic view of the person is the essence of the physiotherapy. Knowledge of approaches that develop the whole person promotes better patient outcomes. Multisensory Self-referential stimulation, more than a unisensory one, seems to produce a holistic experience of the Self ("Core-Self").

OBJECTIVES

(1) To analyze the somatotopic brain activation during unisensory and multisensorial Self-referential stimulus; and (2) to understand if the areas activated by multisensorial Self-referential stimulation are the ones responsible for the "Core-Self."

METHODS

An exploratory functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study was performed with 10 healthy subjects, under the stimulation of the lower limbs with three Self-referential stimuli: unisensory auditory-verbal, unisensory tactile-manual, and multisensory, applying the unisensory stimuli simultaneously.

RESULTS

Unisensory stimulation elicits bilateral activations of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), of the primary somatosensory cortex (S1), of the primary motor cortex (BA4), of the premotor cortex (BA6) and of BA44; multisensory stimulation also elicits activity in TPJ, BA4, and BA6, and when compared with unisensory stimuli, activations were found in: (1) Cortical and subcortical midline structures-BA7 (precuneus), BA9 (medial prefrontal cortex), BA30 (posterior cingulated), superior colliculum and posterior cerebellum; and (2) Posterior lateral cortex-TPJ, posterior BA13 (insula), BA19, and BA37. Bilateral TPJ is the one that showed the biggest activation volume.

CONCLUSION

This specific multisensory stimulation produces a brain activation map in regions that are responsible for multisensory Self-processing and may represent the Core-Self. We recommend the use of this specific multisensory stimulation as a physiotherapy intervention strategy that might promote the Self-reorganization.

How Much We Think of Ourselves and How Little We Think of Others: An Investigation of the Neuronal Signature of Self-Consciousness between Different Personality Traits through an Event-Related Potential Study

BACKGROUND

Previous studies have revealed that self-related tasks (items) receive more attention than non-self-related, and that they elicit event-related potential (ERP) components with larger amplitudes. Since personality has been reported as one of the biological correlates influencing these components, as well as our behavioural differences, it is important to examine how it affects our self-consciousness in relation to tasks of varied relevance and the neurological basis.

METHODS

A total of 33 male and female undergraduate Malaysian medical students of Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) participated in the study. The participants were divided into two groups, Ambivert (n = 18) and Extravert (n = 15) groups, using the USM personality inventory questionnaire. In the ERP experiment, squares containing standard stimuli of any word other than self and non-self-related nouns (e.g., Bola, Gigi, Anak, etc.; in English: Ball, Teeth, Kids, etc., respectively), those containing self-related pronouns (Saya, Kami or Kita; in English: I, Us or We, respectively), and non-self-related pronouns (Dia, Anda or Mereka; in English: He/She, You or They, respectively), were shown 58%, 21% and 21% of the time, respectively, in a three-stimulus visual oddball paradigm. All words were presented in Bahasa Melayu. The participants were instructed to press 1 for self and 2 for non-self, and ignore standard stimuli.

RESULTS

Comparison of both N200 and P300 amplitudes for self-related and non-self-related pronouns in the Extravert group revealed significant differences at seven electrode sites, with self-related having larger amplitude at anterior electrodes and less at posterior. This was not seen in the Ambivert group.

CONCLUSION

The present study suggests that self-relevant pronouns are psychologically more important to extraverts than to ambiverts; hence, they have more self-awareness. This may be due to large amount of dopamine in the brains of extraverts, which is more concentrated in the frontal lobe.

The relationship between self-referential processing-related brain activity and anhedonia in patients with schizophrenia

Despite the possible relationship between impaired self-referential processing and anhedonia, it has not yet been investigated. This study investigated an abnormality in brain activation associated with self-referential processing and its relationship with anhedonia in schizophrenia, specifically in self-related brain regions of interest. Twenty patients with schizophrenia and 25 controls underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while rating the degree of relevance between faces (self, familiar other, or unfamiliar other) and words (positive, negative, or neutral). Brain activation in self-related regions, including the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortices, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, and insula, were compared between groups and their correlations with anhedonia level were calculated. Compared to controls, patients were less likely to rate negative words as irrelevant for the self face. Patients showed significantly increased activation in the ACC and precuneus compared to controls, irrespective of conditions. ACC activity in the self-neutral word condition was positively correlated with anhedonia score in patients. These results suggest that patients with schizophrenia may have an abnormality in the self-related cortical midline structures and particularly, abnormal ACC activation may be involved in anhedonia. Disrupted self-referential processing may be a possible cause of anhedonia in schizophrenia.

