Ethical Issues to Consider Before Introducing Neurotechnological Thought Apprehension in Psychiatry

A healthcare approach to mental integrity

The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy.

Understanding the Ethical Issues of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Blessing or the Beginning of a Dystopian Future?

In recent years, scientific discoveries in the field of neuroscience combined with developments in the field of artificial intelligence have led to the development of a range of neurotechnologies. Advances in neuroimaging systems, neurostimulators, and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are leading to new ways of enhancing, controlling, and "reading" the brain. In addition, although BCIs were developed and used primarily in the medical field, they are now increasingly applied in other fields (entertainment, marketing, education, defense industry). We conducted a literature review following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines to provide background information about ethical issues related to the use of BCIs. Among the ethical issues that emerged from the thematic data analysis of the reviewed studies included questions revolving around human dignity, personhood and autonomy, user safety, stigma and discrimination, privacy and security, responsibility, research ethics, and social justice (including access to this technology). This paper attempts to address the various aspects of these concerns. A variety of distinct ethical issues were identified, which, for the most part, were in line with the findings of prior research. However, we identified two nuances, which are related to the empirical research on ethical issues related to BCIs and the impact of BCIs on international relationships. The paper also highlights the need for the cooperation of all stakeholders to ensure the ethical development and use of this technology and concludes with several recommendations. The principles of bioethics provide an initial guiding framework, which, however, should be revised in the current artificial intelligence landscape so as to be responsive to challenges posed by the development and use of BCIs.

Neurotechnology to reduce recidivism: Ethical and legal challenges

Crime comes with enormous costs, not only financial but also in terms of loss of mental and physical health and, in some cases, even loss of life. Recidivism is responsible for a considerable percentage of the crimes, and therefore, society deems reducing recidivism a priority. To reduce recidivism, several types of interventions can be used, such as education and employment-focused rehabilitation programs which are intended to improve psychological and social factors. Another way to prevent reoffending is to influence the offender's brain functions. For example, medication can be offered to treat delusions or to diminish sexual drive. In the near future, innovative neurotechnologies are expected to improve prediction and prevention of reoffending. Potential positive effects of such neurotechniques include a safer society and earlier release of prisoners who are no longer "at high risk" to relapse into criminal behavior. Meanwhile, employing these neurotechniques in the criminal justice system raises fundamental concerns, for example, about autonomy, privacy and mental integrity. This chapter aims to identify some of the ethical and legal challenges of using neurotechnologies to reduce recidivism.

Is Your Neural Data Part of Your Mind? Exploring the Conceptual Basis of Mental Privacy

It has been argued that neural data (ND) are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states (i.e. our mental privacy), and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ (i.e. protecting them through bodily integrity). Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies (most notably, a Neuroprotection Bill of Law being discussed by the Chilean Senate), it is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that (i) s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that (ii) s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture.

Forensic Brain-Reading and Mental Privacy in European Human Rights Law: Foundations and Challenges

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

Neuroscience-based Psychiatric Assessments of Criminal Responsibility: Beyond Self-Report?

Many legal systems have an insanity defense, which means that although a person has committed a crime, she is not held criminally responsible for the act. A challenge with regard to these assessments is that forensic psychiatrists have to rely to a considerable extent on the defendant's self-report. Could neuroscience be a way to make these evaluations more objective? The current value of neuroimaging in insanity assessments will be examined. The author argues that neuroscience can be valuable for diagnosing neurological illnesses, rather than psychiatric disorders. Next, he discusses to what extent neurotechnological 'mind reading' techniques, if they would become available in the future, could be useful to get beyond self-report in forensic psychiatry.

Neuroprediction and A.I. in Forensic Psychiatry and Criminal Justice: A Neurolaw Perspective

Advances in the use of neuroimaging in combination with A.I., and specifically the use of machine learning techniques, have led to the development of brain-reading technologies which, in the nearby future, could have many applications, such as lie detection, neuromarketing or brain-computer interfaces. Some of these could, in principle, also be used in forensic psychiatry. The application of these methods in forensic psychiatry could, for instance, be helpful to increase the accuracy of risk assessment and to identify possible interventions. This technique could be referred to as 'A.I. neuroprediction,' and involves identifying potential neurocognitive markers for the prediction of recidivism. However, the future implications of this technique and the role of neuroscience and A.I. in violence risk assessment remain to be established. In this paper, we review and analyze the literature concerning the use of brain-reading A.I. for neuroprediction of violence and rearrest to identify possibilities and challenges in the future use of these techniques in the fields of forensic psychiatry and criminal justice, considering legal implications and ethical issues. The analysis suggests that additional research is required on A.I. neuroprediction techniques, and there is still a great need to understand how they can be implemented in risk assessment in the field of forensic psychiatry. Besides the alluring potential of A.I. neuroprediction, we argue that its use in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry should be subjected to thorough harms/benefits analyses not only when these technologies will be fully available, but also while they are being researched and developed.