Medical Acts and Conscientious Objection: What Can a Physician be Compelled to Do?

What does it mean for a clinical AI to be just: conflicts between local fairness and being fit-for-purpose?

There have been repeated calls to ensure that clinical artificial intelligence (AI) is not discriminatory, that is, it provides its intended benefit to all members of society irrespective of the status of any protected characteristics of individuals in whose healthcare the AI might participate. There have also been repeated calls to ensure that any clinical AI is tailored to the local population in which it is being used to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Yet, there might be a clash between these two calls since tailoring an AI to a local population might reduce its effectiveness when the AI is used in the care of individuals who have characteristics which are not represented in the local population. Here, I explore the bioethical concept of local fairness as applied to clinical AI. I first introduce the discussion concerning fairness and inequalities in healthcare and how this problem has continued in attempts to develop AI-enhanced healthcare. I then discuss various technical aspects which might affect the implementation of local fairness. Next, I introduce some rule of law considerations into the discussion to contextualise the issue better by drawing key parallels. I then discuss some potential technical solutions which have been proposed to address the issue of local fairness. Finally, I outline which solutions I consider most likely to contribute to a fit-for-purpose and fair AI.

AI-Enhanced Healthcare: Not a new Paradigm for Informed Consent

With the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies in healthcare, the ethical debate surrounding their adoption is becoming more prominent. Here I consider the issue of gaining informed patient consent to AI-enhanced care from the vantage point of the United Kingdom's National Health Service setting. I build my discussion around two claims from the World Health Organization: that healthcare services should not be denied to individuals who refuse AI-enhanced care and that there is no precedence to seeking patient consent to AI-enhanced care. I discus U.K. law relating to patient consent and the General Data Protection Regulation to show that current standards relating to patient consent are adequate for AI-enhanced care. I then suggest that in the future it may not be possible to guarantee patient access to non-AI-enhanced healthcare, in a similar way to how we do not offer patients manual alternatives to automated healthcare processes. Throughout my discussion I focus on the issues of patient choice and veracity in the patient-clinician relationship. Finally, I suggest that the best way to protect patients from potential harms associated with the introduction of AI to patient care is not via an overly burdensome patient consent process but via evaluation and regulation of AI technologies.

Understanding Conscientious Objection and the Acceptability of its Practice in Primary Care

Ethically challenging or controversial medical procedures have prompted increasing requests for the exercise of conscientious objection, and caused concerns about how and when it should be practised. This paper clarifies definitions, especially with regard to discrimination, and explores the restrictions, duties, and practical limitations, in order to suggest criteria for its practice. It also argues that a conscientious refusal to treat, where there is therapeutic doubt, is a valid form of conscientious objection. An email survey sent to General Practitioners (GPs), explored the adherence to the suggested criteria, and assessed the outcomes, in terms of acceptability, impact, and difficulties experienced by the GPs, their colleagues and their patients. The results demonstrate high acceptability of conscientious objection, and better outcomes when the suggested criteria are adhered to. The GPs would support education to improve the practice of conscientious objection to a professional level, which could further improve outcomes and acceptability.

'Swear by Thy Gracious Self': North American Medical Oath-Taking in 2014/2015

Over the past century, six studies - the most recent data from 2000 - and one review have comprehensively examined the content of medical oaths and oath-taking practices, all focusing on North America, providing an insight into the ethical beliefs of each era. Our study sought to establish a new point of reference. In 2014/2015, oaths from 150 of all 153 US and Canadian medical schools were collected and analyzed. All but one school administered medical oaths and most schools administered more than one. Since 2000, student-written oaths became more popular, and new themes, such as self-care and professionalism, were identified in the oaths for the first time. However, as was identified in 2000, the oaths' contents are disparate and even conflicting at times, raising questions as to whether medicine is being taught or practiced with a coherent ethical worldview.

The right to choose to abort an abortion: should pro-choice advocates support abortion pill reversal?

Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women's mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.