Functional neuroimaging correlates of thinking flexibility and knowledge structure in memory: Exploring the relationships between clinical reasoning and diagnostic thinking

BACKGROUND

Diagnostic reasoning involves the thinking steps up to and including arrival at a diagnosis. Dual process theory posits that a physician's thinking is based on both non-analytic or fast, subconscious thinking and analytic thinking that is slower, more conscious, effortful and characterized by comparing and contrasting alternatives. Expertise in clinical reasoning may relate to the two dimensions measured by the diagnostic thinking inventory (DTI): memory structure and flexibility in thinking.

AIM

Explored the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) correlates of these two aspects of the DTI: memory structure and flexibility of thinking.

METHODS

Participants answered and reflected upon multiple-choice questions (MCQs) during fMRI. A DTI was completed shortly after the scan. The brain processes associated with the two dimensions of the DTI were correlated with fMRI phases - assessing flexibility in thinking during analytical clinical reasoning, memory structure during non-analytical clinical reasoning and the total DTI during both non-analytical and analytical reasoning in experienced physicians.

RESULTS

Each DTI component was associated with distinct functional neuroanatomic activation patterns, particularly in the prefrontal cortex.

CONCLUSION

Our findings support diagnostic thinking conceptual models and indicate mechanisms through which cognitive demands may induce functional adaptation within the prefrontal cortex. This provides additional objective validity evidence for the use of the DTI in medical education and practice settings.

Brain Metabolic Dysfunction in Capgras Delusion During Alzheimer's Disease: A Positron Emission Tomography Study

Capgras delusion is characterized by the misidentification of people and by the delusional belief that the misidentified persons have been replaced by impostors, generally perceived as persecutors. Since little is known regarding the neural correlates of Capgras syndrome, the cerebral metabolic pattern of a patient with probable Alzheimer's disease (AD) and Capgras syndrome was compared with those of 24-healthy elderly participants and 26 patients with AD without delusional syndrome. Comparing the healthy group with the AD group, the patient with AD had significant hypometabolism in frontal and posterior midline structures. In the light of current neural models of face perception, our patients with Capgras syndrome may be related to impaired recognition of a familiar face, subserved by the posterior cingulate/precuneus cortex, and impaired reflection about personally relevant knowledge related to a face, subserved by the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.

Social cognition and the cerebellum: A meta-analytic connectivity analysis

This meta-analytic connectivity modeling (MACM) study explores the functional connectivity of the cerebellum with the cerebrum in social cognitive processes. In a recent meta-analysis, Van Overwalle, Baetens, Mariën, and Vandekerckhove (2014) documented that the cerebellum is implicated in social processes of "body" reading (mirroring; e.g., understanding other persons' intentions from observing their movements) and "mind" reading (mentalizing, e.g., inferring other persons' beliefs, intentions or personality traits, reconstructing persons' past, future, or hypothetical events). In a recent functional connectivity study, Buckner et al. (2011) offered a novel parcellation of cerebellar topography that substantially overlaps with the cerebellar meta-analytic findings of Van Overwalle et al. (2014). This overlap suggests that the involvement of the cerebellum in social reasoning depends on its functional connectivity with the cerebrum. To test this hypothesis, we explored the meta-analytic co-activations as indices of functional connectivity between the cerebellum and the cerebrum during social cognition. The MACM results confirm substantial and distinct connectivity with respect to the functions of (a) action understanding ("body" reading) and (b) mentalizing ("mind" reading). The consistent and strong connectivity findings of this analysis suggest that cerebellar activity during social judgments reflects distinct mirroring and mentalizing functionality, and that these cerebellar functions are connected with corresponding functional networks in the cerebrum.

