"Inconvenient truths" in the pursuit of scientific knowledge and public health

Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.

Biosecurity in an age of open science

The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.

Variations in the Botulinum Neurotoxin Binding Domain and the Potential for Novel Therapeutics

Botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) are categorised into immunologically distinct serotypes BoNT/A to /G). Each serotype can also be further divided into subtypes based on differences in amino acid sequence. BoNTs are ~150 kDa proteins comprised of three major functional domains: an N-terminal zinc metalloprotease light chain (LC), a translocation domain (H_N), and a binding domain (H_C). The H_C is responsible for targeting the BoNT to the neuronal cell membrane, and each serotype has evolved to bind via different mechanisms to different target receptors. Most structural characterisations to date have focussed on the first identified subtype within each serotype (e.g., BoNT/A1). Subtype differences within BoNT serotypes can affect intoxication, displaying different botulism symptoms in vivo, and less emphasis has been placed on investigating these variants. This review outlines the receptors for each BoNT serotype and describes the basis for the highly specific targeting of neuronal cell membranes. Understanding receptor binding is of vital importance, not only for the generation of novel therapeutics but also for understanding how best to protect from intoxication.

A New Approach to Evaluating the Risk-Benefit Equation for Dual-Use and Gain-of-Function Research of Concern

In the twenty-first century, biology faces a problem that has previously vexed other disciplines such as physics, namely the prospect that its knowledge domain could be used to generate biological agents with altered properties that enhanced their weapon potential. Biological weapons bring the additional dimension that these could be self-replicating, easy to manufacture and synthesized with commonly available expertise. This resulted in increasing concern about the type of research done and communicated, despite the fact that such research often has direct societal benefits, bringing the dual-use dilemma to biology. The conundrum of dual use research of concern was crystallized by the so-called "gain-of-function" type of experiments in which avian influenza viruses were endowed with new properties in the laboratory such as increased virulence and the capacity for mammalian transmission. After more than a decade of intensive discussion and controversy involving biological experiments with dual-use potential, there is no consensus on the issue except for the need to carry out such experiments in the safest conditions possible. In this essay, we review the topic with the hindsight of several years and suggest that instead of prescribing prohibitions and experimental limitations the focus should be on the importance of scientific questions at hand. We posit that the importance of a scientific question for medical and scientific progress provides a benchmark to determine the acceptable level of risk in biological experimentation.

A new synthesis for dual use research of concern

Michael Imperiale and Arturo Casadevall propose a path forward for life sciences research whose results could be misused to cause harm.

Gain-of-function experiments: time for a real debate

The debate on whether to allow experiments that increase the transmission and/or pathogenicity of potential pandemic pathogens has recently gained renewed attention, particularly as a result of studies on influenza viruses. Here, five experts discuss the benefits and risks associated with these gain-of-function experiments, and how the ongoing debate affects the scientific community and the general public.

According to the WHO, dual use research of concern (DURC) is “life sciences research that is intended for benefit, but which might easily be misapplied to do harm”. Recent studies, particularly those on influenza viruses, have led to renewed attention on DURC, as there is an ongoing debate over whether the benefits of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments that result in an increase in the transmission and/or pathogenicity of potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) are outweighed by concerns over biosecurity and biosafety. In this Viewpoint article, proponents and opponents of GOF experiments discuss the benefits and risks associated with these studies, as well as the implications of the current debate for the scientific community and the general public, and suggest how the current discussion should move forward.

Ethical alternatives to experiments with novel potential pandemic pathogens

Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary

Redaction of sensitive data in the publication of dual use research of concern

The publication of scientific information that derives from dual use research of concern (DURC) poses major problems for journals because it brings into conflict the benefits of free access to data and the need to prevent misuse of that information by others. Recently, a group of authors and a major scientific journal addressed the issue of publishing information on a newly discovered, highly lethal toxin that can be delivered to large populations and for which there are no available countermeasures. The journal addressed this conflict by permitting the redaction of information that is normally considered essential for publication. This action establishes a precedent for redaction of sensitive data that also provides an example of responsible scientific publishing. However, this precedent leaves many questions unanswered and suggests a need for a discussion by all stakeholders of scientific information so as to derive normative standards for the publication of DURC.