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Zhou S, Xu X, He X, Zhou F, Zhai Y, Chen J, Long Y, Zheng L, Lu C. Biasing the neurocognitive processing of videos with the presence of a real cultural other. Cereb Cortex 2023; 33:1090-1103. [PMID: 35348645 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhac122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2021] [Revised: 03/02/2022] [Accepted: 03/03/2022] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In the digital age, while short videos present vital events with powerful information, the presence of cultural cues may bias our processing of videos of foreign cultures. However, the underlying neurocognitive processes remain unclear. In this study, we hypothesized that cultural cues might bias video processing by either enhancing cultural perspective-taking or shifting cultural self-schema. To test these hypotheses, we used a novel paradigm in which the cultural cue was a real cultural other (the priming participants) who watched American/Chinese videos together with the primed participants. The results showed that when the cue was present, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response to videos with other cultural content was shifted, showing a priming effect. Moreover, the activity pattern in the rTPJ was more congruent with the primed culture than with the original culture, reflecting a neural biasing effect. Finally, intersubject representational similarity analysis indicated that the neural biasing effect in the rTPJ was more closely associated with cultural perspective-taking than with cultural self-schema. In summary, these findings support the perspective-taking hypothesis, suggesting that cultural cues can significantly bias our cultural mindset by altering cultural perspective-taking when we are exposed to culture-relevant naturalistic stimuli.
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Affiliation(s)
- Siyuan Zhou
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Xinran Xu
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Xiangyu He
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Faxin Zhou
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Yu Zhai
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Jinglu Chen
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Yuhang Long
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China.,Institute of Developmental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No19. Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Lifen Zheng
- Center for Teacher Education Research, Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, No19. Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
| | - Chunming Lu
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, No. 19 Xinjiekouwai Street, Beijing 100875, PR China
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Khoudary A, O'Neill K, Faul L, Murray S, Smallman R, De Brigard F. Neural differences between internal and external episodic counterfactual thoughts. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210337. [PMID: 36314151 PMCID: PMC9620758 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0337] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2022] [Accepted: 05/16/2022] [Indexed: 07/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) consist of imagining alternative outcomes to past experiences. A common sub-class of eCFT-upward eCFT-involves imagining how past negative experiences could have been better, either because one could have done something differently (internal) or because something about the circumstances could have been different (external). Although previous neuroimaging research has shown that the brain's default mode network (DMN) supports upward eCFT, it is unclear how it is differentially recruited during internal versus external upward eCFT. We collected functional magnetic resonance imaging data while participants remembered negative autobiographical memories, generated either internal or external upward eCFT for the memory, and then rated the plausibility, perceived control and difficulty of eCFT generation. Both internal and external eCFT engaged midline regions of cingulate cortex, a central node of the DMN. Most activity differentiating eCFT, however, occurred outside the DMN. External eCFT engaged cuneus, angular gyrus and precuneus, whereas internal eCFT engaged posterior cingulate and precentral gyrus. Angular gyrus and precuneus were additionally sensitive to perceived plausibility of external eCFT, while postcentral gyrus and insula activity scaled with perceived plausibility of internal eCFT. These results highlight the key brain regions that might be involved in cases of maladaptive mental simulations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ari Khoudary
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Kevin O'Neill
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Leonard Faul
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Samuel Murray
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Rachel Smallman
- Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA
| | - Felipe De Brigard
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
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More than appearance: the uncanny valley effect changes with a robot’s mental capacity. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-021-02298-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
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The Dynamic Differences between Self- and Other-Oriented Mental Inferences: An ERP Study on a False-Belief Task. COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2021; 21:960-969. [PMID: 33907991 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00899-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/04/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer others' mental states. In our everyday lives, we need to interact constantly and appropriately with others. Not only is ToM involved in understanding others' mental states (other-oriented mental inferences), but it also helps to keep our own mental states (self-oriented mental inferences). In this study, we designed a false-belief task using event-related potential (ERP) measures to investigate the dynamic differences between the two types of mental inferences. In the false-belief task, participants were prompted with a cue to attribute a belief to either themselves (self-oriented) or another person (other-oriented). Results showed that other-oriented false-belief attribution elicited a larger late positive component (LPC; 320~440 ms post-cue onset) than the one elicited by self-oriented attribution at bilateral parieto-occipital electrodes, and also a larger late negative component (LNC; 380~500 ms post-cue onset) at frontal-central electrodes. In addition, the difference in amplitude of LPC between the two types of false-belief attribution was positively correlated with self-reported autistic traits measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Based on prior literature, we propose that the LPC and LNC reflect the processes of self-other distinction and conflict control, respectively. Moreover, the difficulty in distinguishing other from the self is related to one's degree of autistic traits.
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How self-other control determines individual differences in adolescents’ theory of mind. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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The Lens Shapes the View: on Task Dependency in ToM Research. Curr Behav Neurosci Rep 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s40473-020-00205-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Purpose of Review
This article provides an overview of current findings on Theory of Mind (ToM) in human children and adults and highlights the relationship between task specifications and their outcome in socio-cognitive research.
Recent Findings
ToM, the capacity to reason about and infer others’ mental states, develops progressively throughout childhood—the exact time course is still a matter of debate. Neuroimaging studies indicate the involvement of a widespread neuronal network during mentalizing, suggesting that ToM is a multifaceted process. Accordingly, the tasks and trainings that currently exist to investigate and enhance ToM are heterogeneous, and the outcomes largely depend on the paradigm that was used.
Summary
We argue for the implementation of multiple-task batteries in the assessment of socio-cognitive abilities. Decisions for a particular paradigm need to be carefully considered and justified. We want to emphasize the importance of targeted research on the relationship between task specifications and outcomes.
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Bradford EEF, Brunsdon VEA, Ferguson HJ. The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect. Cortex 2020; 126:265-280. [PMID: 32092495 PMCID: PMC7181171 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2020.01.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2019] [Revised: 10/08/2019] [Accepted: 01/23/2020] [Indexed: 01/07/2023]
Abstract
The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10–86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200–400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400–600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600–1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory).
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