Neural correlates of the self-reference effect: evidence from evaluation and recognition processes

The self-reference effect (SRE) is defined as better recall or recognition performance when the memorized materials refer to the self. Recently, a number of neuroimaging studies using self-referential and other-referential tasks have reported that self- and other-referential judgments basically show greater activation in common brain regions, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) when compared with nonmentalizing judgments, but that a ventral-to-dorsal gradient in MPFC emerges from a direct comparison between self- and other-judgments. However, most of these previous studies could not provide an adequate explanation for the neural basis of SRE because they did not directly compare brain activation for recognition/recall of the words referenced to the self with another person. Here, we used an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that measured brain activity during processing of references to the self and another, and for recognition of self and other referenced words. Results from the fMRI evaluation task indicated greater activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in the self-referential condition. While in the recognition task, VMPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and bilateral angular gyrus (AG) showed greater activation when participants correctly recognized self-referenced words versus other-referenced words. These data provide evidence that the self-referenced words evoked greater activation in the self-related region (VMPFC) and memory-related regions (PCC and AG) relative to another person in the retrieval phase, and that the words remained as a stronger memory trace that supports recognition.

Neural basis of nonanalytical reasoning expertise during clinical evaluation

INTRODUCTION

Understanding clinical reasoning is essential for patient care and medical education. Dual-processing theory suggests that nonanalytic reasoning is an essential aspect of expertise; however, assessing nonanalytic reasoning is challenging because it is believed to occur on the subconscious level. This assumption makes concurrent verbal protocols less reliable assessment tools.

METHODS

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to explore the neural basis of nonanalytic reasoning in internal medicine interns (novices) and board-certified staff internists (experts) while completing United States Medical Licensing Examination and American Board of Internal Medicine multiple-choice questions.

RESULTS

The results demonstrated that novices and experts share a common neural network in addition to nonoverlapping neural resources. However, experts manifested greater neural processing efficiency in regions such as the prefrontal cortex during nonanalytical reasoning.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings reveal a multinetwork system that supports the dual-process mode of expert clinical reasoning during medical evaluation.

Functional connectivity mapping of regions associated with self- and other-processing

Neuroscience literature increasingly suggests a conceptual self composed of interacting neural regions, rather than independent local activations, yet such claims have yet to be investigated. We, thus, combined task-dependent meta-analytic connectivity modeling (MACM) with task-independent resting-state (RS) connectivity analysis to delineate the neural network of the self, across both states. Given psychological evidence implicating the self's interdependence on social information, we also delineated the neural network underlying conceptual other-processing. To elucidate the relation between the self-/other-networks and their function, we mined the MACM metadata to generate a cognitive-behavioral profile for an empirically identified region specific to conceptual self, the pregenual anterior cingulate (pACC), and conceptual other, posterior cingulate/precuneus (PCC/PC). Mining of 7,200 published, task-dependent, neuroimaging studies, using healthy human subjects, yielded 193 studies activating the self-related seed and were conjoined with RS connectivity analysis to delineate a differentiated self-network composed of the pACC (seed) and anterior insula, relative to other functional connectivity. Additionally, 106 studies activating the other-related seed were conjoined with RS connectivity analysis to delineate a differentiated other-network of PCC/PC (seed) and angular gyrus/temporoparietal junction, relative to self-functional connectivity. The self-network seed related to emotional conflict resolution and motivational processing, whereas the other-network seed related to socially oriented processing and contextual information integration. Notably, our findings revealed shared RS connectivity between ensuing self-/other-networks within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and medial orbitofrontal cortex, suggesting self-updating via integration of self-relevant social information. We, therefore, present initial neurobiological evidence corroborating the increasing claims of an intricate self-network, the architecture of which may promote social value processing.

Incidental self-processing modulates the interaction of emotional valence and arousal

The middle insula has been associated with incidental self-processing of negative information elicited by individual's handwriting. However, emotional valence and arousal have been proved to work in an interactive way and located in middle insula. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study used participant's handwritings as material to explore how incidental self-processing affected the interaction of valence and arousal and its neural basis. Each participant was asked to read silently emotional and neutral words written by himself/herself or the other person. The right middle insula as well as the left putamen showed greater activations in response to emotional stimuli evoking conflicting approach-withdrawal tendencies (i.e., positive high-arousal and negative low-arousal words) relative to stimuli evoking congruent approach versus withdrawal tendencies (i.e., positive low-arousal and negative high-arousal words), whereas a reverse activation pattern in these two regions was observed during processing other-handwriting. The current study indicated that incidental self-processing modulates the interaction of emotional valence and arousal.