Reply to: Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests

Giubilini and Savulescu in their recent Journal of Bioethical Inquiry symposium article presented an account of conscientious objection that argues for its recognition as a non-financial conflict of interest. In this short commentary, I highlight some problems with their account. First, I discuss their solicitor analogy. Second, I discuss some problems surrounding their objectivity claim about standards of medical care. Next, I discuss some issues arising from consistently applying their approach. Finally, I highlight that conscientious objection should be viewed not as a conflict of interest but as something that society has an interest in preserving. I conclude by arguing that clinicians who have a conscientious objection can be treated in the same way as those who decide to subspecialize and do not need to give up work in their specialty. While Giubilini and Savulescu present an interesting argument about conscientious objection, theirs is not a compelling view. Indeed, the way we approach conscientious objection has more to teach us about conflicts of interest than the other way around.

The rule of right vs might: a reply to Wischik's 'Nazis, teleology, and the freedom of conscience'

Wischik presents an extensive reply to our paper on conscientious objection, which explores the implications of distinguishing 'medical acts' from 'socioclinical acts'. He provides an extensive legal analysis of the issues surrounding conscientious objection, drawing on the concepts of professional practice and consequentialism. Invoking some of these concepts, we respond and demonstrate that Wischik does not seriously engage with our argument. Instead, he merely proffers his preference for legal positivism, which - when viewed as the fount of justice (as Wischik seems to hold) instead of a tool in its service - necessarily bases rightness on might rather than truth. We also argue that in several important areas, Wischik is factually mistaken.

Quotas: Enabling Conscientious Objection to Coexist with Abortion Access

The debate regarding the role of conscientious objection in healthcare has been protracted, with increasing demands for curbs on conscientious objection. There is a growing body of evidence that indicates that in some cases, high rates of conscientious objection can affect access to legal medical services such as abortion—a major concern of critics of conscientious objection. Moreover, few solutions have been put forward that aim to satisfy both this concern and that of defenders of conscientious objection—being expected to participate in the provision of services that compromise their moral integrity. Here we attempt to bring some resolution to the debate by proposing a pragmatic, long-term solution offering what we believe to be an acceptable compromise—a quota system for medical trainees in specialties where a conscientious objection can be exercised, and is known to cause conflict. We envisage two main objectives of the quota system we propose. First, as a means to introduce conscientious objection into countries where this is not presently permitted. Second, to minimise or eliminate the effects of high rates of conscientious objection in countries such as Italy, where access to legal abortion provision can be negatively affected.

Questionable benefits and unavoidable personal beliefs: defending conscientious objection for abortion

Conscientious objection in healthcare has come under heavy criticism on two grounds recently, particularly regarding abortion provision. First, critics claim conscientious objection involves a refusal to provide a legal and beneficial procedure requested by a patient, denying them access to healthcare. Second, they argue the exercise of conscientious objection is based on unverifiable personal beliefs. These characteristics, it is claimed, disqualify conscientious objection in healthcare. Here, we defend conscientious objection in the context of abortion provision. We show that abortion has a dubitable claim to be medically beneficial, is rarely clinically indicated, and that conscientious objections should be accepted in these circumstances. We also show that reliance on personal beliefs is difficult to avoid if any form of objection is to be permitted, even if it is based on criteria such as the principles and values of the profession or the scope of professional practice.

Conscientious objection and systemic injustice

This paper follows on from a brief debate about the role of conscientious objection in healthcare, where the issue arose as to whether conscientious objection is (or can) be a tool of resistance against systemic injustice. The paper contributes to this debate by highlighting that some authors generally opposed to conscientious objection in healthcare have shown some support to this idea. Perhaps if there is one area in which all can agree, it is that in healthcare conscientious objection should be allowed so as to prevent cases of systemic injustice.

Nazis, Teleology, and the Freedom of Conscience: In Response to Gamble and Pruski's 'Medical Acts and Conscientious Objection: What Can a Physician be Compelled to Do?'

Medical practitioners of all specialisms (e.g. RN, MD) are identified by their professional titles. Their function is determined by their regulators, and subject to voluntary employment contracts. Whilst they are expected to act in their patients' best interests, there are situations in which a physician - having human rights - can object to certain acts. This right of objetction arises from the recognition of the practitioner's own conscience rather than the end or purpose of the procedure being performed. Gamble and Pruski explore an act-centred morality, and therefore define acts as medical (and subject to compulsion) and non-medical (therefore voluntary). This analysis has merit when applied to health-systems as a whole, but fails to take into account the humanity of physicians and the specific interactions with patients in different contexts. As such, it serves as a way of compelling physicians to act against their conscience rather than protecting them.