Metaphysical and ethical perspectives on creating animal-human chimeras

Mary Anne Warren and the Boundaries of the Moral Community

In her important and well-known discussion "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," Mary Anne Warren regrets that "it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman's right to obtain an abortion without showing that the fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense." Unlike some more cautious philosophers, Warren thinks that we can definitively demonstrate that the fetus is not a person. In this paper, Warren's argument is critically examined with a focus especially on the question of the foundation and the boundaries of the moral community. The fundamental thesis of the paper is that Warren's approach is flawed for at least four reasons: (1) that being a person is not as obviously central to having full moral rights as Warren assumes, (2) that her exclusivism regarding moral status has dubious moral consequences independent of the abortion issue, (3) that it is not clear that a fetus is not a person, even on Warren's own criteria, and (4) her criteria for personhood are themselves suspect.

The new Japanese regulation on human/non-human chimeras: should we worry?

In March 2019 Japan modified its norms regarding research with human/non-human chimeras. The amended rules allow the creation of chimeras with human brain cells, and the subsequent transfer of the resulting creature to an uterus, where it can develop for more than 14 days, eventually until term. At this moment, the real consequences of this new regulation in actual research are still uncertain. However, many concerning issues have already been identified. This paper will start by addressing traditional topics involving this practice: the use of non-human animals in research, the use of human stem cells in scientific experimentation and the creation of human/non-human chimeras. Subsequently, it will analyze the new concerning issues brought on by the 2019 amendment: the use of human brain cells, the transfer of the chimera to an uterus and its development for more than 14 days, and the possibility of using animals which present close similarities with humans. In the end, the paper will conclude that in spite of the legal and ethical hazards that this new regulation might carry, it should be allowed under strict scrutiny.

Ethical arguments concerning human-animal chimera research: a systematic review

Background

The burgeoning field of biomedical research involving the mixture of human and animal materials has attracted significant ethical controversy. Due to the many dimensions of potential ethical conflict involved in this type of research, and the wide variety of research projects under discussion, it is difficult to obtain an overview of the ethical debate. This paper attempts to remedy this by providing a systematic review of ethical reasons in academic publications on human-animal chimera research.

Methods

We conducted a systematic review of the ethical literature concerning human-animal chimeras based on the research question: “What ethical reasons have been given for or against conducting human-animal chimera research, and how have these reasons been treated in the ongoing debate?” Our search extends until the end of the year 2017, including MEDLINE, Embase, PhilPapers and EthxWeb databases, restricted to peer-reviewed journal publications in English. Papers containing ethical reasons were analyzed, and the reasons were coded according to whether they were endorsed, mentioned or rejected.

Results

Four hundred thirty-one articles were retrieved by our search, and 88 were ultimately included and analyzed. Within these articles, we found 464 passages containing reasons for and against conducting human-animal chimera research. We classified these reasons into five categories and, within these, identified 12 broad and 31 narrow reason types.

15% of the retrieved passages contained reasons in favor of conducting chimera research (Category P), while 85% of the passages contained reasons against it. The reasons against conducting chimera research fell into four further categories: reasons concerning the creation of a chimera (Category A), its treatment (Category B), reasons referring to metaphysical or social issues resulting from its existence (Category C) and to potential downstream effects of chimera research (Category D). A significant proportion of identified passages (46%) fell under Category C.

Conclusions

We hope that our results, in revealing the conceptual and argumentative structure of the debate and highlighting some its most notable tendencies and prominent positions, will facilitate continued discussion and provide a basis for the development of relevant policy and legislation.

Chimeras for the twenty-first century

Recent advances in stem cell biology and molecular engineering have improved and simplified the methodology employed to create experimental chimeras, highlighting their value in basic research and broadening the spectrum of potential applications. Experimental chimeras have been used for decades during the generation of murine genetic models, this being especially relevant in developmental and regeneration studies. Indeed, their value for the research and modeling of human diseases was recognized by the 2007 Nobel Prize to Mario Capecchi, Martin Evans, and Oliver Smithies. More recently, their potential application in regenerative medicine has generated a lot of interest, particularly the enticing possibility to generate human organs for transplantation in livestock animals. In this review, we provide an update on interspecific chimeric organogenesis, its possibilities, current limitations, alternatives, and ethical issues.

Human-Animal Chimeras and Hybrids: An Ethical Paradox behind Moral Confusion?

The prospect of creating and using human-animal chimeras and hybrids (HACHs) that are significantly human-like in their composition, phenotype, cognition, or behavior meets with divergent moral judgments: on the one side, it is claimed that such beings might be candidates for human-analogous rights to protection and care; on the other side, it is supposed that their existence might disturb fundamental natural and social orders. This paper tries to show that both positions are paradoxically intertwined: they rely on two kinds of species arguments, "individual species arguments" and "group species arguments," which formulate opposing demands but are conceptually interdependent. As a consequence, the existence of HACHs may challenge exactly those normative standards on which the protection of HACHs may eventually be based. This ethical paradox could constitute the ultimate source of the "moral confusion" that some authors have suspected HACHs to provoke.