When do negative and positive emotions modulate working memory performance?

The present study investigated when emotion modulates working memory from the perspective of neural activation. Using fMRI, we measured brain activity during the encoding and retrieval phases of a reading span test (RST) that used emotional contexts. The emotional RST required participants to read sentences that elicited negative, neural or positive emotional states while they were memorizing target words from the sentences. Compared with the neutral RST, the negative RST activated the right amygdala during the reading phase. Significant activation was also found in the parahippocampal gyrus, albeit only after activation of the amygdala became comparable to that in the neutral RST. In contrast, the positive RST activated the substantia nigra during the reading phase relative to the neutral RST. These findings suggest that negative and positive emotions modulate working memory through distinctive neural circuits. We also discuss possible relationships between emotional modulation and working memory capacity.

Medial prefrontal cortex dissociation between self and others in a referential task: an fMRI study based on word traits

A number of recent neuroimaging studies using self referential tasks have investigated whether self referential processing depends on a unique neural basis that operates specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex. However, these studies have provided contradictory results despite the use of similar methodologies. We hypothesized that these discrepancies are partially related to the task-difficulty that presents dissociations reaction times in the self- and other-referential tasks. We therefore measured brain activity during self and other referential tasks to determine if such activity can be dissociated according to the reaction times (fast versus slow) for the trait words. Activation differed across self and other only in the slow word condition. The self referential condition with slow reaction time produced greater activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whereas the other referential condition with slow reaction time produced activation of the middle temporal gyrus. Results suggested that the task-difficulty might affect whether or not brain activities within MPFC would be dissociated between self- and other-referential processing.

Social cognition and the cerebellum: a meta-analysis of over 350 fMRI studies

This meta-analysis explores the role of the cerebellum in social cognition. Recent meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies since 2008 demonstrate that the cerebellum is only marginally involved in social cognition and emotionality, with a few meta-analyses pointing to an involvement of at most 54% of the individual studies. In this study, novel meta-analyses of over 350 fMRI studies, dividing up the domain of social cognition in homogeneous subdomains, confirmed this low involvement of the cerebellum in conditions that trigger the mirror network (e.g., when familiar movements of body parts are observed) and the mentalizing network (when no moving body parts or unfamiliar movements are present). There is, however, one set of mentalizing conditions that strongly involve the cerebellum in 50-100% of the individual studies. In particular, when the level of abstraction is high, such as when behaviors are described in terms of traits or permanent characteristics, in terms of groups rather than individuals, in terms of the past (episodic autobiographic memory) or the future rather than the present, or in terms of hypothetical events that may happen. An activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis conducted in this study reveals that the cerebellum is critically implicated in social cognition and that the areas of the cerebellum which are consistently involved in social cognitive processes show extensive overlap with the areas involved in sensorimotor (during mirror and self-judgments tasks) as well as in executive functioning (across all tasks). We discuss the role of the cerebellum in social cognition in general and in higher abstraction mentalizing in particular. We also point out a number of methodological limitations of some available studies on the social brain that hamper the detection of cerebellar activity.

Cortical midline structures and autobiographical-self processes: an activation-likelihood estimation meta-analysis

The autobiographical-self refers to a mental state derived from the retrieval and assembly of memories regarding one’s biography. The process of retrieval and assembly, which can focus on biographical facts or personality traits or some combination thereof, is likely to vary according to the domain chosen for an experiment. To date, the investigation of the neural basis of this process has largely focused on the domain of personality traits using paradigms that contrasted the evaluation of one’s traits (self-traits) with those of another person’s (other-traits). This has led to the suggestion that cortical midline structures (CMSs) are specifically related to self states. Here, with the goal of testing this suggestion, we conducted activation-likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses based on data from 28 neuroimaging studies. The ALE results show that both self-traits and other-traits engage CMSs; however, the engagement of medial prefrontal cortex is greater for self-traits than for other-traits, while the posteromedial cortex is more engaged for other-traits than for self-traits. These findings suggest that the involvement CMSs is not specific to the evaluation of one’s own traits, but also occurs during the evaluation of another person’s traits.

