At what cost is performance-based financing implemented? Novel evidence from Malawi

Leveraging local health system resources to address quality healthcare gaps in sub-Saharan African: lessons from the SafeCare quality improvement programme in Ghana

INTRODUCTION

In low- and-middle-income-countries (LMICs) like Ghana, universal access to quality healthcare remains a mirage and this undermines achievement of sustainable development goal (SDG) 3. The SafeCare Quality Improvement (QI) programme is an initiative of PharmAccess Foundation, a Netherlands-based non-governmental organisation (NGO). In 2009 SafeCare QI programme was launched in Ghana to help address gaps in healthcare quality standards, leveraging existing local resources. Over 600 private and public healthcare facilities are currently enrolled in the programme and is being adopted for nation-wide rollout by government of Ghana and implementing partners.

OBJECTIVE

This paper explored views and experiences of frontline health staff and policy makers on the SafeCare quality improvement programme in Ghana and how local resources were leveraged in its implementation.

METHODOLOGY

Design/setting: The evaluation was conducted in 53 private and public healthcare facilities from seven administrative regions of Ghana across the coastal, middle, and northern geopolitical belts. The regions are Ashanti (n = 12), Bono East (n = 8), Bono (n = 3), Greater Accra (n = 12), Oti (n = 4), Savannah (n = 8) and Western (n = 9).

SAMPLING

Quota and purposive sampling techniques were used to sample the healthcare facilities in accordance with the study eligibility criteria. Total of 45 focus group discussions (FGDs) and 47 individual in-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted among frontline staff and policy makers from government and private local partner institutions.

ANALYSIS

 Group and individual interviews were audio recorded, transcribed verbatim and thematic content analysis done using Nvivo (version 12.0) software.

FINDINGS

Overall, participants perceived the relevance and benefits of the SafeCare programme to be "very satisfactory" while the programme impact, rollout process and success were perceived to be "satisfactory". Quality healthcare standards were perceived to have improved in beneficiary health facilities due to participation in the SafeCare programme. Patient satisfaction, service utilisation and revenue generation in healthcare facilities were also attributed to the SafeCare programme. Proposals were made for harmonisation of existing QI assessment tools to mitigate duplications. Agreed data sharing protocols and interoperability with existing national database were also recommended to promote sustainability. Finally, low staff motivation, high workload, lack of financial and material resources were cited as potential impediments to full compliance with the SafeCare QI standards by healthcare facilities enrolled in the programme.

CONCLUSIONS

SafeCare QI programme has contributed to QI and adherence to patient safety standards in Ghana. Sustainability is however dependent on continuous government commitment as the programme gets adopted as a national QI programme. Overlaps in content of QI assessment tools ought to be addressed to promote efficiency without compromising quality standards. The SafeCare programme demonstrates that health systems in LMICs have the potential to attain acceptable quality healthcare standards when they take advantage of existing local resources, including private-public partnership (PPP) and peer-learning opportunities.

Cost-effectiveness of implementing performance-based financing for improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia

INTRODUCTION

Performance Based Financing (PBF) supports realization of universal health coverage by promoting bargaining between purchasers and health service providers through identifying priority services and monitoring indicators. In PBF, purchasers use health statistics and information to make decisions rather than merely reimbursing invoices. In this respect, PBF shares certain elements of strategic health purchasing. PBF implementation began in Ethiopia in 2015 as a pilot at one hospital and eight health centers. Prior to this the system predominantly followed input-based financing where providers were provided with a predetermined budget for inputs for service provision. The purpose of the study is to determine whether the implementation of PBF is cost-effective in improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia compared to the standard care.

METHODS

The current study used cost-effectiveness analysis to assess the effects of PBF on maternal and child health. Two districts implementing PBF and two following standard care were selected for the study. Both groups of selected districts share common grounds before initiating PBF in the selected group. The provider perspective costing approach was used in the study. Data at the district level were gathered retrospectively for the period of July 2018 to June 2021. Data from health service statistics were transformed to population level coverages and the Lives Saved Tool method used to compute the number of lives saved. Additionally for purpose of comparison, lives saved were translated into discounted quality-adjusted life years.