Ethical Challenges of Germline Genetic Enhancement

The new reproductive technologies have opened the door to different processes of germline genetic enhancement by which the characteristics of an individual according to the interests of the agents involved could be selected during its gestation. Although the initiative is apparently oriented towards developing individuals that would excel in society, critical voices raise the concerns about that this approach would generate and need for a reflection on the ethical, social and legal implications of these techniques and their implementation in society. We reviewed the literature about these issues throughout their historical records to date, focusing on the moral arguments and non-clinical aspects that affect the legal and social environment. We have observed various trends of thought with divergent positions (proactive, preventive, and regulatory) as well as a large number of articles that try to reconcile the different approaches. This review illustrates a series of concepts from the ethics and philosophy fields which are frequently used in studies that evaluate the ethical implications of germline genetic enhancement, such as dignity, benefit, autonomy, and identity. In addition, amongst the many unresolved controversies surrounding genetic enhancement, we identify procreative beneficence, genetic disassociation, gender selection, the value of disability, embryo chimerization, and the psychosocial inequality of potentially enhanced individuals as crucial. We also develop possible scenarios for future debate. We consider especially important the definition and specification of three aspects which are essential for the deployment of new reproductive technologies: the moral status of the embryo undergoing enhancement, the legal status of the enhanced individual, and the responsibility of the agents executing the enhancement. Finally, we propose the precautionary principle as a means to navigate ethical uncertainties.

A framework for the ethical assessment of chimeric animal research involving human neural tissue

BACKGROUND

Animal models of human diseases are often used in biomedical research in place of human subjects. However, results obtained by animal models may fail to hold true for humans. One way of addressing this problem is to make animal models more similar to humans by placing human tissue into animal models, rendering them chimeric. Since technical and ethical limitations make neurological disorders difficult to study in humans, chimeric models with human neural tissue could help advance our understanding of neuropathophysiology.

MAIN BODY

In this article, we examine whether the introduction of human neural tissue and any consequent cognitive change is relevant to the way we ought to treat chimeras. We argue that changes in cognitive abilities are morally relevant to the extent that they increase the capacities that affect the moral status of any entity, including awareness, autonomy, and sociability. We posit that no being, regardless of species, should be treated in a way that is incommensurate with its moral status. Finally, we propose a framework that can be used to guide ethical assessment of research involving chimeras with advanced cognitive capacities.

CONCLUSION

We advance this framework as a useful tool for bringing relevant considerations to the forefront for those considering the ethical merit of proposed chimeric research. In doing so, we examine concepts relevant to the question of how any entity may be treated, including moral status, dignity, and capacities.

Human-animal chimeras: ethical issues about farming chimeric animals bearing human organs

Recent advances in stem cells and gene engineering have paved the way for the generation of interspecies chimeras, such as animals bearing an organ from another species. The production of a rat pancreas by a mouse has demonstrated the feasibility of this approach. The next step will be the generation of larger chimeric animals, such as pigs bearing human organs. Because of the dramatic organ shortage for transplantation, the medical needs for such a transgressive practice are indisputable. However, there are serious technical barriers and complex ethical issues that must be discussed and solved before producing human organs in animals. The main ethical issues are the risks of consciousness and of human features in the chimeric animal due to a too high contribution of human cells to the brain, in the first case, or for instance to limbs, in the second. Another critical point concerns the production of human gametes by such chimeric animals. These worst-case scenarios are obviously unacceptable and must be strictly monitored by careful risk assessment, and, if necessary, technically prevented. The public must be associated with this ethical debate. Scientists and physicians have a critical role in explaining the medical needs, the advantages and limits of this potential medical procedure, and the ethical boundaries that must not be trespassed. If these prerequisites are met, acceptance of such a new, borderline medical procedure may prevail, as happened before for in-vitro fertilization or preimplantation genetic diagnosis.

Faith-based perspectives on the use of chimeric organisms for medical research

Efforts to advance our understanding of neurodegenerative diseases involve the creation chimeric organisms from human neural stem cells and primate embryos--known as prenatal chimeras. The existence of potential mentally complex beings with human and non-human neural apparatus raises fundamental questions as to the ethical permissibility of chimeric research and the moral status of the creatures it creates. Even as bioethicists find fewer reasons to be troubled by most types of chimeric organisms, social attitudes towards the non-human world are often influenced by religious beliefs. In this paper scholars representing eight major religious traditions provide a brief commentary on a hypothetical case concerning the development and use of prenatal human-animal chimeric primates in medical research. These commentaries reflect the plurality and complexity within and between religious discourses of our relationships with other species. Views on the moral status and permissibility of research on neural human animal chimeras vary. The authors provide an introduction to those who seek a better understanding of how faith-based perspectives might enter into biomedical ethics and public discourse towards forms of biomedical research that involves chimeric organisms.