A Philosophical Perspective on the Relation between Cortical Midline Structures and the Self

In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures (CMSs) is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self (i.e., being a subject of conscious experience) and being aware of being a self (i.e., being able to think about oneself as such). While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to explicitly represent one's own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between being aware of oneself "as subject" and being aware of oneself "as object." The focus of existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability to think about oneself (and in particular thinking of oneself "as object"), while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms.

A Philosophical Perspective on the Relation between Cortical Midline Structures and the Self

In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures (CMSs) is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self (i.e., being a subject of conscious experience) and being aware of being a self (i.e., being able to think about oneself as such). While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to explicitly represent one's own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between being aware of oneself "as subject" and being aware of oneself "as object." The focus of existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability to think about oneself (and in particular thinking of oneself "as object"), while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms.

Self-related processing and deactivation of cortical midline regions in disorders of consciousness

Self-related stimuli activate anterior parts of cortical midline regions, which normally show task-induced deactivation. Deactivation in medial posterior and frontal regions is associated with the ability to focus attention on the demands of the task, and therefore, with consciousness. Studies investigating patients with impaired consciousness, that is, patients in minimally conscious state and patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (formerly vegetative state), demonstrate that these patients show responses to self-related content in the anterior cingulate cortex. However, it remains unclear if these responses are an indication for conscious processing of stimuli or are due to automatic processing. To shed further light on this issue, we investigated responses of cortical midline regions to the own and another name in 27 patients with a disorder of consciousness and compared them to task-induced deactivation. While almost all of the control subjects responding to the own name demonstrated higher activation due to the self-related content in anterior midline regions and additional deactivation, none of the responding patients did so. Differences between groups showed a similar pattern of findings. Despite the relation between behavioral responsiveness in patients and activation in response to the own name, the findings of this study do not provide evidence for a direct association of activation in anterior midline regions and conscious processing. The deficits in processing of self-referential content in anterior midline regions may rather be due to general impairments in cognitive processing and not particularly linked to impaired consciousness.

Self-specific stimuli interact differently than non-self-specific stimuli with eyes-open versus eyes-closed spontaneous activity in auditory cortex

Previous studies suggest that there may be a distinct relationship between spontaneous neural activity and subsequent or concurrent self-specific stimulus-induced activity. This study aims to test the impact of spontaneous activity as recorded in an eyes-open (EO) resting state as opposed to eyes-closed (EC) on self-specific versus non-self-specific auditory stimulus-induced activity in fMRI. In our first experiment we used self-specific stimuli comprised of the subject's own name and non-self-specific stimuli comprised of a friend's name and an unknown name, presented during EO versus EC baselines in a 3 name condition × 2 baseline design. In Experiment 2 we directly measured spontaneous activity in the absence of stimuli during EO versus EC to confirm a modulatory effect of the two baseline conditions in the regions found to show an interaction effect in Experiment 1. Spontaneous activity during EO was significantly higher than during EC in bilateral auditory cortex and non-self-specific names yielded stronger signal changes relative to EO baseline than to EC. In contrast, there was no difference in response to self-specific names relative to EO baseline than to EC despite the difference between spontaneous activity levels. These results support an impact of spontaneous activity on stimulus-induced activity, moreover an impact that depends on the high-level stimulus characteristic of self-specificity.

Acquired brain injury: combining social psychological and neuropsychological perspectives

This theoretical paper reviews an emerging literature which attempts to bring together an important area of social psychology and neuropsychology. The paper presents a rationale for the integration of the social identity and clinical neuropsychological approaches in the study of acquired brain injury (ABI). The paper begins by reviewing the social and neuropsychological perspectives of ABI. Subsequently, theoretical and empirical studies that demonstrate the social influences on neuropsychology and the inherently social nature of mind are considered. Neuropsychological understandings of social identities and their potential relationships to the variability in ABIs are also discussed. The values of these understandings to ABI rehabilitation are then examined. The paper concludes by suggesting an agenda for future research that integrates the social identity and neuropsychological paradigms so that psychology might grow in its store of applicable knowledge to enhance support and rehabilitation for those with ABI.

