Biotechnology: impact on biological warfare and biodefense

Detection of bacterial contaminants via frequency manipulation of amino-groups functionalized Fe3O4nanoparticles based resonant sensor

Bacterial infections have a large impact on public health. Through this study, we report on the development of complementary split-ring resonators (CSRR) supplemented by functionalized nanoparticles to detect bacteria in the aqueous medium. Iron oxide (Fe₃O₄) nanoparticles were functionalized with amino groups using (3-aminopropyl) triethoxysilane (APTES) to form (APTES@Fe₃O₄) nanoparticles, which have a specific affinity towards the bacterial species. This affinity was evaluated using theEscherichia coli (E. coli)andStaphylococcus aureus (S. aureus)bacterial species. The resonant sensor was tuned at 430 MHz and the CSRR sensor bed was further activated using APTES@Fe₃O₄nanoparticles. Bacterial detection was studied over a range of concentrations from 2.66 x 10⁹cells to 2.66 x 10⁸cells. The sensor actively responded to small changes in bacterial concentration, showing an overall shift in resonance frequency of ~ 44 MHz (~ 40 MHz / cell count) forE. coliand ~ 55 MHz (50.43 MHz / cell count) forS. aureus. Dextran sulphate and Chitosan were used as the references. The magnetic character of the conjugated system exhibited strong interaction of the bacterial species with APTES@Fe₃O₄, justifying the high selectivity towards these species. This demonstrates the feasibility of a sensitive, fast, portable device, against the traditionally used time-consuming bio-assays.

80 questions for UK biological security

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.

Dual-use nano-neurotechnology

The chemical and biological nonproliferation regime stands at a watershed moment, when failure seems a real possibility. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 2016 Eighth Review Conference, the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is uncertain. As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) approaches its Fourth Review Conference in 2018, it has almost completed removing the huge stocks of chemical weapons, but it now faces the difficult organizational task of moving its focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons at a time when the international security situation appears to be increasingly more difficult and dangerous. In this article, we assess the current and near-term state (5-10 years) and impact of three related areas of science and technology that could be of dual-use concern: targeted delivery of agents to the central nervous system (CNS), particularly by means of nanotechnology; direct impact of nanomaterials on synaptic functions in the CNS; and neuronal circuits in the brain that might be targeted by those with hostile intent. We attempt to assess the implications of our findings, particularly for the consideration of the problem of state-level interest in so-called nonlethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement at the CWC Review Conference in 2018, but also more generally for the longer-term future of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime.

Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios.

Systems kinomics for characterizing host responses to high-consequence pathogens at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility-Frederick

Currently, there is a paucity of information regarding the molecular pathogenesis for many high-consequence pathogens (HCPs) that pose threats to both national and international public health. In spite of this, investigations of the molecular pathogenesis for many HCPs have been limited to gross pathological changes in animal models or global analysis of gene expression. Further, questions remain regarding the ability of animal models of disease to recapitulate human molecular pathogenesis or act as predictors of therapeutic efficacy. Thus, it is likely that medical countermeasure development for HCPs will rely on identifying therapeutic targets that are uniquely modulated during HCP infection. It is also appreciated that many cellular processes can be regulated independently of changes in transcription or translation through phosphorylation events. Cellular kinases, individually or collectively (the kinome), play critical roles in regulating complex biology, underlie various malignancies, and represent high-priority drug targets. The growing interest in kinases in both basic and translational research has driven efforts to develop technologies that enable characterization of phosphorylation-mediated signal transduction. To this end, enhanced technical capabilities at the IRF-Frederick provide the unique capability for characterizing host responses to HCP insult during the course of infection and identify novel targets for therapeutic intervention.

Ethical Considerations in Embedding a Surgeon in a Military or Civilian Tactical Team

Tactical emergency medical services (TEMS) bring immediate medical support to the inner perimeter of special weapons and tactics team activations. While initially envisioned as a role for an individual dually trained as a police officer and paramedic, TEMS is increasingly undertaken by physicians and paramedics who are not police officers. This report explores the ethical underpinnings of embedding a surgeon within a military or civilian tactical team with regard to identity, ethically acceptable actions, triage, responsibility set, training, certification, and potential future refinements of the role of the tactical police surgeon.

KaplanLJ, SiegelMD, EastmanAL, FlynnLM, RosenbaumSH, ConeDC, BlakeDP, MulhernJ. Ethical considerations in embedding a surgeon in a military or civilian tactical team. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2012;27(6):1-6.

Ensuring the security of synthetic biology-towards a 5P governance strategy

Over recent years the label “synthetic biology” has been attached to a number of diverse research and commercial activities, ranging from the search for a minimal cell to the quick delivery of customized genes by DNA synthesis companies. Based on the analysis of biosecurity issues surrounding synthetic biology during the SYNBIOSAFE project, this paper will first provide a rationale for taking security, in addition to safety aspects of this new field, seriously. It will then take stock of the initiatives and measures that have already been taken in this area and will lastly try to map out future areas of activities in order to minimise the security risks emanating from this promising new field of scientific inquiry and technological progress.

Biological Agents and Terror Medicine

In the last decade, terror has become an increasingly global problem. More people have become radicalized, the know-how to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is easily accessible by Internet and electronic media, and precursors and basic ingredients are easily purchased. Terrorists are innovative and we now face a new era of nonconventional terrorism: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN), as well as cyber terrorism.