RESULTS

The number of lives saved under PBF was 261, whereas number of lives saved under standard care was 194. The identified incremental cost per capita due to PBF was $1.8 while total costs of delivering service at PBF district was 8,816,370 USD per million population per year while the standard care costs 9,780,920 USD per million population per year. QALYs obtained under PBF and standard care were 6,118 and 4,526 per million population per year, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion made from this analysis is that, implementing PBF is cost-saving in Ethiopia compared to the standard care.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Due to lack of district-level survey-based data, such as prevalence and effects on maternal and child health, national-level estimates were used into the LiST tool.There may be some central-level PBF start-up costs that were not captured, which may have spillover effects on the existing health system performance that this study has not considered.There may be health statistics data accuracy differences between the PBF and non-PBF districts. The researchers considered using data from records as reported by both groups of districts.

Assessment of strategic healthcare purchasing and financial autonomy in Tanzania: the case of results-based financing and health basket fund

Background

Low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) are implementing health financing reforms toward Universal Health Coverage (UHC). In Tanzania direct health facility financing of health basket funds (DHFF-HBF) scheme was introduced in 2017/18, while the results-based financing (RBF) scheme was introduced in 2016. The DHFF-HBF involves a direct transfer of pooled donor funds (Health Basket Funds, HBF) from the central government to public primary healthcare-PHC (including a few selected non-public PHC with a service agreement) facilities bank accounts, while the RBF involves paying providers based on pre-defined performance indicators or targets in PHC facilities. We consider whether these two reforms align with strategic healthcare purchasing principles by describing and comparing their purchasing arrangements and associated financial autonomy.

Methods

We used document review and qualitative methods. Key policy documents and articles related to strategic purchasing and financial autonomy were reviewed. In-depth interviews were conducted with health managers and providers (n = 31) from 25 public facilities, health managers (n = 4) in the Mwanza region (implementing DHFF-HBF and RBF), and national-level stakeholders (n = 2). In this paper, we describe and compare DHFF-HBF and RBF in terms of four functions of strategic purchasing (benefit specification, contracting, payment method, and performance monitoring), but also compare the degree of purchaser-provider split and financial autonomy. Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed using a thematic framework approach.

Results

The RBF paid facilities based on 17 health services and 18 groups of quality indicators, whilst the DHFF-HBF payment accounts for performance on two quality indicators, six service indicators, distance from district headquarters, and population catchment size. Both schemes purchased services from PHC facilities (dispensaries, health centers, and district hospitals). RBF uses a fee-for-service payment adjusted by the quality of care score method adjusted by quality of care score, while the DHFF-HBF scheme uses a formula-based capitation payment method with adjustors. Unlike DHFF-HBF which relies on an annual general auditing process, the RBF involved more detailed and intensive performance monitoring including data before verification prior to payment across all facilities on a quarterly basis. RBF scheme had a clear purchaser-provider split arrangement compared to a partial arrangement under the DHFF-HBF scheme. Study participants reported that the RBF scheme provided more autonomy on spending facility funds, while the DHFF-HBF scheme was less flexible due to a budget ceiling on specific spending items.

Conclusion

Both RBF and DHFF-HBF considered most of the strategic healthcare purchasing principles, but further efforts are needed to strengthen the alignment towards UHC. This may include further strengthening the data verification process and spending autonomy for DHFF-HBF, although it is important to contain costs associated with verification and ensuring public financial management around spending autonomy.