Self-reflection and the inner voice: activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus during perceptual and conceptual self-referential thinking

Inner speech involvement in self-reflection was examined by reviewing 130 studies assessing brain activation during self-referential processing in key self-domains: agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality traits, autobiographical memory, and miscellaneous (e.g., prospection, judgments). The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) has been shown to be reliably recruited during inner speech production. The percentage of studies reporting LIFG activity for each self-dimension was calculated. Fifty five percent of all studies reviewed indicated LIFG (and presumably inner speech) activity during self-reflection tasks; on average LIFG activation is observed 16% of the time during completion of non-self tasks (e.g., attention, perception). The highest LIFG activation rate was observed during retrieval of autobiographical information. The LIFG was significantly more recruited during conceptual tasks (e.g., prospection, traits) than during perceptual tasks (agency and self-recognition). This constitutes additional evidence supporting the idea of a participation of inner speech in self-related thinking.

Cross-modal pattern of brain activations associated with the processing of self- and significant other's name

Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that the patterns of brain activity during the processing of personally relevant names (e.g., own name, friend's name, partner's name, etc.) and the names of famous people (e.g., celebrities) are different. However, it is not known how the activity in this network is influenced by the modality of the presented stimuli. In this fMRI study, we investigated the pattern of brain activations during the recognition of aurally and visually presented full names of the subject, a significant other, a famous person and unknown individuals. In both modalities, we found that the processing of self-name and the significant other's name was associated with increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Acoustic presentations of these names also activated bilateral inferior frontal gyri (IFG). This pattern of results supports the role of MPFC in the processing of personally relevant information, irrespective of their modality.

Neuroimaging self-esteem: a fMRI study of individual differences in women

Although neuroimaging studies strongly implicate the medial prefrontal cortex (ventral and dorsal), cingulate gyrus (anterior and posterior), precuneus and temporoparietal cortex in mediating self-referential processing (SRP), little is known about the neural bases mediating individual differences in valenced SRP, that is, processes intrinsic to self-esteem. This study investigated the neural correlates of experimentally engendered valenced SRP via the Visual–Verbal Self-Other Referential Processing Task in 20 women with fMRI. Participants viewed pictures of themselves or unknown other women during separate trials while covertly rehearsing ‘I am’ or ‘She is’, followed by reading valenced trait adjectives, thus variably associating the self/other with positivity/negativity. Response within dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex and left temporoparietal cortex varied with individual differences in both pre-task rated self-descriptiveness of the words, as well as task-induced affective responses. Results are discussed as they relate to a social cognitive and affective neuroscience view of self-esteem.

Neural correlates of self-reflection in post-traumatic stress disorder

OBJECTIVE

Disturbances in self-referential processing (SRP) are increasingly recognized in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In healthy adults, SRP tasks engage the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) brain regions that have shown altered function in PTSD. We hypothesized that individuals with PTSD would differ from controls in functional activation of the MPFC and PCC during SRP.

METHOD

We compared neural activation in healthy controls (n = 15) and participants with PTSD (n = 20) during a SRP task, using fMRI at 4.0T.

RESULTS

Controls made faster responses to the self-relevance of personal characteristics than to the accuracy of general facts, whereas response times did not differ between these conditions in PTSD. Controls also demonstrated greater MPFC (dorsal and ventral) and PCC response when considering the self-relevance of personal characteristics in comparison with the accuracy of general facts. Individuals with PTSD demonstrated less MPFC response than did healthy controls for the contrast of self-relevance of personal characteristics relative to general facts.

CONCLUSIONS

These results implicate MPFC in SRP disturbances associated with PTSD. These findings are relevant to current proposals for including symptoms of negative self-referential cognition and identity-existential disturbance as diagnostically relevant to PTSD.

