The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment

A welfare analysis of Medicaid and recidivism

We present conservative estimates for the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) associated with providing Medicaid to inmates exiting prison. The MVPF measures the ratio between a policy's social benefits and its governmental costs. Our MVPF estimates suggest that every additional $1 the government spends on providing inmates exiting prison with Medicaid coverage can result in social benefits ranging between $3.45 and $10.62. A large proportion of the benefits we consider stems from the reduced future criminal involvement among former inmates who receive Medicaid. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we find that Medicaid expansions reduce the average number of times a released inmate is reimprisoned within 1 year by approximately 11.5%. By combining this estimate with key values reported elsewhere (e.g., victimization costs, data on victimization and incarceration), we quantify specific benefits arising from the policy. These encompass diminished criminal harm due to lower reoffense rates, direct benefits to former inmates through Medicaid coverage, increased employment opportunities, and reduced loss of liberty resulting from fewer future reimprisonments. Net-costs consist of the cost of providing Medicaid net of changes in the governmental cost of imprisonment, changes in the tax revenue due to increased employment, and changes in spending on other public assistance programs. We interpret our estimates as conservative since we deliberately err on the side of under-estimating benefits and over-estimating costs when data on specific items are imprecise or incomplete. Our findings align closely with others in the sparse literature investigating the crime-related welfare impacts of Medicaid access, underscoring the substantial indirect benefits public health insurance programs can offer through crime reduction, in addition to their direct health-related advantages.

A Blueprint for U.S. Health Insurance Reform

The current U.S. health insurance "system" was not deliberately planned and constructed but has emerged piecemeal over the past half-century through a series of incremental and haphazard reforms. That policy history also reveals a clear but unfulfilled societal commitment to providing access to essential health care regardless of resources. To fulfill this obligation, the solution proposed in this article has 2 key elements: 1) universal coverage that is automatic, free, and basic, and 2) the option to buy supplemental coverage in a well-designed market. Such a system could, if desired, be created without raising taxes and without disrupting or changing the delivery of medical care.

Health and health system effects on poverty: A narrative review of global evidence

Ill-health causes poverty. The effect runs through multiple mechanisms that span lifetimes and cross generations. Health systems can reduce poverty by improving health and weakening links from ill-health to poverty. This paper maps routes through which ill-health can cause poverty and identifies those that are potentially amenable to health policy. The review confirms that ill-health is an important contributor to poverty and it finds that the effect through health-related loss of earnings is often larger than that through medical expenses. Both effects are smaller in countries that are closer to universal health coverage and have higher social safety nets. The paper also reviews evidence from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and the United States (US) on the poverty-reduction effectiveness of public health insurance (PubHI) for low-income households. This reveals that PubHI does not always deliver financial protection to its targeted population in LMICs. Countries that have succeeded in achieving this goal often combine extension of coverage with supply-side interventions to build capacity and avoid perverse provider incentives in response to insurance. In the US, PubHI is effective in reducing poverty by shielding low-income households with children from healthcare costs and, consequently, generating long-run improvements in health that increase lifetime earnings. Poverty reduction is a potentially important co-benefit of health systems.

The value of improving insurance quality: Evidence from long-run Medicaid attrition

The US government increasingly provides public health insurance coverage through private firms. We examine associated welfare implications for beneficiaries, using a 'revealed preference' framework based on beneficiaries' program attrition rates. Focusing on the Medicaid program in New York State, we exploit quasi-random variation in the initial assignment at birth to public versus private Medicaid based on birth weight. We find that infants assigned to private Medicaid at birth are less likely to subsequently leave Medicaid. We provide suggestive evidence that reduced attrition reflects beneficiary responses to improved program quality, rather than alternative mechanisms such as private Medicaid plans reducing re-enrollment barriers.

The Behavioral Foundations of Default Effects: Theory and Evidence from Medicare Part D

We show in two natural experiments that default rules in Medicare Part D have large, persistent effects on enrollment and drug utilization of low-income beneficiaries. The implications of this phenomenon for welfare and optimal policy depend on the sensitivity of passivity to the value of the default option. Using random assignment to default options, we show that beneficiary passivity is extremely insensitive, even when enrolling in the default option would result in substantial drug consumption losses. A third natural experiment suggests that variation in active choice is driven by random transitory shocks rather than the inherent attentiveness of some beneficiaries.

