Veterinary Medicine in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Biosecurity

Addressing biohazards to food security in primary production

This review addresses ways to prepare for and to mitigate effects of biohazards on primary production of crops and livestock. These biohazards can be natural or intentional introductions of pathogens, and they can cause major economic damage to farmers, the agricultural industry, society, and international trade. Agroterrorism is the intentional introduction of animal or plant pathogens into agricultural production systems with the intention to cause socioeconomic harm and generate public fear. Although few acts of agroterrorism are reported, the threat of agroterrorism in Europe is real. New concerns about threats arise from the rapid advancements in biotechnology and emerging technologies. FORSA, an analytical framework for risk and vulnerability analysis, was used to review how to prepare for and mitigate the possible effects of natural or intentional biohazards in agricultural production. Analyzing the effects of a biohazard event involves multiple scientific disciplines. A comprehensive analysis of biohazards therefore requires a systems approach. The preparedness and ability to manage events are strengthened by bolstered farm biosecurity, increased monitoring and laboratory capacity, improved inter-agency communication and resource allocation. The focus of this review is on Europe, but the insights gained have worldwide applications. The analytical framework used here is compared to other frameworks. With climate change, Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine, the supply chains are challenged, and we foresee increasing food prices associated with social tensions. Our food supply chain becomes more fragile with more unknowns, thereby increasing the needs for risk and vulnerability analyses, of which FORSA is one example.

Performativity and a microbe: Exploring Mycobacterium bovis and the political ecologies of bovine tuberculosis

Mycobacterium bovis, the bacterium responsible for causing bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in cattle, displays what I call ‘microbial performativity’. Like many other lively disease-causing microorganisms, it has an agency which is difficult to contain, and there is a need for fresh thinking on the challenges of dealing with this slippery and indeterminate microbe. As a practising veterinary scientist who side-stepped mid-career into a parallel training in the social sciences to view bTB from an alternative perspective, I create an interdisciplinary coming-together where veterinary science converges with a political ecology of (animal) health influenced by science and technology studies (STS) and social science and humanities scholarship on performativity. This suitably hybridized nexus creates a place to consider the ecologies of a pathogen which could be considered as life out of control. I consider what this means for efforts to eradicate this disease through combining understandings from the published scientific literature with qualitative interview-based fieldwork with farmers, veterinarians and others involved in the statutory bTB eradication programme in a high incidence region of the UK. This study demonstrates the value of life scientists turning to the social sciences to re-view their familiar professional habitus—challenging assumptions, and offering alternative perspectives on complex problems.

Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) Through Cooperative Bioengagement

Cooperative bioengagement efforts, as practiced by U.S. government-funded entities, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program, and parallel programs in other countries, exist at the nexus between public health and security. These programs have an explicit emphasis on developing projects that address the priorities of the partner country as well as the donor. While the objectives of cooperative bioengagement programs focus on reducing the potential for accidental or intentional misuse and/or release of dangerous biological agents, many partner countries are interested in bioengagement as a means to improve basic public health capacities. This article examines the extent to which cooperative bioengagement projects address public health capacity building under the revised International Health Regulations and alignment with the Global Health Security Agenda action packages.

Assessment of emergency preparedness of veterinarians in New York

Veterinarians have unique skills and abilities that could be useful in preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies. However, veterinarians are often absent from emergency preparedness planning and exercises, and little is known about veterinarians' perceptions of emergency preparedness. A focus group was conducted among veterinarians to explore issues such as previous emergency-preparedness education, types of training needed, barriers to participation in training, and future steps to overcome identified barriers. Focus-group participants reported that they had had little to no emergency-preparedness training and had no clear understanding of what their specific role should be in an emergency. Participants also reported several barriers to participation in training and expressed significant concerns about their ability to respond in an emergency. The concerns reported include limited knowledge of zoonotic diseases, confusion about providing care for animals displaced during natural disasters, and poor relationships with other health professions. In order to respond to disasters, veterinarians require training tailored to their concerns and needs. Furthermore, partnerships between veterinarians and health care workers need to be further developed and strengthened.

Agroterrorism: where are we in the ongoing war on terrorism?

The U.S. agricultural infrastructure is one of the most productive and efficient food-producing systems in the world. Many of the characteristics that contribute to its high productivity and efficiency also make this infrastructure extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack by a biological weapon. Several experts have repeatedly stated that taking advantage of these vulnerabilities would not require a significant undertaking and that the nation's agricultural infrastructure remains highly vulnerable. As a result of continuing criticism, many initiatives at all levels of government and within the private sector have been undertaken to improve our ability to detect and respond to an agroterrorist attack. However, outbreaks, such as the 1999 West Nile outbreak, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 2003 monkeypox outbreak, and the 2004 Escherichia coli O157:H7 outbreak, have demonstrated the need for improvements in the areas of communication, emergency response and surveillance efforts, and education for all levels of government, the agricultural community, and the private sector. We recommend establishing an interdisciplinary advisory group that consists of experts from public health, human health, and animal health communities to prioritize improvement efforts in these areas. The primary objective of this group would include establishing communication, surveillance, and education benchmarks to determine current weaknesses in preparedness and activities designed to mitigate weaknesses. We also recommend broader utilization of current food and agricultural preparedness guidelines, such as those developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Hawaii veterinarians' bioterrorism preparedness needs assessment survey

The purpose of this study was to assess the objective bioterrorism-related knowledge base and the perceived response readiness of veterinarians in Hawaii to a bioterrorism event, and also to identify variables associated with knowledge-based test performance. An anonymous survey instrument was mailed to all licensed veterinarians residing in Hawaii (N = 229) up to three times during June and July 2004, using numeric identifiers to track non-respondents. The response rate for deliverable surveys was 59% (125 of 212). Only 12% (15 of 123) of respondents reported having had prior training on bioterrorism. Forty-four percent (55 of 125) reported being able to identify a bioterrorism event in animal populations; however, only 17% (21 of 125) felt able to recognize a bioterrorism event in human populations. Only 16% (20 of 123) felt they were able to respond effectively to a bioterrorist attack. Over 90% (106 of 116) expressed their willingness to provide assistance to the state in its response to a bioterrorist event. Veterinarians scored a mean of 70% correct (5.6 out of 8 questions) on the objective knowledge-based questions. Additional bioterrorism preparedness training should be made available, both in the form of continuing educational offerings for practicing veterinarians and as a component of the curriculum in veterinary schools.