When I saw me standing there: first-person and third-person memories and future projections, and how they relate to the self

What is autonoetic consciousness? Examining what underlies subjective experience in memory and future thinking

Autonoetic consciousness is the awareness that an event we remember is one that we ourselves experienced. It is a defining feature of our subjective experience of remembering and imagining future events. Given its subjective nature, there is ongoing debate about how to measure it. Our goal was to develop a framework to identify cognitive markers of autonoetic consciousness. Across two studies (N = 342) we asked young, healthy participants to provide written descriptions of two autobiographical memories, two plausible future events, and an experimentally encoded video. Participants then rated their subjective experience during remembering and imagining. Exploratory Factor Analysis of this data uncovered the latent variables underlying autonoetic consciousness across these different events. In contrast to work that emphasizes the distinction between Remember and Know as being key to autonoetic consciousness, Re-experiencing, and Pre-experiencing for future events, were consistently identified as core markers of autonoetic consciousness. This was alongside Mental Time Travel in all types of memory events, but not for imagining the future. In addition, our factor analysis allows us to demonstrate directly - for the first time - the features of mental imagery associated with the sense of autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memory; vivid, visual imagery from a first-person perspective. Finally, with regression analysis, the emergent factor structure of autonoetic consciousness was able to predict the richness of autobiographical memory texts, but not of episodic recall of the encoded video. This work provides a novel way to assess autonoetic consciousness, illustrates how autonoetic consciousness manifests differently in memory and imagination and defines the mental representations intrinsic to this process.

Individuals who rarely adopt observer perspectives report richer scene-based autobiographical memories

For most people, the capacity to adopt alternative visual perspectives when remembering emerges spontaneously due to the reconstructive nature of memories. Particularly as memories become more remote and are vulnerable to distortions, there is a shift in the perspective of memories from own eyes to observer-like views. Yet not all individuals report adopting novel perspectives in memories. The current study examines how self-reported differences in adopting an observer-like perspective influences autobiographical memory retrieval. Participants who reported rarely adopting an observer-like perspective had a diminished shift in perspective with memory remoteness and reported richer scene-related aspects of remembering. Additionally, the reduced tendency to use observer-like perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval was linked to more accurate spatial visualization on a standardized objective test. Together these findings offer insights into individual differences in the malleability of memories, and the central role that maintaining our original perspective plays in preserving the personal past.

In the Eyes of the Future: Eye Movement during Near and Distant Future Thinking

Research has suggested that near future events are typically viewed from a first-person (an own-eyes, also known as field) perspective while distant future events are typically viewed from a third-person (an observer) perspective. We investigated whether these distinct mental perspectives would be accompanied by distinct eye movement activities. We invited participants to imagine near and distant future events while their eye movements (i.e., scan path) were recorded by eye-tracking glasses. Analysis demonstrated fewer but longer fixations for near future thinking than for distant future thinking. Analysis also demonstrated more "field" mental visual perspective responses for near than for distant future thinking. The long fixations during near future thinking may mirror a mental visual exploration involving processing of a more complex visual representation compared with distant future thinking. By demonstrating how near future thinking triggers both "field" responses and long fixations, our study demonstrates how the temporality of future thinking triggers both distinct mental imagery and eye movement patterns.

Do positive memory characteristics influence daily-level trajectories of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms? an exploratory daily diary study

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Evidence links posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with positive memory characteristics. To extend this research, we utilized daily diary data to examine (1) concurrent/lagged associations between daily PTSD symptom severity and positive memory vividness/accessibility; and (2) associations between baseline-assessed positive memory characteristics and changes in PTSD symptom severity over time.

DESIGN AND METHODS

A sample of 238 trauma-exposed participants (Mage = 21.19 years; 86% women) completed baseline and 10 daily measures of PTSD symptoms and positive memory characteristics. Multilevel models covaried for gender, number of trauma types, and number of completed surveys.

RESULTS

Days with greater PTSD symptom severity than an individual's average associated with less vividness (b = -0.02, p < .001) and accessibility (b = -0.02, p < .001) of the positive memory on the same day. Days with greater positive memory vividness (b = -1.06, p < .001) and accessibility (b = -0.93, p < .001) than an individual's average associated with less PTSD symptom severity on the same day. There were no significant lagged associations between these constructs. There were significant interactions between baseline-assessed psychological distance and time (b = -0.04, p  = .042) and between baseline-assessed visual perspective and time (b = 0.05, p = .023) on PTSD symptom severity across days.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings inform positive memory intervention targets for PTSD and provide impetus for longitudinal investigations on their inter-relations.

Visual perspective as a two-dimensional construct in episodic future thought

Visual perspective (first-person vs. third-person) is a salient characteristic of memory and mental imagery with important cognitive and behavioural consequences. Most work on visual perspective treats it as a unidimensional construct. However, third-person perspective can have opposite effects on emotion and motivation, sometimes intensifying these and other times acting as a distancing mechanism, as in PTSD. For this reason among others, we propose that visual perspective in memory and mental imagery is best understood as varying along two dimensions: first, the degree to which first-person perspective predominates in the episodic imagery, and second, the degree to which the self is visually salient from a third-person perspective. We show that, in episodic future thinking, these are anticorrelated but non-redundant. These results further our basic understanding of the potent but divergent effects visual perspective has on emotion and motivation, both in everyday life and in psychiatric conditions.

The stability of visual perspective and vividness during mental time travel

When remembering or imagining, people can experience an event from their own eyes, or as an outside observer, with differing levels of vividness. The perspective from, and vividness with, which a person remembers or imagines has been related to numerous individual difference characteristics. These findings require that phenomenology during mental time travel be trait-like-that people consistently experience similar perspectives and levels of vividness. This assumption remains untested. Across two studies (combined N = 295), we examined the stability of visual perspective and vividness across multiple trials and timepoints. Perspective and vividness showed weak within-session stability when reported across just a few trials but showed strong within-session stability when sufficient trials were collected. Importantly, both visual perspective and vividness demonstrated good-to-excellent across-session stability across different delay intervals (two days to six weeks). Overall, our results suggest that people dependably experience similar visual phenomenology across occurrences of mental time travel.

A New Perspective on Visual Perspective in Memory

Memories for events require adopting a particular visual perspective—viewing the past from our own eyes or from an observerlike perspective in which we see ourselves in the memory. The current review synthesizes new behavioral and functional-neuroimaging evidence on the role of visual perspective in reshaping memories and how shifting visual perspective to novel viewpoints relies on similar constructive processes during imagination. Directions for future research are also discussed.