The deliberate use of (WMD–CBRN) by hostile states or terrorists and of naturally emerging infectious diseases that have a potential to cause illness on a massive scale could pose a national security threat.1 Resulting panic and economic damage could paralyze a country.

Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism is defined as the deliberate and malicious deployment of microbial agents or their toxins as weapons in a non-combat setting, represents perhaps the most overt example of human behavior impacting epidemic infectious diseases. There is historical precedent for the use of biological agents against both military and civilian populations. The use of biological (and chemical) agents as weapons of war has been well documented. The German biological warfare program during World War I included covert infections of Allied livestock with anthrax and glanders. The Japanese army began conducting experiments on the effects of bacterial agents of biowarfare on Chinese prisoners in occupied Manchuria in 1932 at their infamous Unit 731. The United States began its own offensive biological weapons program in 1942 and, during its 28-year official existence, weaponized and stockpiled lethal biological agents, such as anthrax, as well as incapacitating agents, such as the etiologic agent of Q fever. There are some recent examples of bioterrorism, though not necessarily resulting in attacks causing morbidity or mortality, may serve as harbingers of future events. Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq developed and deployed anthrax and botulinum-laden warheads in the years leading up to the Gulf War. The reasons that these weapons were never used in an actual attack probably had more to do with the implicit threat of overwhelming US retaliation and Iraqi technological deficiencies rather than the regime's reluctance to violate any moral principles. Biological agents have also been used to forward political ideologies: in 1984 a religious cult, intent on influencing voter turnout during a local election, contaminated restaurant salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon.

Incentives for Biodefense Countermeasure Development

Therapeutics and vaccines are available for only a fraction of biological threats, leaving populations vulnerable to attacks involving biological weapons. Existing U.S. policies to accelerate commercial development of biodefense products have thus far induced insufficient investment by the biopharmaceutical industry. In this article, we examine the technical, regulatory, and market risks associated with countermeasure development and review existing and proposed federal incentives to increase industrial investment. We conclude with several recommendations. To increase industry's engagement in biodefense countermeasure development, Congress should expand BioShield funding, giving HHS the flexibility to fund a portfolio of biodefense countermeasures whose revenues are comparable to those of commercial drugs. Congress should establish tradable priority review vouchers for developers of new countermeasures. A National Academy of Sciences or National Biodefense Science Board should formally evaluate incentive programs and a government-managed "Virtual Pharma," in which HHS contracts separate stages of research, development, and production to individual firms.

Biosecurity implications of the synthesis of pathogenic viruses

Recent peer-reviewed reports of in vitro syntheses of small viruses raise the possibility of misapplying modern biotechnologies to the creation of new smallpox virus, not simply to the malicious manipulation of existing samples. While it would require great effort and significant financing, a smallpox-from-scratch project would seem likely to be feasible, as would some other pathogen-from-scratch projects. Efforts to prevent such work -- or, failing prevention, to detect it -- might be enhanced in a number of ways.

Bioregulators as prototypic nontraditional threat agents

Bioregulators are naturally occurring organic compounds that regulate a multitude of biologic processes. Under natural circumstances, bioregulators are synthesized in minute quantities in a variety of living organisms and are essential for physiologic homeostasis. In the wrong hands, these compounds have the capability to be used as nontraditional threat agents that are covered by the prohibitions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Unlike traditional biowarfare/bioterrorism agents that have a latency period of hours to days,the onset of action of bioregulators may occur within minutes after host exposure. Concerns regarding the potential misuse of bioregulators for nefarious purposes relate to the ability of these nontraditional agents to induce profound physiologic effects.

Bioterrorism: is it a real threat?

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 commits the signatory nations to refraining from the use of biological weapons. However, the terrorist assaults of September 2001 and, subsequently, the anthrax-containing letters are cause for great concerns: new threats to the security of nations are expected, as terrorist organizations seem to increasingly explore novel ways of spreading terror. In this context, naturally emerging diseases such as SARS, monkeypox or West Nile fever assume new importance because it is difficult to distinguish between natural epidemics and possible bioweapon assaults. Great efforts on the part of governments and public health authorities are necessary to counteract these threats.

Responsibility in the life sciences: assessing the role of professional codes

In response to threats from bioweapons, questions are being asked today in some countries about the implications and appropriateness of biological research. Many organizations and governments have suggested that bioscientists adopt what is generally referred to as a "code of conduct" to reduce the security concerns associated with their work. This article examines the potential contribution of such codes. By drawing on past lessons in other areas of professional life, it suggests some key questions, issues, and dilemmas for future consideration. As argued, attempts to establish codes must address demanding questions about their aims and audience--questions whose answers depend on potentially contentious issues regarding arms control, science, ethics, and politics.

Facing the possibility of bioterrorism

The possibility of bioterrorism has been met by significant financial outlays to map out public health responses. These have included comprehensive audits of potential agents, as well as exploring mechanisms for counteracting their impact. Psychological intervention and communication have been identified as key areas requiring further work, as fear of infection could pose a greater strain on social resources than the pathogens themselves. Bioterrorism provides a powerful metaphor for élite fears of social corrosion from within. Accordingly, a broader historical and cultural perspective is required to understand why individuals and societies feel so vulnerable to what remain largely speculative scenarios.