The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance

Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

State Health Insurance Benefit Mandates and Health Care Affordability

Every US state requires private health insurers to cover certain conditions, treatments, and providers. These benefit mandates were rare as recently as the 1960s, but the average state now has more than forty. These mandates are intended to promote the affordability of necessary health care. This study aims to determine the extent to which benefit mandates succeed at this goal. Using fixed effects and difference-in-difference research designs with data from the restricted Medical Expenditure Panel Survey—Household Component (MEPS-HC), it provides the first empirical estimates of how health insurance benefit mandates affect out-of-pocket costs and total spending on health care. Both strategies find that mandates significantly reduce out-of-pocket spending, but they are divided on whether mandates also reduce overall health care spending and spending by private insurers.

Health insurance and subjective well-being: Evidence from two healthcare reforms in the United States

We study the role of access to health insurance coverage as a determinant of individuals' subjective well-being (SWB) by analyzing large-scale healthcare reforms in the United States. Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that the 2006 Massachusetts reform and 2014 Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion improved the overall life satisfaction of Massachusetts residents and low-income adults in Medicaid expansion states, respectively. The results are robust to various sensitivity and falsification tests. Our findings imply that access to health insurance plays an important role in improving SWB. Without considering psychological benefits, the actual benefits of health insurance may be underemphasized.

Price and income effects of hospital reimbursements

Health insurance systems in many countries reimburse hospitals through fixed prices based on the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) of patients. We quantify the effects of price and income changes for the full spectrum of hospital services as average and heterogeneous elasticities of quantities (number of admissions) and quality-related outcomes. For our empirical analysis, we use data on over 160 million hospital admissions, constituting the universe of hospital admissions in Germany between 2005 and 2016. Our identification strategy is based on instruments exploiting a two-year lag in regulatory price setting. The strategy lends itself to a placebo test demonstrating that our instruments do not have substantive anticipatory direct effects. We find that the compensated own-price elasticity of quantity is positive (0.2), while the income elasticity is negative (-0.15). On net, increasing all prices increases costs due to a behavioral response of larger quantities in addition to the mechanical increase.

Intergenerational Mobility in Self-Reported Health Status in the US

We present estimates of intergenerational mobility in self-reported health status (SRHS) in the US using data from the PSID. We estimate that the rank-rank slope in SRHS is 0.26. We show that including both parent health and income in models of intergenerational mobility increases the explanatory power of child outcomes. We construct a monetary metric for health and then use this to combine income and health into a measure of welfare and estimate the rank-rank slope to be about 0.4 for this new measure. Finally, we document striking health mobility gaps by race, region and parent education.

Welfare consequences of access to health insurance for rural households: Evidence from the New Cooperative Medical Scheme in China

This study evaluates the welfare benefits of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), the main public health insurance plan for the rural population in China. The findings show that the value of the NCMS to recipients is slightly lower than the government's costs of implementation, ranging from 0.79 to 0.97 per RMB of the resource cost of the NCMS. The estimated moral hazard costs are low compared with the total benefits. It is also estimated that the benefits originating from the NCMS's insurance function only constitute 20% of the total benefits, suggesting a need for higher generosity levels among rural households. Our results shed new light on the welfare effects of access health insurance among low- and middle-income households.

Estimating the Value of Public Insurance Using Complementary Private Insurance

The welfare associated with public insurance is often difficult to quantify because the demand for coverage is unobserved and thus cannot be used to analyze welfare. However, in many settings, individuals can purchase private insurance to supplement public coverage. This paper outlines an approach to use data and variation from private complementary insurance to quantify welfare associated with counterfactuals related to compulsory public insurance. We then apply this approach using administrative data on disability insurance. Our findings suggests that public disability insurance generates substantial surplus for the sample population, and there may be gains to increasing the generosity of coverage.