Addiction, Identity, Morality

Which kind of sameness? Disambiguating two senses of identity with a novel linguistic task

When people report that a person's identity has changed, what do they mean by this? Recent research has often assumed that participants are indicating a change in numerical, rather than qualitative, identity. Investigations into this matter have been hampered by the fact that English has no clear way to demarcate one type of identity from the other. To resolve this matter, we develop and test a novel task in Lithuanian, which has lexical markers for numerical and qualitative identity. We apply this task to intuitions about changes in moral capacities, which has previously shown to lead to high ratings in identity change. We discover that, when people say that a morally altered person is dramatically different, they mean the person is qualitatively transformed, but numerically intact. We conclude that this methodology is a valuable tool not only for illuminating the specific phenomenon of the moral self, but for general use in studying folk ascriptions of identity persistence.

Application of optogenetics and in vivo imaging approaches for elucidating the neurobiology of addiction

The neurobiology of addiction has been an intense topic of investigation for more than 50 years. Over this time, technological innovation in methods for studying brain function rapidly progressed, leading to increasingly sophisticated experimental approaches. To understand how specific brain regions, cell types, and circuits are affected by drugs of abuse and drive behaviors characteristic of addiction, it is necessary both to observe and manipulate neural activity in addiction-related behavioral paradigms. In pursuit of this goal, there have been several key technological advancements in in vivo imaging and neural circuit modulation in recent years, which have shed light on the cellular and circuit mechanisms of addiction. Here we discuss some of these key technologies, including circuit modulation with optogenetics, in vivo imaging with miniaturized single-photon microscopy (miniscope) and fiber photometry, and how the application of these technologies has garnered novel insights into the neurobiology of addiction.

Not the same same: Distinguishing between similarity and identity in judgments of change

What makes someone the same person over time? There are (at least) two ways of understanding this question: A person can be the same in the sense of being very similar to how they used to be (similarity), or they can be the same in the sense of being the same individual (numerical identity). In recent years, several papers have claimed to explore the commonsense notion of numerical identity. However, we suggest here that these researchers have instead been studying similarity. We develop a novel method that uses simple intuitions about objects to illustrate these two notions of "same person", and then asks which concept applies to instances of personal change. Across 4 studies (N = 2446), we find that these previously documented intuitions are best understood as reflecting judgments about similarity, not identity (Experiments 1 and 2). We then use this method to explore the situations in which participants do perceive a change in numerical identity. We find that when a person's entire brain (Experiments 3 and 4) or soul (Experiment 4) has been replaced with that of another person, the majority of participants judge that numerical identity has changed. However, we also note that a substantial minority of participants denied that identity had changed, opening new questions about the role of the body in intuitive judgments of personal identity.

Cultivating conscience: Moral neurohabilitation of adolescents and young adults with conduct and/or antisocial personality disorders

Individuals diagnosed with conduct disorder (CD) in childhood and adolescence are at risk for increasingly maladaptive and dangerous behaviors, which unchecked, can lead to antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) in adulthood. Children with CD, especially those with the callous unemotional subgroup qualifier ("limited prosocial emotions"/DSM-5), present with a more severe pattern of delinquency, aggression, and antisocial behavior, all markings of prodrome ASPD. Given this recognized diagnostic trajectory, with a pathological course playing out tragically at the individual, familial, and societal level, and lack of effective remediation via current standards of care, we posit an alternate treatment approach; case-specific compulsory moral habilitation aimed at rectifying the undeveloped affective domain of adolescents and young adults suffering from these disorders. We begin with a brief historical overview of response to mental illness, review CD and ASPD diagnostic criteria and treatment limitations, and posit a unique neurohabilitative approach that focuses on the absent affective moral development of these populations. Next, we invoke a public health safety argument to justify case-specific compulsory moral habilitation, discuss neurotechnologies to be considered in treatment, and conclude with ethical considerations and suggestions for further research.