The second agent effect: Interpersonal predictive coding in people with schizophrenia

The effect of anxiety and its interplay with social cues when perceiving aggressive behaviours

Contextual cues and emotional states carry expectations and biases that are used to attribute meaning to what we see. In addition, emotional states, such as anxiety, shape our visual systems, increasing overall, and particularly threat-related, sensitivity. It remains unclear, however, how anxiety interacts with additional cues when categorising sensory input. This is especially important in social scenarios where ambiguous gestures are commonplace, thus requiring the integration of cues for a proper interpretation. To this end, we decided to assess how states of anxiety might bias the perception of potentially aggressive social interactions, and how external cues are incorporated in this process. Participants (N = 71) were tasked with signalling the presence of aggression in ambiguous social interactions. Simultaneously, an observer (facial expression) reacted (by showing an emotional expression) to this interaction. Importantly, participants performed this task under safety and threat of shock conditions. Decision measures and eye-tracking data were collected. Our results showed that threat of shock did not affect sensitivity nor criterion when detecting aggressive interactions. The same pattern was observed for response times. Drift diffusion modelling analysis, however, suggested quicker evidence accumulation when under threat. Finally, dwell times over the observer were higher when under threat, indicating a possible association between anxiety states and a bias towards potentially threat-related indicators. Future probing into this topic remains a necessity to better explain the current findings.

Exploring the use of visual predictions in social scenarios while under anticipatory threat

One of the less recognized effects of anxiety lies in perception alterations caused by how one weighs both sensory evidence and contextual cues. Here, we investigated how anxiety affects our ability to use social cues to anticipate the others' actions. We adapted a paradigm to assess expectations in social scenarios, whereby participants were asked to identify the presence of agents therein, while supported by contextual cues from another agent. Participants (N = 66) underwent this task under safe and threat-of-shock conditions. We extracted both criterion and sensitivity measures as well as gaze data. Our analysis showed that whilst the type of action had the expected effect, threat-of-shock had no effect over criterion and sensitivity. Although showing similar dwell times, gaze exploration of the contextual cue was associated with shorter fixation durations whilst participants were under threat. Our findings suggest that anxiety does not appear to influence the use of expectations in social scenarios.

Two Means Together? Effects of Response Bias and Sensitivity on Communicative Action Detection

Numerous lines of research suggest that communicative dyadic actions elicit preferential processing and more accurate detection compared to similar but individual actions. However, it is unclear whether the presence of the second agent provides additional cues that allow for more accurate discriminability between communicative and individual intentions or whether it lowers the threshold for perceiving third-party encounters as interactive. We performed a series of studies comparing the recognition of communicative actions from single and dyadic displays in healthy individuals. A decreased response threshold for communicative actions was observed for dyadic vs. single-agent animations across all three studies, providing evidence for the dyadic communicative bias. Furthermore, consistent with the facilitated recognition hypothesis, congruent response to a communicative gesture increased the ability to accurately interpret the actions. In line with dual-process theory, we propose that both mechanisms may be perceived as complementary rather than competitive and affect different stages of stimuli processing.

The intentionality bias in schizotypy: a social matter

INTRODUCTION

We aimed to investigate the association between schizotypy and intentionality bias, the tendency to interpret ambiguous actions as being intentional, for social and non-social actions separately. This bias contributes to interpersonal difficulties, and has been associated with psychotic symptoms, such as delusions. However, results have been inconsistent for an association between putative psychosis proneness, schizotypy, and intentionality bias. Further, the multidimensional nature of schizotypy has not been considered. Agreeableness was measured to examine the specificity of the relationship, and inhibition to examine its potential role as a mediator.

METHODS

Two online studies are reported (n = 280 and n = 163) in which participants made intentionality judgements about ambiguous actions described in sentences. They also completed questionnaire measures of schizotypy and agreeableness, and inhibitory efficiency (a sentence completion task).

RESULTS

Schizotypy was associated with perceiving ambiguous actions as intentional, particularly in social contexts, after controlling for agreeableness. The association with social intentionality was stronger for schizotypy subscales capturing paranoia and unusual beliefs. Inhibitory efficiency as not a significant predictor of intentionality bias.

CONCLUSION

These finding suggest intentionality biases for social and non-social events are distinguishable. In relation to schizotypy, social situations appear to generate perceptions of intentionality. Intentionality bias represents a phenotypic cognitive risk for psychosis which should be further investigated.

Increased functional coupling of the left amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex during the perception of communicative point-light stimuli

Interpersonal predictive coding (IPPC) describes the behavioral phenomenon whereby seeing a communicative rather than an individual action helps to discern a masked second agent. As little is known, yet, about the neural correlates of IPPC, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in a group of 27 healthy participants using point-light displays of moving agents embedded in distractors. We discovered that seeing communicative compared to individual actions was associated with higher activation of right superior frontal gyrus, whereas the reversed contrast elicited increased neural activation in an action observation network that was activated during all trials. Our findings, therefore, potentially indicate the formation of action predictions and a reduced demand for executive control in response to communicative actions. Further, in a regression analysis, we revealed that increased perceptual sensitivity was associated with a deactivation of the left amygdala during the perceptual task. A consecutive psychophysiological interaction analysis showed increased connectivity of the amygdala with medial prefrontal cortex in the context of communicative compared to individual actions. Thus, whereas increased amygdala signaling might interfere with task-relevant processes, increased co-activation of the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex in a communicative context might represent the integration of mentalizing computations.

It Is Not Just in Faces! Processing of Emotion and Intention from Biological Motion in Psychiatric Disorders

Social neuroscience offers a wide range of techniques that may be applied to study the social cognitive deficits that may underlie reduced social functioning—a common feature across many psychiatric disorders. At the same time, a significant proportion of research in this area has been conducted using paradigms that utilize static displays of faces or eyes. The use of point-light displays (PLDs) offers a viable alternative for studying recognition of emotion or intention inference while minimizing the amount of information presented to participants. This mini-review aims to summarize studies that have used PLD to study emotion and intention processing in schizophrenia (SCZ), affective disorders, anxiety and personality disorders, eating disorders and neurodegenerative disorders. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed studies: first, the social cognitive problems found in most of the psychiatric samples using PLD were of smaller magnitude than those found in studies presenting social information using faces or voices. Second, even though the information presented in PLDs is extremely limited, presentation of these types of stimuli is sufficient to elicit the disorder-specific, social cognitive biases (e.g., mood-congruent bias in depression, increased threat perception in anxious individuals, aberrant body size perception in eating disorders) documented using other methodologies. Taken together, these findings suggest that point-light stimuli may be a useful method of studying social information processing in psychiatry. At the same time, some limitations of using this methodology are also outlined.