Putting together phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives on empathy

The ontogeny of human empathy is better understood with reference to the evolutionary history of the social brain. Empathy has deep evolutionary, biochemical, and neurological underpinnings. Even the most advanced forms of empathy in humans are built on more basic forms and remain connected to core mechanisms associated with affective communication, social attachment, and parental care. In this paper, we argue that it is essential to consider empathy within a neurodevelopmental framework that recognizes both the continuities and changes in socioemotional understanding from infancy to adulthood. We bring together neuroevolutionary and developmental perspectives on the information processing and neural mechanisms underlying empathy and caring, and show that they are grounded in multiple interacting systems and processes. Moreover, empathy in humans is assisted by other abstract and domain-general high-level cognitive abilities such as executive functions, mentalizing and language, as well as the ability to differentiate another's mental states from one's own, which expand the range of behaviors that can be driven by empathy.

First-person perspective effects on theory of mind without self-reference

This study examined dissociations between brain networks involved in theory of mind, which is needed for guessing others' mental states, and the self, which might constitute the basis for theory of mind's development. We used event-related fMRI to compare a condition that required participants to guess the mental state of a subject featured in first-person perspective sentences (1stPP condition) with a third-person perspective sentence condition (3rdPP condition). The caudate nucleus was marginally more activated in the 1stPP than in the 3rdPP condition, while the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was significantly more activated in the 3rdPP condition as compared to the 1stPP condition. Furthermore, we examined the correlation between activation (signal intensity) of the caudate nucleus and left DLPFC with that of the right DLPFC, which is thought to be closely connected with sense of self. We found a significant correlation between caudate nucleus and right DLPFC activation in the 1stPP condition, and between left and right DLPFC activation in the 3rdPP condition. Although theory of mind and the self both appear to recruit the right DLPFC, this region seems to be accessed through the left DLPFC during theory of mind tasks, but through the caudate nucleus when tasks require self reference.

Dissociation between anterior and posterior cortical regions during self-specificity and familiarity: a combined fMRI-meta-analytic study

The familiarity to the subject of any potential stimuli presents one of the major difficulties for the investigation of the self; the separation of effects resulting from familiarity from self-effects being extremely problematic. The aim of this study was thus to investigate the neural distinction between self and familiarity by combining two sets of fMRI data with a meta-analysis. In the first fMRI experiment, regions responding to self/familiarity were investigated using the subject's own name and names of familiar others. These effects were confirmed and extended in a second fMRI experiment using the subject's own name and a stranger's name, as spoken by familiar and unfamiliar voices. Finally, a meta-analysis of self- and familiarity-related studies was conducted. Neural activity in the anterior brain regions, such as the anterior cingulate (ACC) and anterior insula (AI), was found to be specific for self-specific stimuli. In contrast, posterior brain regions, such as the posterior cingulate, were activated by familiar stimuli. Finally, the distinction between anterior and posterior regions for self and familiarity was confirmed by meta-analytic data. This study demonstrates a clear anterior-posterior cortical partition between self-specificity and familiarity.

Social neuroscience: challenges and opportunities in the study of complex behavior

Social species are so characterized because they form organizations that extend beyond the individual. The goal of social neuroscience is to investigate the biological mechanisms that underlie these social structures, processes, and behavior and the influences between social and neural structures and processes. Such an endeavor is challenging because it necessitates the integration of multiple levels. Mapping across systems and levels (from genome to social groups and cultures) requires interdisciplinary expertise, comparative studies, innovative methods, and integrative conceptual analysis. Examples of how social neuroscience is contributing to our understanding of the functions of the brain and nervous system are described, and societal implications of social neuroscience are considered.

Is it about the self or the significance? An fMRI study of self-name recognition

Our own name, due to its high social relevance, is supposed to have a unique status in our information processing. However, demonstrating this phenomenon empirically proves difficult as famous and unknown names, to which self-name is often compared in the studies, may differ from self-name not only in terms of the 'me vs. not-me' distinction, but also as regards their emotional content and frequency of occurrence in everyday life. In this fMRI study, apart from famous and unknown names we used the names of the most important persons in our subjects' lives. When compared to famous or unknown names recognition, self-name recognition was associated with robust activations in widely distributed bilateral network including fronto-temporal, limbic and subcortical structures, however, when compared to significant other's name, the activations were present specifically in the right inferior frontal gyrus. In addition, the significant other's name produced a similar pattern of activations to the one activated by self-name. These results suggest that the differences between own and other's name processing may rather be quantitative than qualitative in nature.