Exploring the roles of players in strategic purchasing for healthcare in Africa-a scoping review

Following the World Health Organization (WHO) guidance on strategic purchasing in 2000, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are trying to shift from passive purchasing (using fixed budgets) to strategic purchasing of healthcare which ties reimbursement to outcomes. However, there is limited evidence on strategic purchasing in Africa. We conducted a scoping literature review aimed at summarizing the roles played by governments, purchasers and providers in relation to citizens/population in strategic purchasing in Africa. The review searched for scientific journal articles that contained data on strategic purchasing collected from Africa. The literature search identified 957 articles of which 80 matched the inclusion criteria and were included in the review. The study revealed that in some countries strategic purchasing has been used as a tool for healthcare reforms or for strengthening systems that were not functional under fixed budgets. However, there was some evidence of a lack of government commitment in taking leading roles and funding strategic purchasing. Further, in some countries the laws need to be revised to accommodate new arrangements that were not part of fixed budgets. The review also established that there were some obstacles within the public health systems that deterred purchasers from promoting efficiency among providers and that prevented providers from having full autonomy in decision making. As African countries strive to shift from passive to strategic purchasing of healthcare, there is need for full government commitment on strategic purchasing. There is need to further revise appropriate legal frameworks to support strategic purchasing, conduct assessments of the healthcare systems before designing strategic purchasing schemes and to sensitize the providers and citizens on their roles and entitlements respectively.

How much does effective health facility inspection cost? An analysis of the economic costs of Kenya's Joint Health Inspection innovations

BACKGROUND

In most low- and middle-income countries, health facility regulation is fragmented, ineffective and under-resourced. The Kenyan Government piloted an innovative regulatory regime involving Joint Health Inspections (JHI) which synthesized requirements across multiple regulatory agencies; increased inspection frequency; digitized inspection tools; and introduced public display of regulatory results. The pilot significantly improved regulatory compliance. We calculated the costs of the development and implementation of the JHI pilot and modelled the costs of national scale-up in Kenya.

METHODS

We calculated the economic costs of three phases: JHI checklist development, start-up activities, and first year of implementation, from the providers' perspective in three pilot counties. Data collection involved extraction from expenditure records and key informant interviews. The annualized costs of JHI were calculated by adding annualized development and start-up costs to annual implementation costs. National level scale-up costs were also modelled and compared to those of current standard inspections.

RESULTS

The total economic cost of the JHI pilot was USD 1,125,600 (2017 USD), with the development phase accounting for 19%, start-up 43% and the first year of implementation 38%. The annualized economic cost was USD 519,287, equivalent to USD 206 per health facility visit and USD 311 per inspection completed. Scale up to the national level, while replacing international advisors with local staff, was estimated to cost approximately USD 4,823,728, equivalent to USD 103 per health facility visit and USD 155 per inspection completed. This compares to an estimated USD 86,997 per year (USD 113 per inspection completed) spent on a limited number of inspections prior to JHI.

CONCLUSION

Information on costs is essential to consider affordability and value for money of regulatory interventions. This is the first study we are aware of costing health facility inspections in sub-Saharan Africa. It has informed debates on appropriate inspection design and potential efficiency gains. It will also serve as an important benchmark for future studies, and a key input into cost-effectiveness analyses.

How much does it cost to combine supply-side and demand-side RBF approaches in a single intervention? Full cost analysis of the Results Based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health Initiative in Malawi

OBJECTIVE

To estimate the economic cost associated with implementing the Results Based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health (RBF4MNH) Initiative in Malawi. No specific hypotheses were formulated ex-ante.

SETTING

Primary and secondary delivery facilities in rural Malawi.

PARTICIPANTS

Not applicable. The study relied almost exclusively on secondary financial data.

INTERVENTION

The RBF4MNH Initiative was a results-based financing (RBF) intervention including both a demand and a supply-side component.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES

Cost per potential and for actual beneficiaries.

RESULTS

The overall economic cost of the Initiative during 2011-2016 amounted to €12 786 924, equivalent to €24.17 per pregnant woman residing in the intervention districts. The supply side activity cluster absorbed over 40% of all resources, half of which were spent on infrastructure upgrading and equipment supply, and 10% on incentives. Costs for the demand side activity cluster and for verification were equivalent to 14% and 6%, respectively of the Initiative overall cost.

CONCLUSION

Carefully tracing resource consumption across all activities, our study suggests that the full economic cost of implementing RBF interventions may be higher than what was previously reported in published cost-effectiveness studies. More research is urgently needed to carefully trace the costs of implementing RBF and similar health financing innovations, in order to inform decision-making in low-income and middle-income countries around scaling up RBF approaches.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).